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Abstract	  
	  
This	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  American	  public	  intellectual	  and	  theologian	  
Reinhold	  Niebuhr	  (1892-­‐1971).	  	  My	  project	  is	  a	  unique	  contribution	  to	  Niebuhrian	  studies	  
in	  that	  I	  approach	  these	  works	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  theorist.	  My	  intention	  is	  
to	  parse	  from	  Niebuhr’s	  editorial	  commentaries,	  his	  philosophical	  inquiries	  and	  lectures,	  
his	  theological	  treatises,	  and	  his	  sermonic	  essays	  an	  specifically	  “Niebuhrian	  ethics	  of	  
rhetoric.”	  In	  order	  to	  accomplish	  this	  task	  I	  investigate	  the	  rhetorical	  situation	  Niebuhr	  was	  
embedded	  in	  and	  to	  which	  he	  was	  responding	  to	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Part	  
of	  the	  analysis	  of	  his	  rhetorical	  situation	  places	  him	  in	  conversation	  with	  other	  thinkers	  
writing	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  such	  as	  John	  Dewey	  and	  Walter	  Lippmann.	  From	  the	  
rhetorical	  situation,	  the	  dissertation	  tackles	  Niebuhr’s	  thought	  in	  three	  categories:	  
Niebuhr’s	  mythic—specifically	  Christian—approach	  to	  history,	  his	  dialectical	  approach	  to	  
love,	  justice,	  grace	  and	  power,	  and	  finally,	  his	  rhetorical	  approach	  to	  the	  contemporary	  
situations	  that	  call	  for	  judgment.	  I	  argue	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  are	  specifically	  
Christian,	  in	  that	  they	  provide,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  necessary	  mythic	  and	  dialectical	  tools	  
one	  needs	  to	  make	  judgments	  in	  tragic	  realm	  of	  contingency,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  
hope	  and	  faith	  that	  is	  required	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  tragic	  realm	  of	  rhetoric	  without	  despair	  
or	  cynicism.	  Niebuhr’s	  characteristic	  “pragmatic	  Christian	  realism,”	  I	  argue,	  is	  a	  much-­‐
needed	  approach	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric,	  one	  that	  is	  important	  for	  us	  to	  understand	  in	  a	  
globalized	  “electric	  age,”	  wherein	  the	  shared	  myths	  that	  found	  communities	  elude	  us,	  
though	  we	  remain	  asked	  to	  make	  judgments	  that	  effect	  collectives	  we	  may	  never	  see	  face-­‐
to-­‐face.	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  is	  a	  guiding	  light	  for	  a	  rhetorical	  approach	  that	  moves	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past	  the	  local	  community,	  fragmented	  since	  the	  industrial	  revolution	  and	  rationalized	  since	  
the	  Enlightenment,	  to	  a	  broader	  sense	  of	  community	  that	  is	  neither	  Jewish	  nor	  Greek—
neither,	  me	  might	  add,	  Muslim	  or	  Western.	  It	  is	  a	  rhetoric	  that	  moves	  us	  confidently,	  yet	  
qualifiedly,	  into	  the	  future	  that	  is	  beyond	  tragedy.




This	  little	  light	  of	  mine,	  
I'm	  gonna	  let	  it	  shine	  
This	  little	  light	  of	  mine,	  
I'm	  gonna	  let	  it	  shine	  
This	  little	  light	  of	  mine,	  
I'm	  gonna	  let	  it	  shine	  
Let	  it	  shine,	  
Let	  it	  shine,	  
Let	  it	  shine.	  
	  
Hide	  it	  under	  a	  bushel?	  No!	  
I'm	  gonna	  let	  it	  shine	  
Hide	  it	  under	  a	  bushel?	  No!	  
I'm	  gonna	  let	  it	  shine	  
Hide	  it	  under	  a	  bushel?	  No!	  
I'm	  gonna	  let	  it	  shine	  
Let	  it	  shine,	  
Let	  it	  shine,	  
Let	  it	  shine.	  
	  
	  
This	  well-­‐known	  folk	  hymn	  was	  written	  around	  1920	  and	  first	  published	  in	  a	  
collection	  in	  1939.	  It	  was	  used	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  60s	  as	  a	  Civil	  Rights	  anthem	  and	  since	  then,	  
it	  has	  become	  a	  staple	  in	  Christian	  Sunday-­‐Schools	  worldwide.	  Its	  Biblical	  roots	  come	  from	  
Jesus’s	  “Sermon	  on	  the	  Mount”	  recorded	  in	  Matthew	  5:14-­‐16:	  "Ye	  are	  the	  light	  of	  the	  world.	  
A	  city	  that	  is	  set	  on	  an	  hill	  cannot	  be	  hid.	  Neither	  do	  men	  light	  a	  candle,	  and	  put	  it	  under	  a	  
bushel,	  but	  on	  a	  candlestick;	  and	  it	  giveth	  light	  unto	  all	  that	  are	  in	  the	  house.	  Let	  your	  light	  
so	  shine	  before	  men,	  that	  they	  may	  see	  your	  good	  works,	  and	  glorify	  your	  Father	  which	  is	  
in	  heaven”	  (KJV).	  The	  song	  is	  meant	  to	  encourage	  Christians	  not	  to	  keep	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  
gospel	  to	  themselves,	  but	  instead,	  to	  let	  its	  truth	  be	  revealed	  to	  others	  in	  their	  actions	  and	  
words.	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Niebuhr	  took	  these	  metaphors	  seriously.	  As	  a	  Christian	  ethicist,	  his	  utmost	  concern	  
as	  a	  scholar	  was	  the	  church’s	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  social	  justice.	  When	  
he	  surveyed	  the	  scene	  in	  1933,	  the	  odds	  didn’t	  look	  good	  for	  organized	  religion.	  
Modernity’s	  optimism	  was	  built	  on	  sinking	  sand;	  dependent	  on	  the	  expansive	  mood	  of	  the	  
era	  of	  triumphant	  capitalism,	  it	  naturally	  gave	  way	  to	  confusion	  and	  despair	  when	  the	  
material	  conditions	  of	  American	  life	  were	  seriously	  altered.	  What	  was	  worse,	  Protestant	  
Christianity	  had	  linked	  itself	  to	  this	  culture,	  making	  sacrifices	  of	  its	  orthodox	  precepts	  to	  
the	  spirit	  of	  reason	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  science.	  It	  had	  infused	  its	  ethic	  into	  Adam	  Smith’s	  
economics,	  evidence,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr	  by	  the	  church’s	  inability	  to	  support	  the	  cause	  of	  
labor	  in	  the	  battle	  with	  Henry	  Ford.	  “Confused	  and	  tormented	  by	  cataclysmic	  events	  in	  
contemporary	  history,	  the	  ‘modern	  mind’	  faces	  the	  disintegration	  of	  its	  civilization	  in	  
alternate	  moods	  of	  fear	  and	  hope,	  of	  faith	  and	  despair”	  Niebuhr	  writes.1	  Surveying	  the	  post-­‐
War	  American	  landscape,	  Niebuhr	  drearily	  concludes:	  “Therefore	  the	  lights	  in	  its	  towers	  
are	  extinguished	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  when	  light	  is	  needed	  to	  survey	  the	  havoc	  wrought	  in	  
the	  city	  and	  the	  plan	  of	  rebuilding”	  (ibid.).	  The	  Christian	  faith	  that	  claims	  to	  have	  a	  light	  
“the	  same	  yesterday,	  today,	  and	  forever”	  was,	  by	  Niebuhr’s	  estimations,	  unable	  to	  offer	  any	  
guidance,	  insight	  or	  clues	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  life	  or	  the	  logic	  of	  contemporary	  history.	  
	   When	  Niebuhr	  argued	  that	  Christianity	  wasn’t	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  required	  of	  it	  
by	  the	  culture,	  it	  was	  not	  due	  to	  an	  inherent	  fault	  in	  Christianity’s	  myths.	  Christianity	  failed	  
to	  have	  a	  moral	  impact	  on	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  because	  it	  missed	  the	  mark	  in	  its	  
adjustments	  to	  the	  age	  of	  reason	  and	  science.	  These	  adjustments	  were	  necessary	  to	  make,	  
but	  the	  church	  hadn’t	  adjusted	  properly.	  Instead,	  modern	  Christianity	  had	  fallen	  into	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  (Niebuhr	  1935,	  3)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  ICE).	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inept	  modes	  of	  thought:	  Orthodoxy	  and	  Liberalism.	  The	  Orthodox	  Church	  couldn’t	  come	  to	  
the	  aid	  of	  modern	  man	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  its	  religious	  truths	  were	  still	  embedded	  in	  an	  
outmoded	  science.	  Second,	  it	  expressed	  its	  morality	  in	  dogmatic	  and	  authoritarian	  codes	  
(ICE,	  2).	  In	  other	  words	  it	  used	  irrelevant	  and	  outdated	  precepts	  whose	  only	  authority	  
came	  from	  their	  “sometimes	  quite	  fortuitous–inclusion	  in	  the	  sacred	  canon”	  (ibid.)	  
Orthodox	  Christianity,	  for	  example,	  was	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  violation	  of	  Sabbath	  
prohibitions	  and	  puritanical	  prohibitions;	  it	  insisted	  on	  figurative	  sacrifices	  that	  had	  lost	  
both	  their	  religious	  and	  moral	  meanings.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  religion	  and	  ethics	  of	  the	  liberal	  church	  denominations	  were	  
dominated	  by	  a	  desire	  for	  contemporary	  relevance	  and	  a	  need	  to	  prove	  to	  its	  generation	  
that	  “it	  does	  not	  share	  the	  anachronistic	  ethics	  or	  believe	  the	  incredible	  myths	  of	  Orthodox	  
religion”	  (ibid.)	  In	  other	  words,	  liberal	  Christianity	  had	  hid	  its	  light	  under	  the	  bushel	  of	  
culture;	  instead	  of	  letting	  its	  light	  shine,	  it	  had	  tried	  for	  decades	  to	  prove	  that	  Christianity	  
and	  science	  were	  completely	  compatible.	  It	  succeeded	  in	  this	  task,	  Niebuhr	  argued,	  by	  
disavowing	  literal	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Bible,	  and	  by	  clothing	  what	  it	  did	  hold	  onto	  in	  new	  
vocabularies	  that	  were	  acceptable	  to	  the	  modern	  mind.	  Having	  done	  so,	  the	  Liberal	  
tradition,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  was	  now	  in	  an	  even	  sorrier	  state	  of	  affairs	  than	  Orthodoxy	  
was.	  Orthodoxy’s	  truths	  remained	  steadfast	  and	  it	  needed	  only	  to	  move	  past	  its	  moralism	  
to	  become	  relevant—hence	  “Neo-­‐Orthodoxy”—while	  Liberalism	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  
picked	  a	  bad	  horse	  in	  the	  race—their	  destinies	  were,	  in	  a	  sense,	  intertwined	  with	  modern	  
culture’s.	  The	  modern	  mind	  it	  bedded	  down	  with,	  “which	  only	  yesterday	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  
final	  arbiter	  of	  truth,	  beauty,	  and	  goodness,”	  was	  now	  in	  a	  sad	  state	  of	  confusion,	  “amidst	  
the	  debris	  of	  the	  shattered	  temple	  of	  its	  dreams	  and	  hopes”	  (ICE,	  5).	  What	  these	  two	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failures	  really	  came	  down	  to,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  was	  their	  respective	  
misunderstandings	  of	  exactly	  how	  and	  why	  the	  church	  is	  ever	  relevant	  to	  social	  ethics.	  
Secular	  moral	  acts	  resolve	  conflicts	  by	  the	  counsels	  of	  a	  decent	  prudence,	  the	  most	  
typical	  of	  which	  is	  articulated	  by	  Aristotle’s	  “in	  nothing	  too	  much.”	  Niebuhr	  contrasts	  this	  
ethic	  to	  a	  religious	  one,	  noting	  that:	  “The	  distinctive	  contribution	  of	  religion	  to	  morality	  lies	  
in	  its	  comprehension	  of	  the	  dimension	  of	  depth	  in	  life”	  (ICE,	  15).	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  religious	  
morality	  traces	  every	  force	  it	  encounters	  to	  some	  ultimate	  origin	  and	  then	  relates	  it	  to	  an	  
ultimate	  end;	  it	  is	  not	  concerned	  merely	  with	  immediate	  values	  but	  with	  “the	  problem	  of	  
good	  and	  evil;”	  it	  looks	  at	  immediate	  ends	  but	  it	  also	  includes	  “ultimate	  hopes.	  As	  Niebuhr	  
poetically	  put	  it,	  an	  ethico-­‐religious	  passion	  “is	  troubled	  by	  the	  primal	  ‘whence’	  and	  the	  
final	  ‘wherefore’”	  (ICE,	  3).	  The	  reason	  that	  a	  religious	  morality	  is	  concerned	  with	  these	  
ultimate	  beginnings	  and	  ends	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  task	  of	  religion	  to	  give	  life’s	  existence	  a	  unity	  
and	  coherence	  of	  meaning.	  Since	  every	  human	  being	  tries,	  to	  some	  extent,	  to	  live	  a	  unified	  
and	  coherent	  existence	  it	  follows	  that	  every	  person	  is	  more	  or	  less	  religious.	  Furthermore,	  
the	  depth	  of	  one’s	  coherent	  system	  of	  meaning	  is	  the	  deciding	  factor	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  
religious	  person	  one	  is.	  For	  instance,	  in	  primitive	  religion	  the	  depth	  of	  this	  meaning	  only	  
extends	  to	  the	  tribe,	  the	  village,	  those	  who	  live	  under	  this	  or	  that	  mountain.	  In	  an	  ultra-­‐
modern	  conception,	  what	  Niebuhr	  calls	  “superficial	  religion,”	  modern	  man	  concerns	  
himself	  only	  with	  what	  he	  can	  observe	  and	  account	  for	  with	  natural	  law.	  
On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  religious	  spectrum,	  a	  “High	  religion”	  is	  one	  that	  seeks	  to	  
unify	  and	  envelop	  the	  whole	  of	  reality	  and	  existence	  into	  its	  system	  of	  coherence.	  Whereas	  
primitives	  are	  satisfied	  with	  a	  limited	  cosmos	  and	  ultra-­‐moderns	  are	  able	  to	  banish	  
uncertainty	  with	  science	  and	  reason,	  high	  religion	  leaves	  nothing	  unaccounted	  for	  in	  its	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system	  of	  meaning—though	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  it	  reduces	  its	  myths	  to	  rational	  statements.	  
Man’s	  desire	  for	  ultimate	  coherence	  eventually	  and	  inevitably	  drives	  high	  religion	  into	  
depths	  as	  well	  as	  breadth.	  Depths	  are	  matters	  of	  forms.	  Breadths	  are	  matters	  of	  realms.	  The	  	  
problem	  of	  evil	  for	  example,	  cannot	  be	  solved	  on	  the	  same	  plane	  where	  man	  and	  his	  nature	  
remain	  in	  constant	  and	  stubborn	  conflict	  or	  irrational	  incompatibility.	  “Since	  all	  life	  is	  
dynamic,”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “religious	  faith	  seeks	  for	  the	  final	  solution	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  evil	  
be	  centering	  its	  gaze	  upon	  the	  beginning	  and	  the	  end	  of	  this	  dynamic	  process,	  upon	  God	  the	  
creator	  and	  God	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  existence”	  (ICE,	  4).	  To	  summarize:	  as	  man	  looks	  for	  more	  
unity	  he	  goes	  deeper	  into	  existence	  by	  accounting	  for	  more	  forms	  (evil/good),	  and	  
accounting	  for	  this	  depth	  drives	  him	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  observation	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  to	  
a	  world	  he	  can	  only	  find	  through	  transcendent	  symbols,	  thereby	  adding	  breadth	  to	  the	  high	  
religion.	  Thus,	  high	  religions	  are	  distinguished	  from	  other	  religions	  and	  from	  one	  another	  
by	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  unity	  and	  coherence	  of	  life	  they	  seek	  to	  encompass	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  
transcendent	  source	  of	  meaning	  that,	  alone,	  gives	  confidence	  in	  the	  meaningfulness	  of	  life	  
(ibid.).	  
This	  relationship	  between	  depth	  and	  breadth	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Judaism’s	  transition	  
from	  a	  tribal,	  primitive	  religion	  (The	  God	  of	  Abraham,	  Isaac	  and	  Jacob)	  to	  a	  high,	  prophetic	  
one.	  The	  Jews,	  as	  human	  beings,	  had	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  depth	  of	  existence,	  for	  they,	  like	  all	  
humans,	  assumed	  life	  was	  meaningful.	  However,	  the	  breadth	  of	  their	  religion	  was	  limited	  to	  
the	  tribes	  of	  Israel	  until	  they	  encountered	  new	  cultures	  and	  were	  forced	  to	  fit	  new	  cultures	  
and	  civilizations	  into	  their	  system	  of	  meaning.	  The	  prophet	  Amos	  conceived	  of	  God	  as	  no	  
longer	  tribally	  bound—“Are	  ye	  not	  as	  the	  children	  of	  the	  Ethiopians	  unto	  me	  sayeth	  the	  
Lord”—and	  thenceforth,	  breadth	  was	  added	  to	  Judaism’s	  worldview.	  When	  Jesus	  was	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thought	  by	  many	  to	  fulfill	  the	  messianic	  dreams	  of	  Israel,	  Paul	  would	  remind	  them	  in	  a	  
similar	  vein,	  “In	  Christ	  there	  is	  neither	  Jew	  nor	  Greek,	  neither	  bond	  nor	  free.”	  For	  Niebuhr,	  
all	  theology	  began	  with	  Amos.	  This	  was	  due,	  undoubtedly,	  because	  he	  lived	  in	  a	  rapidly	  
growing	  world	  with	  quickly	  expanding	  borders	  by	  means	  of	  travel	  and	  communication.	  
Finding	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  that	  could	  address	  these	  concerns	  was	  imperative	  and	  for	  
Niebuhr,	  the	  perspective	  would	  have	  to	  be	  a	  prophetic	  one,	  if	  its	  judgments	  and	  aspirations	  
were	  to	  stand	  outside	  the	  relativities	  of	  such	  an	  unstable	  and	  rapidly	  changing	  society.	  
My	  task	  then	  is	  to	  analyze	  Niebuhr’s	  Christian	  ethics,	  which,	  as	  a	  prophetic	  one,	  is	  
also	  bound	  to	  be	  a	  rhetorical	  one,	  for	  the	  prophet	  is,	  if	  he	  is	  nothing	  else,	  an	  orator.	  I	  argue	  
that	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  reveal	  a	  Niebuhrian	  rhetorical	  form,	  one	  that	  condemns	  the	  pride	  of	  
collectives,	  and	  yet,	  is	  also	  capable	  of	  showing	  people	  a	  better	  version	  of	  themselves.	  This	  
means	  that	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  adjusting	  to	  the	  shifting	  tides	  of	  public	  sentiment.	  A	  group	  that	  is	  
downtrodden	  and	  in	  despair,	  is	  lifted	  up	  out	  of	  the	  muck	  and	  mire	  of	  injustice,	  out	  of	  the	  
overwhelming	  fate	  of	  tragedy,	  by	  the	  prophet’s	  songs,	  ideals,	  and	  aspirations.	  A	  group	  that	  
holds	  its	  heads	  high,	  that	  sees	  a	  future	  filled	  with	  progress	  and	  marching	  toward	  an	  
inevitable	  victory	  and	  subsequent	  utopia,	  is	  brought	  back	  to	  reality	  the	  prophet’s	  rhetoric	  
of	  condemnation	  and	  judgment.	  In	  the	  prophet’s	  balance	  between	  judgment	  and	  mercy,	  
between	  tragedy	  and	  beyond	  tragedy,	  a	  rhetoric	  is	  revealed	  that	  attempt	  to	  create	  ethical	  
attitudes	  toward	  others	  and	  toward	  history.	  
This	  investigation	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  is	  a	  timely	  one,	  for	  Niebuhr’s	  
thoughts	  and	  forms	  continue	  to	  find	  their	  way	  into	  American	  public	  address.	  In	  a	  2007	  
interview,	  David	  Brooks	  asked	  Obama	  if	  he	  had	  ever	  read	  anything	  by	  Niebuhr.	  Obama’s	  
mood	  and	  tone,	  previously	  fatigued	  and	  measured,	  perked	  up	  a	  bit,	  according	  to	  Brooks:	  “I	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love	  him.	  He	  is	  one	  of	  my	  favorite	  philosophers”(2007).	  When	  Brooks	  asked	  him	  what	  he	  
took	  from	  Niebuhr,	  Obama	  responded	  “in	  a	  rush	  of	  words,”	  with	  a	  knowledgeable	  synthesis	  
of	  Niebuhrian	  thought:	  
I	  take	  away	  the	  compelling	  idea	  that	  there’s	  serious	  evil	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  hardship	  
and	  pain.	  And	  we	  should	  be	  humble	  and	  modest	  in	  our	  belief	  we	  can	  eliminate	  those	  
things.	  But	  we	  shouldn’t	  use	  that	  as	  an	  excuse	  for	  cynicism	  and	  inaction.	  I	  take	  
away	  ...	  the	  sense	  we	  have	  to	  make	  these	  efforts	  knowing	  they	  are	  hard,	  and	  not	  
swinging	  from	  naïve	  idealism	  to	  bitter	  realism.	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  this	  interview,	  Daniel	  Rice	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  a	  “rare	  event”	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
when	  a	  president	  “refers	  to	  a	  thoughtful	  American	  theologian/social	  ethicist	  as	  a	  primary	  
source	  of	  influence”	  (2009,	  xviii).	  But	  Rice	  may	  be	  getting	  ahead	  of	  himself;	  many	  
presidents	  are	  apt	  to	  quote	  a	  philosopher	  or	  poet	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  point	  across,	  and	  many	  
often	  make	  such	  citations	  out	  of	  context	  and	  without	  regard	  for	  their	  sources’	  true	  
intentions.	  In	  fact,	  Obama	  isn’t	  the	  first	  American	  politician	  to	  claim	  Niebuhr	  as	  his	  or	  her	  
own.	  In	  addition	  to	  Jimmy	  Carter’s	  endorsement,	  both	  Newt	  Gingrich	  and	  Senator	  George	  
Mitchell	  have	  also	  gone	  on	  record	  with	  Niebuhr	  quotes	  (Thompson	  2009,	  158).	  John	  
McCain,	  in	  his	  campaign	  biography,	  dedicates	  an	  entire	  chapter	  to	  Niebuhr	  titled,	  “The	  
Paradox	  of	  War.”2	  I	  wont	  go	  into	  detail	  about	  why,	  for	  example,	  Carter	  clearly	  
misinterpreted	  Niebuhr’s	  thoughts;	  what	  is	  more	  significant—and	  I’m	  in	  the	  majority	  
opinion	  here—is	  that	  Obama	  clearly	  gets	  Niebuhr	  “right.”	  
In	  a	  major	  article	  for	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  literary	  critic	  Michiko	  Kakutani	  surveyed	  
the	  literary	  influences	  on	  the	  president,	  noting	  that	  Obama	  “has	  tended	  to	  look	  to	  non-­‐
ideological	  histories	  and	  philosophical	  works	  that	  address	  complex	  problems	  without	  easy	  
solutions,	  like	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr’s	  writings,	  which	  emphasize	  the	  ambivalent	  nature	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  (McCain	  and	  Salter	  2007)	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human	  beings	  and	  the	  dangers	  of	  willful	  innocence	  and	  infallibility.”3	  Richard	  Crouter	  notes	  
that	  “much	  in	  Obama’s	  hopeful	  realism	  echoes	  Niebuhr’s	  blend	  of	  high	  principles	  and	  
purposeful	  pragmatism”	  and	  that	  neither	  Obama	  nor	  Niebuhr	  line	  up	  “easily	  alongside	  the	  
standard	  labels	  of	  left	  or	  right	  in	  politics	  or	  religion”(Crouter	  2010,	  11).	  By	  all	  standards,	  
Obama	  correctly	  understands	  Niebuhr’s	  legacy,	  which	  as	  Eyal	  Naveh	  argues,	  “provides	  
some	  hope	  that	  unlike	  Carter	  he	  will	  not	  abuse	  it”	  (2009,	  285).	  
	   Whether	  or	  not	  Obama	  is	  faithful	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  philosophy	  in	  his	  presidential	  policies	  
and	  politics,	  one	  thing	  is	  for	  sure;	  Obama’s	  rhetoric	  is	  substantially	  littered	  with	  
“Niebuhrian”	  nods.	  The	  rhetorical	  influence	  of	  Niebuhr	  has	  been	  traced	  back	  as	  far	  as	  his	  
address	  to	  the	  Sojourners/Call	  to	  Renewal	  conference	  in	  2006.	  In	  that	  speech,	  Liam	  Julian	  
notes	  that	  Obama,	  “after	  attacking	  the	  impulses	  of	  religious	  conservatives,”	  also	  said	  that	  
“‘secularists	  are	  wrong	  when	  they	  ask	  believers	  to	  leave	  their	  religion	  at	  the	  door	  before	  
entering	  into	  the	  public	  square’”	  (2009).	  Niebuhr’s	  teachings,	  Julian	  notes—“his	  wariness	  
of	  those	  who	  would	  act	  on	  God’s	  behalf	  and	  his	  opposition	  to	  those	  who	  would	  eliminate	  
God	  from	  public	  discourse—echoed	  in	  Obama’s	  formulation.”	  Likewise,	  Obama’s	  2009	  
Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  acceptance	  speech	  was	  singled	  out	  for	  its	  Niebuhrian	  “tone.”	  According	  
to	  Tom	  Heneghan,	  Religion	  Editor	  for	  Reuters,	  “The	  whole	  speech	  had	  a	  tone	  that	  American	  
political	  commentators	  like	  to	  call	  Niebuhrian,	  either	  in	  its	  phrasing	  or	  its	  tough	  mix	  of	  
political	  realism	  and	  moral	  thinking"	  (2009).	  
Obama’s	  2011	  address	  to	  the	  Univ.	  of	  Arizona	  after	  the	  attempted	  assassination	  of	  
Gabby	  Gifford	  was	  perhaps	  his	  most	  Niebuhrian	  moment.	  Exercising	  one	  of	  the	  more	  
important	  rhetorical	  duties	  of	  his	  office—epideictic	  memorial—Obama	  displayed	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See,	  (Rice	  2009),	  for	  a	  concise	  summary	  of	  newspaper	  and	  magazine	  articles	  referenced	  
here.	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sober	  realism	  bookmarked	  with	  optimistic	  hope	  and	  pragmatic	  necessity—a	  formula	  that	  
has	  become	  known	  as	  “Niebuhrian”:	  
Scripture	  tells	  us	  that	  there	  is	  evil	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  that	  terrible	  things	  happen	  for	  
reasons	  that	  defy	  human	  understanding.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Job,	  ‘when	  I	  looked	  for	  light,	  
then	  came	  darkness.’	  Bad	  things	  happen,	  and	  we	  must	  guard	  against	  simple	  
explanations	  in	  the	  aftermath…	  Rather	  than	  pointing	  fingers	  or	  assigning	  blame,	  let	  
us	  use	  this	  occasion	  to	  expand	  our	  moral	  imaginations,	  to	  listen	  to	  each	  other	  more	  
carefully,	  to	  sharpen	  our	  instincts	  for	  empathy,	  and	  remind	  ourselves	  of	  all	  the	  ways	  
our	  hopes	  and	  dreams	  are	  bound	  together.	  
	  
Guarding	  against	  simple	  explanations	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  characteristic	  Niebuhrian	  
rhetorical	  trope.	  It	  is	  one	  that	  some	  writers,	  especially	  those	  on	  the	  left,	  argue	  has	  been	  
missing	  for	  sometime	  from	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  
	   For	  many,	  Obama’s	  use	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  philosophy	  in	  his	  policy	  and	  his	  appropriation	  
of	  a	  Niebuhrian	  tone	  in	  his	  rhetoric	  are	  both	  welcome	  additions	  to	  the	  democratic	  
discourse	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  In	  dealing	  with	  foreign	  affairs	  for	  example,	  Obama’s	  
Niebuhrian	  rhetoric	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  that	  of	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush	  administration.	  
After	  9/11,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  announced	  its	  intention	  of	  bringing	  democracy	  and	  
freedom	  to	  the	  Middle	  East.	  “Ideologues	  within	  the	  Bush	  administration	  persuaded	  
themselves,”	  writes	  Andrew	  Bacevich,	  “that	  American	  power,	  adroitly	  employed,	  could	  
transform	  that	  region,	  and	  they	  intended	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  and	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Saddam	  
Hussein’s	  repressive,	  despotic	  regime	  to	  jumpstart	  that	  process”	  (2008).	  Bush’s	  “for-­‐us	  or	  
against-­‐us”	  rhetorical	  stance	  drew	  a	  proverbial	  polarizing	  line	  in	  the	  Middle-­‐Eastern	  sand.	  
The	  results,	  Bacevich	  argues,	  speak	  for	  themselves	  (2008,	  xiv).	  The	  principles	  of	  
“moderation,	  dialectics,	  and	  irony,”	  Eyal	  Naveh	  argues,	  seem	  to	  have	  disappeared	  from	  
American	  politics	  and	  fallen	  back	  into	  an	  “uncritical	  patriotism	  since	  September	  11,	  2001”	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(2009).	  Thus,	  he	  continues,	  “In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  patriotic	  excess	  and	  illusions	  of	  
omnipotence,	  there	  is	  now,	  more	  than	  ever,	  a	  renewed	  need	  for	  Niebuhr’s	  legacy.”	  
This	  rebirth	  of	  Niebuhrian	  influence	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  political	  discourse	  and	  
policies	  of	  the	  US	  presidents	  and	  politicians;	  Niebuhr	  is	  also	  being	  reborn	  in	  the	  academy.	  
This	  has	  come—as	  rebirths	  often	  do—only	  after	  a	  dormant	  period	  in	  which	  Niebuhr	  was	  
declared	  insignificant—his	  voice	  considered	  an	  antique	  relic,	  incapable	  of	  assisting	  us	  in	  
addressing	  uniquely	  modern	  problems.	  Niebuhr,	  whom	  Cornel	  West	  calls	  “the	  most	  
influential	  cultural	  critic	  in	  mid-­‐century	  America”	  and	  father	  of	  Christian	  pragmatism,	  was	  
“toppled”	  long	  ago	  from	  academia’s	  highest	  pedestal,	  according	  to	  imminent	  theologian	  
Martin	  Marty	  (West	  1989;	  Marty	  2009).	  Niebuhr	  was	  criticized	  for	  being	  “so	  mid-­‐century”	  
by	  today’s	  post-­‐modern	  leaning	  writers	  and	  he	  was	  dismissed	  by	  religious	  leaders	  who,	  
according	  to	  Martin	  Marty,	  wanted	  to	  be	  the	  first	  kid	  on	  their	  theological	  block	  to	  establish	  
their	  currency	  by	  writing	  him	  off.	  But,	  “Surprise,”	  writes	  Marty,	  “Despite	  all	  the	  efforts	  to	  
dismiss	  and	  replace	  him,	  he	  remains	  a	  force	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with.”	  	  
The	  list	  of	  recent	  works	  and	  quotations	  recommending	  a	  return	  to	  Niebuhr,	  
observing	  the	  return,	  or	  seeking	  a	  cause	  for	  the	  turn,	  is	  extensive.	  In	  the	  November,	  2007	  
Atlantic,	  Paul	  Elie	  argues	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  revival	  is	  exigent	  “because	  Niebuhr,	  better	  than	  
any	  contemporary	  thinker,	  got	  to	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  American	  ideals	  and	  
their	  unintended	  consequences	  like	  those	  the	  United	  States	  now	  faces	  in	  Iraq”	  (84).	  Daniel	  
Rice	  notes	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  voice	  remains	  “much	  needed”	  because	  of	  its	  applicability	  to	  
today’s	  political	  and	  social	  problems;	  the	  reason,	  he	  writes,	  is	  that	  “many	  of	  Reinhold	  
Niebuhr’s	  insights	  and	  analysis	  continue	  to	  bear	  the	  mark	  of	  truth”	  (2009).	  John	  Patrick	  
Diggins,	  preeminent	  pragmatist,	  philosopher	  and	  historian	  of	  ideas,	  dedicated	  his	  last	  days	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to	  exploring	  the	  philosophy	  Niebuhr	  (2011).	  In	  Why	  Niebuhr	  Now?	  	  Diggins	  argues	  that	  
Niebuhr	  demands	  that	  we	  be	  mindful	  of	  the	  ethical	  dilemmas	  that	  come	  from	  enormous	  
power	  and	  responsibility;	  for	  Diggins,	  Niebuhr	  asks	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  question	  “How	  much	  
evil	  might	  America	  do	  in	  attempting	  to	  do	  good?”	  
In	  Why	  Niebuhr	  Matters,	  Charles	  Lemert,	  Senior	  Fellow	  of	  the	  Center	  for	  
Comparative	  Research	  at	  Yale	  University,	  eloquently	  hypothesizes	  that	  Niebuhr	  falls	  in	  a	  
noble	  historical	  lineage	  of	  societal	  repairmen:	  
For	  almost	  every	  What–now?	  moment	  in	  history	  there	  has	  been	  a	  thinker	  or	  leader	  
able	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  thread	  of	  what	  was	  unraveling	  to	  weave	  a	  new	  cloak	  out	  of	  the	  
remnants.	  When	  Rome	  fell,	  there	  was	  Augustine.	  When	  Roman	  Christendom	  shook,	  
there	  were	  Martin	  Luther	  and	  John	  Calvin.	  When	  classical	  metaphysics	  lost	  its	  grip,	  
there	  were	  Kant,	  Marx,	  and	  Hegel.	  When	  the	  Qing	  dynasty	  collapsed	  there	  were	  Sun	  
Yat-­‐sen	  and	  Mao.	  On	  and	  on	  it	  goes—Philip,	  then	  Alexander;	  the	  house	  of	  David,	  
then	  Isaiah	  and	  the	  prophets;	  Mary,	  then	  Elizabeth;	  Batista,	  then	  Castro;	  Leopold	  
and	  the	  Belgians,	  then	  Lumumba	  and	  Mobuto.	  Not	  all	  who	  came	  after	  were	  good	  or	  
helpful;	  but	  there	  were	  successors	  and	  for	  better	  or	  worse	  they	  gave	  what	  answers	  
there	  were	  to	  What-­‐now?	  (2011)	  
	  
“Why	  Niebuhr?”	  Lemert	  asks;	  because	  he	  teaches	  us	  a	  “political	  realism	  that	  sacrifices	  
neither	  ideals	  to	  mere	  pragmatism	  nor	  politics	  to	  bitterness	  and	  greed.”	  
It	  is	  significant	  that	  US	  politicians,	  political	  scientists,	  pundits	  and	  theologians	  are	  
experiencing	  a	  Niebuhrian	  revival;	  but	  perhaps	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  revival	  is	  more	  
significant	  for	  rhetorical	  purposes	  than	  its	  depth.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  is	  noteworthy	  about	  
the	  Niebuhrian	  discourse	  is	  that	  it	  is	  uncharacteristically	  dialogic.	  In	  his	  “Preface	  to	  the	  
Third	  Edition”	  of	  The	  Promise	  of	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr,	  released	  in	  2011,	  Gabriel	  Fackre	  nicely	  
summarizes	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  Niebuhrian	  landscape:	  
Indeed,	  as	  in	  previous	  eras,	  folk	  at	  both	  ends	  of	  the	  spectrum	  pay	  tribute	  to	  him	  [i.e.	  
Niebuhr].	  See	  Neo-­‐conservative	  David	  Brooks’s	  New	  York	  Times	  column	  of	  April	  26,	  
2007.	  Important	  as	  well,	  is	  a	  2006	  essay	  by	  Peter	  Beinart.	  And	  then	  there	  is	  the	  
December	  1,	  2009,	  Christian	  Century	  piece	  by	  Andrew	  Finstuen,	  “Where	  Is	  Reinhold	  
Niebuhr	  When	  We	  Need	  Him?:	  This	  American	  Mess.”	  For	  a	  searching	  application	  of	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Niebuhrian	  thought	  to	  recent	  American	  foreign	  policy	  and	  actions,	  see	  also	  Andrew	  
Bacevich’s	  The	  Limits	  of	  Power:	  The	  End	  of	  American	  Exceptionalism.	  Does	  this	  
renewed	  attention	  put	  into	  question	  the	  comment	  of	  Arthur	  Schlesinger	  Jr.	  in	  his	  
2005	  article,	  “Forgetting	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr”?	  The	  lamentation	  itself	  illustrates	  his	  
continuing	  significance,	  since	  Schlesinger	  was	  one	  of	  numerous	  “Atheists	  for	  
Niebuhr.”	  (2011)	  
	  
Niebuhr	  appeals	  to	  left,	  right	  and	  moderate	  political	  stances;	  he	  appeals	  to	  both	  atheists	  
and	  Christians	  alike;	  he	  appeals	  to	  Saul	  Alinsky,	  the	  inspiration	  of	  the	  community	  
organization	  movement	  in	  Chicago’s	  South	  Side	  and	  mentor	  to	  Barack	  Obama;	  and	  yet,	  not	  
only	  to	  Barack	  Obama	  but	  to	  Dick	  Armey	  as	  well—Obama’s	  fiercest	  critic,	  who	  learned	  
from	  the	  Niebuhrian	  Alinsky	  how	  to	  mount	  grassroots	  protests	  against	  Obama’s	  policies—
an	  irony	  that	  Niebuhr	  would	  have	  appreciated	  (Fackre	  2011).	  
Niebuhr’s	  broad	  appeal	  to	  diverse	  audiences	  is	  not	  a	  consequence	  of	  his	  death	  and	  
the	  following	  bastardization	  of	  his	  thoughts—a	  trend	  that	  typically	  follows	  in	  situations	  
where	  the	  author	  is	  no	  longer	  around	  to	  correct	  misinterpretations	  of	  her	  thought.	  On	  the	  
contrary,	  Niebuhr’s	  breadth	  and	  depth	  has	  never	  waivered,	  as	  noted	  by	  Sidney	  Hook,	  the	  
acclaimed	  graduate	  advisee	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  straw-­‐man	  nemesis,	  John	  Dewey.	  “There	  must	  be	  
something	  extremely	  paradoxical	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr,”	  wrote	  Hook,	  “to	  
make	  so	  many	  who	  are	  so	  far	  apart	  in	  their	  own	  allegiances	  feel	  so	  akin	  to	  him”	  (Diggins	  
2011).	  Paradoxical	  indeed;	  in	  fact,	  Niebuhr’s	  gift	  for	  paradoxical	  thinking	  will	  prove	  to	  be	  
central	  to	  understanding	  the	  complex	  dialectics	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  
Despite	  all	  of	  these	  reasons	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  rhetorical	  vision,	  I’ve	  yet	  to	  
mention	  what	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  appropriation	  of	  Niebuhrian	  philosophy	  and	  
rhetoric:	  his	  significant	  influence	  on	  the	  thought	  and	  rhetoric	  of	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.	  
During	  his	  years	  in	  seminary	  at	  Boston	  University,	  King	  wrote	  many	  papers	  on	  Niebuhr.	  In	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his	  earliest,	  an	  outline	  simply	  titled	  “Reinhold	  Niebuhr,”	  he	  writes: “The	  merit	  of	  Niebuhr	  is	  
that,	  seeing	  the	  problem	  of	  our	  age	  in	  its	  proper	  relations	  and	  dimensions,	  and	  laying	  firm	  
hold	  on	  ultimate	  principles,	  he	  sets	  forth	  with	  rigour	  and	  profundity	  in	  analysis	  and	  
criticism	  the	  fundamental	  weaknesses	  and	  inevitable	  sterility	  of	  the	  humanistic	  emphasis”	  
(1992). King	  later	  developed	  these	  initial	  thoughts	  into	  a	  conference	  paper,	  which	  he	  
presented	  to	  the	  Dialectical	  Society	  in	  1954.	  In	  this	  later	  summation	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  insights,	  
King	  agrees	  with	  Niebuhr’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  perfectibility	  of	  human	  nature.	  He	  writes: 
We	  readily	  see	  that	  for	  Niebuhr,	  pride	  is	  the	  basic	  sin	  and	  all	  other	  sins	  such	  as	  
injustice	  and	  sensuality	  result	  from	  this	  pride.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  great	  merits	  to	  
show	  how	  the	  sin	  of	  pride	  develops	  into	  the	  pride	  of	  power,	  pride	  of	  intellect,	  moral	  
pride	  and	  spiritual	  pride.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
King	  then	  has	  a	  very	  typical	  response	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  thought,	  asking	  himself:	  “Within	  such	  a	  
view	  is	  there	  no	  hope	  for	  man?”	  King’s	  conclusion	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  Niebuhr	  foreshadows	  
his	  later	  work	  in	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement,	  where	  he	  would	  insist	  that	  the	  Negro	  must	  not	  
wait	  for	  social	  justice,	  but	  demand	  it	  now.	  King	  writes:	  
Niebuhr’s	  anthropology	  is	  the	  necessary	  corrective	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  liberalism	  that	  too	  
easily	  capitulated	  to	  modern	  culture.	  Man	  who	  has	  come	  so	  far	  in	  wisdom	  and	  
decency	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  go	  much	  further	  as	  his	  methods	  of	  attaining	  and	  
applying	  knowledge	  are	  improved.	  Although	  such	  ethical	  religion	  is	  humane	  and	  its	  
vision	  a	  lofty	  one,	  it	  has	  obvious	  shortcomings.	  This	  particular	  sort	  of	  optimism	  has	  
been	  discredited	  by	  the	  brutal	  logic	  of	  events.	  Instead	  of	  assured	  progress	  in	  
wisdom	  and	  decency,	  man	  faces	  the	  ever	  present	  possibility	  of	  swift	  relapse	  not	  
merely	  to	  animalism	  but	  into	  such	  calculated	  cruelty	  as	  no	  other	  animal	  can	  practice.	  
Niebuhr	  reminds	  us	  of	  this	  on	  every	  hand.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
A	  decade	  later,	  King	  was	  still	  being	  reminded	  of	  it	  and	  using	  Niebuhr	  to	  remind	  others.	  
Locked	  up	  in	  a	  Birmingham	  jail,	  King	  would	  pen	  an	  open	  letter	  calling	  Alabama’s	  church	  
leadership	  to	  concerted	  action	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Negro.	  King	  writes:	  
My	  friends,	  I	  must	  say	  to	  you	  that	  we	  have	  not	  made	  a	  single	  gain	  in	  civil	  rights	  
without	  determined	  legal	  and	  nonviolent	  pressure.	  History	  is	  the	  long	  and	  tragic	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story	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  privileged	  groups	  seldom	  give	  up	  their	  privileges	  voluntarily.	  
Individuals	  may	  see	  the	  moral	  light	  and	  voluntarily	  give	  up	  their	  unjust	  posture;	  but	  
as	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr	  has	  reminded	  us,	  groups	  are	  more	  immoral	  than	  individuals.	  
(1992,	  87)	  
	  
In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  canonical	  rhetorical	  artifacts	  in	  the	  history	  of	  rhetoric,	  King	  directly	  
quotes	  a	  Niebuhrian	  theory	  of	  man	  that	  necessarily	  has	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  a	  theory	  of	  
persuasion	  as	  well;	  for	  if	  rhetoric	  must	  always	  keep	  an	  eye	  toward	  an	  audience’s	  ethos,	  
then	  any	  assumption	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  an	  audiences	  capacity	  for	  virtuous	  action	  
demands	  a	  rhetorical	  response	  in	  kind.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  one	  considers	  a	  collective	  group	  
of	  individuals	  to	  be	  existentially	  incapable	  of	  moral	  action,	  then	  why	  and	  how	  does	  one	  
appeal	  to	  such	  a	  collective	  rhetorically?	  Starting	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  shared	  
interests	  of	  an	  audience	  result	  in	  a	  normative	  immorality	  means	  new	  demands	  on	  the	  
rhetorical	  agent	  and	  the	  rhetorical	  situation.	  How	  does	  one	  appeal	  to	  an	  audience	  ethically	  
when	  that	  audience	  is	  incapable	  of	  ethical	  action?	  Or	  does	  one	  appeal	  to	  them	  at	  all?	  
Instead,	  does	  one	  seek	  out	  those	  moderate	  audiences	  that	  are	  not	  yet	  solidified	  into	  one	  
collective	  or	  another?	  And	  how	  does	  this	  analysis	  help	  us	  understand	  a	  rhetorical	  audience	  
as	  more	  than	  just	  bodies	  sharing	  a	  collective	  space,	  but	  as	  common	  interests	  that	  transcend	  
spatially?	  
These	  questions,	  and	  others	  like	  them,	  are	  an	  important	  reason	  for	  undertaking	  a	  
rhetorical	  analysis	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  work.	  It	  is	  remarkable	  that	  the	  most	  notable	  public	  agents	  
Niebuhr	  impacted	  are	  both	  strong	  rhetoricians—notable	  for	  their	  eloquence,	  charisma,	  and	  
ability	  to	  move	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  into	  coordinated	  political	  action	  for	  common	  goals.	  
Both	  of	  these	  social	  leaders	  are	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr’s	  rhetorical	  legacy.	  They	  applied	  his	  
theology	  and	  philosophy	  to	  their	  rhetorical	  style	  and	  substance,	  and	  they	  were	  successful	  
by	  every	  rhetorical	  standard	  one	  can	  use	  to	  measure	  them.	  Thus	  far,	  we’ve	  addressed	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Niebuhr’s	  influence	  in	  presidential	  politics,	  public	  address	  and	  in	  the	  social	  ethics	  that	  
guided	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement;	  we’ve	  shown	  that	  this	  influence	  has	  been	  unanimously	  
agreed	  upon	  in	  the	  literature;	  we’ve	  seen	  that	  this	  reemergence	  is	  not	  constrained	  to	  
politics	  and	  rhetoric,	  but	  is	  also	  reappearing	  in	  political	  science	  and	  theological	  discussions;	  
and	  finally,	  we’ve	  seen	  that	  many	  agree	  the	  Niebuhrian	  revival	  is	  a	  timely,	  much	  needed	  
one.	  
However,	  before	  linking	  these	  observations	  more	  directly	  to	  their	  correlative	  need	  
for	  a	  rhetorical-­‐minded	  analysis	  of	  Niebuhrian	  thought—which	  I	  hope	  is	  now	  intuitive—
one	  final	  aspect	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  rhetorical	  legacy	  demands	  attention,	  which	  is	  that	  Niebuhr	  
himself	  was	  an	  acclaimed	  orator.	  Niebuhr’s	  rise	  to	  prominence	  in	  American	  discourse	  was	  
due	  in	  no	  small	  part	  to	  his	  massive	  rhetorical	  appeal	  to	  various	  audiences.	  According	  to	  
biographer	  Richard	  Fox,	  Niebuhr	  was	  one	  who	  instantly	  drew	  circles	  around	  him	  wherever	  
he	  went	  (1985,	  111).	  Fox	  writes:	  
[Union’s	  students]	  dogged	  his	  steps	  as	  he	  careened	  through	  the	  hallways,	  they	  sat	  
wide-­‐eyed	  in	  the	  Common	  Room	  after	  lunch	  and	  dinner	  while	  he	  issued	  rapid-­‐fire	  
commentary	  on	  world	  events,	  they	  struggled	  to	  record	  even	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  his	  
lectures	  as	  his	  words	  raced	  ahead	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  his	  mind.	  They	  flocked	  to	  chapel	  
to	  hear	  him	  roar	  and	  watch	  him	  gesticulate:	  his	  words	  rolled	  down	  like	  waters,	  his	  
ideas	  like	  a	  never-­‐ending	  stream.	  Thoughts	  piled	  up	  on	  other	  thoughts	  with	  such	  
speed	  that	  sentences	  were	  often	  abandoned	  halfway	  through,	  overwhelmed	  by	  
more	  potent	  images	  that	  followed…	  it	  was	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  an	  inspired	  mind,	  
summoning	  a	  favorite	  Old	  Testament	  verse	  in	  an	  affectionate	  whisper,	  playing	  
excitedly	  with	  some	  key	  irony	  of	  human	  living	  or	  paradox	  of	  Christian	  belief,	  
clamoring	  with	  fists	  clenched	  for	  an	  end	  to	  Christian	  complacency	  and	  the	  dawn	  of	  a	  
militant	  church	  fighting	  eyeball	  to	  eyeball	  with	  the	  powers	  and	  principalities.	  
	  
Niebuhr’s	  style	  was	  “brash,	  outspoken,”	  and	  “vehement”	  (Fox	  1985).	  It	  was,	  to	  use	  James	  
Darsey’s	  words,	  the	  prophetic	  style	  of	  “fire	  and	  strength”	  (1997).	  As	  Lemert	  notes,	  Niebuhr	  
was	  always	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  preacher,	  and	  his	  philosophical	  insights	  would	  never	  have	  
reached	  the	  public	  stage	  without	  his	  background	  in	  public	  address	  (2011,	  29).	  The	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following	  is	  a	  typical	  report	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  ability	  to	  wake-­‐up	  an	  audience.	  It	  paints	  a	  
beautiful	  picture	  that	  every	  rhetorician	  will	  appreciate,	  and	  so	  I	  quote	  it	  at	  length:	  
The	  final	  speaker	  was	  introduced.	  No	  one	  in	  the	  crowded	  dining	  room	  seemed	  to	  
pay	  much	  attention.	  It	  was	  Saturday	  night	  in	  the	  Spring	  of	  1949,	  and	  several	  
hundred	  politically	  minded	  people	  had	  been	  in	  that	  Chicago	  hotel	  for	  thirty-­‐six	  
hours	  trying	  to	  hammer	  out	  recommendations	  for	  improving	  the	  nation’s	  foreign	  
and	  domestic	  policy.	  By	  ten	  o’clock	  the	  air	  was	  stale	  and	  the	  people	  were	  stale.	  The	  
stimulating	  effect	  of	  the	  cocktail	  hour	  had	  worn	  away,	  leaving	  a	  glaze	  in	  the	  eye,	  a	  
weight	  on	  the	  limbs,	  and	  irresistible	  desire	  to	  yawn.	  A	  young	  couple	  from	  New	  York	  
noted	  with	  relief	  that	  the	  final	  speaker	  carried	  no	  prepared	  text.	  
	  
The	  speaker	  straightened	  his	  tie,	  ran	  a	  big-­‐knuckled	  hand	  over	  his	  shiny	  pate,	  
pulled	  his	  long	  nose	  further	  downward,	  and	  spoke	  rapidly	  in	  a	  deep	  voice.	  By	  the	  
end	  of	  one	  sentence,	  he	  had	  every	  person’s	  full	  attention;	  by	  the	  end	  of	  one	  hour,	  he	  
had	  several	  hundred	  people	  on	  their	  feet,	  clapping,	  stamping,	  shouting	  their	  
approval.	  
	  
Few	  speeches	  can	  have	  rivaled	  this	  one	  for	  profundity,	  for	  range,	  for	  
electromagnetism.	  Listeners	  sat	  bolt	  upright,	  their	  fists	  clenched,	  as	  the	  speaker	  
bombarded	  them	  with	  startling	  new	  ideas,	  startling	  interpretations	  of	  old	  ideas,	  
dramatic	  challenges	  to	  their	  long-­‐accepted	  presuppositions,	  and	  sudden	  explosive	  
humor.	  (Lemert	  2011,	  29-­‐30)	  
	  
Niebuhr’s	  ability	  to	  speak	  powerfully	  to	  crowds	  of	  all	  kinds	  was	  uncanny.	  In	  this	  respect	  
then,	  Niebuhr’s	  rhetoric	  was	  much	  like	  his	  philosophical	  and	  political	  thought:	  his	  appeals	  
were	  as	  broad	  as	  they	  were	  deep.	  When	  Niebuhr	  spoke,	  it	  mattered	  little	  if	  his	  audience	  
was	  farmers	  in	  rural	  Missouri	  churches,	  workers	  and	  executives	  in	  Detroit,	  or	  theologians	  
at	  Union	  or	  in	  Europe	  (Lemert	  2011,	  30).	  Like	  every	  true	  prophet,	  Niebuhr	  spoke	  to	  a	  
particular	  audience	  but	  he	  also	  transcended	  that	  audience	  as	  he	  addressed	  the	  universal	  
problems	  of	  human	  existence.	  In	  other	  words,	  Niebuhr	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  speak	  both	  
“timeless	  words”	  and	  “special	  words”	  to	  every	  audience.	  This	  is	  what	  King	  meant	  when	  he	  
said	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  merit	  was	  that	  he	  saw	  the	  “problem	  of	  our	  age	  in	  its	  proper	  relations	  
and	  dimensions,	  and	  laying	  firm	  hold	  on	  ultimate	  principles,”	  rigorously	  and	  profoundly	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analyzes	  and	  criticizes	  “the	  fundamental	  weaknesses	  and	  inevitable	  sterility”	  of	  the	  human-­‐
being	  (1952).	  
Seeing	  the	  problems	  of	  our	  age,	  was	  always	  a	  pragmatist	  who	  insisted	  that	  working	  
toward	  a	  more	  just	  and	  loving	  society	  was	  the	  church’s	  true	  mission;	  grabbing	  hold	  of	  
ultimate	  principles	  and	  using	  them	  to	  condemn	  and	  aspire	  nations,	  Niebuhr	  was	  always	  a	  
prophet;	  surveying	  the	  scene	  analytically	  and	  dialectically,	  Niebuhr	  was	  always	  a	  
thoroughgoing	  realist.	  In	  this	  threefold	  way,	  Niebuhr’s	  “Pragmatic	  Christian	  Realism,”	  
shows	  us	  one	  way	  to	  bridge	  the	  rhetorical	  divide	  between	  circumstantial	  and	  principled	  
appeals;	  a	  divide	  left	  open	  by	  Richard	  Weaver’s	  Ethics	  of	  Rhetoric	  (1953).	  Niebuhr’s	  ability	  
to	  make	  judgments	  based	  on	  timeless	  ideals	  that	  are,	  as	  he	  called	  them	  “impossible	  
possibilities,”	  in	  a	  postmodern	  world	  that	  rejects	  certainty	  and	  absolutism,	  is	  his	  lasting	  
legacy;	  and	  it	  corrects	  the	  lamentation	  of	  James	  Darsey	  (1997)	  and	  others	  that	  such	  an	  
accomplishment	  isn’t	  possible	  in	  postmodernity.	  The	  key	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  method,	  I	  will	  show,	  
depends	  on	  more	  than	  merely	  understanding	  the	  paradoxical	  relationship	  between	  
timeless	  words	  and	  special	  words,	  ideals	  and	  actuals,	  transcendence	  and	  immanence.	  In	  
addition	  to	  this	  understanding,	  Niebuhr	  demands	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  a	  Christian	  attitude	  that	  
is	  noted	  for	  its	  love,	  forgiveness	  and	  ironic	  depiction	  of	  the	  dramas	  of	  human	  history.	  
The	  ability	  to	  observe	  the	  irony	  in	  a	  situation	  depends	  on	  the	  observer’s	  ability	  to	  
balance	  his	  analysis	  of	  vanity	  and	  virtue.	  The	  observer	  must	  not	  be	  so	  hostile	  to	  the	  victim	  
of	  irony	  as	  to	  deny	  the	  element	  of	  virtue	  in	  the	  historical	  situation;	  but	  equally,	  he	  must	  not	  
be	  so	  sympathetic	  as	  to	  discount	  his	  weakness,	  vanity	  and	  pretensions	  in	  another	  element	  
of	  the	  situation.4	  Participants	  from	  within	  the	  situation	  can	  rarely	  perform	  the	  latter,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  (Niebuhr	  2008)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  IAH).	  
	   18	  
thus	  the	  knowledge	  of	  irony	  is	  usually	  reserved	  for	  observers	  and	  not	  participants.	  For	  
Niebuhr,	  the	  observer	  who	  remains	  outside	  the	  situation	  and	  maintains	  balance	  in	  his	  
judgments	  and	  understandings	  between	  vice	  and	  virtue,	  is	  a	  competent	  critical	  interpreter	  
of	  historical	  situations.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  role	  is	  an	  idealistic	  one	  in	  that	  it	  provides	  timeless	  
judgments	  from	  outside	  or	  above	  the	  given	  community	  that	  negate	  ideological	  assumptions.	  
It	  is	  prophetic	  in	  that	  it	  applies	  these	  timeless	  ideals	  to	  the	  contingent	  historical	  situations	  
of	  its	  community.	  Finally,	  Niebuhr	  synthesizes	  these	  two	  roles	  dialectically	  into	  a	  pragmatic	  
application	  of	  both	  principle	  and	  circumstance,	  ideal	  and	  real,	  transcendent	  and	  immanent,	  
in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  rhetorical	  attitude	  that	  is	  humble,	  ironic,	  repentant	  and	  hopefully,	  more	  
ethical.	  
Niebuhr’s	  impact	  on	  the	  religious,	  political,	  and	  intellectual	  life	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  and	  the	  impression	  he	  made	  on	  contemporaries,	  is	  well	  documented	  (Brown	  1992,	  
1).	  Arthur	  Schlesinger,	  Jr.,	  America’s	  most	  imminent	  historian	  and	  a	  man	  who	  spent	  years	  
in	  the	  White	  House,	  said	  of	  Niebuhr,	  “He	  was	  the	  greatest	  man	  I	  knew;”	  he	  had	  “an	  
understanding	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  human	  society	  that	  no	  one	  has	  equaled	  in	  our	  century”	  
(ibid).	  John	  Gunther	  once	  wrote,	  after	  interviewing	  Niebuhr,	  “to	  ask	  Dr.	  Niebuhr	  a	  question	  
is	  like	  hurling	  a	  paper	  dart	  into	  an	  electric	  fan”	  (ibid).	  He	  continued:	  “The	  ideas	  rushing	  out	  
of	  his	  mind,	  his	  answers	  to	  questions,	  are	  never	  mere	  verbal	  confetti	  but	  are	  like	  splinters	  
off	  craggy	  granite”	  (ibid).	  After	  hearing	  Niebuhr	  speak	  at	  a	  conference,	  Walter	  Lippmann	  
was	  heard	  to	  say,	  “We	  shall	  not	  see	  his	  like	  again.”	  He	  was,	  according	  to	  Nathan	  Scott,	  Jr.	  
“the	  most	  creative	  theologian	  in	  the	  history	  of	  American	  thought”	  (ibid).	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  understanding	  Niebuhr’s	  historical	  context	  within	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  
and	  radically	  new	  rhetorical	  situation,	  we	  must	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  role	  the	  Christian	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myth	  played	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  thought.	  We	  will	  find	  that	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  summary	  of	  Augustine	  
is	  an	  apt	  one	  for	  Niebuhr,	  himself	  influenced	  more	  by	  Augustine	  than	  perhaps	  any	  other	  
thinker:	  
The	  great	  store	  of	  Biblical	  texts,	  learned	  verbatim	  and	  spouted	  forth	  at	  appropriate	  
moments,	  were	  like	  attitudinally	  slanted	  names	  for	  situations.	  Each	  time	  a	  situation	  
arose,	  it	  presented	  itself	  to	  him	  in	  terms	  of	  some	  Scriptural	  formula	  that	  in	  effect	  
“adopted	  a	  policy”	  with	  regard	  to	  it.	  Thus	  by	  confronting	  a	  current	  situation	  in	  terms	  
of	  a	  Biblical	  response,	  such	  citations	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  making	  the	  situation	  itself	  
essentially	  Biblical,	  to	  be	  classed	  with	  situations	  not	  literally	  present	  at	  all.	  Thus	  
there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  his	  Biblical	  terminology	  of	  motives	  enabled	  him	  to	  
“transcend”	  the	  sheerly	  empirical	  events	  of	  his	  times.”	  (Burke	  1970,	  58)	  
	  
From	  the	  rhetorical	  situation	  and	  the	  Christian	  myth,	  we	  will	  then	  observe	  the	  significant	  
role	  dialectical	  inquiries	  played	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  prophetic	  voice.	  Once	  we	  understand	  this	  
characteristically	  Niebuhrian-­‐interplay	  between	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ideal	  and	  the	  real	  aspects	  
of	  existence,	  we	  will	  then	  investigate	  the	  words	  of	  criticism	  and	  aspiration,	  which	  the	  “poet-­‐
prophet”	  speaks	  to	  nations,	  empires,	  and	  their	  public.	  Lastly,	  we	  will	  look	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  own	  
analysis	  of	  notable	  rhetors	  for	  a	  definition	  of	  Niebuhrian	  rhetoric	  that	  comes	  straight	  from	  
the	  ethicist	  himself.	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Chapter	  1	  
The	  Onslaught	  of	  Modernity	  
	  
Grasping	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  utterance,	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  public	  speech,	  a	  poem,	  
a	  theological	  magnum	  opus,	  or	  a	  philosophical	  treatise,	  requires	  us	  to	  locate	  our	  study	  in	  
the	  situation	  that	  calls	  it	  forth.	  Philosophy,	  like	  rhetoric,	  is	  pragmatic:	  “it	  comes	  into	  
existence	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  something	  beyond	  itself;	  it	  functions	  ultimately	  to	  produce	  action	  
or	  change	  in	  the	  world;	  it	  performs	  some	  task”	  (Bitzer	  1968).	  This	  is	  what	  Bertrand	  Russell	  
meant	  when	  he	  wrote	  of	  the	  “imaginative	  background”	  of	  human	  thought	  and	  as	  Roger	  
Shinn	  notes,	  this	  imaginative	  background	  is	  closer	  to	  center-­‐stage	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  
philosophical	  writings	  than	  it	  is	  for	  most	  other	  philosophers	  (Shinn	  2009b,	  3).	  Thus,	  
discovering	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  requires	  that	  we	  first	  understand	  his	  rhetorical	  
situation.	  More	  than	  just	  situating	  Niebuhr	  in	  a	  historical	  setting,	  this	  means	  that	  we	  look	  
closely	  at	  the	  natural	  context	  of	  persons,	  events,	  relations,	  and	  exigencies	  which	  called	  
forth	  Niebuhr’s	  writings	  (Bitzer	  1968).	  For	  Niebuhr,	  that	  means	  we	  recall	  the	  intellectual,	  
material	  and	  social	  developments	  that	  coincided	  with	  America’s	  rapid	  shifts	  from	  an	  
agrarian	  to	  an	  industrial	  economy,	  from	  pious	  and	  religious	  farm	  communities	  to	  secular	  
and	  urban	  suburbs,	  from	  the	  wisdom	  of	  the	  common	  sense	  man	  on	  the	  street	  to	  the	  
management	  of	  social	  technocrats,	  and	  from	  the	  cult	  of	  heroic	  individual	  personality	  to	  
what	  Kenneth	  Burke	  calls,	  “the	  bureaucratization	  of	  the	  imaginative”	  aspects	  of	  creative	  
existence	  (Burke	  1968).This	  task	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  looking	  at	  someone	  like	  
Niebuhr	  who	  truly	  embodied	  the	  experiential	  and	  experimental	  principles	  of	  pragmatism.	  
Niebuhr’s	  thoughts	  were	  like	  infrastructural	  developments;	  they	  appeared	  in	  a	  
world	  of	  ideas	  already	  established	  and	  they	  proceeded	  to	  improve	  the	  landscape	  by	  
bulldozing	  and	  excavating	  earlier	  thoughts	  in	  order	  to	  build	  something	  new,	  better,	  or	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more	  appropriate	  to	  a	  contingency.	  For	  this	  reason	  Shinn	  argues	  that	  understanding	  
Niebuhr	  requires	  that	  we	  locate	  his	  opinions	  in	  their	  historical	  contexts	  and	  relate	  them	  to	  
his	  personal	  experiences,	  “to	  the	  various	  successive	  struggles	  of	  his	  life,	  to	  politics,	  to	  
economics,	  to	  world	  history”	  (Shinn	  2009a,	  83).	  “If	  we	  think	  we	  discover	  his	  judgment	  and	  
freeze	  it	  in	  time”	  Shinn	  writes,	  “we	  may	  blind	  ourselves	  to	  its	  dialectical	  counterparts,	  
which	  may	  prevail	  simultaneously	  or	  later”	  (83).	  In	  fact,	  Niebuhr	  was	  so	  engaged	  in	  the	  
salient	  issues	  of	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  that	  any	  account	  of	  his	  thought	  
necessarily	  provides	  a	  panoramic	  view	  of	  the	  events	  and	  milieus	  of	  his	  age	  as	  well	  (Brown	  
1992,	  1).	  Niebuhr’s	  life	  and	  thought	  spanned	  decades	  that	  witnessed	  momentous	  and	  
traumatic	  events	  in	  American	  life—the	  Great	  Depression,	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  the	  
nuclear	  threat	  and	  challenge	  of	  communism	  it	  brought	  with	  it,	  and	  finally	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  
Movement	  and	  war	  in	  Vietnam.	  Niebuhr’s	  specific	  responses	  to	  these	  crises	  were	  always	  
unique,	  prophetic	  and	  experimental;	  however,	  his	  ability	  to	  see	  what	  others	  didn’t	  have	  
eyes	  to	  see—whether	  because	  they	  were	  closing	  their	  eyes	  in	  apathy	  or	  were	  simply	  
misinformed	  by	  propaganda—was	  a	  rhetorical	  skill	  developed	  during	  his	  earliest	  work	  as	  a	  
pastor	  in	  Detroit.	  
Ford’s	  Detroit	  and	  Wilson’s	  War	  (1915-­‐1919)	  
	  
After	  Niebuhr’s	  undergraduate	  studies	  at	  Eden	  Theological	  Seminary	  he	  took	  his	  
studies	  to	  Yale	  where,	  after	  finishing	  his	  M.Div.,	  he	  was	  invited	  to	  pursue	  his	  doctorate.	  But	  
Niebuhr	  wasn’t	  interested	  in	  a	  monkish	  existence	  as	  an	  academic;	  as	  he	  later	  put	  it,	  
“epistemology	  bored	  me…	  and	  frankly,	  the	  other	  side	  of	  me	  came	  out:	  I	  desired	  relevance	  
rather	  than	  scholarship”	  (Brown	  1992,	  20).	  He	  was	  twenty-­‐three	  when	  he	  arrived	  at	  the	  
Bethel	  Evangelical	  Church	  of	  Detroit,	  MI	  in	  1915.	  There,	  during	  his	  immersion	  into	  the	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cultural	  malignancies	  of	  industrialism—his	  sense	  made	  more	  acute	  by	  his	  residence	  in	  a	  
“Henry	  Ford	  town”—Niebuhr	  became	  deeply	  concerned	  about	  the	  problems	  of	  social	  
justice	  in	  a	  bourgeois	  society	  and	  he	  noticed	  immediately	  that	  the	  Ritschlian	  social	  gospel	  
he	  espoused	  at	  Yale	  was	  an	  inadequate	  solution	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  his	  blue-­‐collar	  
parishioners	  (Niebuhr	  1927,	  6).	  As	  he	  would	  later	  recall,	  “I	  was	  up	  against	  an	  industrial	  city,	  
and	  I	  saw	  that	  human	  nature	  was	  quite	  different	  than	  I	  had	  learned	  at	  Yale	  Divinity	  School”	  
(Brown	  1992,	  20).	  Yale	  Divinity	  School	  was	  a	  booming	  social	  gospel	  program	  that	  taught	  
that	  individual	  morality,	  specifically	  the	  love	  ethic	  of	  Jesus	  Christ,	  was	  a	  practical	  and	  just	  
solution	  for	  the	  public	  and	  political	  square	  as	  well.	  But	  Niebuhr	  soon	  discovered	  that	  Henry	  
Ford	  couldn’t	  be	  mercifully	  “loved”	  into	  giving	  the	  autoworker	  a	  fair	  wage.	  Love	  and	  mercy	  
or	  the	  Sermon	  on	  the	  Mount,	  Niebuhr	  found,	  didn’t	  dominate	  the	  realm	  of	  politics;	  it	  was	  a	  
realm	  dominated	  by	  power	  and	  controlled	  by	  the	  will-­‐to-­‐power.	  
Thus,	  in	  1920	  Niebuhr	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  growing	  popularity	  of	  “the	  social	  
gospel”	  in	  Detroit	  and	  its	  inadequacies	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  injustices	  of	  industrialization	  by	  
noting	  that	  even	  the	  social	  gospel,	  as	  it	  was	  being	  preached,	  was	  tainted	  by	  the	  self-­‐
interests	  of	  the	  church.	  “To	  those	  who	  believe	  in	  the	  kingdom	  mission	  of	  the	  church	  this	  
new	  social	  vision	  of	  religion	  is	  very	  gratifying”	  he	  writes,	  “but	  upon	  closer	  study	  it	  
frequently	  reveals	  disappointing	  characteristics”	  (1920,	  588).	  The	  greatest	  weakness	  of	  the	  
social	  gospel	  is	  that	  it	  was	  “dictated	  by	  the	  church’s	  instincts	  for	  self-­‐preservation”	  (ibid.).	  
Niebuhr	  writes:	  
The	  church	  knows	  what	  is	  occupying	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  world	  and	  it	  is	  anxious	  to	  
satisfy	  that	  interest.	  If	  it	  expresses	  liberal	  or	  radical	  sentiments	  on	  current	  industrial	  
or	  social	  problems	  it	  frequently	  betrays	  a	  greater	  desire	  to	  “hold	  the	  workingman	  
for	  the	  church”	  than	  to	  establish	  justice	  for	  him.	  In	  short,	  the	  church	  seems	  tempted	  
for	  the	  sake	  of	  its	  own	  prestige	  to	  claim	  rather	  than	  actually	  to	  exert	  a	  telling	  
influence	  in	  the	  social	  issues	  of	  the	  hour.	  While	  it	  is	  anxious	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	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agent,	  not	  to	  say	  the	  agent	  of	  world	  salvation	  it	  has	  not	  yet	  applied	  itself	  very	  
diligently	  or	  whole-­‐heartedly	  to	  the	  task,	  and	  its	  interest	  in	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  day	  is	  
still	  quite	  dilettantish.	  (588)	  
	  
Already,	  Niebuhr	  was	  putting	  into	  practice	  what	  he	  learned	  while	  studying	  the	  eighth	  
century	  prophets	  in	  his	  favorite	  class	  at	  Yale;	  that	  the	  beginning	  of	  criticism	  is	  self-­‐criticism.	  
(“All	  theology	  begins	  with	  Amos,”	  he	  would	  later	  remark).	  Niebuhr	  criticized	  the	  church	  
long	  before	  he	  criticized	  labor,	  Ford	  or	  American	  culture.	  The	  church	  was	  committing	  a	  
form	  of	  original	  sin,	  a	  sin	  that	  provided	  the	  backdrop	  for	  everything	  Niebuhr	  wrote	  over	  
the	  next	  fifty	  years.	  The	  church	  was	  no	  different	  from	  mankind	  in	  that	  it	  was	  acting	  
uncritically	  and	  out	  of	  its	  own	  interests.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  was	  guilty	  of	  mankind’s	  
perennial	  sins:	  pride	  and	  egotism.	  
	   During	  his	  early	  work	  as	  a	  pastor	  in	  Detroit,	  Niebuhr	  struggled	  for	  answers	  to	  the	  
problems	  he	  bumped	  up	  against.	  He	  wasn’t	  sure	  exactly	  how	  to	  get	  the	  social	  justice	  he	  
strongly	  desired	  for	  autoworkers	  partly	  because	  he	  wasn’t	  quite	  sure	  who	  was	  at	  fault.	  Was	  
it	  Ford’s	  fault?	  If	  so,	  how	  could	  Niebuhr	  get	  him	  to	  change	  his	  labor	  practices?	  Was	  it	  the	  
workers’	  faults	  for	  fighting	  for	  individual	  rights	  instead	  of	  coming	  together	  to	  bargain	  for	  
rights	  collectively?	  If	  so,	  how	  could	  Niebuhr	  persuade	  him	  to	  organize?	  Finally,	  what	  was	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  Church	  and	  the	  pastor	  in	  all	  this?	  Was	  it	  to	  preach	  love	  and	  repentance	  to	  
Ford	  and	  the	  world,	  to	  offer	  a	  sanctuary	  where	  workers	  could	  retreat	  from	  the	  toils	  of	  labor	  
and	  feel	  some	  sense	  of	  the	  dignity	  of	  personality,	  or	  was	  the	  church’s	  role	  to	  offer	  a	  
prophetic	  judgment	  upon	  all	  those	  who	  were	  guilty	  of	  perpetrating	  injustice—at	  risk	  of	  
losing	  the	  ears	  of	  the	  city	  altogether.	  What	  he	  did	  know,	  he	  would	  later	  remark,	  was	  that	  
working	  as	  a	  pastor	  in	  Detroit	  showed	  him	  “that	  the	  simple	  idealism”	  of	  the	  prevailing	  
liberal	  theology	  “was	  as	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  crises	  of	  personal	  life	  as	  it	  was	  to	  the	  complex	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issues	  of	  an	  industrial	  city”	  (Brown	  1992,	  20).	  Thus,	  Niebuhr’s	  immediate	  experiences	  in	  
Detroit	  led	  him	  to	  cynicism	  and	  disillusionment,	  an	  experience	  he	  would	  always	  remind	  
others	  of	  when	  they	  clung	  to	  a	  too	  optimistic	  a	  view	  of	  human	  nature,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  all	  the	  
facts	  of	  experience.	  
Later,	  Niebuhr	  published	  excerpts	  from	  his	  journal	  during	  his	  Detroit	  years	  under	  
the	  apt	  title	  Leaves	  from	  the	  Notebook	  of	  a	  Tamed	  Cynic.	  This	  journal,	  as	  well	  his	  columns	  
published	  in	  newspapers	  and	  magazines	  during	  the	  same	  period,	  provide	  an	  intimate	  look	  
at	  how	  Niebuhr	  rigorously	  analyzed	  and	  profoundly	  understood	  the	  many-­‐sided	  problems	  
of	  industrial	  civilization.	  Niebuhr’s	  questions,	  from	  1915	  to	  1971,	  were	  always:	  How	  do	  we	  
get	  people	  to	  empathize	  with	  the	  suffering	  of	  people	  whom	  they	  are	  not	  intimately	  
connected	  to?	  How	  do	  we	  garner	  political	  support	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  justice	  from	  those	  who	  
cannot	  see	  the	  wounds,	  hear	  the	  cries,	  or	  feel	  the	  anguish	  of	  the	  downtrodden	  and	  heavy	  
labored?	  
This	  question	  begs	  for	  a	  rhetorical	  answer	  and	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  journal	  
documents	  his	  struggle	  and	  eventual	  success	  in	  answering	  it;	  the	  journal	  shows	  the	  birth	  of	  
an	  articulated	  rhetorical	  philosophy	  for	  a	  prophetic	  pragmatism.	  For	  example,	  this	  1924	  
journal	  entry	  is	  completely	  typical	  for	  the	  published	  collection:	  
I	  wonder	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  way	  of	  being	  potent	  oratorically	  without	  over-­‐
simplifying	  the	  truth.	  Or	  must	  power	  always	  be	  bought	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  truth?	  
Perhaps	  some	  simplification	  of	  life	  is	  justified.	  Every	  artist	  does,	  after	  all,	  obscure	  
some	  details	  in	  order	  to	  present	  others	  in	  bold	  relief.	  (45)	  
	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  here,	  Niebuhr	  understood	  oratory	  as	  an	  ethical	  tool	  for	  moving	  collective	  
action	  that	  nevertheless	  was	  bound	  by	  certain	  ethical	  requirements,	  one	  of	  which	  was	  to	  do	  
justice	  to	  the	  facts	  while	  also	  interpreting	  those	  facts	  and	  presenting	  them	  artistically.	  As	  a	  
pastor,	  Niebuhr’s	  most	  institutionalized,	  protected	  and	  powerful	  weapon	  was	  his	  rhetorical	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voice.	  Every	  Sunday	  Niebuhr	  was	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  address	  a	  diverse	  audience	  of	  
Detroit’s	  citizens	  and	  for	  him	  this	  came	  with	  weighty	  responsibility	  and	  power.	  Niebuhr	  
sought	  to	  use	  this	  responsibility	  and	  power	  for	  the	  Good	  and	  this	  dissertation	  is	  a	  project	  in	  
elaborating	  and	  developing	  this	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  more	  explicitly.	  
One	  of	  the	  largest	  factors	  that	  shaped	  Niebuhr’s	  development	  of	  this	  ethics	  of	  
rhetoric	  was	  his	  personal	  experience.	  His	  was	  always	  a	  pragmatic	  philosophy	  and	  thus,	  it	  
begins	  with	  Niebuhr’s	  lived	  experiences	  in	  Detroit	  from	  1915-­‐1927.	  During	  his	  time	  in	  
Detroit,	  Niebuhr	  bumped	  into	  all	  of	  the	  events	  and	  experiences	  that	  would	  plague	  the	  
modern	  era’s	  common	  experiences	  and	  its	  literary	  and	  philosophical	  struggles	  with	  them.	  
These	  experiences	  may	  be	  succinctly	  broken	  down	  into	  material	  and	  spiritual	  categories,	  i.e.	  
those	  problems	  that	  effected	  health,	  war,	  labor	  hours,	  wages,	  and	  consumer	  goods;	  and	  
those	  that	  affected	  the	  individual	  self	  and	  the	  meaning	  and	  mysteries	  of	  human	  existence.	  
However,	  for	  Niebuhr,	  these	  categories	  were	  not	  distinct	  and	  separate	  concerns.	  As	  a	  
pragmatist	  and	  existentialist,	  Niebuhr	  knew	  that	  the	  facts	  of	  experience	  testified	  to	  the	  
bound	  nature	  of	  their	  relationship	  to	  one	  another.	  Niebuhr	  testified	  to	  Martin	  Luther	  King’s	  
truth;	  that	  preventing	  a	  Negro	  from	  riding	  public	  transportation	  through	  Alabama	  did	  more	  
than	  keep	  him	  from	  getting	  to	  his	  destination,	  it	  had	  a	  damaging	  effect	  on	  his	  dignity	  as	  well.	  
	   During	  his	  first	  few	  years	  in	  Detroit,	  two	  new	  situations	  come	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  his	  
journal	  entries	  and	  seem	  to	  shape	  his	  thoughts	  on	  the	  human	  scene	  at	  that	  time.	  The	  first	  
was	  his	  new	  experiences	  as	  a	  pastor.	  As	  a	  young	  Midwestern	  country	  pastor	  fresh	  out	  of	  
divinity	  school,	  Niebuhr	  was	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  charged	  with	  addressing	  people	  didactically	  
who	  were	  twice	  his	  age	  and	  perhaps	  ten	  times	  his	  cumulated	  experiences	  and	  practical	  
wisdom.	  In	  fact,	  Leaves	  Niebuhr	  confesses,	  was	  published	  in	  order	  to	  help	  pastors	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understand	  and	  prepare	  from	  the	  experiences	  of	  a	  young	  pastor.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Niebuhr	  
was	  always	  critical	  of	  his	  own	  and	  other	  pastors’	  methods.	  Niebuhr	  explains	  the	  reason	  for	  
this	  in	  the	  preface,	  where	  he	  writes:	  “I	  make	  no	  apology	  for	  being	  critical	  of	  what	  I	  love.	  No	  
one	  wants	  a	  love	  based	  on	  illusions,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  not	  love	  a	  
profession	  and	  yet	  be	  critical	  of	  it”	  (8).	  For	  Niebuhr,	  criticism	  was	  part	  of	  establishing	  true	  
ethos	  as	  a	  thinker.	  It	  is	  a	  time-­‐honored	  truth	  we	  often	  forget	  as	  rhetoricians,	  yet	  one	  we	  
learn	  as	  children	  in	  the	  playground,	  discovering	  for	  the	  first	  time	  that	  to	  our	  astonishment,	  
the	  reason	  Johnny	  teases	  Sally	  is	  that	  he	  actually	  likes	  her.	  An	  additional	  aspect	  of	  this	  
truism	  is	  that	  if	  there	  is	  no	  truth	  in	  the	  criticism,	  it	  will	  likewise	  be	  ignored.	  Dignifying	  the	  
criticism	  with	  a	  response	  is	  a	  way	  of	  legitimizing	  it	  and	  perhaps	  there	  is	  no	  greater	  love	  
than	  the	  love	  of	  legitimation.	  
	   When	  Niebuhr	  wrote	  his	  first	  journal	  entry	  in	  Leaves	  he	  was	  1915	  and	  he	  was	  23	  
years	  old.	  He	  begins	  it	  with	  this	  reflection:	  “There	  is	  something	  ludicrous	  about	  a	  callow	  
young	  fool	  like	  myself	  standing	  up	  to	  preach	  a	  sermon	  to	  these	  good	  folks.	  I	  talk	  wisely	  
about	  life	  and	  know	  little	  about	  life’s	  problems.	  I	  tell	  them	  of	  the	  need	  of	  sacrifice,	  although	  
most	  of	  them	  could	  tell	  me	  something	  about	  what	  that	  really	  means”	  (9).	  Niebuhr	  lacked	  
what	  he	  called	  the	  “seasoned	  wisdom”	  of	  old-­‐age,	  revealed	  to	  him	  after	  preaching	  a	  sermon	  
on	  “The	  Involuntary	  Cross”	  when	  an	  older	  lady,	  bolder	  than	  most,	  asked	  him	  if	  he	  had	  
borne	  many	  crosses	  in	  his	  life.	  But	  in	  the	  next	  paragraph	  Niebuhr	  addresses	  another	  new	  
experience,	  an	  important	  one	  because	  it	  shows	  how	  even	  at	  his	  earliest	  age	  and	  without	  
making	  an	  explicit	  connection	  to	  these	  two	  reflections,	  he	  solves	  problems	  rhetorically.	  He	  
writes:	  
I	  found	  it	  hard	  the	  first	  few	  months	  to	  wear	  a	  pulpit	  gown.	  Now	  I	  am	  getting	  
accustomed	  to	  it.	  At	  first	  I	  felt	  too	  much	  like	  a	  priest	  in	  it,	  and	  I	  abhor	  priestliness.	  I	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have	  become	  reconciled	  to	  it	  partly	  as	  a	  simple	  matter	  of	  habit,	  but	  I	  imagine	  that	  I	  
am	  also	  beginning	  to	  like	  the	  gown	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  symbol	  of	  authority.	  It	  gives	  me	  the	  
feeling	  that	  I	  am	  speaking	  not	  altogether	  in	  my	  own	  name	  and	  out	  of	  my	  own	  
experience	  but	  by	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  many	  Christian	  centuries.	  (9-­‐
10)	  
	  
Even	  if	  visual	  rhetorics	  s	  had	  been	  theorized	  by	  this	  time	  (they	  hadn’t)	  Niebuhr	  wouldn’t	  
have	  been	  likely	  to	  have	  encountered	  them	  at	  this	  point	  in	  his	  life.	  It	  wasn’t	  theory,	  but	  
Niebuhr’s	  vocation	  that	  grounded	  his	  experiences	  with	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  
solving	  man’s	  problems.	  Here,	  Niebuhr	  lacked	  the	  experience	  and	  age	  to	  establish	  ethos	  
with	  his	  audience;	  his	  solution	  was	  to	  borrow	  the	  ethos	  of	  Christianity	  by	  way	  of	  wearing	  a	  
robe,	  not	  necessarily	  because	  it	  actually	  gave	  him	  ethos	  with	  the	  audience,	  but	  because	  it	  
made	  him	  feel	  like	  he	  was	  speaking	  for	  a	  timeless	  truth	  that	  transcended	  his	  limited	  
experiences.	  The	  visual	  and	  symbolic	  rhetoric	  in	  this	  case	  was	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  rhetor	  and	  not	  
necessarily	  the	  audience.	  
The	  most	  important	  observation,	  I	  want	  to	  reiterate,	  is	  that	  we	  see	  in	  this	  reflection	  
what	  will	  be	  an	  ongoing	  theme	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  journals	  and	  that	  is,	  when	  Niebuhr	  bumps	  into	  
a	  problem,	  rhetoric	  is	  always	  some	  aspect	  of	  its	  solution.	  For	  instance,	  after	  preaching	  only	  
twelve	  sermons,	  Niebuhr	  already	  found	  himself	  regurgitating	  old	  messages.	  Frustrated,	  his	  
reflection	  on	  the	  topic	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  one	  regarding	  kairos.	  He	  writes:	  
	  If	  I	  really	  had	  great	  convictions	  I	  suppose	  they	  would	  struggle	  for	  birth	  each	  week.	  
As	  the	  matter	  stands,	  I	  struggle	  to	  find	  an	  idea	  worth	  presenting	  and	  I	  almost	  dread	  
the	  approach	  of	  a	  new	  Sabbath.	  I	  don’t	  know	  whether	  I	  can	  ever	  accustom	  myself	  to	  
the	  task	  of	  bringing	  light	  and	  inspiration	  in	  regular	  weekly	  installments.	  (12)	  
	  
Note	  how	  Niebuhr	  moves	  from	  his	  particular	  and	  special	  situation	  to	  exploring	  it	  in	  general	  
and	  universal	  concepts—even	  in	  terms	  that	  call	  to	  mind	  Plato’s	  Phaedrus:	  
How	  in	  the	  world	  can	  you	  reconcile	  the	  inevitability	  of	  Sunday	  and	  its	  task	  with	  the	  
moods	  and	  caprices	  of	  the	  soul?	  The	  prophet	  speaks	  only	  when	  he	  is	  inspired.	  The	  
parish	  preacher	  must	  speak	  whether	  he	  is	  inspired	  or	  not.	  I	  wonder	  whether	  it	  is	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possible	  to	  live	  on	  a	  high	  enough	  plane	  to	  do	  that	  without	  sinning	  against	  the	  Holy	  
Spirit.	  (12)	  
	  
Niebuhr’s	  struggle	  presents	  us	  with	  an	  issue	  of	  rhetoric’s	  timeliness.	  Some	  of	  you	  reading	  
this	  will	  no	  doubt	  be	  teachers	  and	  professors	  and	  as	  such,	  you	  will	  recognize	  this	  struggle	  
as	  well.	  How	  do	  we	  teach	  when	  we	  simply	  don’t	  feel	  like	  it?	  But	  another	  and	  more-­‐pressing	  
issue	  presents	  itself	  to	  the	  pastor	  as	  well.	  His	  congregation	  doesn’t	  radically	  change	  every	  
semester.	  After	  thirteen	  weeks	  of	  teaching,	  Niebuhr	  has	  to	  talk	  fresh	  and	  anew	  to	  the	  same	  
students,	  as	  he	  will	  after	  twenty,	  sixty,	  even	  a	  hundred	  weeks	  of	  sermons.	  
Of	  course,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  congregations	  don’t	  grow	  and	  shrink	  or	  alter	  the	  
make-­‐up	  of	  their	  membership.	  In	  fact,	  Niebuhr’s	  pastoral	  and	  rhetorical	  response	  must	  
have	  proved	  kairotic	  and	  preppon:	  during	  his	  time	  in	  Detroit	  the	  membership	  of	  his	  church	  
grew	  from	  sixty	  to	  six-­‐hundred5.	  Niebuhr	  lamented	  in	  1916	  that	  he	  had	  no	  ideas	  and	  was	  a	  
mere	  glib	  talker;	  he	  hoped	  that	  eventually	  he	  would	  “find	  something	  worth	  saying.”	  But	  
Niebuhr’s	  search	  for	  kairos	  would	  conclude	  quicker	  than	  he	  probably	  expected	  as	  
Woodrow	  Wilson	  would	  end	  America’s	  isolationist	  foreign	  policy	  and	  set	  out	  to	  “make	  the	  
world	  safe	  for	  democracy.”	  In	  1917,	  Niebuhr	  penned	  his	  second	  article	  for	  The	  Atlantic	  on	  
the	  paradox	  of	  Patriotism;	  however,	  his	  more	  somber	  and	  revealing	  thoughts	  on	  the	  
situation	  are	  recorded	  in	  Leaves.	  
Niebuhr	  was	  always	  searching	  for	  new	  experiences	  that	  would	  ground	  his	  thoughts	  
in	  the	  facts	  in	  the	  ground.	  I’m	  reminded	  of	  a	  dialogue	  I	  once	  had	  with	  a	  professor	  on	  the	  
difference	  between	  philosophers	  with	  children	  and	  those	  without,	  an	  important	  one	  being	  
that	  the	  former	  usually	  understand	  psychological	  development	  for	  empirically	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Detroit	  was	  a	  growing	  city	  and	  this	  is	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  Bethel’s	  growth.	  While	  the	  city	  
grew	  at	  a	  staggering	  25%,	  Bethel’s	  growth	  far	  surpassed	  it	  during	  Niebuhr’s	  tenure	  at	  
around	  600%.	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latter	  tend	  to	  talk	  more	  in	  abstracts	  and	  universals.	  Niebuhr	  might	  suggest	  a	  similar	  
difference	  between	  philosophers	  who	  had	  and	  had	  not	  been	  to	  a	  war	  camp	  or	  visited	  
Germany	  after	  the	  war,	  as	  he	  did	  in	  1923	  (afterward,	  he	  immediately	  returned	  to	  the	  US	  
after	  polemicized	  the	  ethical	  and	  moral	  mockery	  that	  was	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles).	  And	  
again,	  Niebuhr	  did	  suggest	  that	  those	  who	  still	  believed	  in	  the	  purity	  of	  reason	  and	  the	  
goodwill	  of	  rational	  man,	  take	  a	  walk	  through	  the	  Ford	  factories	  or	  counsel	  autoworkers’	  
families	  after	  they	  had	  been	  laid	  off.	  In	  a	  journal	  entry	  from	  1927	  he	  observes	  that	  if	  the	  
romanticists	  and	  sentimentalists	  could	  just	  sit	  through	  a	  meeting	  where	  the	  real	  social	  
issues	  of	  the	  city	  were	  discussed,	  they	  would	  instantly	  be	  cured	  of	  their	  optimism	  (115).	  
So	  it	  was	  for	  Niebuhr	  in	  1918-­‐-­‐his	  first	  entry	  in	  Leaves	  from	  that	  year	  is	  subtitled	  
“After	  a	  Trip	  Through	  the	  War	  Training	  Camps”—that	  upon	  returning	  from	  such	  a	  visit	  he	  
once	  again	  reflected	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  adjusted	  his	  attitude	  accordingly	  
(19-­‐20).	  He	  begins	  with	  a	  confession:	  “I	  hardly	  know	  how	  to	  bring	  order	  out	  of	  confusion	  in	  
my	  mind	  in	  regard	  to	  this	  war”;	  which	  reveals	  that	  even	  in	  his	  meta-­‐discourse—his	  
thoughts	  about	  his	  thoughts—he	  speaks	  in	  thoroughly	  Jamesian	  language	  about	  the	  
stream-­‐of-­‐consciousness	  and	  problem	  solving	  (ibid)6.	  Niebuhr	  analyzes	  his	  journey	  
through	  the	  camp	  with	  Jamesian	  reasoning,	  pulling	  our	  objects,	  separating	  them,	  and	  
piecing	  them	  back	  together	  harmoniously.	  First	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  if	  Wilson’s	  aims	  are	  
realized	  the	  war	  may	  serve	  a	  good	  purpose	  but	  that	  these	  aims	  may	  not	  justify	  the	  means	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  I	  can’t	  help	  but	  note	  that	  throughout	  my	  studies	  of	  Niebuhr,	  wherever	  I	  found	  James,	  I	  also	  
found	  the	  roots	  of	  James’	  pragmatism,	  i.e.	  C.S.	  Peirce.	  Whereas	  James	  sometimes	  departs	  
from	  Peirce,	  Niebuhr	  rarely	  uses	  that	  James	  in	  his	  appropriation	  or	  implicit	  use	  of	  
pragmatic	  methods.	  This	  is	  notable	  because	  one	  would	  think	  that	  James’	  Varieties	  would	  be	  
the	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  James’	  thought	  for	  Niebuhr.	  It	  was	  important—Niebuhr	  wrote	  
his	  M.Div.	  thesis	  on	  the	  subject—but	  it	  wasn’t	  James’	  topic	  that	  Niebuhr	  found	  useful;	  it	  was	  
James’	  method,	  which	  he	  did,	  in	  fact,	  appropriate	  from	  Peirce,	  and	  James’	  understanding	  of	  
the	  quest	  for	  ethical	  being	  that	  made	  Niebuhr	  a	  Jamesian.	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by	  which	  America	  is	  using	  to	  achieve	  them.	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “Out	  at	  Funston	  I	  watched	  a	  
bayonet	  practice.	  It	  was	  enough	  to	  make	  me	  feel	  like	  a	  hypocrite	  for	  being	  in	  this	  thing,	  
even	  in	  a	  rather	  indirect	  way.	  Yet	  I	  cannot	  bring	  myself	  to	  associate	  with	  the	  pacifists.	  
Perhaps	  if	  I	  were	  not	  of	  German	  blood	  I	  could”	  (19).	  It	  is	  all	  there,	  in	  this	  quote.	  Niebuhr’s	  
confused	  thoughts,	  not	  separated	  into	  their	  categories	  yet,	  objects,	  events,	  ethical	  questions	  
all	  jumping	  out	  at	  him	  simultaneously.	  The	  question	  about	  what	  to	  do	  is	  always	  intertwined	  
for	  Niebuhr	  with	  what	  James	  calls	  an	  ethical	  moment.	  “What	  he	  shall	  become	  is	  fixed	  by	  the	  
conduct	  of	  this	  moment,”	  James	  writes	  (1961,	  41).	  He	  continues,	  “The	  problem	  with	  the	  
man	  is	  less	  what	  act	  he	  shall	  now	  resolve	  to	  do	  than	  what	  being	  he	  shall	  now	  choose	  to	  
become”	  (ibid).	  
This	  ethical	  tension	  is	  not	  just	  an	  abstract	  universal	  thought	  experiment	  for	  
Niebuhr;	  it	  is	  genuinely	  felt	  as	  a	  part	  of	  his	  project	  of	  becoming,	  which	  always	  involves	  
rhetoric	  in	  some	  aspect.	  This	  is	  evidenced	  by	  his	  reflection	  on	  his	  experiences	  with	  the	  
military	  chaplains.	  “What	  makes	  me	  angry	  is	  the	  way	  I	  kowtow	  to	  the	  chaplains	  as	  I	  visit	  
the	  various	  camps”	  he	  writes	  (19).	  Niebuhr	  knew	  that	  they	  were	  ministers	  of	  the	  gospel	  
just	  as	  he	  was	  and	  additionally,	  that	  they	  were	  both	  serving	  as	  priests	  of	  the	  God	  of	  love	  
and	  the	  great	  God	  of	  Mars,	  at	  this	  moment.	  It	  wasn’t	  that	  they	  were	  of	  a	  higher	  rank	  or	  that	  
they	  were	  particularly	  smart	  or	  astute	  preachers	  or	  theologians.	  The	  only	  difference	  
Niebuhr	  could	  find	  was	  a	  symbolic	  one;	  that	  unlike	  himself,	  they	  bore	  the	  “adequate	  
symbols	  of	  this	  double-­‐devotion”	  to	  both	  God	  and	  country.	  These	  chaplains	  wore	  the	  cross	  
on	  their	  shoulder	  as	  well	  as	  a	  uniform	  that	  symbolized	  their	  devotion	  to	  the	  “god	  of	  battles.”	  
Niebuhr	  makes	  another	  confession:	  “It	  is	  the	  uniform	  and	  not	  the	  cross	  which	  impresses	  
me	  and	  others.	  I	  am	  impressed	  even	  when	  I	  know	  that	  I	  ought	  not	  be”	  (20).	  Thus,	  for	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Niebuhr,	  a	  base	  rhetorical	  appeal—or	  perhaps	  we	  should	  say	  “less	  noble”—are	  those	  
appeals	  that	  stir	  the	  desires,	  emotions,	  and	  feelings	  of	  loyalty	  and	  appreciation	  toward	  
something	  higher	  than	  the	  god	  of	  love.	  This,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  later,	  is	  not	  actually	  a	  rhetorical	  
appeal	  to	  another	  competing	  god,	  i.e.	  the	  god	  of	  battles;	  it	  is	  actually	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  will-­‐
to-­‐power	  of	  the	  self	  in	  that	  it	  is	  persuasive	  because	  it	  triggers	  in	  the	  audience	  an	  
unqualified	  feeling	  of	  pride,	  egotism,	  nationalism,	  and/or	  patriotism.	  
Since	  Niebuhr	  could	  make	  no	  clearly	  logical	  decision	  about	  the	  means	  and	  ends	  of	  
the	  war	  policy	  at	  this	  time,	  he	  tried	  to	  figure	  out	  why	  those	  who	  could	  were	  able	  to	  do	  so.	  
What	  he	  discovered	  was	  a	  practical	  solution	  to	  a	  ethical	  problem	  that	  he	  would	  find	  himself	  
in	  battle	  with	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  career,	  and	  the	  problem	  was	  a	  rhetorical	  one.	  “I	  can	  see	  one	  
element	  in	  this	  strange	  fascination	  of	  war	  which	  men	  have	  not	  adequately	  noted,”	  he	  
writes:	  “It	  reduces	  life	  to	  simple	  terms”	  (21).	  This	  simplicity	  was	  a	  welcome	  retreat	  from	  
the	  complex	  modern	  society	  man	  newly	  inhabited.	  “Every	  moral	  venture,	  every	  social	  
situation	  and	  every	  practical	  problem	  involves	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  conflicting	  loyalties,”	  note	  
Niebuhr,	  “and	  a	  man	  may	  never	  be	  quite	  sure	  that	  he	  is	  right	  in	  giving	  himself	  to	  one	  as	  
against	  the	  other.”	  It	  was	  out	  of	  this	  “mesh	  of	  conflicting	  claims,	  interests,	  loyalties,	  ideals,	  
values	  and	  communities”	  that	  modern	  man	  was	  being	  rescued	  by	  the	  “psychology	  of	  war”	  
which	  elevated	  the	  State,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  moment,	  above	  all	  other	  conflicting	  demands	  for	  
allegiance	  (21).	  This	  simplicity,	  combined	  with	  man’s	  love	  of	  authority,	  purchased	  man’s	  
temporary	  happiness	  that,	  since	  it	  does	  violence	  to	  life,	  could	  not	  be	  finally	  satisfying.	  
Eventually,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  judgment	  returns	  to	  sobriety	  as	  the	  events	  of	  the	  world	  
become	  less	  fragmented	  and	  the	  mixture	  of	  good	  and	  evil	  in	  every	  situation	  once	  again	  
comes	  to	  the	  foreground.	  He	  concludes	  in	  thoughtful,	  self-­‐reflective,	  and	  profound	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language:	  “There	  is	  only	  momentary	  peace	  in	  an	  all-­‐consuming	  passion,	  except	  it	  be	  a	  
passion	  for	  what	  is	  indubitably	  the	  best.	  And	  what	  is	  the	  best?”	  (22)	  
After	  the	  war,	  America	  settled	  back	  into	  its	  routine	  of	  progress	  and	  industrial	  
development.	  Optimistic	  visions	  of	  a	  global	  utopia	  were	  once	  again	  in	  full	  swing	  after	  the	  
signing	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles	  and	  the	  coincident	  initiation	  of	  a	  League	  of	  Nations.	  But	  
Niebuhr	  knew	  better	  than	  to	  buy	  into	  the	  rhetoric	  without	  looking	  at	  the	  realities.	  Even	  
before	  the	  treaty	  was	  signed,	  while	  negotiations	  were	  still	  going	  on,	  Niebuhr	  reflected	  on	  
the	  situation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  once	  again	  sheds	  light	  on	  his	  profound	  understanding	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  reality,	  between	  ideals	  and	  actuals.	  Niebuhr’s	  entry	  from	  
1919	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  in	  three	  sections.	  In	  the	  first	  section	  Niebuhr	  calls	  attention	  to	  an	  
immediate	  event	  of	  political	  concern;	  “What	  a	  picture	  that	  is	  of	  Wilson,	  Lloyd	  George	  and	  
Clemenceau	  settling	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  world	  in	  Paris!	  (24)	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  Wilson	  should	  
have	  stayed	  home	  and	  thrown	  bolts	  from	  Olympus	  because	  by	  showing	  up	  in	  person,	  he	  
was	  compromising	  too	  much	  to	  their	  demands.	  Even	  in	  this	  seemingly	  meaningless	  
reflection	  Niebuhr	  has	  an	  eye	  on	  the	  communicative	  aspects	  of	  the	  situation:	  “If	  you	  have	  
honest	  and	  important	  differences	  of	  opinion	  with	  others,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  write	  letters	  than	  to	  
put	  your	  feet	  under	  the	  same	  table	  with	  them”	  because	  compromises	  were	  always	  more	  
inevitable	  in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  debates	  than	  in	  long	  distance	  ones	  (ibid).	  Once	  again,	  Niebuhr	  
wows	  us	  with	  his	  common	  sense	  understanding	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  element	  in	  a	  given	  situation.	  
The	  next	  two	  elements	  in	  this	  entry	  are	  more	  important,	  for	  they	  reveal	  and	  
highlight	  the	  emergent	  rhetorical	  dualism	  of	  Niebuhr	  that	  I’ve	  chosen	  to	  ground	  this	  
dissertation’s	  organization.	  What	  is	  happening	  in	  Paris,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  is	  that	  they	  are	  
letting	  Wilson	  “label	  the	  transaction	  if	  the	  others	  can	  determine	  its	  true	  import.”	  Thus,	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Niebuhr	  argues,	  “realities	  are	  exchanged	  for	  words”	  (24).	  For	  example,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  
“indemnities”	  but	  there	  will	  be	  “reparations”	  made;	  there	  will	  be	  “no	  annexations”	  but	  
there	  will	  be	  “mandates.”	  Niebuhr	  concludes	  with	  a	  summary	  analysis	  of	  the	  relationship	  
that	  I	  quote	  at	  length	  because	  it	  shows	  that	  even	  in	  1919	  Niebuhr	  was	  weaving	  into	  his	  
political	  and	  social	  theories	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric,	  while	  he	  was	  simultaneously	  practicing	  a	  
mode	  of	  rhetorical	  criticism	  himself:	  
Wilson	  is	  a	  typical	  son	  of	  the	  manse.	  He	  believes	  too	  much	  in	  words…	  Yet	  who	  
knows?	  Time	  may	  yet	  give	  Mr.	  Wilson	  the	  victory.	  Words	  have	  certain	  meanings	  of	  
which	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  rob	  them,	  and	  ideas	  may	  create	  reality	  in	  time.	  The	  league	  of	  
nations	  may	  be,	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  merely	  a	  league	  of	  victors	  but	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  
to	  destroy	  the	  redemptive	  idea	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  it	  completely.	  Realities	  are	  always	  
defeating	  ideals,	  but	  ideals	  have	  a	  way	  of	  taking	  vengeance	  upon	  the	  facts	  which	  
momentarily	  imprison	  them.	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  always	  possible	  that	  diabolical	  facts	  will	  so	  discredit	  the	  
idea	  which	  they	  ostensibly	  incarnate	  that	  they	  will	  necessitate	  the	  projection	  of	  a	  
new	  idea	  before	  progress	  can	  be	  made.	  (24)	  
	  
Thus	  begins	  Niebuhr’s	  fascination	  with	  the	  relationship	  between	  ideals	  and	  reality,	  a	  
relationship	  that	  he	  almost	  always	  formulates	  as	  a	  dynamic	  one	  between	  words,	  thoughts,	  
and	  actions.	  As	  America	  moved	  out	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  domestic	  social	  issues	  would	  come	  to	  
the	  foreground	  of	  American	  thought	  and	  Niebuhr’s	  experiences	  in	  Detroit	  would	  allow	  his	  
to	  test	  his	  hypotheses	  about	  these	  rhetorical	  relationships	  with	  lived	  experiences	  and	  
adjust	  his	  theories	  accordingly.	  
After	  the	  World	  War	  I,	  things	  began	  to	  settle	  down	  in	  America.	  Over	  the	  next	  seven	  
years	  Niebuhr	  would	  move	  from	  a	  position	  of	  a	  somewhat	  balanced	  nature	  between	  
pessimism	  and	  optimism.	  But	  as	  Niebuhr	  would	  bump	  into	  more	  and	  more	  problems	  with	  
modern	  society,	  his	  views	  of	  human	  nature	  would	  shift	  notably	  toward	  a	  more	  cynical	  
viewpoint	  concerning	  man’s	  capacities	  for	  virtuous	  action.	  True,	  he	  would	  never	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completely	  abandon	  his	  trust	  that	  man	  could	  do	  better.	  Sin	  was	  not	  equivalent	  to	  
imperfection,	  he	  would	  often	  point	  out,	  and	  man’s	  freedom	  and	  will	  mean	  that	  history	  is	  
not	  normative	  and	  there	  is	  always	  a	  hope	  man	  can	  do	  better.	  
But	  Niebuhr	  was	  always	  a	  realist	  after	  his	  time	  in	  Detroit	  and	  always	  gravitated	  
more	  toward	  the	  cynical	  view	  of	  man’s	  nature.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  this	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
rhetorical	  practice	  that	  continued	  to	  experience	  failures	  in	  Detroit.	  Niebuhr	  was	  frustrated.	  
He	  thought	  that	  if	  only	  Detroit	  could	  see,	  hear,	  learn	  about	  the	  autoworkers’	  unjust	  
situations,	  then	  they	  would	  be	  moved	  to	  help	  him	  alleviate	  those	  injustices.	  Likewise,	  he	  
thought	  that	  if	  only	  Ford	  could	  see	  the	  love	  of	  Christ	  in	  his	  city	  and	  his	  workers,	  he	  would	  
also	  be	  moved	  into	  just	  actions	  regarding	  his	  labor	  practices.	  In	  other	  words,	  at	  this	  point	  
Niebuhr	  still	  held	  to	  a	  view	  of	  human	  nature	  that	  he	  would	  spend	  the	  next	  forty	  years	  
trying	  to	  correct—that	  is,	  the	  ridiculous	  and	  unempirical	  notion	  that	  if	  only	  man	  knew	  the	  
right	  thing	  to	  do,	  he	  would	  do	  it.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Niebuhr	  would	  note	  seven	  years	  later;	  
when	  man	  knows	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do,	  will	  use	  it	  as	  a	  rationalization	  for	  his	  unjust	  actions,	  
i.e.	  he	  will	  hide	  behind	  it;	  he	  will	  do	  the	  wrong	  thing	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  good.	  
The	  Making	  of	  a	  Prophet	  (1920-­‐1927)	  
	  
Niebuhr	  cut	  his	  prophetic	  teeth	  during	  his	  work	  as	  a	  leader	  and	  organizer	  for	  the	  
labor	  movement	  during	  the	  first-­‐half	  of	  the	  twenties.	  It	  was	  a	  formative	  time	  for	  Niebuhr’s	  
thought	  because	  it	  changed	  his	  outlook	  on	  human	  nature.	  It	  was	  a	  formative	  time	  for	  his	  
voice	  because	  it	  was	  there	  that	  Niebuhr	  solidified	  his	  ministry	  as	  a	  prophetic	  one.	  In	  1922,	  
what	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  big	  year	  for	  Niebuhr,	  he	  submitted	  his	  first	  article	  for	  publication	  
to	  the	  Christian	  Century.	  The	  editor,	  Charles	  Clayton	  Morrison,	  turned	  it	  down	  but	  
encouraged	  Niebuhr	  to	  keep	  trying.	  A	  month	  later,	  Niebuhr	  submitted	  a	  fifteen-­‐hundred-­‐
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word	  essay	  titled	  “Romanticism	  and	  Realism	  in	  the	  Pulpit.”	  Niebuhr	  was	  offered	  a	  choice	  
between	  having	  his	  name	  on	  the	  essay	  or	  publishing	  it	  unsigned	  and	  receiving	  a	  ten-­‐dollar	  
fee	  (Fox	  1985,	  72).	  He	  chose	  the	  latter.	  The	  article	  was	  a	  launching	  point	  for	  Niebuhr’s	  
career	  as	  a	  popular	  writer.	  Morrison	  responded	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Niebuhr	  asking	  for	  more	  
essays,	  “Just	  send	  them	  in,	  as	  many	  as	  possible	  and	  as	  often	  as	  possible”	  (ibid).	  Niebuhr	  did,	  
and	  for	  the	  next	  half-­‐decade	  Niebuhr	  would	  dominate	  Century’s	  pages.	  
	   It	  was	  also	  in	  1922	  that	  Bishop	  Charles	  D.	  Williams	  suggested	  to	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  
Fellowship	  of	  a	  Christian	  Social	  Order	  (FCSO)	  that	  they	  consider	  using	  Niebuhr’s	  talents	  as	  
a	  first-­‐rate	  organizer.	  The	  FCSO	  was	  an	  educational	  organization	  of	  liberal	  Christians	  who	  
would	  study	  industrial	  capitalism	  and	  develop	  a	  Christian	  approach	  to	  reforming	  it	  (Fox	  
1985,	  75).	  Together,	  Niebuhr	  and	  Williams	  established	  the	  Detroit	  branch	  of	  the	  FCSO.	  The	  
timing	  was	  right	  for	  such	  an	  organization;	  a	  recent	  expose	  of	  the	  working	  conditions	  in	  the	  
steel	  industry	  had	  recently	  brought	  church	  awareness	  of	  the	  labor-­‐capital	  conflict	  to	  a	  peak	  
(ibid).	  Thirty	  recruits	  showed	  up	  at	  their	  first	  official	  meeting	  in	  November.	  Had	  the	  FCSO	  
only	  accomplished	  one	  thing,	  bringing	  Niebuhr	  and	  Williams	  together,	  it	  would	  remain	  an	  
important	  historical	  fact	  in	  American	  history	  for	  this	  reason	  alone.	  Niebuhr	  knew	  Bishop	  
Williams	  only	  six	  months	  before	  Williams	  passed	  of	  a	  heart	  attack.	  As	  Fox	  notes,	  this	  was	  a	  
turning	  point	  for	  Niebuhr	  (76).	  Niebuhr’s	  journal	  entry	  from	  Leaves	  records	  the	  profound	  
impact	  Williams’	  death	  had	  on	  him:	  
Bishop	  Williams	  is	  dead.	  I	  sit	  and	  stare	  at	  the	  floor	  while	  I	  say	  that	  to	  myself	  and	  try	  
to	  believe	  it.	  How	  strangely	  a	  vital	  personality	  defies	  the	  facts	  of	  death.	  Nowhere	  
have	  I	  seen	  a	  personality	  more	  luminous	  with	  the	  Christ	  spirit	  than	  in	  this	  bishop	  
who	  was	  also	  a	  prophet.	  Here	  was	  a	  man	  who	  knew	  how	  to	  interpret	  the	  Christian	  
religion	  so	  that	  it	  meant	  something	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  industrial	  civilization.	  His	  fearless	  
protagonism	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  democracy	  in	  industry	  won	  him	  the	  respect	  and	  love	  of	  
the	  workers	  of	  the	  city	  as	  no	  other	  churchman	  possessed.	  Yet	  I'm	  afraid	  it	  must	  be	  
admitted	  that	  he	  didn't	  change	  the	  prevailing	  attitude	  of	  Detroit	  industry	  by	  a	  hair’s	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breadth…	  If	  a	  bishop	  with	  all	  his	  prestige	  could	  make	  no	  bigger	  dent	  upon	  the	  
prevailing	  mood	  of	  the	  city,	  what	  chance	  is	  there	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  us?	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  
that	  any	  of	  us	  can	  do	  is	  to	  say:	  Charge	  once	  more	  and	  then	  and	  be	  dumb/Let	  the	  
victors	  when	  they	  come/When	  the	  forts	  of	  folly	  fall/Find	  thy	  body	  by	  the	  wall.	  
	  
From	  this	  moment	  on,	  Niebuhr	  would	  take	  up	  the	  torch	  Bishop	  Williams	  left	  for	  him.	  His	  
prophetic	  ministry	  can,	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  be	  said	  to	  begin	  right	  here.	  
	   Niebuhr	  took	  up	  the	  prophetic	  task	  in	  his	  editorials.	  His	  prose	  for	  the	  Century	  was	  
distinctive.	  Richard	  Fox	  collected	  and	  recorded	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  that	  marked	  
Niebuhr’s	  stamp	  on	  editorials:	  “hard-­‐headed,	  vehement,	  [and]	  satirical,”	  “A	  dash	  of	  
disillusion,	  a	  sprinkling	  of	  hope;	  mild	  cynicism	  moderated	  by	  firm	  faith	  in	  future	  action	  or	  
conversion,”	  “self-­‐consciously	  pointed,	  realistic,	  and	  masculine,”	  “rhetorically	  explosive	  and	  
determinedly	  paradoxical”	  (73-­‐4).	  Niebuhr,	  was	  forever	  aghast	  at	  the	  “perils”	  facing	  
modern	  civilization,	  discouraged	  over	  the	  “fathomless	  sentimentality”	  and	  “impotence”	  of	  
the	  churches	  in	  the	  social	  arena,	  angered	  by	  the	  “hypocrisy”	  and	  “complacency”	  of	  the	  rich,	  
of	  Christians,	  of	  America	  (74).	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  problems	  Niebuhr	  came	  across	  in	  Detroit	  was	  the	  
immense	  toll	  that	  Ford’s	  automobile	  factories	  took	  on	  laborers,	  both	  physically	  and	  
spiritually.	  After	  touring	  one	  of	  the	  local	  factories,	  Niebuhr	  reflected	  on	  the	  experience	  in	  
his	  journal:	  
So	  artificial	  is	  life	  that	  these	  factories	  are	  like	  a	  strange	  world	  to	  me	  though	  I	  have	  
lived	  close	  to	  them	  for	  many	  years.	  The	  foundry	  interested	  me	  particularly.	  The	  heat	  
was	  terrific.	  The	  men	  seemed	  weary.	  Here	  manual	  labor	  is	  a	  drudgery	  and	  toil	  is	  
slavery.	  The	  men	  cannot	  possibly	  find	  any	  satisfaction	  in	  their	  work.	  They	  simply	  
work	  to	  make	  a	  living.	  Their	  sweat	  and	  their	  dull	  pain	  are	  part	  of	  the	  price	  paid	  for	  
the	  fine	  cars	  we	  all	  run.	  And	  most	  of	  us	  run	  the	  cars	  without	  knowing	  what	  price	  is	  
being	  paid	  for	  them.…	  We	  are	  all	  responsible.	  We	  all	  want	  the	  things	  which	  the	  
factory	  produces	  and	  none	  of	  us	  is	  sensitive	  enough	  to	  care	  how	  much	  in	  human	  
values	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  modern	  factory	  costs	  (Niebuhr	  1980).	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Typical	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  journal,	  this	  experience	  becomes	  a	  moment	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  rhetorical	  
elements	  of	  his	  job	  as	  a	  pastor.	  “Beside	  the	  brutal	  facts	  of	  modern	  industrial	  life,”	  he	  writes,	  
“how	  futile	  are	  all	  our	  homiletical	  spoutings!....	  If	  we	  knew	  the	  world	  in	  which	  we	  live	  a	  
little	  better	  we	  would	  perish	  in	  shame	  or	  be	  overcome	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  futility”	  (ibid).	  One	  will	  
note	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  perennial	  question	  comes	  to	  the	  fore,	  once	  again;	  his	  rhetoric	  is	  felt	  to	  
be	  futile	  because	  it	  isn’t	  able	  to	  make	  the	  audience	  genuinely	  feel	  the	  suffering	  of	  the	  worker.	  
If	  only	  we	  could	  know	  it,	  he	  writes.	  At	  this	  time	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  life,	  an	  unqualified	  optimism	  in	  
the	  power	  of	  reason	  and	  intelligence	  remains.	  Niebuhr	  makes	  the	  same	  argument	  that	  he	  
would	  soon	  chastise	  John	  Dewey	  for	  making;	  Niebuhr	  had	  not	  yet	  learned	  that	  knowing	  the	  
right	  thing	  to	  do	  and	  doing	  it	  were	  two	  completely	  different	  things.	  
	   Niebuhr’s	  reference	  to	  futile	  “homiletical	  spoutings”	  brings	  us	  to	  another	  experience	  
that	  greatly	  influenced	  his	  thoughts	  for	  many	  years:	  the	  seemingly	  impenetrable	  
conscience	  of	  a	  lethargic	  audience.	  His	  situation,	  no	  doubt	  because	  of	  his	  pastoral	  calling,	  
was	  always	  felt	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  one	  and	  the	  exigence	  was	  how	  to	  move	  his	  audiences	  out	  of	  
this	  inertia.	  He	  reflects	  in	  his	  journal:	  
On	  the	  whole,	  people	  do	  not	  achieve	  great	  moral	  heights	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  duty.	  You	  
may	  be	  able	  to	  compel	  them	  to	  maintain	  certain	  minimum	  standards	  by	  stressing	  
duty,	  but	  the	  highest	  moral	  in	  spiritual	  achievements	  depend	  not	  upon	  a	  push	  but	  
upon	  a	  pull.	  People	  must	  be	  charmed	  into	  righteousness.	  The	  language	  of	  aspiration	  
rather	  than	  that	  of	  criticism	  and	  command	  is	  the	  proper	  pulpit	  language.	  Of	  course	  it	  
has	  its	  limitations.	  In	  every	  congregation	  there	  are	  a	  few	  perverse	  sinners	  who	  can	  
go	  into	  emotional	  ecstasies	  about	  the	  city	  of	  God	  and	  yet	  not	  see	  how	  they	  are	  
helping	  to	  make	  their	  city	  a	  hell-­‐hole.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  good	  thing	  to	  convict	  sin	  only	  by	  
implication.	  Sometimes	  the	  cruel	  word	  of	  censure	  must	  be	  uttered.	  “Woe	  unto	  you	  
scribes	  and	  Pharisees,	  hypocrites”	  was	  spoken	  by	  one	  who	  incarnated	  tenderness.	  
The	  language	  of	  aspiration	  is	  always	  in	  danger	  of	  becoming	  soft;	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  
avoid	  that	  pitfall	  and	  yet	  not	  sink	  into	  a	  habit	  of	  cheap	  scolding	  (Niebuhr	  1980).	  
	  
By	  this	  point	  Niebuhr’s	  frustrations	  were	  high;	  he	  was	  unsure	  if	  it	  was	  even	  possible	  to	  
preach	  the	  true	  gospel	  in	  America,	  where	  “happiness	  is	  gauged	  in	  terms	  of	  automobiles	  and	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radios”	  and	  “the	  love	  of	  possession	  controls	  our	  home	  life”	  (Fox	  1985,	  88).	  In	  such	  a	  climate	  
Niebuhr	  argued	  that	  idealistic	  motives	  were	  doomed.	  “It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  attain	  the	  
kingdom	  of	  God,”	  he	  wrote,	  “if	  you	  think	  you	  are	  already	  in	  the	  kingdom”	  (ibid).	  The	  “pious	  
bourgeoisie	  of	  the	  Protestant	  churches”	  that	  Niebuhr	  encountered	  were	  intolerant	  of	  any	  
preacher	  who	  tried	  to	  teach	  them	  a	  rigorous	  social	  ethic.	  Niebuhr	  surmised:	  “It	  seems	  that	  
now,	  as	  in	  ancient	  times,	  the	  only	  safety	  for	  a	  prophet	  lies	  in	  itinerancy…	  the	  Christian	  
religion	  will	  not	  seriously	  challenge	  the	  conscience	  of	  America	  until	  it	  is	  presented	  to	  the	  
nation	  by	  men	  with	  such	  conviction	  and	  passion	  that	  a	  few	  martyrdoms	  will	  become	  
inevitable”	  (ibid).	  “For	  us,”	  he	  argued,	  as	  it	  was	  for	  Amos,	  “the	  day	  of	  the	  Lord	  must	  be	  
darkness	  and	  not	  light,	  and	  things	  must	  become	  worse	  before	  they	  can	  be	  better”	  (ibid).	  He	  
was	  right.	  In	  1927,	  Ford	  released	  the	  Model	  A	  and	  Niebuhr	  was	  aghast	  at	  its	  reception.	  
Niebuhr	  had	  spent	  over	  five	  years	  trying	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  of	  industry	  and	  
capitalism	  and	  yet,	  he	  had	  seen	  little	  to	  no	  progress.	  The	  reception	  of	  the	  new	  Model	  A	  
made	  Niebuhr	  sick.	  “The	  new	  Ford	  car	  is	  out”	  he	  wrote.	  “The	  town	  is	  full	  of	  talk	  about	  it.	  
Newspaper	  reports	  revealed	  that	  it	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  day	  and	  all	  world	  centers.	  Crowds	  
storm	  every	  exhibit	  to	  get	  the	  first	  glimpse	  of	  this	  new	  creation.”	  The	  car	  cost	  Ford	  about	  
$100	  million	  to	  produce	  and	  after	  finishing	  it	  Ford	  “still	  has	  about	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  billion	  
dollars	  in	  the	  bank.”	  By	  Niebuhr’s	  math,	  “the	  car	  cost	  Ford	  workers	  at	  least	  fifty	  million	  in	  
lost	  wages	  during	  the	  past	  year.”	  Niebuhr	  laments	  that	  “No	  one	  knows	  how	  many	  hundreds	  
lost	  their	  homes	  in	  the	  period	  of	  unemployment,	  and	  how	  many	  children	  were	  taken	  out	  of	  
school	  to	  help	  fuel	  the	  depleted	  family	  exchequer,	  and	  how	  many	  more	  children	  lived	  on	  
short	  rations	  during	  this	  period.”	  It	  was	  enough	  for	  Niebuhr	  that	  Mr.	  Ford	  refused	  to	  
concede	  he	  made	  a	  mistake	  in	  bringing	  the	  car	  out	  so	  late;	  what	  was	  worse	  was	  that	  Ford	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had	  a	  way	  of	  impressing	  the	  public	  even	  with	  his	  mistakes.	  “We	  are	  now	  asked	  to	  believe	  
that	  the	  whole	  idea	  of	  waiting	  a	  year	  after	  the	  old	  car	  stopped	  selling…	  was	  a	  great	  
advertising	  scheme	  which	  reveals	  the	  perspicacity	  of	  this	  industrial	  genius”	  Niebuhr	  noted;	  
“But	  no	  one	  asked	  about	  the	  toll	  in	  human	  lives.”	  He	  concludes	  with	  a	  tone	  of	  sheer	  
frustration	  combined	  with	  dumbfounded	  awe:	  
What	  a	  civilization	  this	  is!	  Naïve	  gentleman	  with	  a	  genius	  for	  mechanics	  suddenly	  
become	  the	  arbiters	  over	  the	  lives	  and	  fortunes	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands.	  Their	  
moral	  pretensions	  are	  credulously	  accepted	  at	  full	  value.	  No	  one	  bothers	  to	  ask	  
whether	  an	  industry	  which	  can	  maintain	  a	  cash	  reserve	  of	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  billion	  
ought	  not	  make	  some	  provision	  for	  its	  unemployed.	  Here	  it	  is	  enough	  that	  the	  new	  
car	  is	  a	  good	  one.	  Here	  is	  a	  work	  of	  art	  in	  the	  only	  realm	  of	  art	  which	  we	  can	  
understand.	  We	  will	  therefore	  refrain	  from	  making	  undue	  ethical	  demands	  upon	  the	  
artist.	  Artist	  of	  all	  the	  ages	  have	  been	  notoriously	  unamenable	  to	  moral	  discipline.	  
The	  cry	  of	  the	  hungry	  is	  drowned	  in	  the	  song,	  ‘Henry	  has	  made	  a	  lady	  out	  of	  Lizzy.’	  
(123)	  
	  
In	  his	  last	  “Ford”	  article,	  Niebuhr	  argued	  that	  “Henry	  Ford	  is	  America”:	  like	  America,	  Ford	  
applied	  the	  social	  intelligence	  of	  a	  country	  village	  to	  the	  most	  complex	  industrial	  life	  the	  
world	  has	  ever	  known;”	  Like	  America,	  Ford	  was	  “well-­‐intentioned,	  mechanically	  gifted,	  
(and)	  exuberantly	  backward–looking	  in	  matters	  of	  social	  responsibility;”	  Neither	  America	  
nor	  Ford	  were	  malevolent	  he	  argued,	  but	  both	  were	  “deluded	  innocents	  with	  flashes	  of	  
exploitative	  genius.”	  In	  this	  prophetic	  polemic,	  we	  can	  see	  Niebuhr	  make	  a	  firm	  
argumentative	  leap	  from	  the	  one	  to	  the	  many,	  i.e.	  from	  his	  parishioner/autoworkers’	  
problems	  with	  Henry	  Ford	  in	  Detroit,	  to	  America’s	  problems	  facing	  the	  onslaught	  of	  
modernity.	  
This	  is	  notable	  because	  it	  is	  precisely	  at	  this	  time	  that	  Niebuhr	  receives	  an	  offer	  to	  
join	  the	  faculty	  at	  Union	  Theological	  Seminary;	  true	  to	  scholastic	  form,	  when	  one	  stops	  
talking	  about	  local	  problems	  and	  start	  talking	  about	  “man,”	  Niebuhr	  was	  now	  ready	  to	  join	  
the	  academic	  conversation.	  Thus,	  as	  Niebuhr	  went	  forth	  an	  even	  greater	  leap	  would	  have	  to	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be	  made.	  Ford,	  it	  turns	  out,	  wasn’t	  just	  a	  misguided	  individual	  or	  apt	  symbol	  of	  what	  was	  
wrong	  with	  America.	  Ford	  was	  Calicles	  and	  America	  was	  Athens.	  Ford	  was	  King	  Jeroboam	  
and	  America	  was	  the	  Northern	  Kingdom	  of	  Israel.	  Ford,	  in	  other	  words,	  was	  a	  timeless	  
manifestation	  of	  everything	  that	  is	  both	  good	  and	  bad	  in	  human	  nature.	  Ford	  was	  a	  man	  
driven	  by	  a	  will-­‐to-­‐power	  in	  an	  immoral	  society	  that	  thought	  it	  was	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  
great	  society,	  God’s	  chosen	  people,	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God.	  
The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Expert,	  Eclipse	  of	  the	  Public	  
and	  the	  Onslaught	  of	  Modernity	  (1927-­‐1932)	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  things	  I've	  always	  found	  most	  fascinating	  when	  studying	  the	  
philosophical	  writings	  of	  a	  given	  historical	  period,	  is	  the	  zeitgeist,	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  times,	  
which	  always	  feels	  like	  a	  mysterious	  and	  yet	  momentous	  force	  veiled	  behind	  the	  recorded	  
thoughts	  themselves.	  During	  any	  given	  period	  certain	  phenomenon	  call	  themselves	  forth	  to	  
the	  thinkers	  of	  the	  time	  and	  present	  themselves	  as	  the	  fundamental,	  perhaps	  even	  
primordial	  problems	  of	  human	  existence.	  In	  order	  to	  get	  the	  feeling	  of	  a	  zeitgeist	  from	  the	  
literature	  of	  a	  given	  period,	  it	  may	  require	  looking	  at	  several	  years,	  decades,	  or	  perhaps	  
even	  centuries	  of	  writings;	  but	  in	  this	  instance,	  we	  need	  look	  no	  further	  than	  a	  singular	  
year	  to	  discover	  the	  rhetorical	  situation	  Niebuhr	  found	  himself	  in	  during	  his	  rise	  to	  
prominence	  as	  “America’s	  theologian.”	  
The	  following	  events	  took	  place	  in	  1927	  alone:	  the	  first	  transatlantic	  radio	  signal	  
was	  transmitted	  (prompting	  the	  first	  regulatory	  political	  machine,	  the	  US	  Federal	  Radio	  
Commission—later	  the	  FCC—was	  established);	  Fritz	  Lang’s	  Metropolis	  premiered	  in	  
Germany;	  the	  Bell	  Telephone	  Co.	  transmitted	  an	  image	  of	  Hoover	  in	  the	  first-­‐ever	  
successful	  long-­‐distance	  demonstration	  of	  television;	  Lindberg	  made	  the	  first	  solo	  nonstop	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transatlantic	  flight	  from	  New	  York	  City	  to	  Paris;	  Sacco	  and	  Vanzetti	  were	  executed;	  CBS	  was	  
formed	  and	  went	  on	  air	  with	  47	  radio	  stations;	  “The	  Jazz	  Singer”	  was	  released	  (the	  first	  
feature-­‐length	  motion	  picture	  with	  synchronized	  dialogue	  sequences,	  i.e.	  “talkies”);	  Pan	  Am	  
made	  its	  first	  flight	  (from	  Key	  West	  to	  Havana	  Cuba,	  no	  less);	  Trotsky	  was	  expelled	  from	  
the	  Soviet	  Communist	  Party	  (leaving	  Stalin	  with	  undisputed	  control	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  
where,	  in	  December,	  he	  condemned	  all	  deviators	  from	  the	  party	  line);	  Ford	  released	  the	  
new	  Model	  A	  (after	  nineteen	  years	  of	  Model	  T	  production);	  the	  British	  Empire	  executed	  
Indian	  revolutionaries;	  and	  finally,	  striking	  coal	  miners	  in	  Colorado	  were	  fired	  upon	  with	  
machine	  guns	  by	  their	  own	  police	  department	  (6	  were	  killed,	  60	  were	  injured).	  
Thus,	  the	  world	  was	  trying	  to	  catch	  its	  breath	  from	  the	  rapid	  changes	  that	  seemed	  to	  
be	  adding	  a	  never	  before	  felt	  automatic	  and	  uncontrolled	  aspect	  to	  time	  and	  history.	  The	  
beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  is	  notable	  for	  its	  rapid	  technological	  and	  industrial	  
innovation	  and	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  tremors	  these	  innovations	  left	  in	  their	  wake.	  
Telecommunications,	  assembly	  lines,	  urban	  sprawl,	  and	  nuclear	  warfare	  were	  important	  
topics	  of	  discussion	  for	  political	  scientists,	  psychologists,	  and	  theologians	  alike.	  The	  
scholastic	  and	  intellectual	  climate	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  reveal	  that	  these	  new	  
developments	  were	  seen	  as	  growing	  crises	  that	  must	  be	  understood	  properly	  if	  
humanity—much	  less	  democracy—was	  to	  survive	  them.	  An	  apocalyptic	  tone	  can	  be	  heard,	  
even	  if	  faintly,	  in	  even	  the	  more	  optimistic	  thinkers	  of	  the	  period.	  
One	  can	  only	  imagine	  how	  uncertain	  the	  future	  must've	  seemed	  but	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  
major	  works	  published	  during	  that	  same	  year,	  perhaps	  we	  can	  get	  an	  idea.	  It	  was	  in	  1927,	  
that	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  philosophical	  treatise	  written	  during	  the	  20th	  century	  
appeared	  on	  bookshelves	  in	  Germany	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  Martin	  Heidegger's	  Sein	  und	  Zeit	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would	  shake	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  philosophical	  world.	  In	  it,	  Heidegger	  addressed	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  mass,	  concluding	  that	  the	  latter	  stood	  in	  the	  
way	  of	  the	  former’s	  ability	  to	  achieve	  an	  authentic	  existence.	  It	  was,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  an	  
implicitly	  theological	  treatise	  without	  a	  transcendent	  God	  and	  thus,	  it	  falls	  into	  the	  category	  
of	  another	  notable	  publication	  from	  the	  same	  year:	  Sigmund	  Freud's	  Future	  of	  an	  Illusion.	  
This,	  in	  the	  same	  year	  that	  Bertrand	  Russell	  penned	  Why	  I	  am	  Not	  a	  Christian	  and	  Oswald	  
Chambers	  authored	  the	  all-­‐time	  best-­‐selling	  Christian	  text,	  other	  than	  the	  Bible,	  ever	  
written:	  My	  Utmost	  for	  His	  Highest.	  It	  is	  finally	  worth	  noting	  that	  during	  this	  same	  year	  for	  
the	  nephew,	  Edward	  Bernays—the	  “Father	  of	  Public	  Relations”—combined	  his	  uncle’s	  
work	  with	  his	  own	  ideas	  on	  crowd	  psychology,	  and	  in	  1928	  published	  the	  results	  in	  a	  book	  
titled	  simply	  Propaganda.	  There,	  Bernays	  argued	  that	  manipulation	  as	  necessary	  in	  a	  
rational	  and	  dangerous	  society	  that	  was	  ruled	  by	  the	  “herd	  instinct.”	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  
Hitler	  would	  pen	  Mein	  Kampf.	  Germany	  wasn’t	  alone	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  new	  problems	  
arising	  from	  large,	  ideologically	  driven	  collective	  action.	  In	  Spain,	  Jose	  Ortega	  y	  Gasset	  was	  
already	  observing	  what	  he	  would	  call	  “the	  revolt	  of	  the	  masses.”7	  
So	  it	  was	  that	  across	  several	  thousand	  miles	  of	  ocean,	  the	  US	  was	  also	  experiencing	  
new	  problems	  that	  were	  characterized	  by	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  
mass,	  or	  as	  American	  writers	  would	  call	  it,	  in	  a	  truly	  democratic	  fashion	  that	  hesitated	  to	  
condemn	  the	  demos,	  “the	  public.”	  Walter	  Lippmann,	  John	  Dewey,	  and	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr	  
shared	  this	  common	  rhetorical	  situation	  in	  the	  second	  decade	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  For	  all	  
three	  of	  these	  writers	  industry,	  technology,	  and	  the	  applied	  sciences	  were	  creating	  a	  more	  
complex	  society	  in	  which	  the	  consequences	  of	  individual	  actions	  were	  far	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  It	  is	  notable,	  that	  Niebuhr	  would	  review	  both	  of	  these	  texts,	  the	  former	  in	  the	  original	  
German,	  and	  with	  a	  section	  on	  propaganda	  excluded	  from	  the	  English	  translation.	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unpredictable	  than	  they	  were	  at	  previous	  times	  in	  history.	  Their	  analyses	  of	  their	  historical	  
exigencies	  are	  instructive	  because	  they	  were	  remarkably	  so	  similar,	  despite	  some	  
divergences,	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Dewey	  and	  Niebuhr,	  their	  stark	  contrasts.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  
notable	  and	  lasting	  influential	  voices	  during	  America’s	  transition	  into	  the	  technological	  age,	  
all	  three	  thinkers	  bore	  witness	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  war	  that	  posed	  new	  dilemmas	  
concerning	  the	  delicate	  balance	  between	  isolationist	  foreign	  policies	  and	  the	  
responsibilities	  of	  power;	  all	  three	  saw	  the	  rise	  of	  machination	  and	  technology	  that	  would	  
create	  a	  new	  man—one	  that	  Hannah	  Arendt	  would	  dub	  animal	  laborans;	  and	  all	  three	  
profoundly,	  perhaps	  prophetically,	  perceived	  the	  problematic	  rise	  of	  new	  social	  forces	  on	  
freshly	  alienated	  individuals	  and	  the	  role	  that	  communication	  played	  in	  both	  fostering	  and	  
controlling	  these	  communal	  sentiments.	  In	  other	  words,	  all	  three	  of	  these	  thinkers	  
recognized	  that	  the	  world	  was	  changing	  rapidly	  and	  agreed,	  that	  a	  fresh	  look	  at	  how	  
individuals	  develop	  community	  ties	  and	  function	  as	  cohesive	  publics	  was	  an	  imperative	  
subject	  of	  study,	  if	  America	  was	  to	  face	  the	  new	  demands	  of	  modernity	  intelligently.	  
One	  of	  America’s	  “first-­‐responders”	  to	  the	  growing	  concern	  about	  individuals’	  
relationships	  with	  society	  was	  journalist	  Walter	  Lippmann.	  In	  1925	  he	  published	  The	  
Phantom	  Public,	  where	  he	  developed	  themes	  from	  his	  first	  prominent	  work,	  Public	  Opinion	  
(1922).	  For	  Lippmann,	  the	  impetus	  was	  still	  on	  the	  creativities	  and	  limitations	  of	  
individuals.	  In	  Public	  Opinion,	  Lippmann	  noted	  the	  cognitive	  limitations	  inherit	  in	  dealing	  
with	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  world	  and	  hypothesized	  that	  in	  order	  to	  cope	  with	  such	  a	  vast,	  
complex	  society,	  individuals’	  dependence	  upon	  irrational	  stereotypes	  would	  grow	  
substantially	  (Shinn	  2009a).	  In	  1925,	  Lippmann	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  “public”	  was	  a	  
theoretical	  fiction,	  and	  that	  the	  role	  of	  government	  was	  primarily	  an	  administrative	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problem	  to	  be	  solved	  as	  efficiently	  as	  possible,	  so	  that	  people	  could	  get	  on	  with	  their	  own	  
individualistic	  pursuits”	  (Lippmann	  1922).	  Lippmann	  saw	  a	  world	  where	  the	  few,	  the	  
agents	  in	  a	  given	  situation,	  are	  the	  responsible	  parties	  for	  change	  and	  where	  bystanders,	  
those	  often	  theoretically	  lumped	  into	  one	  cohesive	  “public,”	  are	  usually	  just	  “deaf	  
spectators	  in	  the	  back	  row”	  (Bybee	  1999,	  48).	  
John	  Dewey	  took	  his	  turn	  at	  analyzing	  the	  new	  world	  and	  he	  targeted	  Lippmann’s	  
analysis	  directly.	  In	  The	  Public	  and	  Its	  Problems,	  Dewey	  argued	  that	  the	  public	  was	  not	  a	  
mere	  fiction,	  but	  rather	  had	  been	  “eclipsed”	  due	  to	  rapid	  increases	  in	  technology’s	  range	  of	  
consequences	  that	  were	  not	  met	  with	  the	  response	  of	  an	  evolving	  state	  that	  changed	  along	  
side	  it	  (Lippmann	  1925,	  13).	  For	  Dewey,	  the	  fate	  of	  democracy	  was	  not	  quite	  as	  certain	  as	  
Lippmann	  made	  it	  out	  to	  be.	  The	  solution	  wasn’t	  in	  a	  few	  experts	  who	  could	  run	  the	  show,	  
so	  to	  speak,	  but	  was	  instead	  in	  maintaining	  a	  truly	  experimental	  perspective	  toward	  the	  
organization	  of	  the	  public.	  This,	  for	  two	  reasons:	  first,	  the	  scientific	  method	  called	  for	  
experimentation	  and	  showed	  how	  successful	  such	  experiments	  were	  in	  developing	  better	  
and	  new	  solutions	  to	  old	  problems;	  and	  secondly,	  the	  flux	  of	  time	  called	  for	  
experimentation	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  government	  made	  to	  organize	  a	  public	  yesterday	  
could	  not	  very	  well	  organize	  a	  different	  public,	  with	  its	  difference	  features	  and	  traits,	  
equally	  well.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  worked	  yesterday	  might	  not	  work	  today	  and	  the	  only	  
way	  to	  find	  what	  will	  work	  today	  is	  to	  try	  new	  things	  and	  test	  them	  out.	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  Dewey	  published	  The	  Public	  and	  Its	  Problems	  a	  young	  
Midwestern	  pastor	  without	  a	  graduate	  degree	  published	  his	  first	  book,	  which	  has	  never	  
been	  reprinted	  and	  is	  seldom	  read.	  Niebuhr	  was	  beginning	  his	  transition	  from	  advocate-­‐
pastor	  to	  advocate-­‐philosopher.	  During	  his	  last	  year	  in	  Detroit,	  he	  penned	  his	  first	  large-­‐
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scale	  response	  to	  the	  growing	  crises	  of	  modern	  living,	  by	  posing	  the	  exigence	  for	  his	  
inquiry	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  question:	  Does	  Civilization	  Need	  Religion?	  (1927)	  There,	  Niebuhr	  
formally	  laid	  all	  the	  new	  phenomena	  of	  his	  time,	  closely	  examining	  their	  pros	  and	  cons.	  
Niebuhr	  was	  never	  one	  prone	  to	  nostalgia	  and	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  trouble	  he	  thought	  a	  
new	  situation	  might	  bring,	  he	  was	  never	  one	  to	  think	  we	  can	  “go	  back”	  to	  a	  better	  time	  and	  
place.	  Instead,	  Niebuhr	  tried	  to	  use	  the	  tools	  he	  had	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  he	  could,	  as	  
pragmatically	  as	  possible.	  In	  this	  work,	  as	  a	  pastor	  and	  popular	  columnist	  for	  Christian	  
Century,	  that	  meant	  asking	  how	  religion	  might	  aid	  in	  solving	  for	  some	  of	  the	  inevitable	  
failures	  of	  modernity.	  Although	  Niebuhr	  would	  adjust	  his	  solutions	  to	  these	  problems	  over	  
time,	  many	  of	  his	  core	  ideas	  would	  remain	  forever,	  and	  regardless,	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  
problems	  themselves	  is	  instructive.	  
By	  1927	  Niebuhr	  had	  become	  a	  popular	  speaker	  and	  columnist	  throughout	  the	  
country.	  He	  summarized	  his	  experiences	  with	  Detroit’s	  workers,	  citizens	  and	  factory	  
owners	  in	  the	  first	  of	  his	  twenty-­‐five	  books,	  Does	  Civilization	  Need	  Religion?	  Although	  
published	  in	  1927,	  Niebuhr	  was	  working	  on	  it	  as	  far	  back	  as	  1923.	  It	  is	  important	  for	  our	  
analysis	  of	  his	  rhetorical	  situation	  because	  it	  takes	  all	  of	  the	  specific	  problems	  he	  
encountered	  in	  Detroit	  and	  conceptualizes	  them	  into	  their	  larger,	  broader	  categories	  for	  
investigation.	  While	  trying	  to	  make	  religion	  relevant	  to	  the	  autoworker	  Niebuhr	  ran	  into	  
problems	  with	  the	  basic	  societal	  structure	  developing	  in	  his	  industrial	  city	  and,	  noting	  that	  
the	  industrial	  cities	  were	  growing	  in	  number,	  sought	  to	  express	  these	  problems	  to	  other	  
pastors	  seeking	  religious	  resources	  for	  their	  respective	  laities.	  
Upon	  doing	  so,	  Niebuhr	  encountered	  a	  new	  threat	  to	  society:	  specialization.	  "The	  
world	  is	  filled	  with	  men	  who	  are	  pathologically	  incapable	  of	  doing	  anything	  with	  life	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outside	  the	  rounds	  of	  their	  specialization,"	  he	  wrote	  in	  an	  editorial	  in	  the	  Detroit	  Times	  in	  
1925	  (Tabscott	  2009).	  In	  a	  column	  he	  began	  to	  write	  for	  the	  Detroit	  Times	  in	  early	  1928,	  
Niebuhr	  notes	  the	  inevitable	  and	  unstoppable	  drift	  toward	  specialization.	  “While	  this	  
tendency	  makes	  for	  productive	  and	  professional	  efficiency,”	  he	  writes,	  “the	  loss	  in	  spiritual,	  
social,	  and	  moral	  values	  is	  tremendous.	  If	  we	  are	  not	  careful,	  we	  will	  all	  develop	  into	  a	  
society	  of	  undereducated	  experts	  who	  know	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  a	  small	  area	  of	  life	  and	  very	  
little	  about	  life	  itself”	  (Brown	  1992,	  35).	  
Niebuhr	  found	  that	  the	  industrial	  worker	  was	  indifferent	  to	  religion	  for	  two	  basic	  
reasons.	  First,	  Niebuhr	  noted	  that	  is	  was	  “partly	  because	  he	  is	  enmeshed	  in	  relations	  which	  
are	  so	  impersonal	  and	  fundamentally	  unethical	  that	  his	  religious	  sense	  atrophies	  in	  him”	  
(1927,	  5-­‐6).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  “he	  is	  hostile	  to	  religion	  because	  he	  observes	  
the	  ethical	  impotence	  of	  the	  religion	  of	  the	  privileged	  classes,	  particularly	  in	  its	  failure	  to	  
effect	  improvement	  in	  economic	  and	  social	  attitudes”	  (ibid).	  He	  concludes:	  
The	  industrial	  worker	  raises	  a	  general	  characteristic	  of	  modern	  urban	  man	  to	  a	  
unique	  degree.	  His	  own	  experiences	  help	  him	  to	  see	  the	  moral	  limitations	  of	  modern	  
civilization	  more	  clearly	  than	  do	  the	  more	  privileged	  classes;	  but	  what	  is	  true	  of	  him	  
is	  generally	  true	  of	  all	  members	  of	  a	  complex	  society	  in	  which	  human	  relations	  are	  
impersonal	  and	  complicated	  (ibid).	  
	  
For	  Niebuhr,	  there	  was	  one	  reason	  why	  religion	  might	  be	  of	  use	  in	  solving	  man’s	  modern	  
problems	  and	  that	  was	  that	  the	  development	  of	  new	  technologies	  was	  presenting	  new	  
ethical	  problems,	  which	  meant	  then,	  that	  religion	  was	  a	  potential	  solution	  to	  them.	  It	  is	  
notable,	  to	  understand	  Niebuhr’s	  experimental	  and	  empirical	  method,	  that	  he	  doesn’t	  start	  
by	  assuming	  that	  it	  can.	  Instead,	  he	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  to	  find	  out	  if	  it	  can,	  we	  must	  
analyze	  the	  problems	  and	  then	  analyze	  the	  state	  of	  religion.	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As	  Niebuhr	  saw	  it,	  the	  industrial	  worker	  was	  without	  religion	  and	  was	  thereby	  
lacking	  one	  (not	  the	  only)	  of	  his	  useful	  tools	  for	  achieving	  an	  ethical	  community	  and	  
existence.	  Religion’s	  job,	  as	  Niebuhr	  understood	  it	  at	  this	  time—which	  was	  very	  much	  a	  
Jamesian	  understanding—was	  to	  promote	  the	  value	  and	  dignity	  of	  “personality.”	  Niebuhr’s	  
ability	  to	  grasp	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin	  is	  unrivaled	  and	  his	  analysis	  of	  this	  problem	  
shows	  that	  his	  characteristic	  dialectical	  thinking—which	  will	  provide	  the	  framework	  for	  
this	  entire	  dissertation—manifests	  in	  even	  his	  earliest	  thought.	  This	  religious	  task	  was	  
being	  attacked	  on	  two	  sides	  and	  thus	  it	  had	  to	  “face	  and	  do	  battle	  with	  two	  enemies,	  those	  
who	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  men	  because	  they	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  God,	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not	  
believe	  in	  God	  because	  modern	  civilization	  has	  robbed	  them	  of	  their	  faith	  in	  the	  moral	  
integrity	  of	  men”	  (1927,	  7).	  Here	  we	  see	  Niebuhr’s	  typical	  method	  of	  addressing	  problems.	  
His	  ability	  to	  provide	  an	  aphorism	  that	  poetically	  sums	  up	  a	  problem	  and	  then	  the	  
coinciding	  explanation	  of	  the	  aphorism	  in	  more	  succinct	  and	  detailed	  language.	  Following	  
this	  particular	  aphorism,	  Niebuhr	  develops	  and	  explains	  the	  twofold	  problem	  this	  way:	  
The	  industrial	  worker	  is	  indifferent	  to	  religion,	  partly	  because	  he	  is	  enmeshed	  in	  
relations	  which	  are	  so	  impersonal	  and	  fundamentally	  unethical	  that	  his	  religious	  
sense	  atrophies	  in	  him.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  he	  is	  hostile	  to	  religion	  because	  he	  
observes	  the	  ethical	  impotence	  of	  the	  religion	  of	  the	  privileged	  classes,	  particularly	  
in	  its	  failure	  to	  effect	  improvement	  in	  economic	  and	  social	  attitudes	  (1927,	  15).	  
	  
For	  Niebuhr	  then,	  looking	  at	  the	  problem	  begins	  by	  asking	  why	  it	  is	  a	  new	  problem,	  i.e.	  Why	  
has	  man	  abandoned	  religion	  now?	  Niebuhr	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  importance	  placed	  on	  
reason	  by	  the	  sciences,	  especially	  in	  their	  applied	  technologies,	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  decrease	  
the	  amount	  of	  faith	  one	  puts	  in	  “irrational”	  beliefs.	  But	  Niebuhr	  isn’t	  convinced	  this	  is	  the	  
real	  problem	  and	  he	  moves	  into	  the	  prophetic	  element	  of	  his	  analysis,	  i.e.	  he	  always	  looks	  at	  
tree	  in	  his	  own	  people’s	  eye	  before	  he	  points	  out	  the	  splinter	  in	  the	  other’s.	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   The	  real	  reason	  that	  the	  middle-­‐class	  worker	  abandoned	  religion	  was	  pretty	  
obvious	  to	  Niebuhr.	  Steeped	  in	  a	  Jamesian	  pragmatist	  philosophy,	  Niebuhr	  knew	  that	  if	  
religion	  was	  being	  abandoned,	  it	  wasn’t	  because	  it	  was	  a	  logical	  proposition	  that	  had	  failed.	  
Instead,	  it	  must	  be	  tied	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  wasn’t	  serving	  the	  needs	  of	  people	  that	  it	  had	  
formerly	  served.	  For	  Niebuhr,	  if	  religion	  was	  being	  doubted,	  it	  wasn’t	  because	  of	  a	  
Cartesian	  doubt	  of	  a	  rational	  proposition,	  hardly;	  it	  was	  that	  experiences	  in	  the	  world	  were	  
no	  longer	  calling	  forth	  religious	  varieties	  of	  them.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  was	  that	  modern	  
industry	  and	  its	  capitalist	  government	  were	  founded	  and	  institutionalized	  by	  a	  Christian	  
society.	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “The	  fact	  is	  that	  more	  men	  in	  our	  modern	  era	  are	  irreligious	  
because	  religion	  has	  failed	  to	  make	  civilization	  ethical	  than	  because	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  maintain	  
its	  intellectual	  respectability”	  (1927,	  12).	  If	  a	  Christian	  culture	  could	  allow	  and	  even	  
promote	  such	  developments,	  the	  autoworker	  was	  reasonable	  in	  his	  rejection	  of	  such	  a	  
belief	  system	  because	  it	  coincided	  with	  so	  much	  misery	  for	  himself	  and	  his	  family.	  In	  other	  
words,	  those	  who	  got	  modern	  man	  into	  the	  situation	  he	  now	  faced	  professed	  religion	  and	  
thus,	  it	  was	  unclear	  to	  the	  middle-­‐classes	  how	  it	  could	  possibly	  be	  of	  help	  in	  getting	  him	  out.	  
Religion’s	  situation	  then,	  is	  that	  being	  pushed	  on	  both	  sides	  by	  two	  forces—on	  the	  
one	  side	  its	  metaphysics	  challenged	  by	  science	  and	  on	  the	  other	  its	  ethics	  are	  being	  
challenged	  by	  the	  facts	  of	  injustice—and	  unable	  to	  fight	  both	  simultaneously,	  it	  has	  chosen	  
to	  do	  battle	  with	  the	  former	  because	  “It	  is	  easier	  to	  challenge	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  impersonal	  
universe	  than	  to	  change	  the	  fact	  of	  an	  impersonal	  civilization”	  (1927,	  7).	  In	  other	  words,	  
religion’s	  first	  problem	  was	  one	  of	  vocabulary:	  it	  hasn’t	  been	  able	  to	  restate	  its	  affirmations	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  make	  them	  consistent	  with	  scientific	  facts.	  Niebuhr	  knew	  that	  religion	  and	  
science	  could	  and	  would	  eventually	  coincide	  perfectly	  if	  only	  time	  was	  allowed	  to	  run	  its	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course.	  No	  truly	  deterministic	  theory	  could	  win	  out	  in	  the	  end	  and	  as	  he	  put	  it,	  “Outraged	  
truth	  has	  a	  way	  of	  avenging	  itself”	  (1927,	  8).	  More	  importantly,	  religion’s	  logical	  victory	  
would	  be	  in	  vain	  if	  the	  facts	  on	  the	  ground	  didn’t	  change	  as	  well.	  
These	  facts	  on	  the	  ground	  are	  mechanization,	  efficiency	  and	  complexity.	  First,	  the	  
mechanization	  of	  society	  makes	  an	  ethical	  life	  more	  necessary	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  it	  
makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  and	  furthermore,	  it	  makes	  ethical	  failures	  more	  obvious	  than	  was	  
ever	  previously	  the	  case	  (13).	  It	  isn’t	  necessarily	  that	  we	  are	  less	  ethical	  than	  our	  fathers;	  it	  
is	  that	  we	  are	  more	  dependent	  than	  our	  fathers	  were	  on	  an	  ethical	  society.	  Secondly,	  the	  
speed	  and	  efficiency	  of	  both	  commerce	  and	  communications	  have	  brought	  the	  world	  into	  
intimate	  causal	  relations	  without	  the	  coincident	  intimacy	  of	  living	  in	  close	  quarters	  with	  
one	  another	  and	  without	  “increasing	  the	  spiritual	  dynamic	  and	  ethical	  intelligence	  which	  
makes	  close	  contact	  sufferable”	  (ibid).	  Third,	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  we	  have	  also	  multiplied	  
the	  tools	  of	  destruction	  that	  this	  “confused	  conscience”	  now	  wields	  and	  thus	  have	  armed	  
our	  evil	  natures	  with	  scientific	  and	  technological	  precision	  and	  efficiency.	  Finally,	  we	  have	  
developed	  a	  complex	  society	  that	  Niebuhr	  argues	  cannot	  be	  made	  more	  ethical	  solely	  by	  
goodwill	  alone	  because	  our	  moral	  purpose	  in	  this	  complex	  existence	  demands	  an	  astute	  
guide	  (ibid).	  In	  other	  words,	  modern	  man	  is	  negatively	  judging	  the	  US’s	  morality	  as	  a	  fruit	  
of	  its	  religion	  and	  forgetting	  that	  morality	  is	  also	  the	  root	  of	  religion,	  and	  that	  these	  roots	  
require	  a	  fertile	  soil,	  which	  the	  mechanization	  of	  society	  has	  destroyed.	  Niebuhr’s	  
concludes	  that	  modern	  man’s	  most	  pressing	  problem,	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  his	  “aggregate	  
existence”	  (1927,	  17).	  If	  man	  is	  to	  live	  in	  harmony	  with	  his	  fellow	  men	  while	  the	  size	  and	  
intricacy	  of	  his	  social	  machinery	  continues	  to	  emphasize	  the	  vices,	  which	  make	  life	  more	  
inhuman,	  then	  he	  must	  maintain	  a	  rigorous	  ethic.	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Furthermore,	  the	  existential	  aspects	  of	  the	  problem	  made	  its	  solution	  potentially	  
religious.	  First,	  human	  beings	  seek	  the	  development	  of	  a	  harmonious	  and	  unified	  
personality	  and	  second,	  they	  also	  seek	  to	  express	  and	  assert	  this	  unified	  personality	  in	  
defiance	  of	  nature’s	  indifference	  and	  contempt	  (1927,	  19).	  Niebuhr	  notes	  the	  coincident	  
rise	  in	  popular	  psychology	  and	  decline	  of	  religious	  belief	  as	  evidence	  of	  this	  fact	  before	  
pointing	  out	  that	  even	  if	  religion	  fails	  to	  make	  society	  more	  ethical,	  any	  analysis	  of	  the	  
resources	  of	  religion	  will	  show	  that	  it	  will	  always	  maintain	  at	  least	  some	  vitality	  due	  to	  this	  
aspect	  of	  its	  nature.	  As	  far	  as	  religion’s	  adequacy	  in	  solving	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  problem,	  
Niebuhr	  concludes	  that	  religion’s	  “rejuvenation	  waits	  upon	  a	  reorientation	  of	  its	  ethical	  
traditions	  as	  well	  as	  of	  its	  theological	  conceptions”	  (1927,	  220).	  But	  he	  extends	  this	  
solution	  into	  what	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  typical	  Niebuhrian	  paradox.	  It	  is	  precisely	  the	  
rational	  formulation	  of	  religious	  truths	  that	  destroy	  their	  ultra-­‐rational	  powers	  and	  it	  is	  
precisely	  religion’s	  existential	  solvency	  that	  gets	  in	  the	  way	  of	  it	  engaging	  in	  a	  rigorous	  
morality.	  The	  solution	  to	  the	  first	  problem	  then	  was	  that	  the	  critical	  (rational)	  and	  naively	  
reverent	  (irrational)	  aspects	  of	  religious	  belief	  were	  to	  be	  maintained	  in	  ongoing	  tension.	  
The	  solution	  to	  the	  second	  problem	  was	  that	  the	  ethical	  (worldly)	  and	  the	  mystical	  (other-­‐
worldly)	  qualities	  of	  religious	  devotion	  were	  to	  also	  maintain	  a	  tight	  tension.	  The	  resultant	  
solution,	  for	  Niebuhr,	  was	  “spiritualized	  technicians”	  who	  demonstrated	  an	  intelligent	  
worldly	  knowledge	  and	  an	  ultra-­‐rational	  faith	  in	  God,	  who	  lived	  in	  a	  qualified	  asceticism,	  an	  
existence	  of	  “attached	  detachment.”	  
Thus,	  in	  1927	  Niebuhr	  was	  choosing	  sides	  in	  lines	  already	  drawn	  in	  the	  intellectual-­‐
sand.	  Niebuhr	  chose	  Lippmann’s	  side	  when,	  in	  his	  last	  chapter	  of	  DCNR?	  he	  writes,	  
“Rejuvenation	  and	  progress	  must	  come	  from	  the	  few	  who	  understand	  the	  fuller	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implications	  of	  the	  faith	  which	  they	  share	  with	  the	  multitudes	  whose	  eyes	  are	  holden	  and	  
who	  lack	  the	  courage	  to	  follow	  even	  such	  visions	  as	  may	  come	  to	  them	  (Niebuhr	  1927,	  227).	  
This	  highly	  spiritual	  religion	  can’t	  be	  the	  esoteric	  possession	  to	  which	  the	  multitudes	  may	  
never	  aspire,	  thus	  making	  it	  a	  priestly	  cult	  (1927,	  227-­‐228).	  For	  Niebuhr,	  it	  must	  not	  lose	  
confidence	  in	  the	  masses	  but	  must	  nevertheless	  resist	  the	  gravitation	  toward	  moral	  
mediocrity	  among	  them.	  It	  must	  be	  a	  layman’s	  movement	  that	  expresses	  itself	  in	  rebuilding	  
the	  social	  order	  and	  not	  rebuilding	  religious	  institutions.	  These	  spiritualized-­‐technicians	  
should	  have	  the	  technical	  skill	  and	  spiritual	  resources	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  practical	  problems	  
of	  industry	  and	  politics	  without	  succumbing	  to	  the	  errors	  of	  making	  mechanical	  efficiency	  
and	  material	  rewards	  ends	  in	  themselves.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  must	  be	  in	  this	  world	  and	  
yet	  not	  of	  the	  world	  by	  promoting	  a	  religiously	  inspired	  moral	  idealism	  that	  centers	  life	  in	  
something	  beyond	  nature	  but	  yet,	  is	  qualified	  by	  nature	  as	  well.	  Such	  other-­‐worldliness,	  he	  
would	  argue	  in	  a	  1941	  Christianity	  and	  Society	  article,	  “is	  not	  an	  escape	  from	  history.	  It	  
gives	  us	  a	  fulcrum	  from	  which	  we	  can	  operate	  in	  history.	  It	  gives	  us	  a	  faith	  by	  which	  we	  can	  
seek	  to	  fulfill	  our	  historic	  tasks	  without	  illusions	  and	  without	  despair.”8	  Niebuhr’s	  (1927)	  
conclusion	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  what	  is	  to	  follow	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  his	  mythic,	  dialectic,	  and	  
rhetorical	  inquiries.	  He	  writes:	  
Men	  need	  to	  subject	  all	  partial	  moral	  achievements	  to	  comparison	  with	  the	  absolute	  
standards	  of	  truth,	  beauty	  and	  goodness	  of	  their	  religious	  faith,	  and	  yet	  be	  able	  to	  
see	  and	  willing	  to	  concede	  the	  relativities	  in	  the	  absolute	  values	  of	  their	  devotion.	  
They	  can	  be	  saved	  from	  a	  morality	  of	  mere	  utilitarianism	  only	  by	  the	  religious	  quest	  
for	  an	  absolute	  moral	  standard;	  yet	  they	  need	  to	  be	  discerning	  enough	  to	  see	  that	  
every	  ethical	  achievement,	  even	  when	  inspired	  by	  religious	  motives,	  is	  tinged	  with	  
prudential	  self-­‐interest.	  They	  must	  continue	  to	  strive	  after	  freedom	  and	  yet	  realize	  
that	  human	  life	  and	  character	  is	  largely	  determined	  by	  environment.	  If	  they	  seek	  
happiness,	  divorced	  from	  fortune,	  they	  nevertheless	  escape	  the	  duty	  of	  making	  the	  
material	  world	  serve	  human	  welfare.	  Their	  ability	  to	  discover	  the	  transcendent	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values	  in	  human	  personality	  has	  value	  only	  if	  they	  maintain	  faith	  in	  human	  nature	  
after	  they	  have	  discovered	  its	  imperfections.	  They	  must	  search	  after	  the	  perfect	  
goodness	  in	  God	  and	  yet	  be	  prepared	  to	  face	  the	  cruelties	  of	  life	  without	  either	  
denying	  their	  reality	  or	  being	  driven	  to	  despair	  by	  them.	  (224-­‐5)	  
	  
Conclusion	  
This	  was	  Niebuhr’s	  alternative	  way	  out	  of	  the	  crises	  of	  the	  1920s.	  It	  was	  a	  time	  when	  
political	  normalcy	  spelled	  corruption,	  passivity	  and	  parochialism.9	  It	  was	  a	  time	  when	  
business	  prosperity	  morphed	  into	  corporate	  capitalism,	  the	  domestication	  of	  labor,	  the	  
maldistribution	  of	  wealth,	  and	  growth	  in	  income	  inequality.	  The	  middle	  class	  withdrew	  
from	  social	  responsibility	  due	  to	  social	  atomization.	  Intellectuals	  turned	  to	  nihilism	  and	  
cynicism,	  expatriating	  to	  Europe	  or	  escaping	  to	  lofts	  in	  Greenwich	  Village.	  Liberals	  and	  
progressives	  were	  disillusioned	  and	  in	  general,	  they	  chose	  one	  of	  two	  paths.	  The	  first	  path	  
led	  to	  the	  constant	  questioning	  of	  every	  value	  and	  meaning	  without	  attribution	  of	  an	  
positive	  alternative.	  The	  second	  path	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  an	  alternate	  outlook	  as	  a	  new	  
synthesis	  that	  would	  give	  life	  meaning.	  Those	  who	  chose	  the	  first	  path	  called	  themselves	  
the	  “lost	  generation.”	  They	  retreated	  to	  psychology’s	  aesthetic	  remedies	  for	  their	  liberal	  
discontents	  and	  literally	  fled	  areas	  saturated	  with	  the	  “booboisie.”	  Those	  who	  chose	  the	  
second	  path	  search	  for	  new	  creeds	  to	  replace	  the	  old	  ones	  and	  engaged	  in	  new	  activities	  of	  
reconstruction,	  reformation,	  and	  revolution.	  Some	  disillusioned	  progressives	  turned	  racist	  
and	  preached	  white	  supremacy.	  Some	  former	  social	  gospelers	  became	  hardline	  Christian	  
fundamentalists.	  Most	  however,	  moved	  to	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  and	  
embraced	  the	  Socialist	  ideal.	  
	   Niebuhr	  chose	  both	  of	  the	  paths	  during	  his	  years	  in	  Detroit.	  He	  constantly	  searched	  
for	  a	  radical	  alternative,	  and	  his	  skepticism	  about	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  such	  an	  alternative,	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  the	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  climate	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combined	  with	  his	  reluctance	  to	  abandon	  the	  basic	  premises	  of	  liberal	  Christianity,	  
characterized	  his	  thought	  during	  the	  1920s.	  His	  journal	  from	  the	  1920s	  reveals	  the	  deeply	  
felt	  personal	  dilemma	  regarding	  these	  two	  paths.	  It	  is	  true,	  that	  in	  his	  most	  popular	  and	  
moving	  work,	  Moral	  Man	  and	  Immoral	  Society,	  Niebuhr	  almost	  lost	  sight	  of	  the	  balance.	  
Moral	  Man,	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  heralded	  as	  the	  “Doctrine	  of	  Christ	  and	  Marx	  linked.”10	  
Niebuhr	  was	  rejecting	  ideas,	  not	  people,	  but	  he	  could	  not,	  according	  to	  Fox	  (1985),	  “help	  
implying	  that	  the	  people	  who	  held	  the	  ideas	  were	  fools.”	  Moral	  Man’s	  tone	  was	  an	  integral	  
part	  of	  the	  message;	  it	  was	  rhetorical	  vehemence	  in	  order	  to	  spark	  a	  feeling	  of	  crisis	  and	  the	  
militant	  commitment	  needed	  to	  engage	  its	  contingency.	  “The	  book	  rumbles	  and	  thunders	  
along,	  cerebral	  and	  pugnacious,”	  Fox	  argues.	  Only	  a	  few	  months	  before	  its	  publication,	  he	  
attended	  a	  banquet	  in	  John	  Dewey’s	  honor;	  yet	  only	  three	  pages	  into	  Moral	  Man,	  he	  
dismissed	  Dewey	  as	  a	  “tepid	  apostle	  of	  rational	  experimentation	  and	  political	  gradualism,”	  
“platitudinous,”	  and	  a	  confused	  analyst	  who	  has	  “no	  clear	  counsels	  about	  the	  way	  to	  
overcome	  social	  inertia.”	  Niebuhr’s	  response	  was	  thought	  provoking	  because	  it	  suggested	  
that	  it	  might	  be	  necessary	  to	  use	  violence	  and	  condoned	  force	  if	  it	  could	  be	  used	  with	  “the	  
tempo	  of	  a	  surgeon’s	  skill”	  so	  that	  “healing”	  could	  “follow	  quickly	  upon	  its	  wounds.”	  In	  
other	  words,	  Niebuhr	  was	  calling	  for	  a	  revolution,	  but	  was	  demanding	  it	  be	  ethical.	  
	   Moral	  Man	  was	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  balance	  and	  a	  temporary	  abandonment	  of	  the	  
hope	  of	  a	  lay-­‐movement	  of	  spiritualized-­‐technicians.	  He	  was	  surveying	  Sodom	  and	  
Gomorrah,	  and	  speaking	  from	  on	  high,	  intonating	  that	  not	  one	  righteous	  man	  could	  be	  
found	  in	  America,	  that	  complete	  destruction	  may	  be	  needed.	  Disillusioned	  by	  Detroit,	  
Niebuhr	  fell	  in	  line	  with	  Lippmann	  momentarily.	  Like	  Lippmann,	  Niebuhr	  saw	  society	  as	  “a	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realm	  of	  power	  blocs	  to	  be	  adjusted,	  not	  a	  garden	  in	  need	  of	  regeneration.”	  America’s	  
cultural	  pluralism	  left	  it	  devoid	  of	  moral	  consensus.	  “We	  are	  merely	  a	  vast	  horde	  of	  people	  
let	  loose	  on	  a	  continent	  with	  little	  to	  unify	  us	  by	  way	  of	  a	  common	  cultural,	  moral,	  and	  
religious	  traditions…	  We	  are	  held	  together	  mechanically	  by	  our	  means	  of	  production	  and	  
communication.”	  Fox	  records	  that	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  Moral	  Man,	  Niebuhr	  drew	  the	  
battlelines:	  “The	  dream	  of	  perpetual	  peace	  and	  brotherhood	  for	  human	  society	  is	  one	  
which	  never	  be	  fully	  realized…	  Society	  is	  in	  a	  perpetual	  state	  of	  war”	  (140).	  Niebuhr	  didn’t	  
speak	  about	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  or	  about	  realizing	  individual	  personality.	  With	  millions	  
out	  of	  work,	  what	  was	  the	  point?	  Justice,	  not	  love,	  was	  the	  goal	  of	  Christian	  action	  in	  
society;	  revolution,	  not	  love,	  was	  the	  Christian’s	  final	  social	  appeal.	  Some	  of	  his	  colleagues	  
were	  taken	  aback	  and	  viewed	  the	  book	  as	  a	  personal	  attack.	  Hadn’t	  Niebuhr	  spent	  ten	  years	  
speaking	  about	  pacifism	  and	  moral	  appeals?	  This	  was	  not	  Niebuhr	  the	  Amos-­‐like	  prophet	  
but	  Niebuhr	  the	  Joshua-­‐like	  warrior,	  whose	  deepest	  intention	  was	  “the	  interruption	  of	  the	  
course	  of	  the	  world.”	  Like	  Joshua,	  his	  “intention	  sprang	  his	  violence,	  his	  impatience,	  and	  his	  
anger;	  from	  it,	  too,	  sprang	  the	  ever-­‐renewed	  attempts	  to	  cut	  the	  world	  to	  the	  heart	  [or	  sing	  
it	  to	  sleep].”11	  Niebuhr	  was	  searching	  for	  a	  third	  way,	  but	  he	  had	  not	  yet	  found	  it.	  
	   If	  nothing	  else,	  the	  intellectual	  exchanges	  that	  followed	  Moral	  Man’s	  publication	  
seemed	  to	  prove	  Niebuhr’s	  point	  that	  “reason	  is	  always	  the	  servant	  of	  interest	  in	  a	  social	  
situation.	  Men	  of	  high	  education	  and	  goodwill	  went	  for	  one	  another’s	  jugular.”12	  Perhaps	  
the	  most	  telling	  response	  to	  Moral	  Man	  came	  from	  the	  one	  reader	  that	  Niebuhr	  could	  count	  
on	  for	  a	  sympathetic	  reading	  and	  a	  honest	  analysis:	  his	  brother	  Richard.	  Reinhold	  burned	  
all	  of	  his	  correspondence	  with	  his	  brother,	  but	  Richard’s	  letters	  from	  Reinhold	  remain.	  By	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Richard’s	  estimates,	  Reinhold	  was	  cynical	  and	  skeptical	  but	  displayed	  traces	  that	  he	  “had	  
hope—not	  much	  but	  a	  little,	  and	  faith,	  not	  a	  great	  deal	  but	  some.”	  Richard	  arguing	  that	  he	  
regarded	  Moral	  Man	  alongside	  Lippmann’s	  Preface	  [to	  Morals]	  as	  the	  most	  important	  
religious	  books	  written	  since	  the	  war.	  “But	  neither	  of	  them	  are	  finality.	  They	  are	  the	  death	  
of	  the	  old	  man	  and	  insofar	  the	  harbingers	  of	  a	  new	  birth,”	  Richard	  wrote.13	  Richard	  thought	  
Reinhold’s	  movement	  toward	  Socialism	  displayed	  the	  skeptical	  hope	  against	  hope	  that	  
ideals	  could	  be	  effective	  in	  guiding	  action.	  This	  was	  a	  liberal	  illusion,	  according	  to	  Richard,	  
and	  he	  was	  even	  bold	  enough	  to	  tell	  Reinhold	  that	  he	  predicted	  he	  would	  realize	  it	  soon	  
enough	  and	  return	  to	  the	  more	  detached	  position	  he	  had	  abandoned.	  Richard	  thought	  “that	  
an	  activism	  which	  stresses	  immediate	  results	  is	  the	  cancer	  of	  our	  modern	  life”	  and	  that	  it	  
was	  “betraying	  us	  constantly	  into	  interfering	  with	  events,	  pushing,	  pulling,	  trying	  to	  
wriggle	  out	  of	  an	  impassable	  situation,	  and	  so	  drawing	  the	  noose	  tighter	  around	  our	  necks.	  
We	  want	  to	  be	  saviors	  of	  civilization,	  he	  argued,	  and	  simply	  bring	  down	  new	  destruction…	  
You	  are	  about	  ready	  to	  break	  with	  that	  activism.	  I	  think	  I	  discern	  that.”	  Richard	  was	  wrong.	  
Reinhold	  would	  never	  give	  up	  “teleological”	  politics;	  nor	  would	  he	  stop	  “interfering	  with	  
events.”	  He	  would	  never	  renounce	  his	  view	  that	  religion	  was	  a	  powerful	  force	  of	  energy	  in	  
the	  social	  struggle.	  
Yet,	  Niebuhr	  would	  subsequently	  choose	  a	  different	  path;	  a	  third	  way,	  in	  which	  he	  
could	  be	  active	  in	  the	  world	  of	  political	  appearances	  and	  yet	  detached	  as	  an	  observer.	  His	  
personal	  involvement	  in	  the	  Socialist	  Party	  ceased	  and	  he	  would	  never	  again	  run	  for	  
political	  office	  or	  jostle	  in	  the	  corridors	  of	  Party	  conventions.	  Instead,	  he	  articulated	  a	  
Jamesian	  “double-­‐jointedness,”	  a	  constant	  “both/and”	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  irrational	  absurdity	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of	  such	  a	  proposition.	  Niebuhr	  took	  up	  a	  prophetic	  position	  on	  the	  mountaintop—“a	  place	  
from	  which	  all	  politics	  could	  be	  subjected	  to	  judgments.”	  Religious	  action	  meant	  developing	  	  
“theory	  and	  profound	  theory,”	  resisting	  “temptations	  to	  premature	  revolt	  by	  the	  disciples	  
of	  activism	  which	  wants	  to	  act	  without	  having	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  notion	  of	  what	  action	  is	  all	  
about.”14	  Niebuhr	  argued	  that	  the	  church’s	  survival	  was	  dependent	  on	  its	  role	  as	  a	  
leavening	  portion,	  one	  that	  would	  provide	  spiritual	  and	  moral	  discipline	  to	  civilization,	  one	  
that	  would	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  intensity	  of	  human	  egotism,	  one	  that	  would	  speak	  the	  
truth	  about	  human	  selfhood	  boldly.	  He	  affirmed	  the	  permanent	  power	  of	  mythic	  truths	  in	  
the	  face	  of	  incoherency	  and	  he	  reaffirmed	  the	  need	  for	  a	  discriminating	  dialectical	  
intelligence.	  He	  used	  both	  affirmations	  to	  address	  his	  audiences	  in	  both	  noble,	  sacred	  terms,	  
and	  in	  secular,	  profane	  ones.	  He	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  appearances	  of	  the	  world	  and,	  
instead	  of	  retreating	  to	  the	  woods	  of	  his	  fatherland	  or	  the	  lofts	  of	  Greenwich	  Village;	  he	  
faced	  the	  realm	  of	  tragedy,	  the	  realm	  of	  justice,	  and	  stared	  it	  straight	  in	  the	  eye.	  He	  spoke	  a	  
“woe!”	  and	  a	  “nay!”	  when	  it	  was	  needed,	  and	  yet,	  in	  spite	  of	  his	  prophetic	  polemical	  attitude,	  
he	  spoke	  words	  of	  love	  and	  mercy,	  forgiveness	  and	  contrition.	  Our	  task	  then,	  is	  to	  
understand	  how	  Niebuhr	  managed	  such	  a	  balance.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  (Fox	  1985,	  146)	  
	   57	  
Chapter	  2	  
Mythic	  Narrative:	  The	  Nature	  and	  Destiny	  of	  Man	  
	  
By	  universal	  truths	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  person	  
will	  probably	  or	  necessarily	  say	  or	  do	  in	  a	  given	  situation,;	  and	  this	  is	  the	  aim	  of	  
poetry.	  
	  
⎯Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  (1451b1-­‐5)	  
	  
But	  in	  all	  things	  approving	  ourselves	  as	  the	  ministers	  of	  God,	  in	  much	  patience,	  in	  
afflictions,	  in	  necessities,	  in	  distresses,	  in	  stripes,	  in	  imprisonments,	  in	  tumults,	  in	  
labors,	  in	  watching	  this,	  and	  fast	  things;	  by	  pureness,	  by	  knowledge,	  by	  long-­‐
suffering,	  like	  kindness,	  by	  the	  Holy	  Ghost,	  by	  love	  unfeigned,	  by	  the	  word	  of	  truth,	  
by	  the	  power	  of	  God,	  by	  the	  armor	  of	  righteousness	  on	  the	  right	  hand	  and	  on	  the	  left,	  
by	  honor	  and	  dishonor,	  by	  evil	  report	  and	  good	  report;	  as	  DECEIVERS	  and	  YET	  
TRUE;	  is	  unknown,	  and	  yet	  well	  known;	  as	  dying,	  and,	  behold,	  we	  live;	  as	  chastened,	  
and	  not	  killed;	  as	  sorrowful,	  yet	  always	  rejoicing;	  as	  poor,	  yet	  making	  many	  rich;	  as	  
having	  nothing,	  and	  yet	  possessing	  all	  things.	  
	  
⎯II	  Corinthians	  6:4-­‐10	  
	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  Paul’s	  letter	  to	  a	  small	  Christian	  sect	  in	  Roman	  occupied	  Greece,	  his	  
reputation	  as	  a	  thinker	  was	  questionable	  at	  best,	  for	  he	  had	  been	  publicly	  dishonored.	  Paul	  
was	  subjected	  to	  “evil	  reports”	  about	  his	  character;	  in	  short,	  he	  was	  accused	  of	  being	  a	  liar,	  
a	  false	  prophet,	  and	  a	  deceiver	  for	  preaching	  that	  Jesus	  was	  the	  Christ,	  the	  messiah	  the	  Old	  
Testament	  prophets	  foretold	  would	  come.	  But	  if	  Paul	  believed	  he	  had	  a	  hold	  of	  the	  Truth,	  
the	  question	  remains	  for	  us,	  as	  it	  remained	  for	  Niebuhr,	  why	  he	  admits	  the	  charges	  against	  
him	  before	  refuting	  them.	  Niebuhr	  entertains	  one	  hypothesis:	  it	  could	  be	  that	  Paul,	  having	  
committed	  to	  a	  rhetorical	  trope,	  simply	  wished	  to	  preserve	  the	  unbroken	  line	  of	  
paradoxical	  statements;	  “If	  this	  be	  the	  case,”	  he	  writes	  “a	  mere	  cannon	  of	  rhetorical	  style	  
has	  prompted	  a	  very	  profound	  statement”	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  preaching	  the	  gospel.	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The	  truth	  in	  this	  passage	  by	  Paul,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  one	  for	  every	  apologist	  of	  
the	  Christian	  faith,	  who	  would	  do	  well	  to	  understand	  that	  they	  are	  teachers	  of	  the	  truth	  by	  
deception.15	  Niebuhr	  draws	  on	  this	  Paulean	  passage	  to	  illustrate	  a	  timeless	  truth	  about	  the	  
nature	  of	  profound	  religious	  myths.	  Religious	  myths	  point	  to	  the	  ultimate	  ground	  and	  the	  
ultimate	  fulfillment	  of	  existence.	  So	  all	  great	  religious	  myths	  deal	  with	  creation	  and	  
redemption,	  Niebuhr	  argues.	  “But	  since	  myth	  cannot	  speak	  of	  the	  trans-­‐historical	  without	  
using	  symbols	  and	  events	  in	  history	  as	  its	  form	  of	  expression,	  it	  invariably	  falsifies	  the	  facts	  
of	  history,	  as	  seen	  by	  science,	  to	  state	  its	  truth”	  (ICE,	  7).	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  religion	  
must	  always	  confess,	  along	  with	  St	  Paul,	  that	  they	  are	  “as	  deceivers	  yet	  true.”	  
Myth	  is	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  key	  element	  in	  rhetoric	  and	  public	  discourse	  and	  a	  
number	  of	  scholars	  have	  explored	  the	  relationship	  between	  myth	  and	  rhetoric	  (Jasinski	  
2001,	  382).	  Roderick	  Hart,	  for	  example,	  defines	  myths	  as	  “master	  stories	  describing	  
exceptional	  people	  doing	  exceptional	  things	  and	  serving	  as	  moral	  guides	  to	  proper	  action”	  
and	  accordingly,	  he	  notes	  that	  “Virtually	  all	  rhetoric	  depends	  on	  myth	  for	  its	  effect”	  (1997,	  
234,	  242).	  Cultural	  Historian	  Richard	  Slotkin	  argues	  that	  myths	  are	  stories	  drawn	  from	  
social	  memory	  “that	  have	  acquired	  through	  persistence	  usage	  the	  power	  of	  symbolizing	  
that	  society’s	  ideology	  or	  dramatizing	  its	  moral	  consciousness—with	  all	  the	  complexities	  
and	  contradictions	  that	  consciousness	  may	  contain”	  (1992,	  5).	  Furthermore,	  they	  may	  
serve	  a	  rhetorical	  function;	  for	  as	  Slotkin	  notes,	  they	  are	  “formulated	  as	  ways	  of	  explaining	  
problems	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  course	  of	  historical	  experience”	  (Ibid.,	  6).	  Jasinski	  argues	  that	  
myths,	  in	  short,	  “are	  narratives	  that	  report	  the	  struggles	  and	  heroic	  exploits	  from	  a	  
community’s	  past”	  (383).	  These	  narratives	  or	  myths,	  Jasinski	  and	  Rushing	  &	  Frentz	  (1995)	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  3)	  (hereafter	  cited	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agree,	  are	  mixtures	  of	  archetypal	  elements	  that	  transcend	  the	  local	  community’s	  
boundaries	  and	  unique	  cultural	  elements,	  specific	  to	  the	  society	  that	  holds	  them	  (Jasinski	  
2001,	  383).	  
In	  addition	  to	  general	  agreement	  on	  what	  myths	  are,	  rhetoric	  scholars	  are	  generally	  
in	  agreement	  on	  their	  function	  as	  behavioral	  and	  cognitive	  reference	  points	  for	  a	  culture	  or	  
community.	  “Myths	  explain	  the	  world	  and	  suggest	  ways	  of	  coping	  with	  it,”	  Jasinski	  argues	  
(Ibid).	  Doty	  (1986)	  argues	  that	  myths	  are	  normative	  in	  supporting	  particular	  types	  of	  
behavior	  and	  association	  and	  rejecting	  others,	  they	  are	  educative	  and	  heuristic	  (29).	  Weiss	  
(1969)	  suggests	  that	  myths	  “condition	  the	  way	  men	  [sic]	  view	  the	  world	  and	  understand	  
their	  experience”	  (3-­‐4).	  
Niebuhr	  distinguished	  between	  “primitive”	  and	  “profound”	  myths.	  Primitive	  or	  “pre-­‐
scientific”	  myths	  try	  to	  simplify	  the	  world	  into	  a	  simple	  system	  of	  meaning,	  i.e.	  “monism,”	  
or	  they	  completely	  divide	  the	  world	  into	  two	  distinct	  spheres,	  natural	  and	  supernatural,	  i.e.	  
“strict	  dualism.”	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  prescientific	  myths	  “disregard	  what	  may	  have	  always	  
been	  known,	  or	  have	  now	  become	  known,	  about	  the	  ordered	  course	  of	  events	  in	  the	  
world.”16	  Permanent	  myths,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  “are	  those	  which	  describe	  some	  meaning	  or	  
reality,	  which	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  exact	  analysis	  but	  can	  nevertheless	  be	  verified	  in	  experience”	  
(ibid.).	  Their	  truth	  is	  usually	  verified	  in	  experiences	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  history	  and	  freedom	  
beyond	  the	  structures	  and	  laws	  of	  natural	  existence.	  These	  distinctions	  between	  “primitive”	  
and	  “permanent”	  myths	  are	  significant	  because	  they	  provide	  us	  a	  hint	  into	  how	  Niebuhr	  
combined	  two	  schools	  of	  thought	  into	  his	  understanding	  of	  myth:	  pragmatism	  and	  Hegelian	  
dialectics.	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Niebuhr’s	  analysis	  of	  myth	  and	  religious	  experiences	  is	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  the	  
Jamesian	  pragmatist	  tradition.	  First,	  for	  both	  Niebuhr	  and	  James,	  the	  truth	  was	  always	  
verified	  by	  experience.	  Second,	  Niebuhr	  recognized	  the	  power	  of	  vocabularies	  to	  change	  
perceived	  realities.	  Niebuhr	  notes	  in	  a	  parenthetical	  aside	  that	  “it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  use	  
the	  word	  symbol	  to	  avoid	  the	  skeptical	  connotation	  of	  the	  word	  “myth”	  and	  later,	  that	  the	  
question	  of	  myths	  and	  symbols	  contains	  the	  whole	  problem	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  
Hellenic	  and	  Hebraic	  cultural	  components	  in	  the	  West.	  In	  his	  later	  years,	  and	  much	  like	  his	  
pragmatist	  brethren,	  Niebuhr	  would	  wonder	  if	  you	  would	  have	  been	  more	  successful	  in	  his	  
goal	  had	  he	  changed	  his	  vocabulary;	  suggesting	  that	  he	  would	  probably	  should	  have	  called	  
Original	  Sin,	  “the	  universality	  of	  self–concern.”	  
Third,	  like	  his	  predecessors—Peirce,	  James,	  and	  Dewey—and	  his	  successors—Rorty,	  
Dickstein,	  and	  Diggins—Niebuhr	  constantly	  tries	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  what	  he	  doesn’t	  like	  in	  the	  
traditional	  canons	  while	  holding	  onto	  what	  might	  be	  permanently	  valid	  in	  them.	  He	  writes,	  
“The	  essential	  truth	  in	  a	  great	  religious	  myth	  cannot	  be	  gauged	  by	  the	  immediate	  occasion	  
which	  prompted	  it;	  nor	  apprehended	  in	  its	  more	  obvious	  intent;”	  “neither	  it's	  doubtful	  
origin	  nor	  the	  fantastic	  character	  of	  its	  purported	  history	  will	  obscure	  its	  essential	  message	  
to	  those	  who	  are	  wise	  enough	  to	  discern	  the	  permanently	  valid	  insights	  in	  primitive	  
imagination”	  (BT,	  27).	  Thus,	  with	  a	  Jamesian	  eye,	  Niebuhr	  attempted	  to	  find	  the	  essential	  
and	  verifiable	  truths	  in	  religious	  experiences	  while	  constructing	  them	  in	  vocabularies	  that	  
brought	  them	  to	  life	  for	  modern	  man.	  But	  only	  one	  Niebuhrian	  eye	  was	  set	  on	  James’s	  
method:	  “James’s	  analysis	  of	  religious	  life	  is	  defective,”	  Niebuhr	  wrote,	  because	  it	  showed	  
no	  concern	  “for	  the	  meaning	  of	  history”	  (Diggins	  2011,	  31).	  To	  understand	  the	  difference	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between	  an	  individual’s	  religious	  experience	  and	  a	  collective’s,	  one	  had	  to	  venture	  into	  the	  
realm	  of	  myth	  and	  history,	  of	  collective	  origins	  and	  collective	  destinies.	  
Niebuhr’s	  concern	  with	  historical	  meaning	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  second	  major	  influence	  
on	  his	  mythology:	  Hegel’s	  dialectical	  method.	  Hegel	  believed	  that	  dialectics	  were	  about	  
antagonistic	  perspectives,	  contradictions,	  clashing	  opinions,	  and	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  
these	  antagonisms	  were	  worked	  out	  (Jasinski	  2001,	  166).	  Unlike	  the	  classical	  
understandings	  of	  dialectics	  as	  the	  opposition	  of	  two	  contrary	  propositions,	  Hegel	  shifted	  
the	  substance	  of	  dialectics	  to	  conflicting	  terms	  or	  concepts	  (Rescher	  1977,	  52).	  Seeking	  to	  
show	  how	  concepts	  in	  conflict	  at	  one	  level	  were	  linked	  together	  at	  another	  level,	  Hegel	  
demonstrated	  that	  mutually	  exclusive	  terms	  might	  really	  involve	  one	  another.	  This	  method	  
of	  dialectics	  is	  an	  important	  facet	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  thought.	  
Wellek	  and	  Warren’s	  (1956)	  definition	  of	  myth	  then,	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  relevant	  
for	  an	  exploration	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  distinctively	  Hegelian	  theology;	  for	  them,	  myth	  meant	  “any	  
anonymously	  composed	  storytelling	  of	  origins	  and	  destinies:	  the	  explanations	  a	  society	  
offers	  its	  young	  of	  why	  the	  world	  is	  and	  why	  we	  do	  as	  we	  do,	  its	  pedagogic	  images	  of	  the	  
nature	  and	  destiny	  of	  man”	  (191).	  It	  is	  apropos	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  magnum	  opus,	  originally	  
delivered	  as	  the	  renowned	  Gifford	  Lectures,	  was	  published	  as,	  The	  Nature	  and	  Destiny	  of	  
Man.	  The	  nature	  of	  man	  is	  characterized	  according	  to	  the	  from	  whence	  he	  came,	  his	  origin.	  
The	  destiny	  of	  man	  is	  a	  story	  about	  to	  where	  he	  is	  going,	  his	  end,	  his	  fini	  and/or	  his	  telos.	  	  
Niebuhr	  defined	  myth	  differently	  throughout	  his	  works	  but	  he	  aptly	  captured	  them	  
all	  when	  he	  wrote:	  “All	  mythology	  is	  a	  philosophy	  of	  history,”	  for	  if	  history	  is	  to	  have	  
meaning,	  it	  must	  have	  a	  mythology.17	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.	  summarizing	  Niebuhr’s	  view	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of	  the	  connection	  between	  myth	  and	  history,	  writes:	  “The	  myth	  is	  a	  story,	  the	  origin	  of	  
which	  is	  generally	  forgotten,	  which	  serves	  to	  explain	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  religious	  practice	  or	  
belief.	  The	  myth	  is	  an	  artistic	  attempt	  to	  give	  depth	  to	  history”	  (1992,	  275).	  Accordingly	  
then,	  whenever	  a	  philosophy	  of	  history	  was	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  organized	  social	  
practice,	  Niebuhr	  understood	  the	  philosophy	  as	  a	  “myth”	  and	  the	  social	  practices	  it	  made	  
normative	  as	  “religious.”	  
Myths,	  or	  as	  he	  sometimes	  called	  them	  “principles	  of	  interpretation,”	  covered	  a	  
much	  broader	  range	  of	  human	  action	  than	  was	  typically	  understood	  by	  modern	  emphases	  
on	  the	  “primitive”	  aspects	  of	  mythology.	  From	  Niebuhr’s	  perspective,	  Christianity	  was	  no	  
different	  in	  kind—i.e.	  a	  myth—than	  naturalism,	  Marxism,	  humanism,	  socialism,	  
communism,	  idealism,	  and	  romanticism.	  In	  other	  words,	  where	  one	  finds	  a	  philosophy,	  
implied	  or	  explicit,	  of	  man’s	  nature	  and	  destiny,	  one	  found	  a	  mythology;	  where	  one	  found	  it	  
influencing	  human	  actions,	  one	  found	  a	  religion.	  All	  “isms”	  then,	  were	  systems	  of	  meaning	  
that,	  in	  the	  final	  analysis,	  rested	  on	  some	  irrational	  or	  supra-­‐rational	  proposition	  that	  
depended	  on	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  “faith.”	  Furthermore,	  Niebuhr	  insisted	  that	  for	  a	  myth,	  
religion,	  or	  system	  of	  meaning	  to	  produce	  and	  maintain	  moral	  vigor,	  it	  was	  imperative	  that	  
it	  be	  profoundly	  dialectical.	  
Perhaps	  not	  since	  Hegel	  has	  there	  been	  a	  more	  dialectical	  thinker	  than	  Reinhold	  
Niebuhr	  and	  perhaps	  not	  since	  Augustine	  or	  Plato	  has	  there	  been	  a	  more	  profoundly	  
paradoxical	  and	  ironic	  dialectician.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  many	  and	  diverse	  interpretations	  and	  
misinterpretations	  of	  Niebuhr's	  theology,	  politics,	  ethics	  and	  philosophy,	  there	  is	  one	  fact	  
about	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr	  that	  in	  all	  of	  my	  research	  on	  him	  I've	  yet	  to	  find	  disagreement	  on,	  
and	  that	  is	  that	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr	  is	  a	  supreme	  dialectician.	  Even	  the	  titles	  of	  most	  of	  his	  
	   63	  
published	  works	  display	  this	  talent	  for	  profound	  dualisms:	  Moral	  Man	  and	  Immoral	  Society,	  
Christianity	  and	  Power	  Politics,	  The	  Nature	  and	  Destiny	  Of	  Man,	  Faith	  and	  History,	  The	  
Children	  Of	  Light	  and	  The	  Children	  Of	  Darkness,	  The	  Self	  and	  The	  Dramas	  Of	  History,	  Love	  and	  
Justice,	  Faith	  and	  Politics,	  Man's	  Nature	  And	  His	  Communities.	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  what	  role	  these	  dualisms	  play	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  thought	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  understand	  “Christian	  Realism.”	  Niebuhr’s	  thought,	  if	  it	  can	  be	  fairly	  
categorized	  at	  all,	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  brand	  of	  “Christian	  Realism”	  and	  the	  best	  
synthesis	  I’ve	  found	  of	  exactly	  what	  this	  label	  entails	  is	  Larry	  Rasmussen’s	  synthesis	  from	  
his	  introduction	  to	  a	  collection	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  theological	  essays:	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr:	  
Theologian	  of	  Public	  Life	  (Rice	  2009).	  Niebuhr's	  realism	  gets	  him	  accused	  of	  pessimism	  at	  
times,	  and	  when	  completely	  bastardized,	  it	  gets	  him	  cast	  as	  an	  apologist	  for	  power	  who	  
“prefers	  cautious	  gradualism	  to	  risking	  a	  better	  world	  through	  bold	  action”	  (20).	  This	  is	  
why	  Niebuhr's	  Christian	  Realism	  gets	  transposed	  into	  conservative	  and	  neoconservative	  
political	  creeds;	  but	  the	  transposition	  is	  unjust.	  For	  Niebuhr,	  realism	  simply	  meant	  
recognizing	  that	  while	  humans	  are	  both	  self-­‐regarding	  and	  other–regarding,	  or	  social,	  the	  
impulses	  of	  the	  former	  are	  generally	  stronger	  than	  the	  latter.	  Furthermore,	  even	  the	  latter	  
impulses	  lose	  some	  of	  their	  virtue	  because	  they	  are	  often	  compounded	  into	  collectives	  that	  
serve	  the	  self-­‐regarding	  egotism	  as	  well,	  as	  in	  when	  nationalism	  or	  patriotism	  are	  fed	  by	  
individual	  psychological	  feelings	  of	  pride	  and	  self-­‐righteousness.	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  see	  
that	  Niebuhr	  was	  never	  an	  apologist	  for	  power;	  he	  was	  just	  realistic	  about	  its	  role	  in	  
political	  action.	  As	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  political	  and	  moral	  realism	  is	  “the	  disposition	  to	  take	  all	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factors	  in	  a	  social	  and	  political	  situation,	  which	  offer	  resistance	  to	  establish	  norms,	  into	  
account,	  particularly	  the	  factors	  of	  self–interest	  and	  power.”18	  
Rasmussen	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  the	  qualifier	  “Christian”	  that	  leads	  directly	  to	  the	  
structure	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  thought	  as	  dialectical,	  i.e.	  as	  one	  between	  idealism	  and	  realism	  (ibid.,	  
20).	  He	  notes	  that,	  “Niebuhr	  characteristically	  moved	  between	  the	  polar	  elements	  of	  certain	  
theologically	  crucial	  pairs.	  Both	  terms	  of	  each	  pair	  were	  equally	  real	  for	  him:	  the	  ideal	  and	  
the	  real,	  the	  absolute	  and	  the	  contingent,	  the	  infant	  and	  the	  finite,	  the	  eternal	  Kingdom	  of	  
God	  and	  the	  flux	  of	  history”	  (ibid.).	  The	  dialectic	  of	  Niebuhr's	  thought	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  early	  
as	  a	  1916	  article	  for	  the	  Atlantic,	  written	  when	  he	  was	  twenty-­‐four	  years	  old.	  In	  this	  early	  
essay,	  despite	  having	  not	  yet	  explicitly	  formulated	  his	  personal	  brand	  of	  Christian	  Realism,	  
the	  interplay	  of	  ideal/real,	  absolute/relative,	  and	  eternity/time—“the	  dialectic	  of	  his	  
thought”—was	  already	  a	  prominent	  aspect	  of	  his	  method	  (ibid.,	  21).	  Rasmussen	  concludes	  
that,	  “Niebuhr	  always	  thought	  dialectically	  and	  paradoxically,	  though	  many	  of	  his	  readers	  
have	  been	  prone	  to	  relax	  the	  tension	  of	  his	  extremes.	  Niebuhr	  never	  relaxed	  the	  tension.	  He	  
discerned	  and	  decided	  amidst	  the	  play	  of	  antinomies,	  one	  set	  of	  which	  was	  ideal/real”	  
(ibid.).	  
Aside	  from	  being	  a	  Christian	  Realist,	  Niebuhr	  is	  often	  lumped	  into	  the	  theological	  
camp	  of	  neo-­‐orthodoxy.	  This	  isn’t	  unfair	  but	  it	  is	  much	  too	  simple	  for	  a	  paradoxical	  thinker	  
like	  Niebuhr,	  who	  typically	  loathed	  any	  form	  of	  systematic—and	  therefore	  abstract	  and	  
unpragmatic—conceptualizations.	  Niebuhr	  plainly	  refuted	  the	  accusation	  that	  he	  was	  a	  
neo-­‐orthodox	  theologian,	  or	  even	  a	  theologian	  at	  all.	  Instead,	  he	  argued	  that	  he	  found	  
himself	  much	  more	  in	  the	  camp	  of	  liberalism	  than	  the	  neo-­‐orthodox	  tradition	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  (Niebuhr	  1953,	  119)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  CRPP).	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theologians	  like	  Emil	  Brunner	  Karl	  Barth.	  This	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  trivial	  scholastic	  argument	  
and	  on	  some	  level	  I’m	  sure	  it	  is;	  but	  Niebuhr’s	  disagreements	  and	  agreements	  with	  both	  
liberalism	  and	  neo-­‐orthodoxy	  actually	  reveal	  another	  ongoing	  dialectic	  in	  his	  thought	  that	  
justifies	  the	  framework	  for	  how	  I’ve	  chosen	  to	  separate	  a	  particular	  Niebuhrian	  binary	  for	  
my	  analysis	  here:	  that	  of	  timeless	  and	  special	  words.	  
Niebuhr	  wanted	  to	  sharply	  distinguish	  religion	  and	  politics	  from	  one	  another	  and	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  relate	  them	  to	  one	  another.	  It	  is	  this	  latter	  aspect	  that	  is	  the	  “neo”	  in	  “neo-­‐
orthodoxy.”	  Another	  aspect	  of	  neo-­‐orthodoxy	  Niebuhr	  held	  to	  was	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  belief	  
in	  human	  perfectibility	  and	  the	  inevitability	  of	  progress	  and,	  acceptance	  of	  a	  belief	  in	  
human	  freedom,	  the	  capacity	  for	  transcendence,	  and	  Luther’s	  “Hidden	  God”	  of	  justice	  and	  
mercy.	  Lastly,	  neo-­‐orthodoxy	  also	  held	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  one	  should	  take	  the	  Christian	  
symbols	  seriously	  but	  not	  literally,	  a	  belief	  that	  is	  pertinent	  to	  grasp	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  
how	  Niebuhr	  viewed	  religion	  and	  myths.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  call	  Niebuhr	  a	  neo-­‐orthodox	  
theologian.	  
Were	  it	  not	  for	  his	  outright	  and	  explicit	  rejections	  of	  neo-­‐orthodox	  theologians	  there	  
wouldn’t	  be	  a	  debate	  at	  all.	  “I	  have	  never	  thought	  of	  myself	  in	  their	  [Brunner	  and	  Barth]	  
category,”	  Niebuhr	  writes;	  “I	  think	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  crux	  I	  belong	  to	  the	  liberal	  
tradition	  more	  than	  to	  theirs.”19	  The	  reason	  Niebuhr	  felt	  this	  way,	  despite	  having	  made	  his	  
career	  out	  of	  attacking	  the	  liberal	  Protestant	  tradition,	  was	  that	  when	  he	  engaged	  their	  
writings	  or	  arguments	  he	  felt	  that	  they	  were	  “trying	  to	  fit	  life	  into	  a	  dogmatic	  mold”	  and	  
that	  they	  “held	  fast	  to	  Biblical	  presuppositions”	  that	  he	  couldn’t	  hold	  to	  (ibid.).	  Lastly,	  
Niebuhr	  felt	  that	  “their	  indifference	  to	  and	  lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  political	  and	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  (Niebuhr	  1991,	  22)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  J&M).	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problems”	  always	  made	  them	  foreigners	  to	  him	  (ibid.).	  Niebuhr	  later	  repeated	  this	  
sentiment,	  noting	  that	  when	  he	  found	  “neo-­‐orthodoxy	  turning	  into	  sterile	  orthodoxy	  or	  a	  
new	  Scholasticism,”	  he	  remembered	  that	  he	  was	  “liberal	  at	  heart”	  (ibid.).	  That	  said,	  Niebuhr	  
rejected	  almost	  all	  of	  liberalism	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  built	  his	  career	  on	  tearing	  it	  down.	  
Liberalism	  typically	  held	  that	  injustice	  was	  due	  to	  man’s	  ignorance	  and	  would	  yield	  
to	  education	  and	  greater	  intelligence;	  that	  civilization	  was	  gradually	  progressing	  and	  
becoming	  more	  moral;	  that	  the	  character	  of	  individuals	  is	  the	  solvent	  for	  injustice,	  not	  
social	  systems	  or	  political	  arrangements;	  that	  appeals	  to	  love,	  justice	  and	  good-­‐will	  would	  
bound	  to	  be	  efficacious	  in	  the	  end	  and	  that	  any	  failure	  now	  was	  due	  to	  an	  inadequate	  
amount	  of	  appeals	  made	  on	  their	  behalf;	  that	  goodness	  makes	  for	  happiness	  and	  that	  the	  
increasing	  knowledge	  of	  this	  fact	  will	  eventually	  overcome	  selfish	  impulses;	  and	  finally,	  
that	  wars	  are	  stupid	  and	  are	  caused	  by	  those	  who	  are	  more	  stupid	  than	  those	  who	  
recognize	  the	  stupidity	  of	  war.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  liberal	  credo	  was	  primarily	  a	  “faith	  in	  
man”—whether	  Darwin’s	  or	  Hegel’s—and	  it	  was	  utterly	  optimistic	  about	  her	  future.	  
It	  was	  liberalism	  as	  “faith	  in	  man”	  and	  “soft	  utopianism”	  that	  Niebuhr	  rejected	  but	  
he	  did	  hold	  fast	  to	  some	  liberal	  traditions,	  notably	  those	  rooted	  in	  the	  German	  theological	  
tradition	  (ibid.,	  25).	  First,	  Niebuhr’s	  thought	  moved	  from	  human	  experience	  and	  historical	  
consciousness	  into	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God,	  rather	  than	  the	  reverse	  (which	  was	  neo-­‐
orthodoxy’s	  preference).	  Secondly,	  Niebuhr	  held	  to	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Jesus	  that	  
distinctively	  German,	  although	  many	  influential	  social	  gospelers	  like	  Troeltsch	  and	  
Harnacks	  held	  it	  as	  well:	  a	  Jesus	  of	  “free	  personal	  piety”	  and	  heroic	  moral	  rigor,	  not	  a	  social	  
reformer	  with	  a	  social	  program.	  The	  Kingdom	  of	  God,	  for	  Niebuhr,	  was	  not	  a	  social	  program	  
at	  all,	  but	  rather	  it	  was	  “the	  vision	  of	  an	  ideal	  ethical	  and	  religions	  situation”	  where	  God’s	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will	  controls	  history	  and	  the	  values	  of	  pure	  spirituality	  are	  appreciated	  and	  recognized	  
ultimately	  (ibid).	  Since	  these	  two	  notions—Jesus’	  piety	  and	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God—only	  
provided	  the	  rudiments	  of	  a	  social	  ethic,	  Niebuhr	  believed	  it	  was	  the	  church’s	  task	  to	  finish	  
the	  formulation.	  In	  this	  sense	  then,	  it	  was	  liberalism’s	  view	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  power	  for	  social	  
transformation	  and	  a	  source	  of	  energy	  for	  the	  social	  struggle	  that	  Niebuhr	  retained.	  
Additionally,	  Niebuhr	  shared	  political	  liberalism's	  model	  of	  society	  as	  a	  marketplace	  of	  
competing	  interests	  and	  powers;	  Niebuhr's	  notion	  of	  justice	  was	  regulated	  by	  liberalism's	  
principles—equality	  and	  liberty—and	  his	  social	  strategy	  was	  liberal	  as	  well—“justice	  is	  
furthered	  by	  increasing	  the	  relative	  power	  of	  marginal	  groups”	  (ibid.,	  26).	  Finally,	  Niebuhr	  
hated	  absolutism	  and	  was	  a	  pragmatist	  and	  pluralist	  who	  prized	  tolerance	  and	  social	  
experimentation—classic	  liberal	  trademarks	  (ibid.).	  
However,	  Niebuhr	  rejected	  liberalism's	  skepticism	  about	  knowing	  ultimate	  meaning	  
and	  ultimate	  values	  as	  well	  as	  liberalism's	  sentimentality,	  the	  idea	  that	  love	  and	  goodwill	  
would	  harmonize	  social	  relations.	  It	  is	  in	  these	  last	  two	  rejections	  of	  liberalism	  that	  
Niebuhr	  aligned	  himself	  with	  the	  neo–orthodox	  tradition’s	  use	  of	  classic	  Christian	  symbols	  
and	  doctrines;	  yet,	  much	  liberalism	  can	  be	  found	  in	  how	  he	  uses	  these	  symbols	  and	  
doctrines,	  as	  expressed	  in	  an	  important	  category	  for	  Niebuhr—that	  of	  “myth,”	  and	  his	  
subsequent	  distinction	  between	  “primitive”	  and	  “permanent”	  myths.	  This	  is	  where	  
Niebuhr’s	  liberalism—the	  legacy	  of	  19th	  century	  liberalism—was	  affirmed;	  he	  continually	  
sought	  to	  separate	  and	  sort	  the	  permanent	  from	  the	  primitive,	  the	  timeless	  truths	  from	  
their	  relative	  trappings	  (ibid.,	  29).	  
Niebuhr’s	  thought,	  if	  it	  can	  be	  fairly	  categorized	  at	  all,	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  unique	  
brand	  of	  Christian	  Realism.	  Understandably,	  the	  qualifier	  “Christian”	  may	  cause	  the	  ears	  of	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some	  readers	  to	  perk-­‐up	  and	  subsequently,	  to	  turn	  off	  completely;	  however,	  the	  group	  
“Atheists	  for	  Niebuhr”	  would	  probably	  advise	  against	  such	  out-­‐of-­‐hand	  dismissals.	  For	  one	  
thing,	  much	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  religious	  faith	  can	  be	  understood—to	  use	  his	  own	  terms—as	  
“reverent	  agnosticism.”	  Secondly,	  Niebuhr’s	  Christian	  faith	  was	  grounded	  in	  a	  nuanced	  and	  
qualified	  understanding	  of	  the	  larger	  categories	  of	  “religion”	  and	  “mythology.”	  Let	  us	  
unpack	  this	  second	  aspect	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  thought,	  so	  that	  we	  may	  better	  understand	  the	  role	  
religion,	  specifically	  Christianity,	  plays	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  
There	  are	  two	  primary	  sources	  of	  human	  vitality,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr.	  The	  first	  is	  
the	  natural	  will–two–live,	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “animal	  impulse.”	  The	  second	  primary	  source	  of	  
human	  vitality	  is	  “confidence	  in	  the	  meaningfulness	  of	  human	  existence.”	  The	  more	  
complex	  the	  world	  gets,	  the	  more	  self-­‐conscious	  man	  becomes,	  the	  more	  man	  recognizes	  
the	  total	  forces	  of	  the	  universe	  in	  which	  he	  finds	  himself,	  then	  the	  more	  he	  will	  depend	  
upon	  the	  second	  source	  to	  maintain	  a	  healthy	  sense	  of	  life.	  This	  confidence	  that	  life	  has	  
meaning	  is	  not	  dependent	  upon	  a	  rational	  analysis	  of	  the	  multifarious	  forces	  and	  factors	  of	  
existence;	  instead,	  it	  is	  something	  that	  is	  assumed	  in	  every	  healthy	  life.	  Though	  men	  may	  be	  
unable	  to	  define	  the	  meaning	  of	  life,	  this	  does	  not	  keep	  them	  from	  living	  by	  a	  simple	  trust	  
that	  it	  does	  have	  meaning.	  This	  simple	  trust,	  this	  basic	  optimism	  of	  all	  vital	  and	  wholesome	  
life,	  Niebuhr	  called	  “primary	  religion.”20	  
How	  the	  meaning	  of	  existence,	  the	  primary	  religious	  vitality,	  is	  revealed	  to	  different	  
individuals,	  cultures,	  and	  generations	  will	  transform	  man’s	  primary	  religion	  into	  a	  more	  
specific	  and	  qualified	  genre	  of	  religion.	  For	  instance,	  there	  are	  totemistic	  religions,	  
primitive	  religions,	  tribal	  religions,	  superficial	  religions,	  and	  profound	  or	  “High”	  religions,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  (Niebuhr	  and	  Brown	  1986)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  ERN).	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just	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  In	  order	  to	  place	  a	  particular	  religion,	  say	  Christianity,	  Buddhism,	  Greek	  
Mythology,	  or	  Marxism—yes,	  Marxism—one	  must	  simply	  ask,	  where	  is	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  
that	  religion’s	  meaning	  of	  existence?	  How	  is	  life’s	  meaning	  revealed	  to	  its	  followers?	  Thus,	  
if	  the	  meaning	  of	  existence	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	  relation	  of	  an	  individual	  to	  his	  group,	  as	  it	  was	  
in	  primitive	  and	  tribal	  life,	  we	  have	  a	  primitive	  religion,	  regardless	  of	  the	  when	  and	  where	  
that	  it	  manifests	  itself—and	  we	  may	  now	  note	  that	  this	  is	  precisely	  why	  Marxism	  qualifies	  
as	  a	  primitive	  religion,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr.	  Importantly,	  when	  the	  meaning	  of	  life	  is	  
achieved	  through	  its	  organic	  relation	  to	  a	  social	  enterprise	  the	  resulting	  loyalty	  will	  usually	  
form	  a	  kind	  of	  totemism	  by	  giving	  a	  mythical	  and	  symbolic	  expression	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
value	  and	  meaning	  of	  a	  social	  group	  are	  absolute.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  transcendent	  
elements	  of	  the	  primary	  religion	  will	  be	  placed	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  immanence,	  i.e.	  now	  in	  
history	  and/or	  here	  on	  earth.	  Thus,	  nature-­‐gods	  become	  identified	  with	  the	  gods	  of	  tribes	  
and	  both	  tribe	  and	  nature	  become	  unified	  into	  a	  common	  center	  and	  source	  of	  meaning.	  
It	  follows	  them,	  that	  where	  people	  refuse	  to	  ask	  ultimate	  questions	  about	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  values	  of	  their	  social	  group	  to	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  values	  we	  
will	  find	  some	  sort	  of	  primitive	  religion.	  Typically,	  however,	  the	  natural	  order	  doesn’t	  
follow	  prescribed	  rules	  of	  our	  or	  our	  god’s	  making.	  “The	  world	  is	  not	  only	  a	  cosmos	  but	  a	  
chaos,”	  as	  Niebuhr	  puts	  it	  (ERN,	  4).	  Thus,	  the	  simple	  and	  optimistic	  faith	  of	  primitive	  
religion	  is	  threatened,	  as	  every	  system	  of	  meaning	  is	  always	  threatened,	  with	  
meaninglessness;	  and	  furthermore,	  this	  meaninglessness	  typically	  results	  in	  a	  despairing	  
pessimism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  newly	  disillusioned	  faithful.	  Here,	  a	  theme	  emerges	  that	  will	  
often	  repeat	  itself	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  analyses	  of	  various	  problems,	  which	  is	  that	  the	  facts	  of	  
experience	  are	  stubborn	  things:	  they	  inevitably	  crash	  headlong	  into	  our	  simple	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explanations,	  destroying	  our	  theories,	  and	  unless	  we	  are	  given	  grace,	  our	  individual	  
wellbeing	  and/or	  our	  culture’s	  vitality.	  
Enter	  “profound	  religions,”	  the	  manifestation	  of	  which	  is	  always	  due	  to	  an	  effort	  to	  
challenge	  the	  pessimism	  of	  disillusionment	  that	  is	  the	  residue	  of	  all	  primitive	  religions.	  It	  is	  
profound	  religion’s	  task	  to	  find	  a	  meaning	  in	  life	  that	  includes	  the	  totality	  of	  existence	  and	  
interprets	  the	  chaos	  of	  life	  as	  only	  provisionally	  threatening,	  hopeful	  that	  perhaps	  it	  will	  
eventually	  be	  brought	  under	  the	  source	  of	  meaning’s	  dominion	  (ibid.).	  “The	  more	  men	  
think	  the	  more	  they	  are	  tempted	  to	  pessimism,”	  writes	  Niebuhr	  “because	  their	  thought	  
surveys	  the	  worlds	  which	  lie	  beyond	  their	  little	  cosmos,	  and	  analyzes	  the	  chaos,	  death,	  
destruction	  and	  misery	  which	  seem	  to	  deny	  their	  faith	  in	  the	  harmony	  and	  meaningfulness	  
of	  history”	  (ibid.).	  In	  Niebuhr’s	  analysis,	  the	  history	  of	  religions	  is	  the	  history	  of	  man’s	  
search	  for	  ultimate	  meaning,	  his	  subsequent	  oversimplification	  of	  his	  own	  relationship	  to	  
that	  source	  of	  meaning,	  and	  lastly,	  the	  debunking	  of	  his	  theory	  about	  said	  relationship	  and	  
his	  search	  for	  a	  new	  and	  more	  profound	  vocabulary,	  symbolic	  system,	  or	  mythology	  to	  
replace	  it.	  
Having	  explored	  the	  theological	  conceptions	  of	  Niebuhr’	  thought,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  
Niebuhr	  genuinely	  desired	  a	  “third	  way”	  to	  understand	  time	  and	  eternity,	  nature	  and	  
destiny.	  This	  is	  what	  he	  meant	  by	  “profound,”	  “High,”	  “ultra-­‐rational,”	  and	  “supra-­‐rational”	  
myths,	  which	  prefer	  paradox	  to	  simplicity,	  and	  ambiguity	  to	  certainty.	  Instead	  of	  collapsing	  
time	  and	  eternity,	  or	  separating	  the	  two	  completely,	  a	  dialectical	  theology	  combines	  both	  
aspects	  of	  primitive	  myths	  paradoxically.	  The	  first	  two	  methods	  are	  rationally	  sound	  and	  
logically	  coherent	  while	  the	  third	  is	  not;	  which	  is	  why	  the	  third	  way	  is	  a	  “deceptive”	  one.	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Christianity’s	  Dialectical	  Philosophy	  of	  History	  
	  
A	  philosophy	  of	  history	  that	  can	  bring	  all	  of	  the	  various	  perspectives	  of	  economists,	  
political	  strategists,	  insightful	  artists,	  and	  moralists,	  into	  a	  harmonious	  unity	  “must	  be	  
endowed	  with	  the	  highest	  imagination”	  (REE,	  122).	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  it	  must	  “combine	  
the	  exact	  data	  of	  the	  scientist	  with	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  artist	  and	  must	  add	  religious	  depth	  to	  
philosophical	  generalizations.”	  The	  solution,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  the	  only	  adequate	  
philosophy	  of	  history,	  is	  mythology.	  The	  first	  reason	  Niebuhr	  suggests	  that	  we	  turn	  to	  
mythology	  concerns	  the	  role	  of	  subjectivity	  in	  historical	  analysis.	  Modern	  man,	  as	  Niebuhr	  
found	  him,	  was	  so	  empirically	  rationalistic	  that	  he	  could	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  history	  he	  was	  
spectating.	  He	  was,	  in	  other	  words,	  inside	  of	  it,	  looking	  closely	  at	  the	  phenomenon	  of,	  say	  
“railroads”	  or	  “radios,”	  and	  this	  caused	  him	  to	  miss	  out	  on	  the	  larger	  whole.	  Modern	  man	  
couldn’t	  see	  the	  forest	  because	  of	  the	  trees.	  He	  lacked	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  whole	  that	  would	  give	  
meaning	  to	  the	  specific	  events	  he	  wanted	  to	  comprehend	  (ibid.,	  122).	  “A	  vision	  of	  the	  whole	  
is	  possible	  only	  if	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  human	  history	  has	  meaning”	  Niebuhr	  argued;	  “and	  
modern	  empiricism	  is	  afraid	  of	  that	  assumption”	  (ibid.,	  122-­‐3).	  This	  meaning	  was	  precisely	  
what	  modern	  man	  needed	  and	  in	  order	  for	  history	  to	  feel	  meaningful,	  one	  had	  to	  start	  with	  
a	  mythology.	  Of	  course,	  the	  modern	  empiricist,	  Niebuhr	  observed,	  didn’t	  escape	  
mythological	  interpretations	  of	  history	  simply	  because	  he	  tried	  to	  consciously	  avoid	  them.	  
“He	  merely	  insures	  their	  inadequacy	  by	  leaving	  their	  presuppositions	  unexamined”	  (ibid.,	  
123).	  Thus,	  he	  translates	  the	  mood	  of	  optimism,	  prevalent	  in	  bourgeois	  circles,	  into	  a	  
“mythology	  of	  progress.”	  But	  an	  adequate	  mythology,	  a	  sufficient	  philosophy	  of	  history,	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must	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for,	  not	  only	  progress,	  but	  also	  find	  “meaning	  in	  momentary	  chaos”	  
(ibid.,	  124).21	  
A	  consistent	  religion,	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  is	  as	  equally	  absurd	  as	  a	  consistent	  scientific	  
empiricism.	  The	  latter	  is	  absurd	  because	  it	  tends	  to	  deny	  the	  continuities	  in	  reality	  and	  see	  
everything	  only	  in	  its	  immediate	  and	  momentary	  situation.	  The	  former	  is	  absurd	  because	  it	  
regards	  all	  reality—personality	  in	  particular—as	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis,	  and	  thus	  it	  fails	  to	  
see	  “how	  truly	  personality	  is	  the	  product	  of	  specific	  social	  and	  natural	  forces	  and	  neglects	  
to	  change	  the	  material	  environment	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  human	  welfare.”22	  (Niebuhr	  1927,	  
183)Surveying	  the	  historical	  landscape	  in	  1927,	  Niebuhr—by	  no	  means	  alone—argued	  that	  
the	  latter	  worldview	  typified	  the	  Western	  perspective	  and	  that	  the	  former	  was	  typical	  of	  
Eastern	  philosophies	  and	  religions.23	  
The	  Western	  world	  Niebuhr	  argued,	  had	  much	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  East	  in	  its	  strategy	  
of	  life,	  but	  there	  was	  nothing	  to	  gain	  by	  substituting	  one	  strategy	  for	  the	  other:	  both	  were	  
defective.	  The	  current	  problems	  of	  the	  West,	  for	  Niebuhr,	  were	  the	  result	  of	  the	  “complete	  
bankruptcy	  of	  religious	  forces	  and	  the	  unchallenged	  dominion	  of	  science”	  that	  permeated	  
its	  culture,	  just	  as	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  East	  was	  due	  “to	  the	  unchallenged	  sway	  of	  religion”	  that	  
held	  it	  back	  from	  achieving	  economic,	  technological	  and	  political	  gains	  (ibid.,	  184).	  As	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Herein	  lies	  the	  necessity	  and	  power	  behind	  ideology.	  Since	  they	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  
chaos,	  they	  subsume	  it	  into	  their	  philosophy	  of	  history.	  It	  becomes	  “breaking	  eggs	  to	  make	  
omelets,”	  as	  Hannah	  Arendt	  described	  Nazi	  ideology.	  Niebuhr	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  
understand	  this	  powerful	  dynamic	  in	  ideological	  myths.	  Writing	  in	  1934,	  he	  argues,	  
“Interpretations	  of	  history	  actually	  tend	  to	  verify	  themselves,	  when	  rigorously	  held,	  
because	  they	  direct	  the	  course	  of	  history	  toward	  an	  imagined	  goal.”	  
	  
22	  Latin	  for	  "under	  the	  aspect	  of	  eternity";	  hence,	  from	  Spinoza	  onwards,	  an	  honorific	  
expression	  describing	  what	  is	  universally	  and	  eternally	  true,	  without	  any	  reference	  to	  or	  
dependence	  upon	  the	  merely	  temporal	  portions	  of	  reality.	  
23	  (Niebuhr	  1927,	  183)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  DCNR).	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Niebuhr	  poetically	  put	  it:	  “Neither	  the	  West	  nor	  the	  East	  has	  arrived	  at	  a	  perfect	  basis	  for	  
happiness.	  The	  Oriental	  soul	  is	  like	  a	  bird,	  free	  of	  its	  cage,	  but	  with	  no	  wings	  to	  fly.	  The	  
Occidental	  soul	  has	  wings	  but	  is	  so	  fascinated	  by	  its	  gilded	  cage	  that	  it	  does	  not	  care	  to	  fly”	  
(ibid.,	  184-­‐5).	  The	  situation,	  Niebuhr	  sums	  up,	  is	  this:	  
Human	  personality	  can	  be	  understood	  neither	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  environment	  alone	  nor	  
in	  absolute	  terms	  which	  leave	  the	  material	  world	  in	  which	  it	  develops	  out	  of	  account.	  
The	  final	  victory	  of	  personality	  must	  be	  gained	  by	  transcending	  concrete	  situations	  
and	  material	  circumstances;	  but	  it	  is	  a	  hollow	  victory	  if	  circumstances	  are	  not	  
previously	  used	  and	  amended	  to	  improve	  personal	  values.	  The	  soul	  is	  at	  once	  the	  
victim	  and	  the	  master	  of	  the	  material	  world.	  It	  gains	  its	  highest	  triumph	  by	  
renouncing	  the	  world,	  but	  the	  pronunciation	  is	  premature	  if	  a	  futile	  and	  yet	  not	  
futile	  effort	  is	  not	  made	  to	  make	  the	  natural	  world	  conform	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  human	  
character.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
Niebuhr’s	  conclusions	  will	  most	  likely	  shock	  Orthodox	  religionists:	  the	  values	  of	  religion	  
are	  conditioned	  and	  not	  absolute	  and	  hey	  attain	  their	  highest	  usefulness	  not	  when	  they	  
subdue	  all	  other	  values	  but	  when	  they	  are	  in	  perpetual	  conflict	  with	  them,	  or	  it	  may	  be	  
truer	  to	  say	  when	  they	  are	  coordinated	  with	  them	  (ibid.,	  185).	  But	  coordination,	  Niebuhr	  
argues,	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  accomplishment;	  yet,	  it	  is	  possible.	  The	  East	  could	  learn	  to	  live	  in	  
time	  and	  the	  West	  could	  learn	  to	  view	  its	  temporalities	  with	  indifference.	  Man,	  Niebuhr	  
argues,	  is	  a	  citizen	  of	  two	  worlds	  and	  thus,	  he	  “cannot	  afford	  to	  renounce	  his	  citizenship	  in	  
either”	  (ibid.,	  186)	  In	  the	  end,	  we	  must	  work	  out	  our	  destiny	  both	  as	  a	  child	  of	  nature	  and	  
as	  a	  servant	  of	  the	  absolute.	  He	  writes,	  “The	  only	  fruitful	  alternative	  to	  a	  monism	  and	  
pantheism	  which	  identifies	  God	  and	  the	  world,	  the	  real	  and	  the	  ideal,	  is	  a	  dualism	  which	  
maintains	  some	  kind	  of	  distinction	  between	  them	  and	  does	  not	  lose	  one	  in	  the	  other”	  (ibid.,	  
194).	  Despite	  Niebuhr’s	  continual	  adjustments	  and	  movements	  along	  the	  wide	  political	  and	  
theological	  spectrums,	  it	  was	  this	  solution	  that	  he	  would	  never	  abandon.	  It	  remained,	  from	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the	  beginning	  to	  the	  end	  of	  his	  expansive	  career,	  the	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  his	  
mythopoeic	  thought.	  
We	  should	  note	  however,	  as	  Niebuhr	  does,	  that	  mythopoeic	  dialectics	  are	  not	  new	  
solutions	  to	  the	  riddles	  of	  life.	  Niebuhr	  points	  out	  that,	  “they	  are	  in	  fact	  as	  numerous	  as	  
pantheistic	  ones,	  but	  their	  metaphysical	  limitations	  have	  usually	  outweighed	  their	  moral	  
advantages	  and	  shortened	  their	  life”	  (ibid.).	  For	  instance,	  in	  Zoroastrianism	  the	  spirit	  of	  evil	  
exist	  independently	  of	  the	  good	  spirit	  and	  this	  Persian	  dualism	  is	  found	  in	  both	  Hebrew	  and	  
Christian	  thought.	  It	  is	  partly	  responsible	  for	  the	  satanology	  of	  the	  Old	  Testament	  and	  
Augustine’s	  early	  Manichaeism	  is	  also	  a	  compound	  of	  both	  Persian	  and	  Christian	  faiths.	  
Thus	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “Mythology	  is	  filled	  with	  efforts	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  conflicts	  which	  the	  
world	  reveals	  as	  obviously	  as	  its	  unities,	  as	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  myth	  of	  Prometheus	  and	  
Zeus”	  and	  “Even	  Plato,	  from	  whom	  most	  Western	  pantheism	  has	  been	  indirectly	  derived,	  
held	  that	  God's	  perfect	  goodness	  was	  thwarted	  by	  the	  intractableness	  of	  the	  materials	  with	  
which	  he	  worked”	  (ibid.,	  195).	  
The	  relationship	  between	  the	  temporal	  world	  and	  the	  eternal	  world,	  from	  the	  
Christian	  perspective,	  is	  not	  strictly	  dualistic;	  it	  does	  not	  hold	  that	  the	  eternal	  world	  is	  
separate	  and	  distinct	  from	  the	  temporal	  one.	  “Christianity	  does	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  natural,	  
temporal	  and	  historical	  world	  is	  self–derived	  or	  self–explanatory”	  (ibid.,	  4).	  	  Rather,	  the	  
Biblical	  perspective	  is	  that	  the	  ground	  and	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  existence,	  the	  Alpha	  and	  
Omega,	  beginning	  and	  end,	  lie	  outside	  of	  existence	  itself	  “in	  an	  eternal	  and	  divine	  Will”	  
(ibid.).	  It	  holds	  that	  the	  eternal	  is	  revealed	  and	  expressed	  in	  the	  temporal	  but	  not	  exhausted	  
in	  it,	  that	  man	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  God’s	  will,	  that	  He	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  man’s	  existence.	  On	  the	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other	  hand,	  just	  because	  man	  is	  not	  God,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  finite	  world	  is	  “merely	  
a	  corrupt	  emanation	  from	  the	  ideal	  and	  eternal	  one"	  (ibid.)	  
The	  logical	  absurdity	  of	  Christianity’s	  paradoxical	  dualism	  is	  obscene	  to	  the	  modern	  
mind	  and	  thus,	  since	  the	  influx	  of	  Greek	  influence	  on	  Christian	  mythology,	  many	  attempts	  
have	  been	  made	  to	  evade,	  veil,	  or	  eliminate	  the	  element	  of	  deception	  in	  Christianity’s	  truths.	  
Expressing	  the	  relationship	  between	  time	  and	  eternity	  in	  rational	  and	  logical	  terms	  
invariably	  leads,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  to	  pantheism	  or	  a	  false	  supernaturalism.	  Pantheism	  
results	  from	  a	  complete	  unification	  of	  God	  and	  world,	  granting	  meaning	  to	  everything	  that	  
happens	  in	  the	  flux	  of	  time—God’s	  providence	  is	  found	  in	  the	  record	  crops	  last	  harvest,	  his	  
judgment	  and	  wrath	  revealed	  in	  Hurricane	  Katrina’s	  path	  through	  New	  Orleans.	  But	  when	  
God	  and	  the	  natural	  world	  are	  completely	  in	  harmony,	  what	  do	  we	  make	  of	  the	  completely	  
inexplicable?	  For	  instance,	  how	  do	  we	  interpret	  the	  sudden	  death	  of	  an	  infant	  in	  her	  sleep,	  
the	  assassination	  of	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.,	  or	  the	  AIDs	  virus?	  From	  the	  pantheistic	  
perspective	  man	  loses	  his	  ability	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  in	  a	  way	  that	  isn’t	  chaotic,	  that	  
isn’t	  bound,	  as	  was	  Hellas,	  to	  the	  unpredictable	  and	  malicious	  manipulations	  of	  jealous	  
Zeus	  or	  slighted	  Apollo—or	  worse,	  a	  simply	  bored	  Athena.	  	  
At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  a	  false	  supernaturalism	  emerges	  when	  the	  
dialectic	  is	  completely	  severed	  between	  heaven	  and	  earth,	  God	  and	  man,	  transcendent	  and	  
immanent,	  sacred	  and	  profane,	  leaving	  the	  temporal	  world	  without	  meaning	  or	  significance.	  
Over-­‐correction	  is	  a	  common	  and	  natural	  reaction	  to	  our	  many	  problems,	  as	  individuals	  
and	  communities	  and	  this,	  of	  course,	  was	  the	  eventual	  reaction	  of	  the	  Greeks	  to	  the	  
unpredictability	  of	  Mt.	  Olympus’s	  tenants.	  Hellas	  sought	  emancipation	  of	  man’s	  changeless	  
reason	  from	  this	  world	  of	  change	  and	  disorder.	  The	  life	  of	  the	  mind—though	  only	  the	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aristocratic	  philosopher’s	  mind—was	  valued	  over	  all	  else	  and	  life’s	  only	  meaning	  was	  
found	  in	  the	  contemplation	  of	  the	  timeless	  forms	  of	  the	  eternal	  realm.	  Of	  course,	  it	  goes	  
without	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  dwell	  on	  love	  and	  beauty	  when	  one	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  worry	  
about	  getting	  all	  the	  wheat	  planted	  before	  the	  third	  phase	  of	  the	  moon,	  and	  for	  this	  reason,	  
the	  eternal	  forms	  of	  supernaturalism	  aren’t	  really	  available	  for	  contemplation	  outside	  the	  
rank	  and	  file	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie.	  
Pantheism	  and	  false	  supernaturalism	  can	  be	  avoided	  by	  accepting	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  
are	  certain	  truths	  in	  this	  world	  that	  can	  only	  be	  expressed	  mythically	  and	  in	  symbolic	  terms.	  
In	  fact,	  what	  is	  remarkable	  about	  man’s	  tendency	  to	  insist	  that	  Christian	  truths	  are	  actually	  
lies	  because	  of	  their	  logical	  absurdity	  is	  that	  we	  are	  all	  hypocrites	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  other	  
forms	  of	  symbolic	  expression.	  Painting	  was	  one	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  favorite	  analogies	  for	  the	  
relationship	  between	  permanently	  valid	  myths	  and	  rational	  truths.	  Artists	  are	  forced	  to	  use	  
deceptive	  symbols	  because	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  portray	  two	  dimensions	  of	  space	  on	  a	  single	  
dimension	  of	  canvas.	  Painting	  a	  picture	  that	  has	  depth	  and	  perspective	  requires	  an	  artist,	  
not	  to	  paint	  angles	  not	  as	  they	  are,	  but	  as	  they	  appear	  to	  the	  eye	  when	  it	  looks	  into	  depth	  
(ibid.,	  5).	  Parallel	  lines	  aren’t	  drawn	  as	  parallel	  lines	  but	  are	  made	  to	  appear	  as	  if	  they	  
converge	  on	  the	  horizon,	  for	  that	  is	  how	  they	  appear	  to	  the	  naked	  eye.”	  “This	  necessity	  of	  
picturing	  things	  as	  they	  seem	  and	  not	  as	  they	  are,	  in	  order	  to	  record	  on	  one	  dimension	  
what	  they	  are	  in	  two	  dimensions,”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “is	  a	  striking	  analogy,	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
space,	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  time”	  (ibid.,	  5).	  Time	  is	  a	  succession	  of	  
actual	  phenomenal	  events.	  Yet	  this	  succession	  is	  not	  time	  because	  time	  is	  experienced	  as	  
real	  only	  when	  these	  successions	  are	  given	  meaningful	  relationships	  to	  one	  another.	  Since	  
these	  meanings	  cannot	  come	  from	  within	  time	  itself,	  time	  can	  only	  be	  experienced	  as	  real	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when	  processes	  that	  are	  outside	  time	  are	  used	  to	  explain	  it.	  Unfortunately,	  since	  we	  exist	  in	  
time,	  we	  cannot	  express	  these	  processes,	  whatever	  they	  are,	  without	  viewing	  them	  through	  
the	  lens	  of	  temporality.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  temporal	  process	  is	  like	  the	  painter’s	  flat	  canvas.	  
“It	  is	  one	  dimension	  upon	  which	  two	  dimensions	  must	  be	  recorded.	  This	  can	  only	  be	  done,	  
Niebuhr	  argues,	  with	  “symbols	  which	  deceive	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  truth”	  (ibid.,	  6).	  
“Great	  art”	  argued	  Niebuhr,	  faces	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  time	  and	  the	  
two	  dimensions	  of	  space,	  at	  the	  same	  (ibid.).	  Elaborating	  on	  this	  analogy	  Niebuhr	  
demonstrates	  that	  modern	  man	  typically	  accepts	  supra-­‐rational	  truth	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  visual	  
art.	  Niebuhr	  often	  calls	  attention	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  photograph	  and	  the	  artistic	  
portrait	  to	  make	  this	  point.	  The	  portrait	  artist	  is	  confronted	  with	  painting	  a	  “character,”	  yet	  
human	  personality,	  he	  notes,	  “is	  more	  than	  a	  succession	  of	  moods.”	  Ever	  the	  Jamesian,	  
Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  the	  moods	  of	  a	  moment,	  as	  we	  experience	  them	  in	  reality,	  are	  held	  
together	  in	  the	  stream	  of	  consciousness	  by	  a	  unity	  of	  thought	  and	  feeling,	  which	  gives	  them	  
a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  consistency.	  We	  may	  note	  that	  our	  experiences	  and	  diagnoses	  of	  
bi-­‐polar	  behaviors	  as	  “mood	  dis-­‐orders,”	  evidence	  Niebuhr’s	  testimony.	  It	  is,	  in	  lay	  terms	  
and	  from	  the	  observers’	  perspective,	  a	  person’s	  rapid	  mood	  changes	  that	  are	  not	  in	  a	  
perceivable	  successive	  “order”	  and	  thus,	  they	  are	  viewed	  as	  erratic	  and	  unpredictable.	  
The	  portrait	  then,	  is	  a	  deception.	  Unlike	  a	  photograph,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  exact,	  precise,	  
scientific	  rendering	  of	  what	  one	  sees	  when	  they	  look	  at	  a	  person.24	  	  The	  artist	  problem	  is	  to	  
portray	  a	  personality,	  an	  inner	  consistency	  of	  character,	  which	  transcends	  the	  gesture	  or	  
expression	  of	  any	  one	  moment	  in	  time.	  What	  separates	  a	  good	  portrait	  from	  a	  bad	  one	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Of	  course,	  we	  now	  know	  much	  more	  about	  photography	  than	  did	  Niebuhr	  at	  the	  time	  and	  
we’ve	  problematized,	  deconstructed	  and	  demolished	  everything	  once	  commonly	  thought	  
about	  the	  “realism”	  of	  photography.	  Nevertheless,	  for	  Niebuhr’s	  purposes	  and	  his	  audience,	  
the	  analogy	  works.	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the	  ability	  to	  capture	  the	  subject’s	  “essence,”	  some	  timeless	  truth	  about	  the	  person,	  by	  not	  
rendering	  as	  they	  appear	  to	  the	  normal	  eye.	  Artistic	  elements	  are	  added	  in	  order	  get	  at	  
something	  beyond	  what	  is	  seen	  by	  the	  naked	  eye	  and	  transcend	  the	  moment	  in	  time.	  The	  
character	  must	  be	  made	  into	  a	  “symbol	  of	  something	  beyond	  itself.”25	  	  This	  is	  the	  reason,	  
Niebuhr	  notes,	  that	  art	  and	  religion	  are	  much	  more	  closely	  related	  than	  science	  and	  
religion—one	  of	  many	  Niebuhrian	  insights	  that	  brought	  him	  closer	  to	  his	  “arch-­‐nemesis,”	  
John	  Dewey,	  than	  he	  was	  probably	  aware	  (ibid.).	  The	  fundamental	  tension	  between	  
mystery	  and	  meaning,	  between	  deception	  and	  truth,	  is	  maintained	  in	  all	  profound,	  
paradoxical,	  prophetic,	  “high”	  religious	  myths.	  
Niebuhr	  wanted	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  “necessary	  and	  valid	  contribution	  of	  myth	  to	  
the	  biblical	  world	  view”	  (BT,	  x).	  However,	  Niebuhr	  points	  out	  that	  “The	  idea	  of	  a	  meaningful	  
history	  does	  not,	  however,	  explain	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  that	  meaning.”	  The	  content	  of	  the	  
biblical	  mythology,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  that	  “the	  Christian	  view	  of	  history	  passes	  
through	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  tragic	  to	  a	  hope	  and	  an	  assurance	  which	  is	  ‘beyond	  tragedy.’”	  It	  is	  
tragic	  because	  recognizes	  that	  evil	  is	  an	  inevitable	  concomitant	  of	  even	  man’s	  most	  
righteous	  and	  spiritual	  accomplishments	  and	  enterprises.	  It	  goes	  beyond	  tragedy	  because	  it	  
does	  not	  regard	  evil	  as	  normative	  or	  inherent	  in	  existence	  but	  as	  finally	  under	  the	  
dominion	  of	  a	  good	  God	  (ibid.,	  xi).	  
The	  Biblical	  God	  is	  mysterious	  and	  man	  cannot	  understand	  his	  ways;	  yet,	  He	  is	  a	  God	  
of	  revelation.	  His	  purposes	  are	  revealed,	  though	  not	  clearly,	  in	  the	  significant	  events	  of	  
history.	  The	  revelatory	  power	  of	  these	  events	  must	  be	  apprehended	  by	  faith	  and	  once	  
apprehended,	  they	  prove	  to	  be	  more	  than	  particular	  events—they	  take	  on	  ultimate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Thus,	  portraiture	  and	  caricature,	  both	  done	  by	  falsifying	  physiognomic	  details,	  can	  never	  
be	  sharply	  distinguished	  from	  one	  another.	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significance.	  This,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  “the	  scandal	  of	  particularity”	  (einmaligkeit)	  that	  
is	  a	  necessary	  aspect	  of	  Biblical	  faith.	  This	  revelation	  is	  also	  an	  act	  of	  redemption	  because	  
though	  God	  reveals	  his	  judgment	  in	  history,	  he	  also	  reveals	  his	  mercy	  in	  these	  disclosures.	  
If	  the	  disclosure	  is	  apprehended	  in	  repentance	  and	  faith	  it	  leads	  to	  a	  reformation	  of	  life.	  But	  
note	  that	  one	  cannot	  apprehend	  the	  revelation	  without	  repentance	  because	  only	  the	  
contrite	  heart	  will	  seek	  out	  God’s	  mercy.	  In	  other	  words,	  according	  to	  the	  Biblical	  
conception,	  one	  must	  have	  faith	  in	  the	  revealed	  God	  to	  experience	  his	  judgment,	  one	  must	  
repent,	  and	  then	  one	  must	  come	  back	  to	  the	  revelation	  and	  will	  see	  it	  as	  a	  source	  of	  mercy	  
and	  new	  life	  afterward.	  
	   Suppose	  that	  I’m	  a	  family	  in	  Hawaii	  when	  Pearl	  Harbor	  is	  bombed.	  Though	  I	  
recognize	  that	  this	  is	  not	  an	  absolutely	  clear	  judgment	  of	  God,	  since	  I’m	  a	  person	  of	  faith	  I	  
interpret	  this	  event	  as	  a	  revelation	  of	  God’s	  judgment	  in	  history.	  Let’s	  say	  I	  think,	  “God	  has	  
allowed	  this	  to	  happen	  because	  we	  are	  an	  imperialist	  country.”	  I	  repent	  for	  being	  
complacent	  in	  this	  imperialism	  and	  not	  doing	  more	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  it.	  My	  “reformation”	  
takes	  place	  by	  way	  of	  joining	  a	  political	  advocacy	  group,	  say	  “Democrats	  for	  Social	  Justice”	  
and	  I	  send	  them	  money	  every	  month.	  Looking	  back	  on	  the	  events	  of	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  I’m	  
saddened	  but	  I’m	  also	  encouraged	  by	  my	  reformation	  that	  there	  is	  new	  life,	  grace,	  and	  
mercy	  after	  the	  dark	  days	  of	  God’s	  judgment.	  
This	  example	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  Niebuhr’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Biblical	  
myth	  pertaining	  to	  the	  prophetic	  contribution	  to	  Israel’s	  mythos.	  The	  Bible	  tells	  us	  that	  
Israel	  is	  specifically	  singled	  out	  from	  all	  other	  nations,	  it	  is	  chosen	  by	  God	  and	  given	  a	  
special	  destiny;	  however,	  this	  specialness	  only	  results	  in	  more	  responsibility	  and	  not	  a	  
divine	  guarantee	  of	  its	  security.	  “You	  only	  have	  I	  known	  of	  all	  the	  families	  of	  the	  earth,”	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Amos	  declares	  on	  behalf	  of	  Yahweh;	  “therefore	  I	  will	  punish	  you	  for	  all	  your	  iniquities”	  
(Amos	  3:2).	  Prophetic	  universalism	  strongly	  differentiates	  between	  the	  will	  of	  Israel	  and	  
the	  will	  of	  God.	  The	  Biblical	  God	  is	  not	  conceived	  of	  as	  “the	  projection	  or	  extension	  of	  a	  
nation’s	  or	  individual’s	  ideals	  and	  purposes.”26	  Nor	  is	  His	  power	  coextensive	  with,	  or	  
supplementary	  to,	  a	  nation's	  power.	  As	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  “Israel	  does	  not	  choose	  God.	  God	  
chooses	  Israel.”	  This	  characteristic	  sets	  Israel	  apart	  from	  their	  historical	  neighbors	  and	  the	  
surrounding	  Mesopotamian	  myths.	  Since	  Israel	  has	  no	  choice	  in	  this	  narrative,	  the	  Biblical	  
mythos	  represents	  a	  radical	  break	  in	  the	  history	  of	  culture.	  “It	  is,”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “in	  a	  
genuine	  sense,	  the	  beginning	  of	  revelation;	  for	  here	  a	  nation	  apprehends	  and	  is	  
apprehended	  by	  the	  true	  God	  and	  not	  by	  a	  divine	  creature	  of	  its	  own	  contrivance”	  (ibid.,	  
104).	  The	  proof	  that	  he	  is	  the	  one	  true	  God,	  Niebuhr	  concludes,	  is	  that	  he	  confronts	  the	  
tribe	  of	  Israel	  not	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  their	  power	  but	  as	  its	  limit.	  
God’s	  choice	  of	  Israel	  “is	  regarded	  as	  an	  act	  of	  grace	  for	  which	  no	  reason	  can	  be	  
given,	  other	  than	  God's	  own	  love	  (ibid.).	  This	  act	  of	  grace	  reveals	  the	  second	  unique	  aspect	  
of	  the	  Biblical	  God,	  and	  that	  is,	  that	  He	  is	  not	  “a	  force	  of	  reason	  identical	  with	  the	  Logos	  that	  
the	  human	  mind	  incarnates”	  (ibid.).	  It	  makes	  no	  sense	  why	  God	  would	  choose	  Israel	  and	  
His	  ways	  are	  not	  our	  ways.	  Thus,	  God’s	  grace,	  given	  to	  Israel,	  completes	  the	  structure	  of	  His	  
meaning	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  reason	  and	  intelligence,	  as	  well	  as	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  
history.	  It	  is	  this	  idea	  of	  an	  ultimate	  source	  and	  end	  of	  life	  that	  transcends	  human	  capacities	  
to	  comprehend	  it	  and	  human	  powers	  to	  manipulate	  it,	  that	  represents	  a	  radical	  break	  of	  
Biblical	  faith	  from	  the	  idolatrous	  tendencies	  of	  every	  culture.	  Man	  and	  tribe	  worship	  a	  God	  
that	  views	  them	  like	  he	  views	  “even	  the	  Ethiopians,”	  The	  Biblical	  God	  must	  be	  experienced	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  (Niebuhr	  1949,	  102)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  F&H).	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as	  “enemy”	  before	  he	  can	  be	  known	  as	  friend.	  Human	  desires,	  insofar	  as	  they	  usurp	  God’s,	  
must	  be	  broken	  and	  redirected	  before	  man’s	  will	  and	  God’s	  will	  can	  be	  concurrent	  (ibid.,	  
103).	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  Biblical	  God	  reveals	  himself	  to	  us	  in	  history,	  making	  life	  
meaningful;	  meanwhile,	  his	  revelation	  transcends	  the	  bounds	  of	  reason,	  making	  it	  
mysterious.	  This	  God,	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “is	  not	  made	  in	  any	  human	  image”	  and	  crafting	  such	  
an	  image	  is	  strictly	  prohibited.	  He	  is	  Deus	  Absconditus.	  Isaiah	  tells	  us	  that	  God’s	  thoughts	  
are	  not	  our	  thoughts	  and	  God’s	  ways	  are	  not	  our	  ways	  (55:8).	  In	  other	  words,	  Yahweh	  is	  
radically	  other—the	  “nations	  are	  as	  a	  drop	  in	  a	  bucket”	  to	  him	  (Isaiah	  40:15-­‐17).	  Niebuhr	  
argues	  that	  it	  is	  this	  radical	  otherness,	  the	  unfathomable	  mystery	  of	  God	  that	  outrages	  
man’s	  reason.	  Yet,	  he	  notes,	  the	  worship	  of	  this	  God	  is	  “the	  basis	  for	  the	  first	  genuine	  
conception	  of	  universal	  history;	  and	  it	  remains	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  only	  possible	  universalism	  
which	  does	  not	  negate	  or	  unduly	  simplify	  the	  meaning	  of	  history	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
universalizing	  it”	  (ibid.,	  103).	  	  Niebuhr	  finds	  a	  mythic	  paradox	  in	  this	  relationship	  between	  
the	  mystery	  of	  God	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  history.	  “Mystery	  does	  not	  annul	  meaning	  but	  
enriches	  it”	  he	  argues;	  “It	  prevents	  the	  realm	  of	  meaning	  from	  being	  reduced	  too	  simply	  to	  
rational	  intelligibility	  and	  thereby	  being	  given	  a	  false	  center	  of	  meaning	  in	  a	  relative	  or	  
contingent	  historical	  force	  or	  end”	  (ibid.).	  Mystery,	  Niebuhr	  poetically	  put	  it	  over	  twenty	  
years	  later,	  “is	  the	  shadowy	  realm	  of	  twilight	  where	  both	  coherence	  and	  incoherence	  are	  
known	  or	  intimated,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  threshold	  of	  glory	  which	  gives	  light	  but	  does	  not	  reveal	  
its	  nature.”27	  The	  very	  word	  “God,”	  he	  argues,	  represents	  both	  the	  unknowable	  ‘X’	  of	  
mystery	  and	  the	  fullness	  of	  ultimate	  meaning.	  This	  is	  a	  powerful	  paradox	  in	  Niebuhr’s	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  1968,	  5)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	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mythopoeic	  interpretation	  and	  it	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  Niebuhr’s	  thought	  as	  
thoroughly	  dialectical	  in	  nature.	  
Of	  all	  of	  the	  traditions	  of	  mythic	  dualism	  Niebuhr	  obviously	  prefers	  the	  Judeo-­‐
Christian	  one.	  We	  find	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  preference	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
Judaism’s	  dualism.	  The	  first	  reason	  for	  this	  preference	  is	  that	  the	  Judaic	  dualism	  is	  dramatic	  
and	  not	  philosophical.	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  early	  Judaism’s	  naïve	  dualism	  is	  partly	  
responsible	  for	  its	  potency	  in	  the	  history	  of	  religion.	  In	  the	  early	  Hebrew	  tradition	  God	  was	  
conceived	  of	  as	  omnipotent,	  which	  led	  to	  its	  monotheism;	  but	  the	  idea	  of	  omnipotence	  was	  
elaborated	  dramatically	  rather	  than	  philosophically.	  As	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  “The	  heavens	  might	  
declare	  his	  glory	  and	  the	  firmament	  show	  his	  handiwork,	  but	  he	  was	  revealed	  in	  national	  
history	  and	  (according	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  later	  prophets)	  in	  personal	  experience	  
more	  than	  in	  natural	  phenomena.”	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  Judaism	  it	  is	  typically	  the	  still,	  small	  
voice,	  rather	  than	  the	  earthquake	  or	  the	  fire	  that	  was	  the	  symbol	  of	  God's	  presence.	  
Prophetic	  Christianity	  continued	  this	  tradition,	  maintaining	  a	  tense	  dualism	  that	  
results	  in	  its	  moral	  superiority	  over	  its	  mythic	  competitors28.	  Jesus,	  like	  the	  Old	  Testament	  
prophets,	  “emphasized	  the	  moral	  rather	  than	  the	  metaphysical	  attributes	  of	  God	  in	  such	  a	  
way	  as	  to	  develop	  a	  practical	  and	  morally	  potent	  distinction	  between	  God	  and	  the	  universe,	  
between	  the	  ideal	  of	  religious	  devotion	  and	  the	  disappointing	  realities	  of	  life”	  (ibid.).	  The	  
practical	  dualism	  of	  Christianity,	  in	  its	  unspoiled	  form,	  is	  markedly	  different	  from	  Oriental	  
monism	  in	  that	  Christianity	  has	  always	  been	  a	  religion	  seeking	  a	  metaphysics,	  whereas	  
Buddhism	  is	  a	  metaphysics	  generating	  a	  religion	  (ibid.).	  The	  defect	  of	  the	  East’s	  
metaphysical	  system	  is	  precisely	  that	  it	  is	  a	  neat	  little	  system,	  which	  inevitably	  results	  in	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oversimplifications	  of	  its	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  Thus,	  “in	  respect	  to	  its	  treatment	  of	  evil,	  
Christianity	  is	  therefore	  less	  clear	  in	  its	  metaphysical	  ideas	  but	  more	  inclusive	  of	  the	  facts”	  
of	  human	  existence.	  
The	  second	  reason	  Niebuhr	  finds	  Christian	  dialectics	  superior	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  
their	  polytheistic	  and	  simultaneously	  monistic	  God.	  Jesus’	  deification	  gave	  him	  dramatic	  
and	  dynamic	  force	  within	  history.	  The	  “God	  of	  the	  ideal,	  the	  symbol	  of	  the	  redemptive	  force	  
in	  life	  which	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  evil”	  entered	  the	  world	  through	  Christ.	  Furthermore,	  since	  
no	  clear	  distinctions	  exist	  between	  the	  Holy	  Ghost	  and	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  living	  Christ,	  the	  
doctrine	  of	  the	  trinity	  was	  in	  effect	  the	  ultimate	  symbolic	  dualism.	  The	  metaphysical	  
inconsistency	  inherent	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  trinity	  helps	  it	  retain	  its	  dualistic	  aspects	  from	  
within	  a	  monistic	  orthodoxy.	  These	  symbols	  are	  ambiguous	  and	  it	  is	  precisely	  their	  lack	  of	  
philosophical	  precision	  that	  gives	  dramatic	  and	  vivid	  force	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  conflict	  between	  
evil	  and	  the	  redemptive	  force	  and	  creative	  force	  in	  life	  (ibid.,	  199).	  Thus,	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  
Christianity	  can	  fulfill	  “the	  two	  great	  functions	  of	  religion	  in	  prompting	  men	  to	  repent	  of	  
their	  sins,	  and	  in	  encouraging	  them	  to	  hope	  for	  redemption	  from	  them”	  (ibid.).	  
However,	  even	  Niebuhr’s	  preference	  for	  dualisms	  isn’t	  without	  qualification.	  
Notably,	  it	  is	  Christianity’s	  naïve,	  ambiguous	  and	  paradoxical	  dualism	  that	  characterizes	  it	  
as	  unique.	  Absolute	  dualisms,	  either	  between	  God	  and	  the	  world,	  man	  and	  nature,	  spirit	  
and	  matter,	  or	  good	  and	  evil,	  are	  neither	  realistically	  possible	  nor	  necessary.	  “What	  is	  
important”	  writes	  Niebuhr,	  “is	  that	  justice	  be	  done	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  creative	  purpose	  meets	  
resistance	  in	  the	  world	  and	  that	  the	  ideal	  which	  is	  implicit	  in	  every	  reality	  is	  also	  in	  conflict	  
with	  it”	  (ibid.,	  200).	  Naïve	  religions	  like	  Judeo-­‐Christianity	  avoid	  the	  rational	  need	  for	  
consistency	  that	  results	  in	  the	  inevitable	  obscurity	  of	  some	  existential	  facts	  for	  the	  sake	  of	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intellectual	  unity.	  This	  is	  how	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  tradition	  lost	  much	  of	  the	  moral	  power	  
that	  its	  paradoxical	  theology	  armed	  it	  with.	  Instead,	  it	  disintegrated,	  on	  the	  hand	  into	  the	  
completely	  paradoxical	  perspectives	  of	  liberalism	  and	  mysticism,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  
into	  the	  rational	  absurdity	  of	  orthodoxy	  and	  literalism.	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  
Religions	  grow	  out	  of	  real	  experience	  in	  which	  tragedy	  mingles	  with	  beauty	  and	  
man	  learns	  that	  the	  moral	  values	  which	  dignify	  his	  life	  are	  embattled	  in	  his	  own	  soul	  
and	  imperiled	  in	  the	  world.	  He	  is	  inclined	  neither	  to	  obscure	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  
struggle	  nor	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  hope	  of	  victory	  until	  too	  much	  reflection	  persuades	  him	  
to	  believe	  either	  that	  all	  partial	  evil	  is	  universal	  good	  or	  that	  destiny	  makes	  his	  
struggle	  futile	  and	  his	  defeat	  inevitable.	  That	  is	  how	  morality	  dies	  with	  religion	  
when	  ages	  become	  too	  sophisticated.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
For	  Niebuhr,	  too	  much	  reflection,	  reason,	  systematic	  theology	  or	  logical	  consistency	  is	  a	  
deathblow	  to	  a	  religion’s	  moral	  fortitude.	  Thus,	  Niebuhr	  traces	  the	  denigration	  of	  
Christianity’s	  naïve	  dualism	  historically	  to	  its	  enculturation	  into	  Rome’s	  Greece.	  
Christianity	  was	  forced,	  in	  order	  to	  win	  over	  the	  Graeco-­‐Roman	  world,	  to	  make	  some	  
intellectual	  concessions	  and	  incorporate	  Hellenic	  philosophies	  into	  its	  theology.	  Thus,	  the	  
gospel	  was	  polluted	  with	  Neo-­‐Platonism	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  more	  culturally	  palatable.	  Its	  
naïve	  and	  dramatic	  conception	  of	  God’s	  omnipotence	  was	  metaphysically	  elaborated	  and	  
this	  systematization	  betrayed	  the	  early	  church	  into	  an	  essential	  pantheism.	  The	  fusion	  of	  
Greek	  dialectics	  and	  the	  simplicities	  of	  the	  gospel	  culminated	  in	  Augustine	  (himself	  
influenced	  heavily	  by	  the	  Neo-­‐Platonist	  Plotinus),	  who	  turned	  the	  simple	  Christian	  epic	  into	  
an	  elaborate	  theological	  system,	  in	  which	  God	  becomes	  the	  guarantee	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  
ideal	  and	  the	  cause	  of	  every	  concrete	  reality	  (ibid.,	  202).	  In	  the	  end,	  writes	  Niebuhr,	  “the	  
logic	  of	  a	  system	  of	  ideas	  becomes	  the	  pattern	  of	  human	  action.”	  Thus,	  regarding	  moral	  
vigor,	  Augustine’s	  systematization	  of	  Christianity	  did	  it	  in,	  because	  “if	  reality	  only	  thinly	  
veils	  the	  ideal	  implicit	  in	  it,	  or	  if	  the	  implicit	  ideal	  is	  certain	  to	  become	  real	  in	  history,	  there	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is	  no	  occasion	  for	  moral	  adventure	  and	  no	  reason	  for	  moral	  enthusiasm”	  (ibid.,	  202-­‐3).	  
Religion’s	  necessary	  involvement	  with	  metaphysics	  means	  it	  inevitably	  repeats	  this	  cycle	  
between	  metaphysical	  monism	  and	  dialectical	  paradox	  because	  the	  realities	  of	  life	  testify	  to	  
the	  truth	  of	  the	  paradox	  while	  the	  reason	  of	  man’s	  intellect	  testify	  to	  the	  falsity	  of	  the	  
formulations	  of	  these	  experiences	  in	  mythical	  terms.	  In	  other	  words,	  religion	  will	  always	  be	  
forced	  to	  choose	  between	  an	  adequate	  metaphysics	  and	  an	  adequate	  ethics	  and	  Niebuhr	  
suggests	  that	  it	  is	  always	  better	  to	  have	  a	  metaphysics	  with	  some	  lose	  ends	  than	  a	  religion	  
inimical	  to	  moral	  values	  (ibid.,	  214).	  What	  is	  needed,	  then	  as	  it	  is	  today,	  is	  a	  philosophy	  and	  
a	  religion	  that	  do	  justice	  “both	  to	  the	  purpose	  and	  to	  the	  frustration	  which	  purpose	  meets	  
in	  the	  inertia	  of	  the	  concrete	  world,	  both	  to	  the	  ideal	  which	  fashions	  the	  real	  and	  to	  the	  real	  
which	  defeats	  the	  ideal,	  both	  to	  the	  essential	  harmony	  and	  to	  the	  inevitable	  conflict	  in	  the	  
cosmos	  and	  in	  the	  soul”	  (ibid.,	  209).	  
Of	  course,	  there	  are	  objections	  to	  a	  naïve	  religious	  dualism	  and	  they	  come	  from	  both	  
sides—those	  who	  prefer	  the	  monism	  of	  rational	  consistency	  and	  those	  who	  prefer	  the	  
monism	  of	  pure	  religious	  values.	  Of	  the	  former,	  Niebuhr	  notes	  in	  passing	  that	  there	  are	  
philosophically	  competent	  scientists	  and	  scientifically	  competent	  philosophers	  who	  
continually	  arrive	  at	  conclusions	  that	  are	  “in	  closer	  accord	  with	  a	  naïve	  theism	  than	  the	  
monism	  of	  absolute	  idealism”	  (ibid.,	  210-­‐11).	  Aside	  from	  this	  fact	  however,	  Niebuhr	  also	  
notes	  that	  there	  “is	  no	  more	  reason	  today	  to	  deny	  the	  reality	  of	  God”	  he	  continues,	  “than	  to	  
explain	  every	  causal	  phenomenon	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  omnipotent	  will”	  because	  the	  truths	  of	  
religions	  are	  empirically	  verified	  in	  experience	  (ibid.,	  210).	  The	  corrective	  naïve	  dualism,	  
no	  matter	  how	  it	  is	  defined—mind/matter,	  thought/extension,	  force/inertia,	  God/devil—
approximates	  the	  real	  facts	  of	  life.	  In	  a	  sense,	  Niebuhr	  notes	  as	  an	  aside,	  there	  is	  never	  a	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single	  dualism	  but	  many	  of	  them.	  In	  a	  man’s	  lifetime	  he	  may	  experience	  a	  conflict	  between	  
his	  spirit	  and	  his	  flesh,	  his	  moral	  will	  and	  his	  natural	  desires,	  his	  cherished	  values	  and	  the	  
caprices	  of	  nature.	  “It	  may	  be	  impossible	  to	  do	  full	  justice	  to	  the	  two	  types	  of	  facts	  by	  any	  
set	  of	  symbols	  or	  definitions”	  argues	  Niebuhr,	  “but	  life	  gives	  the	  lie	  to	  any	  attempt	  by	  which	  
one	  is	  explained	  completely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  other.”	  	  Thus,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  critics	  who	  
subordinate	  all	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  naïve	  theism	  to	  rational	  consistency,	  Niebuhr	  returns	  
to	  his	  graduate	  work	  on	  William	  James	  by	  suggesting	  a	  pluralistic	  model	  that	  has	  both	  
scientific	  and	  metaphysical	  virtues	  and	  which	  dignifies	  “personality.”	  Though	  not	  in	  
metaphysics,	  science	  and	  religion	  are	  completely	  compatible	  regarding	  experiences	  
because	  both	  attest	  “to	  the	  reality	  and	  painfulness	  of	  the	  creative	  process	  in	  man	  and	  
nature”	  (218).	  They	  may	  unite,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  in	  persuading	  man	  that	  “if	  hopes	  are	  dupes,	  
fear	  may	  be	  liars,”	  and	  that	  he	  must	  “work	  out	  his	  salvation	  in	  fear	  and	  trembling”	  (ibibd.,	  
219).	  
The	  objection	  to	  a	  naïve	  dualism	  also	  comes	  from	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  aisle,	  from	  
those	  who	  believe	  that	  it	  imperils	  religious	  values	  by	  robbing	  God	  of	  omnipotence	  and	  the	  
universe	  of	  dependability.	  According	  to	  these	  critics,	  religious	  dualism	  doesn’t	  guarantee	  
the	  inevitable	  triumph	  of	  good	  over	  evil,	  of	  personal	  and	  spiritual	  values	  over	  the	  lower	  
ones	  of	  materialism,	  commercialism,	  individualism,	  etc.	  Niebuhr’s	  answer	  to	  this	  objection	  
is	  that	  the	  moral	  virtues	  of	  dualism	  are	  derived	  precisely	  from	  this	  characteristic	  (ibid.,	  
215).	  One	  cannot	  easily	  do	  battle	  with	  evil	  while	  guaranteeing	  victory	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
Thus,	  as	  religion	  dignifies	  personality	  it	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  obscuring	  the	  defects	  in	  man’s	  
nature;	  by	  making	  the	  triumph	  of	  good	  over	  evil	  certain,	  it	  may	  prompt	  him	  to	  take	  “moral	  
holidays”;	  if	  it	  emphasizes	  the	  harmonies	  of	  the	  universe	  it	  may	  make	  evil	  seem	  unreal.	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Given	  the	  chance,	  Niebuhr	  knew	  that	  men	  prefer	  to	  extract	  comfort	  from	  religion	  and	  forget	  
the	  challenge	  implied	  in	  their	  faith,	  i.e.	  “They	  will	  use	  religion	  to	  sublimate	  rather	  than	  to	  
qualify	  their	  will	  to	  live.	  They	  will	  accept	  the	  assurance	  of	  faith	  that	  the	  frustrations	  of	  the	  
natural	  world	  are	  not	  permanent,	  but	  they	  will	  not	  accept	  the	  challenge	  of	  faith	  to	  
overcome	  the	  corruptions	  of	  nature	  in	  their	  own	  souls”	  (ibid.,	  216).	  
This	  tension	  between	  metaphysics	  and	  ethics,	  between	  certainty	  and	  paradox,	  is	  at	  
the	  core	  of	  the	  religious	  function,	  symbolized	  by	  the	  perennial	  conflict	  between	  priest	  and	  
prophet.	  The	  former’s	  task	  is	  to	  dispense	  comfort	  and	  the	  latter’s	  task	  is	  to	  make	  the	  
challenge	  of	  religion	  potent.	  Thus,	  the	  priests	  always	  outnumber	  the	  prophets	  because	  in	  
religion,	  as	  in	  all	  other	  fields,	  human	  selfishness	  is	  a	  major	  determining	  factor.	  Despite	  his	  
inevitable	  victory	  over	  the	  prophet,	  the	  priest	  is	  indebt	  to	  her	  because	  her	  original	  
experience	  is	  the	  reality	  that	  gives	  the	  priest’s	  message	  its	  plausibility.	  The	  prophet	  
guarantees	  the	  reality	  of	  God	  by	  making	  him	  real	  in	  experience,	  by	  defeating	  reality	  in	  the	  
name	  of	  the	  ideal	  in	  history,	  thereby	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  priest	  to	  declare	  the	  victory	  of	  
the	  ideal.	  The	  priest’s	  speculation	  and	  deduction	  contribute	  to	  religious	  faith	  only	  after	  the	  
experiences	  of	  the	  prophet	  lay	  the	  foundation	  for	  their	  faith.	  	  Thus,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  
the	  comforting	  assurance	  of	  religion	  should	  be	  done	  away	  with	  completely.	  It	  has	  as	  much	  
right	  to	  preach	  hope	  as	  it	  does	  repentance.	  It	  must	  save	  man	  from	  despair	  as	  well	  as	  from	  
pride	  and	  complacency.	  
These	  myths	  help	  us	  make	  sense	  out	  of	  three	  types	  of	  relationships.	  First,	  myths	  
serve	  an	  ontological	  function.	  They	  help	  us	  understand	  and	  make	  sense	  out	  of	  the	  dialogue	  
between	  the	  Self	  and	  the	  Self,	  the	  struggle	  between	  our	  personal	  Wills	  and	  Consciences	  
(“that	  which	  I	  Will	  to	  do,	  yet	  do	  not	  do”).	  Secondly,	  myths	  serve	  a	  historical	  function.	  All	  
	   88	  
mythologies,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  are	  in	  a	  sense,	  philosophies	  of	  history;	  they	  shed	  light	  
on	  the	  relationship	  between	  our	  individuality	  and	  our	  loyalty	  to	  more	  inclusive	  
communities;	  they	  place	  us	  into	  a	  dramatic	  framework	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  necessary	  
tension	  between	  these	  two	  elements	  of	  existence,	  i.e.	  the	  paradox	  of	  patriotism.	  They	  help	  
us	  answer	  the	  question,	  “what	  is	  God	  and	  what	  is	  Caesar’s?”	  Finally,	  myths	  serve	  a	  
phenomenological	  or	  existential	  function.	  They	  help	  us	  understand	  man’s	  dialogue	  with	  
God,	  every	  human	  being’s	  sense	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  relationship	  to	  the	  absolute	  and	  
transcendent	  meaning	  of	  all	  life.	  They	  help	  us	  understand	  our	  desire	  for	  the	  “Good”	  and	  our	  
longing	  for	  “Truth”.	  Though	  they	  give	  us	  a	  sense	  of	  meaning	  in	  each	  of	  these	  dialogues,	  if	  
they	  are	  dialectical,	  paradoxical,	  and	  profound,	  they	  also	  come	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  awe	  and	  
timeless	  mystery	  that,	  ideally,	  prevents	  us	  from	  abusing	  them	  by	  interpreting	  every	  one	  of	  
life’s	  relationships	  through	  their	  transcendent	  lenses.	  
There	  are	  four	  Christian	  myths	  that	  are	  basic	  to	  the	  Biblical	  faith.	  They	  are,	  the	  
Creation,	  the	  Fall,	  the	  Incarnation	  and	  the	  Final	  Judgment.	  The	  first	  two	  are	  Judaic	  in	  origin	  
and	  the	  last	  two	  are	  Christ’s	  contributions	  to	  the	  Hebrew	  tradition.	  The	  latter	  cannot	  be	  
understood	  without	  the	  former.	  Hart	  (1997)	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  four	  characteristic	  types	  
of	  myths,	  each	  serving	  its	  own	  respective	  function.	  Cosmological	  myths	  explain	  where	  we	  
came	  from,	  how	  we	  got	  here,	  and	  why	  we	  are	  here.	  Societal	  myths	  are	  pedagogical	  in	  that	  
they	  instruct	  us	  on	  “the	  proper	  way	  to	  live.”	  Identity	  myths	  provide	  members	  of	  a	  
community	  with	  a	  story	  that	  serves	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  sense	  of	  who	  they	  are	  as	  a	  
collective.	  Lastly,	  Eschatological	  myths	  help	  people	  know	  where	  they	  are	  going	  and	  tell	  
them	  what	  lies	  ahead	  in	  the	  future.	  On	  the	  surface,	  each	  myth	  fits	  neatly	  into	  Hart’s	  four	  
categories,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  isolated	  myths.	  For	  instance,	  though	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  Fall	  may	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tell	  us	  that	  we	  are	  all	  sinners,	  giving	  us	  an	  identity,	  is	  also	  tells	  us	  how	  we	  are	  to	  live	  and	  is	  
therefore	  societal.	  
Before	  looking	  at	  each	  myth	  in	  depth,	  one	  final	  note	  should	  be	  observed.	  Over	  the	  
course	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  long	  career	  the	  names	  he	  used	  for	  these	  myths	  seem	  to	  echo	  whatever	  
he	  may	  have	  been	  reading	  or	  studying	  at	  a	  given	  time.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  “Original	  Sin,”	  “The	  
Fall”	  the	  “Tower	  of	  Babel”	  and	  “The	  Universality	  of	  Self-­‐Concern”	  (which	  sounds	  like	  
something	  Paul	  Tillich	  talked	  him	  into	  using)	  are	  all	  different	  names	  for	  the	  same	  
permanent	  truth,	  expressed	  mythically.	  In	  each	  respective	  section	  I	  will	  try	  to	  catalog	  the	  
names	  Niebuhr	  gives	  each	  of	  these	  myths	  and	  perhaps	  show,	  if	  there	  is	  sufficient	  reason,	  
why	  certain	  names	  were	  given	  at	  certain	  times.	  Niebuhr	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  pragmatist,	  firmly	  
entrenched	  between	  the	  old	  schools	  of	  Dewey	  and	  James	  and	  the	  “new”	  schools	  of	  Rorty	  
and	  Dickstein.	  As	  such,	  he	  often	  demonstrates	  a	  profound	  understanding	  of	  the	  power	  of	  
vocabularies	  to	  change	  behaviors,	  alter	  attitudes,	  move	  individuals	  into	  solidarity	  with	  
others,	  and	  energize	  collectives	  into	  unified	  action.	  
The	  Creation	  
“We	  are	  deceivers	  yet	  true,	  when	  we	  say	  that	  God	  created	  the	  world.”	  
	  
The	  biblical	  account	  of	  creation	  is	  well	  known.	  In	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  Genesis	  it	  is	  
recorded	  that	  over	  the	  course	  of	  six	  days	  God	  created	  the	  heavens	  and	  the	  earth;	  lit	  up	  the	  
world	  with	  the	  sun,	  the	  moon	  and	  the	  stars;	  formed	  the	  earth,	  the	  sky	  and	  the	  oceans;	  
breathed	  life	  into	  the	  fish	  of	  the	  sea,	  the	  animals	  of	  the	  land,	  the	  birds	  of	  the	  air;	  out	  
molding	  him	  out	  of	  clay,	  He	  created	  Adam,	  the	  first	  man.	  On	  the	  seventh	  day,	  he	  looked	  at	  
what	  he	  had	  created	  and,	  noting	  that	  it	  was	  “good,”	  he	  rested.	  Due	  to	  that	  monumental	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week	  over	  3,000	  years	  ago,	  college	  students	  in	  the	  American	  South	  have	  had	  to	  drive	  hours	  
to	  find	  counties	  that	  sell	  alcohol	  on	  Sundays	  ever	  since.	  
Modern	  man	  doesn’t’	  do	  well	  with	  the	  Creation	  myth	  because	  it	  can’t	  be	  fully	  
rationalized.	  It	  offends	  scientists	  and	  philosophers	  alike,	  who	  tend	  to	  substitute	  idea	  of	  
“causality”	  for	  creation.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  beginning	  of	  time,	  for	  Aristotle,	  began	  with	  a	  “first	  
cause;”	  but	  as	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  a	  first	  cause	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  living	  relationship	  with	  the	  events	  
of	  nature	  and	  history.	  Thus,	  it	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  novelty	  in	  every	  new	  
event.	  Novelty,	  from	  this	  perspective	  is	  viewed	  as	  arbitrary;	  similar	  to	  those	  previously	  
mentioned	  mood	  swings	  of	  the	  bi-­‐polar	  or	  manic	  personality.	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  no	  new	  
event	  in	  history	  is	  completely	  arbitrary;	  new	  events	  are	  always	  related	  in	  some	  way	  to	  
previous	  ones.	  “But	  it	  is	  a	  great	  error	  to	  imagine	  that	  this	  relationship	  completely	  accounts	  
for	  the	  new	  emergence,”	  he	  writes,	  because	  each	  novelty	  is	  only	  one	  of	  an	  infinite	  number	  
of	  possibilities	  (BT,	  8).	  This	  is	  why,	  no	  matter	  how	  good	  man	  gets	  at	  tracing	  the	  past,	  he	  will	  
always	  fail	  to	  predict	  the	  future	  with	  accuracy.	  Rational	  theories	  about	  causation,	  in	  other	  
words,	  tend	  to	  obscure	  the	  arbitrary	  aspects	  of	  every	  new	  object,	  event,	  and	  even	  
evolutionary	  species.	  “It	  is	  therefore	  true,”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “to	  account	  for	  the	  
meaningfulness	  of	  life	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relation	  of	  every	  thing	  to	  a	  creative	  centre	  and	  source	  
of	  meaning”	  (ibid.).	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  Creation	  incapable	  of	  being	  fully	  rationalized,	  but	  
the	  concepts	  that	  emerge	  from	  the	  idea	  can	  only	  be	  expressed	  in	  terms	  that	  outrage	  reason	  
as	  well.	  For	  instance,	  involved	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  Creation	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  “making	  something	  
out	  of	  nothing.”	  This	  idea	  is	  “profoundly	  ultrarational,”	  Niebuhr	  argues;	  “for	  human	  reason	  
can	  deal	  only	  with	  the	  stuff	  of	  experience,	  and	  in	  experience	  the	  previous	  event	  and	  cause	  
are	  seen,	  while	  the	  creative	  source	  of	  novelty	  is	  beyond	  experience”	  (ibid.,	  9).	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Since	  the	  idea	  of	  creation	  relates	  the	  ground	  of	  existence	  to	  existence	  itself,	  it	  is	  
necessarily	  mythical,	  rather	  than	  rational	  (ibid.).	  Its	  irrational	  nature	  does	  not	  make	  it	  
untrue	  or	  deceptive	  but	  it	  does	  make	  it	  “a	  temptation	  to	  deceptions,”	  according	  to	  Niebuhr.	  
The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  “every	  mythical	  idea	  contains	  a	  primitive	  deception	  and	  a	  more	  
ultimate	  one”	  (ibid.).	  The	  primitive	  deception	  comes	  in	  when	  we	  regard	  the	  original	  
formulation	  of	  the	  myth	  as	  authoritative.	  For	  example,	  Christianity	  is	  always	  tempted	  to	  
commit	  the	  error	  of	  Biblical	  literalism	  by	  insisting	  that	  the	  myth	  of	  Creation	  means	  that	  an	  
actual	  man	  was	  formed	  out	  of	  an	  actual	  lump	  of	  clay	  in	  an	  actual	  creative	  act	  that	  took	  place	  
over	  the	  course	  of	  six	  days.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  more	  ultimate	  deception	  in	  the	  myth	  of	  
Creation	  takes	  place	  when	  the	  Church	  extends	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  divine	  cause	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  
all	  human	  activity,	  thereby	  confusing	  the	  scientific	  analysis	  of	  relationships	  with	  the	  mythic	  
one.	  This	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  intentional	  error	  of	  certain	  artists,	  who	  falsify	  the	  natural	  
relations	  of	  objects	  to	  express	  their	  ultimate	  significance.	  
The	  myth	  of	  creation,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  expresses	  more	  than	  just	  the	  dynamic	  and	  
organic	  qualities	  in	  reality	  that	  cannot	  be	  stated	  rationally;	  it	  also	  expresses	  the	  paradoxical	  
qualities	  of	  reality,	  which	  elude	  the	  canons	  of	  logic	  (F&P,	  18).	  In	  what	  theologians	  would	  
immediately	  recognize	  as	  an	  Augustinian	  notion,	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “All	  life	  and	  existence	  in	  
its	  concrete	  forms	  suggests	  not	  only	  sources	  but	  possibilities	  beyond	  itself.	  These	  
possibilities	  must	  be	  implied	  in	  the	  source	  or	  they	  would	  not	  be	  true	  possibilities.”	  This	  
conception,	  in	  which	  God	  is	  the	  ground	  and	  the	  ultimate	  fulfillment	  of	  existence,	  is	  by	  
Niebuhr’s	  estimation	  the	  only	  ground	  of	  an	  effective	  ethic	  “because	  it	  alone	  harmonizes	  
ethical	  and	  metaphysical	  interests,	  and	  gives	  us	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  world	  which	  is	  really	  a	  
universe,	  but	  not	  so	  unqualifiedly	  a	  meaningful	  world	  as	  to	  obscure	  the	  fact	  of	  evil	  and	  the	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possibility	  of	  a	  dynamic	  ethics.”	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  makes	  the	  world	  of	  appearances	  
meaningful,	  but	  not	  ultimately	  meaningful.	  
The	  Fall	  
“We	  are	  deceivers,	  yet	  true,	  we	  say	  that	  man	  fell	  into	  evil.”	  
	  
The	  story	  of	  man’s	  first	  sin	  is	  really	  a	  primitive	  myth	  about	  the	  origin	  and	  the	  nature	  
of	  evil	  in	  human	  life.	  The	  story	  begins	  with	  God	  placing	  Adam	  and	  Eve,	  the	  first	  human	  
beings,	  in	  the	  Garden	  of	  Eden—a	  perfect	  world	  here	  on	  earth.	  In	  this	  earthly	  paradise	  there	  
is	  a	  Tree	  of	  Knowledge,	  which	  God	  instructs	  Adam	  not	  to	  eat	  from.	  A	  talking	  snake	  tempts	  
Eve,	  who	  subsequently	  tempts	  Adam,	  to	  eat	  the	  fruit	  from	  the	  tree	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  
knowledge	  of	  good	  and	  evil.	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  eat	  the	  fruit,	  realize	  they	  are	  naked,	  and	  are	  
immediately	  ashamed.	  God	  reasons	  that	  with	  the	  knowledge	  of	  good	  and	  evil	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  
may	  also	  be	  tempted	  to	  eat	  from	  the	  Tree	  of	  Life	  and	  become	  gods	  themselves.	  Thus,	  He	  
banishes	  them	  from	  paradise	  forever,	  punishing	  all	  of	  mankind	  from	  that	  moment	  on	  with,	  
among	  other	  painful	  life	  processes,	  mortality.	  
	   Is	  the	  most	  important	  aspect,	  the	  essential	  point	  of	  this	  myth,	  is	  that	  human	  evil	  
arises	  from	  “the	  very	  freedom	  of	  reason	  with	  which	  man	  is	  endowed”	  (BT,	  11).	  Man's	  sin	  is	  
not	  the	  result	  of	  his	  unrestrained	  natural	  impulses;	  if	  it	  were,	  then	  animal	  life	  would	  be	  
considered	  sinful.	  Instead,	  man's	  unrestrained	  freedom	  is	  the	  reason	  he	  sins;	  he	  uses	  his	  
freedom	  to	  “throw	  the	  harmonies	  of	  nature	  out	  of	  joint.”	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  are	  not	  guilty	  of	  
eating	  the	  forbidden	  fruit.	  In	  fact,	  the	  particular	  commandment	  is	  of	  no	  consequence.	  What	  
they	  are	  guilty	  of,	  instead,	  is	  making	  themselves,	  rather	  than	  God,	  the	  center	  of	  existence.	  
“This	  egoism	  is	  sin	  in	  its	  quintessential	  form,”	  argues	  Niebuhr	  (ibid.).	  It	  demonstrates	  that	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evil	  is	  not	  due	  to	  a	  defect	  in	  man	  himself,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  normative;	  rather	  evil	  only	  comes	  
about	  “because	  man	  has	  been	  endowed	  with	  a	  freedom	  not	  known	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  creation.”	  
	   Like	  the	  other	  Christian	  myths,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  fall	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  interpretive	  
errors.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  of	  taking	  the	  myth	  literally,	  of	  regarding	  the	  primitive	  myth	  of	  the	  
garden,	  the	  apple	  and	  the	  serpent,	  as	  historically	  true.	  Less	  literally,	  but	  equally	  absurd,	  is	  
giving	  into	  the	  temptation	  to	  regard	  the	  fall	  as	  a	  historical	  occurrence.	  “The	  fall	  is	  not	  
historical,”	  writes	  Niebuhr	  “it	  does	  not	  take	  place	  in	  any	  concrete	  human	  act;”	  rather,	  “It	  is	  
the	  presupposition	  of	  such	  acts”	  (ibid.).	  What	  Niebuhr	  means	  is	  that	  when	  the	  Fall	  is	  taken	  
as	  a	  historical	  moment	  in	  time,	  it	  expresses	  the	  myth	  in	  actual	  action,	  and	  since	  an	  action	  is	  
always	  historically	  related	  to	  previous	  actions,	  this	  error	  leads	  to	  a	  determinism	  that	  isn’t	  
part	  of	  the	  permanent	  truth	  in	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  Fall.	  Our	  tendency	  to	  look	  at	  human	  behavior	  
externally	  and	  not	  introspectively	  tempts	  us	  to	  present	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  Fall	  in	  terms	  of	  
causation,	  which	  misses	  the	  truth	  in	  the	  myth.	  
	   Another	  powerful	  truth	  in	  this	  myth	  could	  be	  called	  the	  “perfection	  before	  free	  
action.”	  Before	  Adam	  and	  Even	  acted	  out	  of	  their	  own	  freedom	  and	  will,	  the	  world	  was	  
perfect.	  The	  Garden	  of	  Eden	  and	  paradise	  on	  Earth	  are	  symbols	  of	  a	  perfection	  in	  history	  
that	  is	  an	  ideal	  possibility,	  which	  every	  man	  can	  comprehend	  but	  none	  can	  realize	  (ibid.,	  
12).	  For	  example,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  imagine	  a	  perfectly	  disinterested	  justice	  but	  when	  we	  try	  
to	  achieve	  it	  we	  continually	  fall	  short	  of	  the	  standard	  we	  conceive	  of	  (ibid.).	  Niebuhr	  sums	  
this	  truth	  up	  maximally:	  “Self	  intrudes	  itself	  into	  every	  ideal,	  when	  thought	  gives	  place	  to	  
action”	  (ibid.,	  13).	  
The	  Fall,	  Original	  Sin,	  is	  also	  a	  perfectly	  dialectical	  myth.	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  the	  
myth	  of	  the	  Fall	  “solves	  the	  problem	  of	  evil	  upon	  an	  essentially	  monistic	  basis	  by	  making	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human	  sin	  responsible	  for	  even	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  nature	  and	  attributing	  everything	  from	  
weeds	  to	  mortality	  to	  the	  luckless	  error	  of	  the	  first	  man”	  (ibid.,	  196).	  In	  this	  conception,	  
Niebuhr	  notes,	  “neither	  the	  goodness	  nor	  the	  omnipotence	  of	  God	  is	  abridged”	  because	  “the	  
human	  conscience	  assumes	  responsibility	  for	  more	  than	  its	  share	  of	  human	  ills	  in	  order	  to	  
save	  the	  reputation	  of	  divine	  virtue”	  (ibid.).	  However	  this	  monism	  is	  qualified	  by	  the	  
“injection	  of	  the	  tempting	  serpent,	  an	  element	  which	  is	  precursory	  of	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  devil,	  
and	  which	  the	  Jews	  inherited	  from	  Babylonia	  and	  Persia	  and	  which	  has	  fortunately	  
qualified	  all	  monastic	  tendencies	  in	  Jewish	  and	  Christian	  orthodoxy	  until	  today”	  (Ibid.).	  
Thus,	  the	  Fall	  fulfills	  both	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  requirements:	  it	  is	  a	  mythic	  narrative	  that	  is	  
dramatic	  and	  dialectical.	  
Original	  Sin,	  more	  than	  any	  other	  single	  Christian	  doctrine,	  is	  the	  most	  
reprehensible	  and	  disdained	  mythic	  narrative	  in	  the	  Bible.	  Niebuhr,	  despite	  being	  urged	  to	  
give	  up	  the	  doctrine	  by	  notable	  theologians,	  philosophers	  and	  friends,	  many	  who	  agreed	  
with	  Niebuhr’s	  overarching	  goal,	  insisted	  that	  the	  reason	  the	  doctrine	  was	  so	  disgusting	  for	  
modern	  man	  was	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  that	  it	  had	  been	  misunderstood	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
that	  if	  it	  were	  completely	  untrue	  modern	  man	  wouldn't	  find	  it	  so	  disgusting—rather,	  it	  
would	  just	  ignore	  it	  altogether.	  The	  Original	  Sin,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  was	  the	  most	  
empirically	  verifiable	  doctrine	  in	  the	  entire	  Bible.	  
In	  his	  later	  years,	  and	  much	  like	  his	  pragmatist	  brethren,	  Niebuhr	  would	  wonder	  if	  
you	  would	  have	  been	  more	  successful	  in	  his	  goal	  had	  he	  changed	  his	  vocabulary;	  suggesting	  
that	  he	  would	  probably	  should	  have	  called	  Original	  Sin,	  “the	  universality	  of	  self–concern.”	  
By	  this,	  Niebuhr	  simply	  meant	  that	  original	  sin	  could	  be	  defined	  as	  “the	  universal	  
inclination	  of	  the	  self	  to	  be	  more	  concerned	  with	  itself	  than	  to	  be	  embarrassed	  by	  its	  undue	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claims.”	  Though	  this	  tendency	  is	  a	  paradox,	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  reduce	  it	  to	  an	  ontological	  fate	  
and	  thus	  equate	  the	  Fall	  with	  Creation.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  survival	  impulse,	  but	  the	  
tendency	  to	  “consider	  ourselves	  whenever	  we	  rise	  to	  survey	  the	  whole	  human	  situation”	  
(SDH,	  18).	  Niebuhr	  offers	  us	  some	  examples	  in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  its	  universality	  does	  not	  
indicate	  its	  uniformity:	  a	  deserter	  in	  war,	  whose	  self–concern	  tempts	  him	  to	  evade	  the	  risk	  
of	  war;	  or,	  the	  brave	  soldier	  who	  may,	  upon	  enlistment	  in	  the	  Army,	  anxiously	  speculate	  on	  
the	  possibility	  of	  being	  promoted.	  The	  latter	  example	  demonstrates	  how	  a	  person	  may	  be	  
thoroughly	  devoted	  to	  a	  cause,	  community,	  or	  creative	  relationship,	  and	  yet	  may,	  within	  the	  
terms	  of	  that	  very	  devotion,	  express	  a	  more	  ultimate	  concern	  for	  his	  own	  prestige,	  power,	  
or	  security	  (ibid.).	  
	   During	  his	  career	  however,	  Niebuhr	  found	  other	  ways	  to	  express	  the	  timeless	  truths	  
in	  Christian	  myths	  without	  abandoning	  anything	  he	  wanted	  to	  preserve.	  He	  did	  this	  by	  
searching	  out	  the	  recurrence	  of	  mythic	  and	  dramatic	  themes,	  not	  only	  in	  other	  passages	  in	  
the	  Bible,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  the	  culture.	  The	  Genesis	  account	  of	  the	  Fall	  is	  not	  the	  
only	  mythic	  narrative	  in	  the	  Bible	  that	  expresses	  permanent	  truths	  about	  pride	  and	  the	  
corruption	  of	  man’s	  freedom.	  Nor	  was	  the	  Bible	  the	  only	  source	  of	  permanent	  truths,	  
thought	  is	  was	  the	  most	  profound	  source.	  Niebuhr	  often	  drew	  on	  diverse	  mythic	  narratives	  
to	  demonstrate	  the	  same	  truths.	  
One	  notable	  myth	  Niebuhr	  used	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  Fall	  was	  the	  story	  of	  
the	  Tower	  of	  Babel,	  found	  in	  the	  eleventh	  chapter	  of	  Genesis29.	  “And	  the	  whole	  earth	  was	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  It	  is	  notable	  because	  it	  prompted	  a	  sermonic	  essay,	  which	  prompted	  a	  collection	  of	  such	  
essays,	  Beyond	  Tragedy,	  which	  in	  turn	  prompted	  Niebuhr’s	  most	  profound	  analysis	  of	  
narrative	  and	  drama,	  The	  Irony	  of	  American	  History.	  In	  “The	  Tower	  of	  Babel,”	  as	  in	  most	  of	  
the	  essays	  found	  in	  Beyond	  Tragedy,	  Niebuhr	  builds	  a	  mansion	  on	  the	  foundations	  
Nietzsche	  laid	  down	  in	  The	  Birth	  of	  Tragedy.	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one	  language	  and	  of	  one	  speech,”	  the	  myth	  begins.	  After	  journeying	  across	  the	  face	  of	  the	  
earth,	  they	  settled	  down	  in	  a	  plain	  and	  started	  making	  bricks	  and	  mortar.	  Having	  done	  so,	  
and	  I	  am	  sure	  feeling	  quite	  proud	  of	  such	  a	  marvelous	  feat,	  they	  said,	  “Go	  to,	  let	  us	  build	  a	  
city,	  and	  a	  tower,	  whose	  top	  may	  reach	  unto	  heaven;	  and	  let	  us	  make	  us	  a	  name,	  lest	  we	  be	  
scattered	  abroad	  upon	  the	  face	  of	  the	  earth.”	  God,	  looking	  down	  on	  them,	  knows	  what	  is	  
coming—“now	  nothing	  will	  be	  restrained	  from	  them,	  which	  they	  have	  imagined	  to	  do”—so	  
he	  scatters	  the	  people	  abroad	  and	  “confounds”	  their	  language	  “that	  they	  may	  not	  
understand	  one	  another’s	  speech.”	  Thus,	  the	  place	  is	  now	  called	  “Babel”…	  
Niebuhr	  begins	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  myth	  by	  noting	  “The	  Tower	  of	  Babel	  myth	  belongs	  
to	  the	  same	  category	  of	  mythical	  fantasies	  as	  the	  Promethean	  myth…	  they	  both	  picture	  God	  
as	  being	  jealous	  of	  man’s	  ambitions,	  achievements	  and	  pretensions”	  (SDH,	  27).	  Elsewhere,	  
Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  the	  Christian	  and	  Greek	  views	  of	  tragedy	  are	  similar	  because	  they	  both	  
agree,	  “guilt	  and	  creativity	  are	  inextricably	  interwoven”	  (ibid.,	  165).	  Then,	  Niebuhr	  notes	  
that	  once	  again,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Creation	  and	  the	  Fall,	  the	  modern	  mind,	  which	  
oscillates	  between	  “wooden-­‐headed	  literalism”	  and	  “shallow	  rationalism,”	  finds	  no	  validity	  
in	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  jealous	  God;	  the	  modern	  either	  doesn’t	  believe	  in	  God	  at	  all	  or	  believes	  in	  
one	  that	  is	  so	  very	  kind	  it	  is	  really	  “grandmotherly”	  (ibid.,	  28).	  For	  primitives,	  a	  jealous	  God	  
was	  an	  expression	  of	  their	  fear	  of	  higher	  powers;	  but	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  jealous	  God,	  for	  Niebuhr,	  
is	  a	  permanent	  expression	  of	  man’s	  valid	  sense	  of	  guilt	  in	  all	  of	  his	  earthly	  striving.	  
Niebuhr	  sums	  up	  this	  truth	  in	  a	  dialectical	  maxim:	  “Religion,	  declares	  the	  modern	  
man,	  is	  consciousness	  of	  our	  highest	  social	  values.	  Nothing	  could	  be	  further	  from	  the	  truth.	  
True	  religion	  is	  a	  profound	  uneasiness	  about	  our	  highest	  social	  values”	  (ibid.).	  This	  
profound	  uneasiness,	  is	  no	  different	  in	  kind,	  than	  the	  shame	  which	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  felt	  upon	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recognizing	  their	  nakedness;	  just	  as	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  are	  symbols	  of	  every	  individuals’	  
struggle	  between	  creative	  action	  and	  defying	  God’	  limits,	  so	  too	  is	  “every	  civilization	  and	  
every	  culture”	  “a	  tower	  of	  Babel”	  (ibid.).	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  “Man	  is	  mortal.	  That	  is	  his	  fate.	  
Man	  pretends	  not	  to	  be	  mortal.	  That	  is	  his	  sin”	  (ibid.,	  29).	  He	  is	  a	  “creature	  of	  time	  and	  place”	  
yet	  he	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  creature	  of	  time	  and	  place	  because	  “he	  touches	  on	  the	  fringes	  of	  the	  
eternal.”	  Thus,	  man	  is	  never	  content	  to	  be	  just	  an	  “American	  man,	  or	  Chinese	  man,	  or	  
bourgeois	  man,	  or	  man	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  He	  wants	  to	  be	  man”	  (ibid.).	  Nor	  is	  man	  
ever	  content	  with	  his	  truth.	  “He	  seeks	  the	  truth.”	  The	  result	  is	  always	  the	  same,	  as	  it	  was	  in	  
the	  myth	  of	  Fall	  and	  in	  the	  Tower	  of	  Babel;	  man	  forgets	  that	  he	  is	  a	  creature,	  forgets	  that	  he	  
is	  not	  God,	  and	  in	  making	  himself	  the	  center	  of	  the	  universe,	  he	  loses	  that	  very	  thing	  which	  
he	  prided	  himself	  on.	  
In	  Niebuhr’s	  conclusion,	  we	  can	  see	  hints	  of	  what	  is	  to	  come	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  
Niebuhr’s	  rhetorical	  method.	  Though	  here,	  Niebuhr	  speaks	  only	  vaguely	  and	  broadly	  about	  
“American	  man”	  and	  “Chinese	  man,”	  when	  addressing	  ethical	  situations,	  Niebuhr	  would	  
weave	  mythopoeic	  dialectics	  into	  a	  prophetic	  rhetorical	  form.	  Thus	  in	  1952,	  drawing	  on	  
this	  same	  myth,	  Niebuhr	  would	  prophetically	  write:	  
The	  builders	  of	  the	  Tower	  of	  Babel	  are	  scattered	  by	  a	  confusion	  of	  tongues	  because	  
they	  sought	  to	  build	  a	  tower	  which	  would	  reach	  into	  the	  heavens.	  The	  possible	  
destruction	  of	  a	  technical	  civilization,	  of	  which	  the	  “skyscraper”	  is	  a	  neat	  symbol,	  
may	  become	  a	  modern	  analogue	  to	  the	  Tower	  of	  Babel.	  (IAH,	  158)	  
	  
The	  Incarnation	  
“We	  are	  deceivers,	  yet	  true,	  when	  we	  affirm	  that	  God	  became	  man	  
to	  redeem	  the	  world	  from	  sin.”	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The	  Christmas	  story	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  well	  know	  myth	  in	  the	  Christian	  Bible.	  It	  
begins	  with	  a	  young	  Hebrew	  girl	  named	  Mary,	  living	  in	  Roman	  occupied	  Galilee.	  An	  angel	  
appears	  to	  her	  and	  announces	  that	  she	  will	  bear	  a	  son,	  despite	  having	  never	  “known”	  a	  man.	  
His	  name,	  the	  angel	  tells	  her,	  will	  be	  Jesus	  and	  he	  will	  be	  the	  Son	  of	  God	  and	  will	  reign	  over	  
Judah	  forever.	  Joseph,	  Mary’s	  husband,	  performs	  by	  any	  estimates	  the	  highest	  act	  of	  
religious	  faith	  and	  loving	  trust	  that	  has	  ever	  been	  demonstrated;	  he	  believes	  her.	  Jesus	  of	  
Nazareth	  is	  the	  Christ	  that	  Old	  Testament	  prophets	  foretold	  would	  come	  and	  establish	  a	  
Messianic	  kingdom.	  He	  is	  born	  in	  a	  manger	  in	  a	  stable	  in	  Bethlehem.	  Shepherds	  in	  nearby	  
fields	  are	  told	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  messiah	  by	  angels	  as	  well	  and	  they	  journey	  to	  the	  stable	  to	  
worship	  the	  Christ-­‐child.	  Visions	  come	  to	  several	  parties	  that	  Jesus	  is	  indeed	  the	  Christ.	  
After	  living	  a	  rather	  quiet	  life,	  at	  age	  thirty	  Jesus	  begins	  his	  earthly	  ministry.	  He	  heals	  the	  
sick,	  he	  cast	  out	  demons,	  he	  polemicizes	  the	  religious	  leaders	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community,	  he	  
preaches	  a	  message	  of	  love	  and	  forgiveness	  instead	  of	  rabbinic	  law,	  and	  finally,	  he	  claims	  
that	  he	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  forgive	  man’s	  sins,	  himself.	  Thus,	  he	  is	  crucified	  on	  a	  cross	  for	  
the	  crime	  of	  blasphemy.	  Three	  days	  later,	  he	  walks	  out	  of	  the	  grave,	  alive.	  He	  makes	  some	  
appearances	  to	  his	  followers	  before	  ascending	  into	  the	  heavens,	  promising	  to	  return	  soon,	  
to	  establish	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God.	  This	  is	  a	  brief	  narrative	  of	  the	  life	  of	  Jesus.	  However,	  it	  is	  
not	  the	  myth	  of	  Christ.	  
The	  mythic	  story	  of	  Christ	  is	  much	  shorter.	  The	  eternal	  God	  entered	  temporal	  
history	  as	  a	  Christ.	  This	  Christ	  lived	  a	  perfect	  life	  of	  love,	  which	  had	  never	  been	  done	  before,	  
and	  hasn’t	  been	  repeated	  since.	  He	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  human	  could	  live	  according	  to	  the	  
law	  of	  love,	  which	  is	  the	  highest	  ideal	  of	  historical	  existence;	  yet,	  he	  also	  demonstrated	  that	  
if	  one	  does,	  it	  inevitably	  ends	  on	  a	  cross,	  for	  perfection	  on	  earth	  ends	  in	  death.	  Thus,	  he	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demonstrated	  that	  “in	  order	  to	  find	  oneself,	  one	  must	  lose	  oneself.”	  Knowing	  that	  man	  
inevitably	  fails	  in	  his	  efforts	  to	  live	  accordingly,	  Christ	  bore	  the	  sins	  of	  everyone	  on	  the	  
cross,	  atoning	  for	  their	  sin,	  granting	  them	  grace,	  forgiveness	  and	  mercy.	  Finally,	  he	  showed	  
that	  the	  persecution	  of	  perfection	  on	  this	  earth	  is	  not	  permanent,	  because	  he	  snatched	  
victory	  from	  defeat	  by	  rising	  from	  the	  grave.	  These	  two	  stories,	  told	  in	  these	  two	  ways,	  
demonstrate	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  mythic	  narrative	  and	  a	  historical	  one.	  Niebuhr	  
writes:	  “Compared	  to	  this	  Christ	  who	  died	  for	  men’s	  sins	  upon	  the	  cross,	  Jesus,	  the	  good	  
man	  who	  tells	  all	  men	  to	  be	  good,	  is	  more	  solidly	  historical.	  But	  he	  is	  the	  bearer	  of	  no	  more	  
than	  a	  pale	  truism”	  (BT,	  21).	  
Conceptually	  speaking,	  the	  idea	  of	  eternity	  entering	  time	  is	  absurd	  and	  irrational.	  
The	  theological	  dogmas	  which	  try	  to	  make	  it	  rational,	  describing	  in	  ornate	  detail	  the	  
relationship	  between	  God	  the	  Father	  and	  God	  the	  Son,	  only	  prove	  just	  how	  absurd	  the	  idea	  
is.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  eternal	  ground	  of	  existence	  has	  entered	  existence	  
without	  sacrificing	  its	  eternal	  and	  unconditioned	  quality,	  “without	  outraging	  every	  canon	  of	  
reason”	  (ibid.,	  14).	  Other	  dogmas,	  such	  as	  “the	  two	  natures	  of	  Christ,”	  fare	  no	  better,	  for	  
logically,	  a	  man	  cannot	  be	  “truly	  God”	  and	  “truly	  man”	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
The	  Incarnation	  is	  the	  fundamental	  mythic	  drama	  in	  the	  “gospels”—translated	  
literally	  as	  “good	  news.”	  When	  rhetorically	  embodied,	  the	  good	  news	  of	  the	  Incarnation	  is	  
delivered	  through	  “kerygma”—translated	  literally	  as	  “to	  cry	  out	  or	  proclaim	  as	  a	  herald.”	  
Most	  of	  the	  New	  Testament	  is	  a	  recording,	  not	  of	  Christ’s	  life,	  but	  of	  his	  apostles	  and	  their	  
followers’	  kerygma—most	  notably	  Peter	  and	  Paul—to	  the	  Greeks	  and	  Romans.	  Yet	  in	  all	  
their	  kerygmatic	  proclamations	  to	  the	  Gentiles,	  no	  one	  surpassed,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  poetic	  
profundity	  of	  the	  John.	  The	  Johannine	  version	  of	  the	  Incarnation,	  written	  for	  the	  ultra-­‐
	   100	  
rational	  Greeks,	  states:	  “In	  the	  beginning	  was	  the	  Logos…	  And	  the	  Logos	  was	  made	  flesh.”	  
This	  beautiful	  passage	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  kerygma	  “was	  in	  transposing	  
symbolic,	  dramatic	  statements	  into	  ontological	  ones”	  (SDH,	  96).	  However,	  the	  truth	  in	  this	  
myth	  has	  not	  been	  invalidated	  by	  the	  logical	  difficulty,	  though	  it	  does	  remain,	  “a	  stumbling	  
block	  to	  the	  Jews	  (who	  expected	  a	  messianic	  “King”)	  and	  to	  the	  Gentiles	  (the	  rational	  
Greeks),	  foolishness.”	  Commenting	  on	  John’s	  gospel,	  Niebuhr	  concludes,	  “The	  truth	  that	  the	  
Word	  was	  made	  flesh	  outrages	  all	  the	  canons	  by	  which	  truth	  is	  usually	  judged.	  Yet	  it	  is	  the	  
truth”	  (BT,	  14).	  
After	  reading	  all	  twenty	  or	  more	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  books,	  the	  last	  line	  jumps	  out	  to	  me	  
immediately.	  Rarely	  does	  Niebuhr	  make	  such	  plain	  and	  simple	  claims	  to	  truth.	  He	  may	  say	  
that	  “the	  facts	  of	  experience	  verify	  the	  truth	  in	  it”	  or	  “the	  man	  on	  the	  street	  knows	  this	  is	  
true,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  expert-­‐scientists	  recognize	  it”;	  but	  it	  isn’t	  often	  that	  Niebuhr	  just	  
comes	  right	  out	  and	  says,	  “It	  is	  true.”	  The	  reason	  Niebuhr	  so	  boldly	  affirms	  this	  gospel	  truth,	  
I	  speculate,	  is	  found	  in	  the	  next	  lines:	  
The	  whole	  character	  of	  the	  Christian	  religion	  is	  involved	  in	  that	  affirmation.	  It	  
asserts	  that	  God's	  word	  is	  relevant	  to	  human	  life.	  It	  declares	  that	  an	  event	  in	  history	  
can	  be	  of	  such	  a	  character	  as	  to	  reveal	  the	  character	  of	  history	  itself;	  that	  without	  
such	  a	  revelation	  the	  character	  of	  history	  cannot	  be	  known.	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  
arrive	  at	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  life	  and	  history	  without	  such	  a	  
revelation.	  (BT,	  14)	  
	  
One	  can't	  induce	  a	  conclusion	  about	  the	  ultimate	  meaning	  of	  life	  from	  empirical	  facts	  
without	  presupposing	  a	  cannon	  and	  criterion	  of	  meaning.	  The	  Incarnation—all	  
biographical	  jokes	  about	  “Atheists	  for	  Niebuhr”	  aside—is	  the	  most	  important	  truth	  in	  
Niebuhr’s	  thought,	  and	  it	  is	  there—always	  implicitly,	  though	  usually	  explicitly—in	  
everything	  he	  writes.	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   In	  Faith	  and	  History,	  Niebuhr	  sums	  up	  the	  symbol’s	  meaning	  this	  way.	  The	  climax	  of	  
the	  Biblical	  drama,	  those	  theme	  is	  the	  divine	  sovereignty	  of	  God	  over	  history,	  is	  “the	  self-­‐
disclosure	  of	  a	  divine	  love”	  (125).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Christ	  overcomes	  the	  evil	  inclination	  to	  
self-­‐worship	  in	  the	  human	  heart,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  Christ	  takes	  the	  evil	  of	  human	  
history	  upon	  himself.	  These	  two	  facets	  of	  the	  divine	  love,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  establish	  the	  two	  
most	  important	  points	  in	  the	  biblical	  interpretation	  of	  history:	  
On	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  of	  the	  renewal	  of	  life	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  
evil,	  whenever	  men	  and	  nations	  see	  themselves	  as	  truly	  under	  the	  divine	  judgment,	  
which	  is	  as	  merciful	  as	  it	  is	  terrible.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  life	  of	  each	  individual	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  total	  human	  enterprise	  remains	  in	  contradiction	  to	  God;	  and	  the	  final	  
resolution	  of	  this	  contradiction	  is	  by	  God’s	  mercy.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
One	  the	  one	  hand	  then,	  human	  history	  is	  a	  story	  about	  new	  beginnings;	  not	  like	  those	  of	  
naturalistic	  philosophies	  that	  view	  springtime	  as	  a	  new	  beginning,	  however—life	  doesn’t	  
arise	  from	  the	  winter’s	  death.	  The	  new	  beginnings	  come	  instead	  from	  contrition.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  however,	  no	  amount	  of	  rebirth	  in	  history	  will	  ever	  reconcile	  the	  inevitable	  
conflicts	  between	  the	  human	  will	  and	  God’s	  will.	  Thus,	  a	  last	  judgment	  awaits	  the	  end	  of	  
history	  in	  order	  to	  finally	  reconcile	  the	  two	  incoherencies.	  	  
In	  a	  way,	  the	  Incarnation	  is	  a	  complementary	  symbol	  to	  the	  Creation	  myth	  because	  
in	  a	  sense	  it	  is	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  revelatory	  aspect	  of	  Judaic-­‐Christianity.	  The	  Christian	  
God	  who	  created	  this	  world	  also	  reveals	  himself	  in	  this	  world.	  When	  He	  created	  the	  world	  
he	  gave	  man	  a	  general	  revelation,	  which	  points	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  His	  existence	  but	  not	  to	  His	  
particular	  attributes.	  But	  a	  mythology	  that	  only	  contains	  general	  revelations	  is	  inevitably	  
pantheistic	  because,	  as	  Niebuhr	  points	  out,	  “a	  God	  who	  is	  merely	  the	  object	  of	  human	  
knowledge	  and	  not	  a	  subject	  who	  communicates	  with	  man	  by	  His	  own	  initiative	  is	  
something	  less	  than	  a	  God”	  (BT,	  15).	  The	  knowledge	  of	  God	  that	  comes	  only	  from	  a	  study	  of	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the	  world	  is	  flat,	  just	  as	  the	  knowledge	  of	  a	  human	  being	  that	  comes	  from	  such	  a	  
behavioristic	  study	  is	  flat.	  Personality	  can’t	  be	  found	  in	  general	  revelations,	  in	  the	  
observation	  of	  behavior,	  in	  the	  inartistic	  photograph,	  or	  the	  mere	  “facts.”	  They	  are	  
important	  clues	  and	  are	  helpful	  guides	  for	  understanding	  the	  past,	  and	  to	  a	  much	  less	  
degree,	  predicting	  the	  future.	  But	  “the	  depth	  of	  freedom	  in	  every	  personality”	  can	  only	  
communicate	  itself	  truly	  “in	  its	  own	  word”	  (ibid.,	  16).	  “Without	  such	  a	  word”	  Niebuhr	  
argues,	  “the	  picture	  of	  any	  personality	  would	  be	  flat,	  as	  the	  interpretations	  of	  the	  divine	  
which	  eliminate	  revelation	  are	  flat.”	  
	   The	  Incarnation	  adds	  the	  element	  of	  special	  revelation	  to	  the	  Hebrew	  mythology,	  
giving	  God	  a	  personality	  in	  history,	  putting	  him	  into	  a	  dialogic	  conversation	  with	  man.	  In	  
Christianity,	  Christ	  is	  both	  “the	  second	  Adam”	  who	  restores	  the	  perfection	  of	  what	  was	  
supposed	  to	  be	  when	  the	  first	  Adam	  was	  created;	  and	  “the	  Son	  of	  God,	  who	  transcends	  all	  
the	  possibilities	  of	  human	  life”	  (ibid.).	  Christ	  expresses	  both	  the	  infinite	  possibilities	  of	  love	  
in	  history	  and	  the	  infinite	  possibilities	  beyond	  human	  life,	  and	  thus,	  he	  reveals	  the	  total	  
situation	  in	  which	  all	  human	  life	  stands	  (ibid.).	  Again,	  one	  may	  deceive	  oneself	  by	  insisting	  
on	  the	  absolutely	  absurd	  and	  primitive	  idea	  of	  a	  Virgin	  Birth;	  or	  one	  may	  deceive	  oneself	  by	  
rationalizing	  the	  myth	  and	  making	  it	  into	  a	  philosophical	  creed;	  but	  both	  deceptions	  will	  
not	  destroy	  the	  truth	  in	  the	  Incarnation.	  
I	  wish	  to	  pause	  for	  a	  moment	  and	  note	  a	  place	  of	  conceptual	  overlap	  between	  
Niebuhr	  and	  another	  ethicist,	  Mikhail	  Bakhtin.	  Niebuhr	  is	  an	  ethicist	  who	  draws	  on	  art	  and	  
myth;	  Mikhail	  Bakhtin	  was	  also	  concerned	  with	  making	  art	  ethical.	  So	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  
Bakhtin	  lands	  upon	  the	  Incarnation	  concept	  without	  the	  explicitly	  Christian	  or	  religious	  
tones.	  In	  his	  search	  for	  an	  ethical	  and	  dialogic	  form	  of	  art,	  Bakhtin	  coined	  the	  phrase	  “live-­‐
	   103	  
entering.	  ”In	  the	  process	  of	  live-­‐entering,	  “one	  simultaneously	  renounces	  and	  exploits	  one’s	  
surplus;	  one	  brings	  into	  interaction	  both	  perspectives	  simultaneously	  and	  creates	  an	  
‘architectonics’	  of	  vision	  reducible	  to	  neither.	  This	  architectonics	  produces	  new	  
understanding”	  (Morson	  and	  Emerson	  1990,	  54)	  Bakhtin’s	  later	  called	  this	  process	  
“creative	  understanding.”	  
Like	  empathy,	  creative	  understanding	  happens	  when	  one	  enters	  into	  the	  lived	  
experience	  of	  another	  while	  not	  renouncing	  one’s	  own	  position	  outside	  the	  other	  in	  time,	  
space,	  and	  culture.	  This	  outsideness	  creates	  the	  potential	  for	  dialogue,	  which	  helps	  us	  
understand	  culture	  in	  a	  profound	  way.	  The	  myth	  of	  a	  human	  Christ,	  particularly	  a	  
“suffering”	  God,”	  I	  argue,	  is	  a	  model	  for	  this	  creative	  understanding	  and	  this	  is	  what	  
Niebuhr	  is	  getting	  at.	  By	  experiencing	  earthly	  life,	  the	  divine	  participates	  in	  a	  dialogue	  with	  
man	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reveals	  the	  true	  limits	  to	  man’s	  freedom,	  the	  true	  potential	  for	  his	  
creative	  and	  divinely	  inspired	  enterprises,	  the	  true	  ideal	  for	  all	  human	  life	  with	  others.	  This	  
type	  of	  dialogue,	  “educates	  each	  side	  about	  itself	  and	  about	  the	  other,	  and	  it	  not	  only	  
discovers	  but	  activates	  potentials”	  that	  are	  “realizable	  only	  through	  future	  activity	  and	  
dialogue”	  (ibid.)	  However,	  just	  because	  the	  future	  becomes	  “open”	  and	  “free”	  and	  
“unfinalizable,”	  to	  use	  Bakhtin’s	  terms,	  does	  not	  mean	  Redemption	  is	  inevitable.	  
The	  Incarnation	  contains	  a	  cross	  and	  a	  crucifixion,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  manger	  and	  a	  
resurrection.	  This	  is	  what	  is	  commonly	  called	  the	  Atonement.	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  the	  
atonement	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  difficult	  myth	  to	  grasp	  without	  fully	  surrendering	  rational	  
analysis.	  According	  to	  Niebuhr,	  no	  theories	  about	  the	  atonement	  are	  nearly	  as	  satisfying	  as	  
the	  simple	  statements	  of	  Christ’s	  death	  in	  the	  gospels.	  He	  writes,	  “This	  may	  mean	  that	  faith	  
is	  able	  to	  sense	  and	  appropriate	  an	  ultimate	  truth	  too	  deep	  for	  human	  reason”	  (BT,	  18).	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Drawing	  on	  Paul’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  gospel	  message	  for	  the	  Greeks,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  “This	  is	  the	  
foolishness	  of	  God	  which	  is	  wiser	  than	  the	  wisdom	  of	  men”	  (ibid.).	  Wise	  women	  have	  long	  
since	  pointed	  out	  the	  absurdity	  of	  the	  atonement.	  Ethical	  women	  have	  long	  since	  pointed	  
out	  that	  the	  message	  is	  more	  than	  absurd;	  it	  is	  immoral.	  By	  the	  standards	  of	  logic	  and	  
reason,	  the	  wise	  and	  ethical	  women	  are	  correct.	  But	  notably,	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  these	  
standards	  are	  not	  the	  real	  reason	  that	  modern	  woman	  rejects	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  atonement.	  
Modern	  man	  rejects	  the	  atonement	  because	  he	  does	  not	  regard	  life	  as	  tragic.	  Modern	  
man	  believes	  in	  progress,	  that	  history	  is	  the	  record	  of	  a	  triumphant	  victory	  for	  good	  and	  the	  
slow	  demise	  of	  its	  enemy,	  evil.	  Modern	  man	  doesn’t	  recognize	  the	  simple	  truth	  that	  life	  
always	  remains	  self-­‐contradictory	  in	  its	  sin,	  no	  mater	  how	  high	  human	  intelligence	  and	  
culture	  rises.	  Their	  view	  of	  the	  world	  is	  essentially	  non-­‐tragic,	  romantic,	  built	  on	  delusion.	  
However,	  recognition	  of	  the	  fact	  alone	  is	  not	  a	  solution.	  Recognizing	  that	  man	  is	  sinful	  
results	  in	  a	  tragic	  perspective	  of	  human	  life.	  This	  is	  where	  the	  Christian	  faith	  has	  a	  new	  
message	  for	  man,	  and	  that	  message	  is	  beyond	  tragedy—there	  is	  hope	  in	  tragedy.	  It	  is	  true	  
that	  Christ	  “came	  unto	  his	  own	  and	  they	  received	  him	  not”;	  that	  Christ	  demonstrated	  a	  
perfect	  love	  to	  his	  own	  people	  and	  they	  killed	  him	  for	  it.	  That	  is	  a	  tragic	  message.	  But	  it	  is	  
also	  true,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  that	  when	  that	  fact	  is	  understood	  and	  the	  norm	  of	  life	  is	  
recognized	  as	  no	  longer	  sin	  but	  love,	  i.e.	  the	  new	  reality	  revealed	  in	  Christ,	  even	  if	  one	  fails	  
to	  measure	  up,	  the	  spirit	  of	  contrition	  and	  repentance	  opens	  the	  eyes	  of	  faith.	  It	  is	  “the	  
Godly	  sorrow	  that	  worketh	  repentance”	  (ibid.,	  19).	  “Out	  of	  this	  despair”	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  
“hope	  is	  born.”	  
“The	  hope	  is	  simply	  this”	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  that	  the	  contradictions	  of	  life,	  which	  man	  
can’t	  surmount,	  “	  swallowed	  up	  in	  the	  life	  of	  God	  Himself”	  (ibid.).	  This	  God	  is	  a	  creator	  and	  a	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redeemer.	  He	  will	  not	  allow	  life	  to	  end	  tragically,	  for	  he	  snatches	  victory	  out	  of	  defeat,	  just	  
as	  he	  did	  on	  the	  cross	  when	  he	  was	  defeated	  in	  history	  but	  was	  ultimately	  victorious	  in	  that	  
defeat.	  2,000	  years	  ago	  he	  embodied	  love	  perfectly	  and	  was	  killed	  for	  it;	  and	  2,000	  years	  
later,	  those	  who	  refuse	  his	  judgment,	  evade	  his	  redemption,	  and	  reject	  him	  as	  absurd	  
foolishness	  are	  still	  trying	  to	  kill	  him	  in	  culture.	  Even	  in	  death,	  they	  must	  continue	  to	  kill	  
him.	  They	  still	  mark	  their	  calendars	  from	  the	  day	  he	  was	  born,	  they	  still	  fight	  to	  keep	  his	  
influence	  out	  of	  government	  affairs,	  they	  are	  still	  confronted	  with	  daily	  reminders	  of	  the	  
cross	  they	  placed	  him	  on—gently	  dangling	  on	  the	  napes	  of	  lovers’	  necks,	  overshadowing	  
the	  scenes	  of	  Renaissance	  paintings	  in	  modern	  museums,	  crashing	  through	  the	  chorus	  of	  
classical	  symphonies,	  and	  signaling	  the	  triumphant	  march	  from	  Selma	  to	  Washington	  in	  the	  
name	  of	  justice,	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  Not	  only	  in	  events,	  processes	  and	  symbols	  but	  also	  in	  
life,	  they	  still	  kill	  him,	  for	  it	  is	  him	  they	  kill	  when	  they	  kill	  his	  embodiments:	  Lincoln,	  John	  F.	  
Kennedy,	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.,	  Bobby	  Kennedy,	  John	  Lennon.	  
Niebuhr	  echoes	  these	  insights	  when	  he	  notes	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  Greek	  
heroes	  and	  Christ.	  The	  Greek	  heroes,	  aristocratic	  warriors,	  tragically	  beg	  for	  pity:	  “Weep	  
for	  me!”	  they	  plead.	  But	  Christ	  on	  the	  cross,	  the	  suffering	  son	  of	  a	  carpenter	  and	  God,	  says,	  
“Weep	  not	  for	  me,	  but	  for	  yourselves.”	  “If	  there	  are	  tears	  for	  this	  man	  on	  the	  cross	  they	  
cannot	  be	  tears	  of	  ‘pity	  and	  terror’,”	  as	  they	  are	  in	  Greek	  tragedies	  (ibid.,	  168).	  “The	  cross	  
does	  not	  reveal	  life	  at	  cross	  purposes	  with	  itself,”	  Niebuhr	  notes;	  but	  on	  the	  contrary,	  “it	  
declares	  that	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  inherent	  defect	  in	  life	  itself	  is	  really	  a	  contingent	  defect	  
in	  the	  soul	  of	  each	  man,	  the	  defect	  of	  the	  sin	  which	  he	  commits	  in	  his	  freedom.	  If	  he	  can	  
realize	  that	  fact,	  if	  he	  can	  weep	  for	  himself,	  if	  he	  can	  repent,	  he	  can	  also	  be	  saved”	  by	  hope	  
and	  faith	  and	  our	  “tears	  of	  self-­‐pity”	  (ibid.).	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Thus,	  we	  are	  deceivers	  yet	  we	  are	  honest,	  when	  we	  look	  for	  the	  permanent	  truth	  in	  
this	  timeless	  occurrence,	  when	  Aeschylus’s	  judgment	  that	  “wisdom	  comes	  from	  the	  awful	  
grace	  of	  God”	  keeps	  us	  from	  rioting	  in	  Indianapolis;	  yet	  even	  more	  truth	  lay	  in	  our	  
deceptions	  when	  we	  declare	  that	  Aeschylus	  was	  only	  a	  man,	  that	  his	  theodicy	  was	  as	  much	  
a	  guess	  as	  ours,	  and	  that	  we	  need	  not	  guess	  at	  all	  because	  God	  has	  entered	  into	  history	  and	  
revealed	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  our	  suffering.	  We	  do	  not	  suffer	  randomly,	  normatively,	  because	  
we	  have	  not	  honored	  our	  parents,	  or	  because	  it	  is	  God’s	  preferred	  pedagogy;	  we	  suffer	  
because	  we	  love	  ourselves	  more	  than	  others,	  we	  misuse	  our	  freedom,	  we	  substitue	  Will-­‐
power	  for	  our	  Will-­‐to-­‐Power,	  we	  don’t	  acknowledge	  that	  our	  existence	  is	  tragic,	  and	  that	  
the	  law	  of	  love	  is	  the	  law	  of	  life.	  Christ	  entered	  the	  world	  to	  suffer	  for	  man	  and	  save	  him	  
from	  sin	  tragically.	  He	  does	  this,	  not	  by	  his	  power,	  but	  he	  suffers,	  being	  powerless,	  from	  the	  
injustices	  of	  the	  powerful	  (ibid.).	  He	  suffers	  the	  worst	  from	  the	  sins	  of	  the	  “righteous”	  who	  
do	  not	  understand	  how	  full	  of	  unrighteousness	  if	  all	  human	  righteousness.”	  “The	  Savior	  of	  
the	  world”	  writes	  Niebuhr,	  “is	  not	  crucified	  by	  criminals	  or	  obviously	  evil	  people;	  he	  is	  
crucified	  by	  the	  ‘princes	  of	  this	  world’”	  (ibid.,	  182).	  Our	  failure	  to	  see	  this	  tragedy	  ensures	  
us	  that	  life	  will	  remain	  tragic	  anytime	  the	  strong	  destroy	  the	  weak,	  when	  our	  system	  of	  
justice	  fails	  to	  fulfill	  its	  promises,	  when	  the	  best	  we	  have	  and	  the	  best	  that	  we	  are	  isn’t,	  in	  
the	  last	  analysis,	  enough.	  The	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  was	  a	  display	  of	  the	  best	  American	  
democracy	  has	  to	  offer;	  yet	  it	  ended	  with	  the	  death	  of	  the	  powerless	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  
powerful.	  It	  is	  an	  apt	  display	  of	  this	  tragic	  feeling	  whenever	  we	  are	  enraged	  at	  sexual	  
violence	  committed	  against	  an	  innocent	  child,	  when	  the	  best	  and	  most	  pure	  in	  all	  of	  
existence	  is	  taken	  advantage	  of	  and	  exploited,	  and	  we	  ask	  ourselves	  “What	  kind	  of	  world	  do	  
we	  live	  in?”	  If	  we	  have	  to	  ask,	  if	  this	  type	  of	  brutal	  violence	  and	  horrendous	  act	  comes	  as	  a	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shock	  to	  us,	  then	  we	  have	  refused	  to	  see	  the	  world	  for	  what	  it	  is.	  For	  only	  if	  we	  first	  accept	  a	  
view	  of	  the	  world	  as	  tragic	  can	  we,	  in	  humble	  contrition,	  live	  tomorrow	  with	  hope	  and	  
grace	  and	  get	  beyond	  tragedy.	  
The	  atonement	  of	  Christ,	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  is	  a	  revelation	  of	  what	  life	  actually	  is.	  It	  is	  
tragic	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  human	  striving,	  which	  can	  do	  no	  better	  than	  the	  Roman	  law	  
or	  the	  Hebraic	  religion—both	  the	  best	  of	  their	  kind,	  yet	  both	  the	  reasons	  that	  the	  perfect	  
Christ	  was	  crucified	  (ibid.,	  20).	  Yet,	  this	  crucifixion	  reveals	  in	  human	  history	  that	  which	  
transcends	  human	  striving.	  This	  revelation	  helps	  us	  apprehend	  those	  elements	  of	  life	  that	  
are	  beyond	  tragedy.	  “Without	  the	  cross”	  argues	  Niebuhr	  “men	  are	  beguiled	  by	  what	  is	  good	  
in	  human	  existence	  into	  a	  false	  optimism	  and	  by	  what	  is	  tragic	  into	  despair.”	  This	  truth	  
can’t	  be	  stated	  without	  deceptions	  but	  without	  them	  they	  are	  less	  profound.	  “Pure	  
goodness	  without	  power,”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “cannot	  maintain	  itself	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  ends	  on	  
the	  cross.	  Yet	  that	  is	  not	  where	  it	  finally	  ends.	  The	  Messiah	  will	  finally	  transmute	  the	  whole	  
world	  order"	  (ibid.,	  177-­‐8).	  
The	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  
	  
“We	  are	  deceivers,	  yet	  true,	  when	  we	  declare	  that	  Christ	  will	  come	  again	  at	  the	  last	  judgment,	  
that	  he	  who	  was	  defeated	  in	  history	  will	  ultimately	  triumph	  over	  it,	  will	  become	  its	  judge	  and	  
the	  author	  of	  its	  new	  life.”	  
	  
The	  myth	  of	  the	  second	  coming	  can	  be	  briefly	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  Christ,	  upon	  
ascending	  to	  the	  right	  hand	  of	  the	  throne	  of	  his	  Father,	  God,	  promised	  to	  return	  and	  
establish	  his	  eternal	  reign.	  When	  he	  returns,	  as	  it	  is	  said	  in	  the	  Catholic	  and	  Methodist	  
creeds	  of	  faith,	  he	  will	  judge	  the	  quick	  and	  the	  dead.	  The	  dead	  in	  Christ	  will	  rise	  and	  will	  
reign	  with	  Him.	  Commonly,	  there	  is	  a	  Hell	  somewhere	  in	  this	  story,	  though	  it	  is	  notably	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absent	  from	  the	  messages	  of	  Christ	  and	  where	  it	  is	  present	  in	  other	  New	  Testament	  
scholars	  it	  is	  more	  often	  about	  the	  present	  age	  and	  “the	  age	  to	  come.”	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  no	  
biblical	  myth	  has	  led	  to	  more	  deceptions	  and	  illusions	  than	  this	  one.	  The	  imagery	  in	  the	  
apocalyptic	  literature	  is	  often	  so	  extravagant	  and	  fanatical	  that	  the	  even	  moderately	  liberal	  
side	  of	  Christianity	  has	  been	  ashamed	  by	  its	  appropriation	  and	  exploitation	  by	  sectarian	  
fanatics,	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  they	  have	  been	  content	  with	  leaving	  it	  alone	  entirely	  (BT,	  
21).	  It	  is	  a	  large	  ranging	  myth	  and	  for	  our	  purposes	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  three	  
elements:	  the	  second	  coming	  and	  final	  judgment,	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  life	  through	  the	  
resurrection	  of	  the	  body,	  and	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  history	  through	  the	  founding	  of	  a	  Kingdom	  
of	  God.	  The	  final	  judgment	  comes	  at	  the	  end	  of	  history.	  Niebuhr	  is	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  
Christ’s	  ultimate	  judgments	  are	  at	  the	  end	  of	  history	  as	  opposed	  to	  in	  it.	  There	  may	  be	  
moments	  of	  divine	  judgment	  in	  history	  but	  we	  should	  tread	  very	  carefully	  in	  pronouncing	  
those	  judgments	  in	  his	  name,	  as	  if	  we	  know	  his	  will	  absolutely.	  The	  best	  way	  to	  keep	  from	  
making	  this	  mistake	  is	  to	  pronounce	  the	  judgments	  on	  ourselves	  first,	  noting	  the	  log	  in	  our	  
own	  eye,	  pointing	  out	  the	  speck	  in	  our	  neighbor’s.	  
The	  resurrection	  of	  the	  body	  is	  the	  second	  aspect	  of	  this	  myth.	  This	  idea,	  Niebuhr	  
notes,	  “can	  of	  course	  not	  be	  literally	  true”	  just	  as	  no	  other	  idea	  of	  fulfillment	  can	  be	  literally	  
true	  (BT,	  290).	  All	  ideas	  of	  fulfillment	  use	  symbols	  from	  our	  present	  reality	  to	  describe	  and	  
conceptualize	  a	  completion	  of	  life	  that	  transcends	  our	  present	  reality.	  We	  will	  go	  into	  
Niebuhr’s	  ontology	  more	  in	  the	  second	  chapter;	  but	  for	  now,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  
Niebuhr	  prefers	  this	  myth	  because	  it	  keeps	  the	  body	  and	  the	  soul	  intact.	  Niebuhr	  rejected	  
Cartesian	  and	  Greek	  dualisms	  and	  insisted	  that	  there	  was	  no	  more	  reason	  to	  think	  the	  soul	  
could	  exist	  without	  a	  body,	  as	  there	  was	  to	  think	  a	  body	  could	  exist	  without	  a	  soul.	  Both	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were	  inconceivable	  because	  “reason	  can	  only	  deal	  with	  the	  stuff	  of	  experience”	  and	  no	  man	  
has	  yet	  to	  experience	  a	  discarnate	  soul	  or	  an	  immortal	  body.	  Here,	  yet	  again,	  we	  see	  
Niebuhr	  insisting	  on	  a	  Jamesian	  radical	  empiricism:	  “But	  we	  do	  have	  an	  experience	  of	  a	  
human	  existence	  which	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  processes	  of	  nature	  and	  yet	  transcends	  them”	  
(ibid.,	  291).	  Over	  and	  over	  again,	  throughout	  his	  career,	  Niebuhr	  insisted	  that	  “The	  facts	  of	  
human	  experience	  point	  to	  the	  organic	  unity	  of	  the	  body	  and	  soul”	  (ibid.,	  292).	  This	  is	  the	  
first	  reason	  that	  Niebuhr	  prefers	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  resurrection	  of	  the	  body.	  
The	  second	  reason	  is	  ethical:	  the	  “hope	  of	  resurrection	  of	  the	  body”	  he	  notes,	  “is	  
preferable	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  immortality	  of	  the	  soul	  because	  it	  expresses	  at	  once	  a	  more	  
individual	  and	  a	  more	  social	  idea	  of	  human	  existence”	  (ibid.,	  297).	  Those	  myths	  that	  
emphasize	  the	  immortality	  of	  the	  soul	  and	  their	  respective	  ideals	  tend	  to	  be	  highly	  
individualistic,	  perhaps	  even	  ascetic.	  They	  interpret	  fulfillment	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  it	  
achievable	  without	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  social	  process.	  To	  combat	  this	  idea,	  Niebuhr	  
emphasizes	  that	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  resurrection	  of	  the	  body	  grew	  out	  of	  a	  Hebraic	  social	  hope	  
for	  a	  Messianic	  kingdom.	  Fulfillment	  for	  the	  Hebrews	  was	  a	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  social	  process.	  
Thus,	  in	  combat	  to	  the	  individualistic	  elements	  of	  Christianity	  that	  highlighted	  “eternal	  life”	  
as	  the	  ideal	  end	  of	  history,	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  Marxian	  ideas	  were	  a	  consequential	  and	  
perhaps	  even	  necessary	  revolt.	  They	  set	  up	  a	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  minus	  the	  resurrection,	  
minus	  the	  divine	  transformation	  of	  human	  existence,	  and	  whatever	  the	  errors	  in	  the	  
utopianism,	  Niebuhr	  appreciated	  their	  restoration	  of	  an	  important	  element	  in	  prophetic	  
religion.	  That	  element	  is	  the	  social	  one:	  that	  every	  life	  may	  be	  significant	  and	  transcend	  the	  
social	  process,	  but	  its	  significance	  cannot	  be	  developed	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  social	  
process	  as	  well	  (ibid.,	  299).	  The	  body,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  is	  the	  mark	  of	  individuality	  as	  well	  as	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of	  sociality	  (ibid.,	  301)	  Once	  again	  then,	  in	  the	  final	  analysis,	  the	  resurrection	  is	  another	  
mythic	  element	  that	  confirms	  the	  dialectical	  nature	  of	  time	  and	  eternity	  in	  a	  paradoxical	  
tension	  that	  Niebuhr	  finds	  ethically	  constructive.	  
The	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  lies	  beyond	  history	  but	  is	  not	  a	  realm	  of	  eternity	  that	  negates	  
time	  (ibid.,	  192).	  “It	  is	  a	  realm	  of	  eternity	  which	  fulfills	  time,”	  Niebuhr	  writes.	  It	  is	  a	  symbol	  
of	  the	  eternal	  in	  time.	  In	  a	  similar	  dialectical	  vein,	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  history	  by	  the	  
foundation	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  distinguishes	  Christianity	  from	  naturalistic	  utopianism	  
and	  Hellenistic	  otherworldliness	  (ibid.,	  22-­‐3).	  Unlike	  those,	  Christianity’s	  hope	  of	  the	  
fulfillment	  of	  life	  is	  expressed	  paradoxically	  and	  dialectically;	  it	  holds	  fast	  to	  its	  conception	  
of	  the	  relation	  to	  time	  and	  eternity	  that	  is	  demonstrates	  in	  its	  other	  mythic	  symbols.	  
History,	  as	  it	  was	  for	  the	  Greeks,	  is	  not	  held	  to	  be	  meaningless;	  the	  Christian	  myth	  doesn’t	  
place	  fulfillment	  above	  history,	  in	  some	  realm	  of	  pure	  form	  and	  abstracted	  existence,	  but	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  history.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  end	  of	  history	  is	  not	  a	  point	  in	  history.	  Thus	  the	  
Christian	  eschatology	  symbolizes	  that	  “fulfillment	  both	  transcends	  and	  is	  relevant	  to	  
historical	  forms”	  (ibid.).	  Any	  hope	  to	  achieve	  an	  ultimate	  fulfillment	  in	  history	  is	  in	  vain	  
because	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  history	  man	  has	  freedom	  and,	  recalling	  the	  prior	  myths,	  where	  man	  
has	  freedom	  there	  will	  also	  be	  the	  misuse	  of	  that	  freedom,	  i.e.	  sin.	  So	  ultimate	  fulfillment	  
must	  come	  outside	  of	  man’s	  historical	  possibilities.	  Christ,	  according	  to	  the	  biblical	  mythos,	  
is	  the	  judge	  of	  the	  world	  and	  author	  of	  its	  ultimate	  fulfillment—the	  symbol	  “of	  what	  man	  
ought	  to	  be	  and	  of	  what	  God	  is	  beyond	  man”	  (ibid.).	  
To	  briefly	  summarize	  Niebuhr’s	  eschatology:	  “The	  apocalypse	  is	  a	  mythical	  
expression	  of	  the	  impossible	  possibility	  under	  which	  all	  human	  life	  stands,”	  writes	  Niebuhr	  
(ICE,	  36).	  Thus,	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  is	  always	  here	  whenever	  the	  impossibilities	  are	  felt	  as	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really	  possible	  and	  lead	  to	  new	  actualities	  in	  history.	  Nevertheless,	  he	  continues,	  every	  
actuality	  always	  reveals	  itself	  in	  history,	  after	  the	  event,	  as	  only	  an	  approximation	  of	  the	  
ideal.	  Thus,	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  is	  not	  here.	  “It	  is	  in	  fact	  always	  coming	  but	  never	  here”	  
(ibid.).	  
Conclusion	  
I	  believe	  in	  God,	  the	  Father	  almighty,	  creator	  of	  heaven	  and	  earth.	  
	  
I	  believe	  in	  Jesus	  Christ,	  His	  only	  Son,	  our	  Lord,	  who	  was	  conceived	  by	  the	  power	  of	  
the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  born	  of	  the	  virgin	  Mary,	  suffered	  under	  Pontius	  Pilate,	  was	  crucified,	  
died,	  and	  was	  buried;	  On	  the	  third	  day	  he	  rose	  again,	  He	  ascended	  into	  heaven,	  is	  
seated	  at	  the	  right	  hand	  of	  the	  Father,	  and	  He	  will	  come	  again	  to	  judge	  the	  living	  and	  
the	  dead.	  
	  
I	  believe	  in	  the	  Holy	  Spirit,	  the	  holy	  catholic	  Church,	  the	  communion	  of	  saints,	  the	  
forgiveness	  of	  sins,	  the	  resurrection	  of	  the	  body,	  and	  the	  life	  everlasting.	  Amen.	  
	  
⎯The	  Apostle’s	  Creed,	  United	  Methodist	  Church	  version	  
	  
Though	  hard	  numbers	  are	  hard	  to	  find,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  guesstimate	  that	  this	  creed	  is	  
spoken,	  in	  unison,	  in	  the	  congregations	  of	  thousands	  of	  churches	  holding	  millions	  of	  
parishioners,	  every	  Sunday	  morning.	  In	  Latin,	  the	  creed	  was	  called	  “Symbolum	  
Apostolorum”—the	  symbol	  of	  the	  apostles.	  I	  myself	  repeat	  it	  every	  week,	  and	  despite	  my	  
disbelief	  that	  Jesus	  was	  born	  of	  a	  virgin,	  and	  my	  sometimes	  embarrassment	  at	  other	  
historical	  and	  rational	  flaws	  in	  the	  message,	  I	  repeat	  it	  nevertheless.	  I	  do	  it	  because	  there	  
are	  timeless	  truths	  in	  its	  message	  that	  I	  think	  are	  worth	  preserving,	  much	  as	  Niebuhr	  did.	  	  
It	  was	  1916.	  In	  one	  of	  his	  earliest	  journal	  entries,	  Niebuhr	  reflects	  on	  his	  first	  
experience	  with	  serving	  communion	  at	  a	  sick	  bed.	  He	  writes,	  “I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  
superstition	  connected	  with	  the	  rite…	  Yet	  I	  will	  not	  be	  too	  critical.	  If	  the	  rite	  suggests	  and	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expresses	  the	  emotion	  of	  honest	  contrition	  it	  is	  more	  than	  superstition.”30	  In	  1920,	  Niebuhr	  
would	  continue	  this	  strain	  of	  thought	  in	  another	  entry:	  “Religion	  is	  poetry.	  The	  truth	  in	  the	  
poetry	  is	  vivified	  by	  adequate	  poetic	  symbols	  and	  is	  therefore	  more	  convincing	  that	  the	  
poor	  prose	  with	  which	  the	  average	  preacher	  must	  attempt	  to	  grasp	  the	  ineffable…	  Yet	  one	  
must	  not	  forget	  that	  the	  truth	  is	  not	  only	  vivified	  but	  also	  corrupted	  by	  the	  poetic	  symbol,	  
for	  it	  is	  only	  one	  step	  from	  a	  vivid	  symbol	  to	  the	  touch	  of	  magic”	  (ibid.,	  30).	  Niebuhr’s	  
argument	  is	  that	  the	  energies	  of	  life	  are	  not	  rational	  and	  that,	  though	  reason	  may	  guide	  
them,	  it	  cannot	  create	  them.	  He	  writes,	  “The	  adjustment	  of	  man	  to	  his	  universe,	  toward	  
which	  he	  must	  maintain	  an	  attitude	  of	  both	  filial	  piety	  and	  heroic	  rebellion,	  involves	  too	  
many	  paradoxes	  to	  be	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  pure	  rationality”	  (F&P,	  69).	  
Thus,	  men	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  universe	  only	  by	  “heroic	  and	  poetic	  insights”	  and	  
he	  is	  spurred	  to	  courage	  in	  undertaking	  the	  world	  of	  appearances,	  “only	  as	  he	  gains	  
sufficient	  self-­‐respect	  in	  his	  moral	  relationships	  to	  his	  fellow	  men	  to	  feel	  that	  the	  human	  
spirit	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  the	  effort	  is	  made	  to	  penetrate	  the	  ultimate	  
mysteries.”	  Religion,	  Niebuhr	  would	  define	  eventually	  as	  the	  “whole	  of	  man	  adjusting	  
himself	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  life,”	  and	  he	  insisted	  that	  this	  could	  only	  be	  done	  in	  accord	  with	  two	  
elements—“poetic	  insight	  and	  moral	  vigor”	  (ibid.).	  The	  task	  of	  creating	  these,	  Niebuhr	  
insisted,	  was	  the	  prophet-­‐technician’s,	  who	  knew	  how	  to	  insist	  that	  “man	  cannot	  be	  whole	  
until	  he	  lives	  again	  in	  organic	  unity	  with	  his	  fellow	  men”	  and	  that	  “All	  civilization	  is	  a	  peril	  
to	  brotherhood”	  (ibid.,	  71).	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  prophet’s	  task	  was	  to	  preach	  the	  Christian	  ideal	  
to	  a	  fallen	  world;	  to	  demand	  that	  the	  mythic	  insights	  of	  poetic	  and	  permanent	  truth	  stand	  
above	  the	  actualities	  of	  mere	  approximations	  of	  justice	  and	  love.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  (Niebuhr	  1980,	  13)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  Leaves).	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Yet,	  as	  Niebuhr	  counters,	  “it	  is	  idle	  to	  protest	  against	  the	  inevitable	  in	  the	  name	  of	  an	  
ideal.”	  Therefore,	  the	  modern	  prophet	  must	  also	  be	  a	  technician,	  “who	  knows	  how	  to	  
transmute	  realities	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  ideal;”	  a	  “pedagogical	  technician”	  who	  knows	  how	  to	  
create	  the	  kind	  of	  social	  and	  spiritual	  imagination	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  overcome	  the	  
mechanical	  and	  indirect	  relationships	  which	  modern	  life	  produces.	  They	  must	  help	  man	  to	  
feel	  with	  and	  for	  his	  brother	  in	  such	  an	  alienated	  state	  of	  existence.	  He	  must	  be	  a	  “social	  
technician”	  who	  knows	  how	  to	  create	  social	  organisms	  that	  can	  control	  the	  mechanical	  
world.	  But	  they	  must	  be	  more	  than	  mere	  engineers.	  Intelligence	  may	  help	  solve	  the	  
problems	  which	  intelligence	  has	  created,	  but	  it	  will	  need	  more	  than	  that;	  it	  will	  need	  to	  
create	  a	  moral	  energy	  and	  a	  social	  intelligence	  in	  equal	  proportions	  (ibid.,	  72).	  Mythic	  and	  
poetic	  insights	  create	  moral	  vigor	  and	  ardor.	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  
intelligence	  plays	  in	  prophetic	  inquiry,	  i.e.	  to	  the	  dialectics	  of	  prophetic	  truth.	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Chapter	  3	  
Dialectical	  Inquiry:	  Love,	  Justice,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  Truth	  
	  
	  
Man	  has	  always	  been	  his	  most	  vexing	  problem.	  How	  shall	  he	  think	  of	  himself?	  
⎯R.	  Niebuhr,	  The	  Nature	  and	  Destiny	  of	  Man	  
	  
If	  you	  gloss	  over	  Niebuhr’s	  existential	  question	  you	  will	  miss	  something	  profound.	  
Wouldn’t	  it	  make	  more	  sense	  to	  ask	  what	  should	  man	  think	  of	  himself,	  instead	  of	  how;	  
focusing	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  thoughts	  instead	  of	  their	  method?	  “Every	  affirmation	  that	  
man	  makes	  about	  his	  place	  in	  the	  world”	  argues	  Niebuhr,	  ends	  in	  some	  contradiction.	  Yet	  
again,	  we	  may	  ask,	  is	  it	  the	  content	  of	  the	  affirmation	  that	  results	  in	  the	  contradictions	  or	  is	  
the	  method,	  i.e.	  the	  action	  of	  affirming	  itself	  that	  is	  causing	  the	  problems?	  Man’s	  
affirmations,	  the	  propositions	  man	  makes	  about	  himself,	  fall	  under	  the	  realm	  of	  dialectics.	  
In	  fact,	  Niebuhr	  is	  correct	  in	  his	  assertion	  that	  the	  vexing	  problem	  is	  found	  in	  the	  how.	  Man	  
may	  think	  of	  himself	  mythically	  and	  never	  run	  into	  contradictions;	  yet,	  when	  he	  thinks	  of	  
himself	  dialectically,	  ergo	  conceptually,	  he	  inevitably	  reaches	  a	  logical	  impasse,	  as	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  many	  affirmations	  man	  has	  made	  about	  himself	  will	  show.	  
The	  “vexing	  problem”	  of	  Being	  has	  been	  through	  the	  language	  cipher;	  defined	  
essentially	  as	  a	  logistikon	  and/or	  a	  daimon;	  defined	  in	  dramatic	  action	  as	  bios	  politikos,	  
animal	  laborans,	  and	  a	  cogito	  ergo	  sum;	  defined	  dialectically	  as	  its	  opposite—nothing—
before	  being	  isolated,	  alienated,	  and	  finally,	  authenticated	  as	  Dasein—a	  phenomena	  in	  
opposition	  to	  the	  they	  of	  the	  world—mitsein—and	  itself—Dasein.	  Man’s	  problem	  with	  
himself	  has	  been	  summed	  up	  in	  its	  sensation	  and	  feelings:	  despair,	  angst,	  anxiety,	  fear	  and	  
trembling,	  doubt,	  thought,	  absurdity,	  ambiguity,	  and	  to	  those	  who	  don’t	  ask	  at	  all,	  
ambivalence.	  The	  questions	  man	  asks,	  in	  order	  to	  get	  at,	  around,	  or	  behind	  his	  existential	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uncertainty,	  are	  varied:	  “Why	  is	  there	  Being,	  rather	  than	  Non-­‐Being?”	  “Why	  doesn’t	  man	  
kill	  himself?”	  “Why	  doesn’t	  man	  kill	  every	  other	  man?”	  and	  “When	  man	  asks	  about	  himself,	  
why	  and	  what,	  is	  he	  asking,	  exactly?”	  Lately,	  it	  is	  fashionable	  to	  turn	  and	  reify	  and	  deify	  
man’s	  vexation	  with	  himself:	  he’s	  been	  turned	  “upside	  down,”	  turned	  “linguistically,”	  
turned	  into	  an	  animal,	  and	  taken	  a	  turn	  for	  the	  worse;	  he’s	  been	  rephrased,	  reorganized,	  re-­‐
dialecticized,	  re-­‐analyzed,	  restricted,	  and	  regurgitated;	  finally,	  he’s	  been	  demythologized,	  
demystified,	  denationalized,	  and	  deconstructed—if	  you	  are	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  be	  around	  
certain	  folks,	  you	  may	  have	  even	  come	  across	  man’s	  (Re)turning	  or	  his	  
(De)(Re)construction!	  If	  the	  history	  of	  thought	  tells	  us	  anything,	  it	  is	  the	  affirmation	  that,	  at	  
least	  for	  those	  privileged	  few	  who	  have	  the	  resources,	  education,	  freedom	  and	  health	  to	  live	  
a	  vita	  contemplativa,	  Niebuhr’s	  estimate	  of	  man’s	  situation	  is	  correct.	  
The	  problem	  with	  man’s	  vexing	  problem	  with	  himself	  is,	  if	  I	  may	  offer	  one	  more	  
analysis	  of	  the	  human	  condition,	  that	  man—literate	  man	  anyway—usually	  tries	  to	  solve	  the	  
problem	  dialectically,	  i.e.	  categorically.	  According	  to	  Niebuhr,	  “Every	  affirmation	  which	  he	  
may	  make	  about	  his	  stature,	  virtue,	  or	  place	  in	  the	  cosmos	  becomes	  involved	  in	  
contradictions	  when	  fully	  analyzed.	  The	  analysis	  reveals	  some	  presupposition	  or	  
implication	  which	  seems	  to	  deny	  what	  the	  proposition	  intended	  to	  affirm.”31	  For	  this	  
reason,	  any	  investigation	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  man,	  that	  insists	  on	  logical	  coherency,	  which	  
indeed	  is	  the	  standard	  of	  measurement	  for	  dialectics,	  will	  inevitably	  end	  in	  rational	  
absurdity.	  
The	  reason	  for	  this	  inevitable	  absurdity	  is	  that	  man	  is	  both	  a	  creature	  and	  a	  creator	  
of	  history;	  he	  has	  both	  vitality	  and	  form.	  If	  we	  insist	  that	  man	  is	  an	  animal,	  that	  he	  is	  merely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  (Niebuhr	  1996)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  NDMI	  or	  NDMII).	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one	  natural	  species	  in	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  such	  species,	  which	  he	  obviously	  is,	  and	  that	  he	  
ought	  not	  to	  pretend	  to	  be	  any	  more	  than	  that,	  we	  must	  at	  least	  tacitly	  admit	  that	  he	  is	  “at	  
any	  rate,	  a	  curious	  kind	  of	  animal	  who	  has	  both	  the	  inclination	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  
such	  pretensions”	  (ibid.)	  On	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  insist	  that	  man	  is	  unique	  and	  holds	  a	  special	  
place	  in	  the	  natural	  world,	  pointing	  to	  his	  rational	  faculties	  as	  proof	  of	  his	  distinctive	  place,	  
“there	  is	  an	  anxious	  note”	  in	  such	  avowals	  of	  uniqueness,	  which	  betray	  our	  “unconscious	  
sense	  of	  kinship	  with	  the	  brutes”	  (ibid.)	  Furthermore,	  man’s	  very	  effort	  to	  estimate	  the	  
value	  of	  his	  reason	  implies	  some	  degree	  of	  transcendence	  over	  his	  rational	  capacities;	  for	  
the	  man	  who	  estimates	  the	  value	  of	  his	  “reason”	  must	  be	  more	  than	  “reason,”	  since	  he	  has	  
the	  capacity	  to	  transcend	  his	  ability	  to	  form	  general	  concepts.	  “The	  obvious	  fact,”	  writes	  
Niebuhr,	  is	  that	  man	  is	  both	  a	  child	  of	  nature	  and	  a	  spirit	  who	  stands	  outside	  of	  nature;	  he	  
is	  both	  a	  creature	  of	  the	  natural	  order	  and	  a	  creator	  who,	  by	  taking	  thought,	  can	  make	  
himself	  and	  his	  thoughts	  his	  own	  object;	  he	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  “forms	  of	  nature”	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  he	  is	  free	  of	  them—he	  has	  “vitality”	  (ibid.)	  
	   Obvious	  complexities	  and	  vexing	  problems	  result	  from	  man’s	  vitality	  and	  thus,	  any	  
attempt	  to	  understand	  man	  by	  fitting	  him	  into	  a	  completely	  coherent	  and	  rational	  order	  
inevitably	  ends	  in	  absurdity—for	  reason	  and	  logic,	  by	  their	  very	  nature,	  cannot	  account	  for	  
the	  new	  and	  contingent	  in	  life,	  when	  man’s	  creativity	  disrupts	  the	  order	  of	  a	  rational	  
worldview.	  For	  this	  reason,	  man’s	  nature	  and	  his	  destiny,	  the	  meaning	  of	  life	  and	  history,	  
must	  be	  viewed	  incoherently,	  if	  certain	  existential	  truths	  are	  not	  to	  be	  missed.	  This	  is	  the	  
realm	  of	  ultimate	  systems	  of	  meaning,	  of	  myths,	  religions,	  ideologies,	  metaphysics,	  and	  
philosophies.	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Nevertheless,	  man’s	  rational	  capacities	  for	  abstract	  concepts	  may	  add	  to	  his	  
understanding	  of	  certain	  universal	  truths.	  Niebuhr,	  echoing	  Peirce	  and	  James,	  argues	  that	  
reality	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  basic	  coherence;	  “things	  and	  events	  are	  in	  a	  vast	  web	  of	  
relationships	  and	  are	  known	  through	  their	  relations”	  (CRPP,	  218).	  Our	  knowledge	  of	  
appearances	  is	  possible	  only	  through	  conceptual	  images,	  “which	  in	  some	  sense,”	  Niebuhr	  
continues,	  “conform	  to	  the	  structures	  in	  which	  reality	  is	  organized.”	  Our	  impulse	  to	  
understand	  the	  world	  naturally	  expresses	  itself	  in	  metaphysics;	  we	  rise	  above	  physics	  to	  
penetrate	  behind	  and	  above	  the	  forms	  and	  structures	  of	  things	  to	  the	  form	  and	  structure	  of	  
being	  per	  se.	  
As	  long	  as	  we	  remember	  that	  ultimately,	  we	  “see	  through	  a	  glass	  darkly,”	  and	  don’t	  
insist	  on	  making	  every	  conceptual	  analysis	  part	  of	  a	  systematic	  and	  coherent	  “ology,”	  there	  
are	  certain	  truths	  which	  can	  be	  gotten	  closer	  to	  by	  way	  rational	  analysis.	  For	  centuries,	  
argues	  Niebuhr,	  “we’ve	  been	  subjected	  to	  a	  conflict	  between	  a	  theology	  which	  has	  become	  a	  
bad	  science,	  and	  a	  science	  which	  implied	  an	  unconscious	  theology,	  a	  theology	  of	  
unconscious	  presuppositions	  about	  the	  ultimate	  meaning	  of	  life”	  (ERN,	  89).	  There	  is	  room	  
then	  for	  dialectical	  inquiry	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  thought;	  it	  is	  the	  method	  for	  investigating	  
conceptual	  images	  of	  the	  perceptual	  world	  and	  is	  valuable,	  if	  it	  doesn’t	  insist	  on	  systematic	  
coherency.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  more	  than	  just	  “some	  room;”	  one	  could	  build	  a	  mansion	  full	  of	  
them.	  Niebuhr’s	  dialectical	  investigations	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  love	  &	  justice,	  creator	  &	  
creature,	  power	  &	  grace,	  and	  many	  other	  variants	  of	  these	  conceptual	  schemes,	  make	  up	  a	  
substantial	  portion	  of	  his	  writings.	  Niebuhr	  was	  just	  as	  at	  home	  when	  elaborating	  on	  
abstractions,	  ideas,	  and	  concepts,	  as	  he	  was	  when	  he	  exploring	  the	  permanent	  truths	  in	  
mythic	  narratives	  or	  when	  he	  was	  writing	  a	  polemic	  against	  Henry	  Ford	  for	  the	  Atlantic.	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Eubanks	  notes,	  in	  agreement	  with	  both	  D.R.	  Davies	  and	  June	  Bingham,	  that	  Niebuhr	  was	  “a	  
supremely	  dialectical	  thinker,	  desirous	  of	  understanding	  and	  explaining	  the	  world	  in	  a	  
rationally	  coherent	  manner	  but	  not	  afraid	  of	  admitting	  ignorance	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  
irrational,	  nor	  uneasy	  about	  paradox.”	  Indeed,	  Eubanks	  continues,	  “Niebuhr	  agreed	  with	  
his	  friend	  Paul	  Tillich	  that	  "reality	  is	  dialectical.”	  It	  is	  this	  aspect	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  work,	  “the	  
supremely	  dialectical	  quality	  of	  his	  thought”	  that	  we	  will	  undertake	  in	  this	  chapter,	  on	  our	  
way	  to	  understanding	  how	  myth	  and	  dialectic	  collide	  into	  Niebuhr’s	  Christian	  ethics	  of	  
rhetoric.	  Niebuhr	  approaches	  the	  “laws,”	  “norms,”	  “universals,”	  and	  “inevitable	  
appearances”	  both	  mythically	  and	  dialectically.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  will	  separate	  the	  
dialectic	  form	  the	  mythic	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  thought	  in	  order	  to	  show	  how,	  when,	  and	  why	  
Niebuhr	  uses	  dialectical	  inquiry.	  In	  the	  following	  and	  final	  analysis	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  we	  
will	  bring	  the	  mythic	  and	  dialectic	  elements	  back	  together,	  as	  Niebuhr	  always	  does,	  to	  show	  
how	  they	  function	  as	  a	  fruitful	  addition	  to	  his	  ethics	  of	  Christian	  rhetoric.	  
Dialectic	  as	  Inquiry	  
	  
I	   had	   a	   great	   discussion	   in	   my	   young	   men’s	   class	   this	   morning.	   Gradually	   I	   am	  
beginning	  to	  discover	  that	  my	  failure	  with	  the	  class	  was	  due	  to	  my	  talking	  too	  much.	  
Now	  I	  let	  them	  talk	  and	  the	  thing	  is	  becoming	  interesting.	  Of	  course	  it	  isn’t	  so	  easy	  to	  
keep	   the	   discussion	   steered	   on	   any	   track.	   Sometimes	   we	   talk	   in	   circles.	   But	   the	  
fellows	  are	  at	   least	   getting	  at	   some	  of	   the	  vital	  problems	  of	   life	   and	   I	   am	   learning	  
something	  from	  them.	  Disciplinary	  problems	  have	  disappeared.	  The	  only	  one	  left	  is	  
the	  fellow	  who	  is	  always	  trying	  to	  say	  something	  foolish	  or	  smart	  in	  the	  discussion.	  
⎯R.	  Niebuhr,	  Leaves	  
It	  is	  hard	  to	  balance	  the	  free-­‐flowing	  creativity	  of	  the	  Socratic	  circle	  with	  the	  desire	  to	  “get	  
somewhere.”	  Anyone	  who	  has	  sat	  in	  on	  a	  graduate	  seminar	  in	  any	  capacity	  knows	  that	  it	  
requires	  patience,	  understanding,	  humility,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  than	  anything,	  a	  trust	  that	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others	  present	  share	  a	  mutual	  desire	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  the	  truth.	  Niebuhr’s	  Sunday	  school	  
was	  apparently	  no	  different;	  for	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  always	  one	  fellow	  who	  consistently	  
tries	  to	  say	  something	  foolish	  or	  smart—and	  I’m	  afraid	  I’ve	  committed	  both	  sins,	  at	  one	  
time	  or	  another,	  against	  the	  hallowed	  and	  sacred	  Socratic	  method.	  The	  Socratic	  or	  dialectic	  
method	  generally	  consists	  of	  several	  elements,	  the	  first	  being	  that	  it	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  a	  dialogue	  or	  discussion	  with	  others.	  Its	  main	  focus	  is	  on	  topics	  of	  the	  utmost	  
importance—such	  as	  the	  highest	  human	  values—in	  order	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  
recognized	  as	  valid	  by	  everyone.	  It	  demands	  patience—“sometimes	  we	  talk	  in	  circles”	  
Niebuhr	  lamented—but	  all	  good	  things	  comes	  to	  those	  that	  wait—“the	  fellows	  are	  at	  least	  
getting	  at	  some	  of	  the	  vital	  problems	  of	  life”	  (Leaves).	  
“Dialectic”	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  Greek	  dialektos;	  it	  can	  mean	  (depending	  on	  how	  it	  is	  
used),	  discourse,	  debate,	  dialogue,	  or	  conversation	  (Jasinski	  2001).	  According	  to	  Aristotle	  it	  
was	  the	  pre-­‐Socratic	  thinker	  Zeno,	  a	  well-­‐known	  refuter	  of	  opposing	  arguments,	  who	  
invented	  the	  practice.	  Zeno	  used	  dialectic	  to	  subvert	  the	  hypotheses	  of	  his	  opponents	  by	  
tracing	  out	  the	  unacceptable	  consequences	  they	  might	  lead	  to	  if	  followed.	  It	  was	  Plato,	  
however,	  who	  established	  the	  dialectical	  form	  as	  dialogic	  and	  conversational.	  Plato’s	  
dialectical	  method	  was	  a	  rigorous	  and	  collaborative	  examination	  of	  questions.	  Plato’s	  
dialectical	  method	  is	  different	  from	  the	  Hegelian	  “conceptual”	  dialectics	  that	  Niebuhr	  is	  
most	  known	  for	  mastering,	  which	  we	  analyzed	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter	  on	  mythic	  
narratives.	  The	  Hegelian	  dialectic	  takes	  two	  seemingly	  opposite	  or	  polar	  terms	  and	  shows	  
how	  they	  are	  related	  to	  one	  another.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Platonic	  dialectic	  explores	  conflicting	  
propositions,	  hypotheses,	  or	  value	  statements	  in	  order	  to	  discover	  which	  of	  these	  is	  true	  
and	  which	  is	  false.	  It	  explores	  these	  claims	  and	  tests	  their	  validity	  by	  starting	  with	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particular	  appearances,	  placing	  them	  into	  general	  propositions,	  and	  then	  analyzing	  these	  
propositions	  in	  different	  abstract	  and	  theoretical	  contexts.	  Though	  it	  was	  Plato	  who	  
mastered	  the	  form	  as	  a	  literary	  style,	  it	  was	  Aristotle	  who	  scientifically	  formulated	  dialectic	  
as	  a	  “mode	  of	  inquiry.”	  
There	  are	  three	  modes	  of	  inquiry	  for	  Aristotle,	  according	  to	  Farrell’s	  analysis:	  
analytic,	  dialectic,	  and—Farrell’s	  contribution	  to	  Aristotelian	  and	  rhetorical	  studies—
rhetoric.	  We	  will	  postpone	  addressing	  rhetoric	  as	  an	  ethical	  mode	  of	  inquiry	  until	  the	  next	  
chapter	  of	  this	  analysis;	  for	  now,	  let’s	  look	  at	  the	  first	  two	  modes	  of	  inquiry.	  Analytics	  is	  the	  
explicitly	  scientific	  mode	  of	  inquiry	  and	  it	  is	  a	  search	  for	  the	  reasons	  and	  causes	  of	  specific	  
appearances.	  Analytic	  questions	  do	  not	  put	  forth	  generalizable	  causal	  connections	  but	  are	  
interested	  in	  the	  essential	  nature	  and	  causes	  of	  particular	  phenomena.	  They	  are	  inquiries	  
into	  subject-­‐predicate	  relationships	  and	  they	  demonstrate	  their	  proofs	  with	  syllogisms.	  
Analytics	  begins	  with	  what	  we	  know	  about	  the	  subject—an	  object,	  event	  or	  occurrence—
and	  inquiry	  moves	  from	  there	  to	  the	  predicate	  relationship—into	  cause	  and	  effect	  
demonstrations.	  For	  example:	  three	  people	  are	  in	  an	  automobile	  at	  night.	  The	  driver	  sees	  
something	  flash	  in	  the	  sky.	  He	  asks	  the	  other	  passengers:	  “Did	  you	  both	  see	  that?”	  The	  
passengers	  agree	  that	  they	  did	  see	  something	  flash	  in	  the	  sky.	  Thus,	  analytic	  inquiry	  begins	  
with	  the	  known	  elements	  of	  an	  appearance	  and	  moves	  to	  the	  unknown.	  The	  car	  passengers	  
are	  unanimously	  agreed,	  through	  categorical	  inference,	  that	  the	  appearance	  was	  at	  one	  
time	  visual	  (it	  was	  seen),	  radiant	  (lit-­‐up),	  and	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  visible	  or	  radiant.	  As	  the	  
inquiry	  continues	  the	  passengers	  may	  discover	  more	  areas	  of	  agreement,	  e.g.	  that	  the	  
object	  moved	  from	  east	  to	  west,	  in	  the	  sky,	  and	  appeared	  to	  have	  a	  tail	  of	  light.	  For	  now,	  all	  
three	  passengers	  agree	  that	  the	  object	  was	  the	  effect	  of	  divine	  photography:	  Zeus	  is	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redecorating	  the	  halls	  of	  Olympus	  with	  pictures	  of	  the	  earth	  below;	  the	  flash	  was,	  of	  course,	  
from	  his	  camera.	  
In	  the	  opening	  lines	  of	  book	  1	  of	  the	  Topics,	  Aristotle	  suggests	  an	  alternative	  to	  
analytic	  inquiry,	  one	  that	  “shall	  be	  able	  to	  reason	  from	  opinions	  that	  are	  generally	  accepted”	  
concerning	  all	  of	  life’s	  problems	  (100a18-­‐21).	  These	  “first	  principles	  of	  science”	  are	  not	  
disputed	  about	  when	  they	  are	  commonly	  held	  as	  true.	  But	  when	  they	  are	  doubted,	  a	  “kind	  
of	  second-­‐order	  reflective	  method”	  of	  inquiry	  is	  to	  be	  used,	  and	  that	  method	  is	  dialectic	  
(Farrell	  1993,	  23).	  Farrell	  notes	  that	  analytic	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  grammatical	  relations	  
among	  subjects	  and	  predicates	  while	  dialectic	  is	  concerned	  with	  dichotomous	  relationships	  
among	  general	  propositions	  linked	  by	  question	  and	  answer	  (ibid.,	  25).	  Thus,	  dialectic	  
inquiry	  begins	  with,	  in	  the	  previous	  example,	  with	  a	  questioning	  of	  the	  agreed	  upon	  
category	  with	  which	  the	  phenomenon	  was	  placed	  in.	  It	  says,	  in	  other	  words,	  “Wait	  a	  
minute…	  I’m	  not	  sure	  that	  I	  agree	  that	  all	  visible	  and	  radiant	  objects	  that	  appear	  briefly	  and	  
disappear	  quickly	  in	  the	  night	  sky	  are	  “divine	  camera	  flashes.”	  Then,	  it	  asks	  a	  question,	  
“What	  exactly	  do	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  say	  ‘divine,’	  ‘flash’	  or	  ‘Zeus’?”	  Thus,	  definition	  always	  
starts	  with	  what	  is	  admitted,	  either	  by	  one’s	  conversant	  or	  by	  people	  in	  general.	  This	  may	  
also	  begin	  with	  a	  given	  hypothesis,	  e.g.	  let	  us	  proceed	  as	  if	  the	  proposition	  “what	  we	  saw	  
was	  Zeus’	  camera	  flash,”	  is	  true.	  Then,	  the	  discussion	  works	  out	  what	  follows	  from	  the	  
hypothesis	  and	  tests	  these	  findings	  by	  other	  established	  facts	  (Jaeger	  and	  Highet	  1986,	  63).	  
For	  this	  reason,	  as	  Farrell	  notes,	  “dialectic	  tends	  to	  be	  more	  powerful	  as	  a	  retrospective	  
critical	  system	  than	  as	  a	  prospective	  guide	  to	  action”	  (1993,	  34).	  When	  arguments	  are	  
based	  on	  certain	  definite	  statements,	  contradictions	  always	  follow	  these	  dialectic	  advances	  
and	  thus,	  they	  compel	  us	  to	  “re-­‐examine	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  judgments	  we	  laid	  down	  as	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true,	  and	  sometimes	  to	  revise	  them	  or	  abandon	  them	  (Jaeger	  and	  Highet	  1986,	  63).	  In	  other	  
words,	  we	  may	  conclude	  that	  dialectic	  deals	  with	  appearances	  from	  the	  past;	  it	  interprets	  
and	  judges	  them	  in	  order	  to	  find	  larger	  tensions	  at	  work	  in	  their	  smaller	  oppositions	  
(Farrell	  1993,	  34).	  This	  aspect	  of	  dialectic	  brings	  to	  light	  another	  aspect	  of	  the	  method.	  
Dialectic	  isn’t	  to	  be	  understood	  only	  as	  something	  that	  takes	  place	  between	  a	  questioner	  
and	  answerer,	  or	  groups	  of	  answerers,	  in	  a	  cooperative	  search	  for	  truth	  through	  
conversation.	  It	  manifest	  in	  internal	  thought	  as	  well,	  whenever	  we	  converse	  with	  ourselves,	  
that	  “very	  obnoxious	  fellow,”	  “that	  close	  relative,”	  the	  daimon.	  Sometimes,	  individuals	  must	  
interpret	  and	  judge	  events	  of	  the	  past	  in	  solicitude.	  In	  this	  “soundless	  dialogue	  between	  me	  
and	  myself”	  dialectic	  is	  used	  to	  reflect	  on	  and	  conceptualize	  the	  past	  into	  a	  system	  of	  
coherent	  and	  logical	  meaning.	  
Much	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  journal	  is	  made-­‐up	  of	  recordings	  of	  these	  dialectical	  
conversations.	  The	  following	  two	  examples	  show	  the	  difference	  between	  Niebuhr’s	  uses	  of	  
the	  dialectic	  method	  prophetically,	  and	  hence	  rhetorically,	  contrasted	  with	  his	  use	  of	  the	  
method	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  inquiry.	  The	  first	  example	  comes	  from	  his	  reflection	  on	  race	  relations	  
in	  Detroit.	  “Our	  city	  race	  commission	  has	  finally	  made	  its	  report	  after	  months	  of	  
investigation”	  he	  begins,	  noting	  his	  appreciation	  of	  the	  rare	  experience	  he	  has	  gotten,	  
getting	  to	  meet	  with	  “the	  white	  and	  colored	  leaders	  and	  talk	  over	  our	  race	  problems”	  
(Leaves,	  115).	  He	  continues,	  moving	  from	  the	  particular	  situation	  he	  has	  experienced,	  to	  
one	  step	  removed	  from	  his	  experience:	  “The	  situation	  which	  the	  colored	  people	  of	  the	  city	  
face	  is	  really	  a	  desperate	  one,	  and	  no	  one	  who	  does	  not	  spend	  real	  time	  gathering	  the	  facts	  
can	  have	  any	  idea	  of	  the	  misery	  and	  pain	  which	  exists	  among	  these	  people…”	  Then,	  Niebuhr	  
moves	  another	  step	  away,	  conceptualizing	  the	  groups	  involved:	  “I	  wish	  that	  some	  of	  our	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romanticists	  and	  sentimentalists	  could	  sit	  through	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  where	  the	  real	  
social	  problems	  of	  a	  city	  are	  discussed.	  They	  would	  be	  cured	  of	  their	  optimism.”	  Then,	  
Niebuhr	  moves	  from	  his	  city	  to	  all	  cities	  like	  his:	  “A	  city	  which	  is	  built	  around	  a	  productive	  
process	  and	  which	  gives	  only	  causal	  thought	  and	  incidental	  attention	  to	  its	  human	  
problems	  is	  really	  a	  kind	  of	  hell.”	  Finally,	  his	  experiences	  become	  another	  iteration	  of	  the	  
hedonistic	  creed	  and	  the	  entire	  world	  is	  indicted:	  “Thousands	  in	  this	  town	  are	  really	  living	  
in	  torment	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  us	  eat,	  drink,	  and	  make	  merry.	  What	  a	  civilization!”	  In	  this	  
example,	  Niebuhr	  moves	  from	  the	  particulars	  to	  the	  general	  concepts;	  yet	  he	  does	  it	  for	  
prophetic	  rhetorical	  effect.	  It	  isn’t	  an	  inquiry	  at	  all,	  but	  is	  a	  polemic	  used	  to	  pronounce	  
judgment	  on	  local	  pastors,	  romanticists,	  and	  finally	  civilization	  itself.	  
The	  second	  example	  comes	  from	  Niebuhr’s	  reflection	  on	  some	  criticism	  he	  received	  
after	  a	  speech.	  It	  is	  particularly	  poignant	  because	  Niebuhr’s	  response	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  
Socrates	  dialectical	  speaking	  of	  the	  young	  and	  “impertinent”	  Calicles.	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  
An	  impertinent	  youngster	  at	  the	  forum	  accused	  me	  today	  of	  being	  authoritarian	  
because	  I	  quoted	  several	  modern	  philosophers	  and	  scientists	  in	  my	  address	  in	  
support	  of	  my	  theistic	  belief.	  I	  made	  a	  deep	  bow	  before	  and	  congratulated	  him	  upon	  
being	  so	  proficient	  in	  laboratory	  experiments	  in	  every	  science	  and	  so	  profound	  in	  
his	  philosophical	  meditations	  that	  he	  could	  arrive	  at	  his	  conclusions	  without	  the	  
help	  of	  anyone	  else,	  scientist	  or	  philosopher.	  (Leaves,	  99)	  
	  
But	  when	  Niebuhr	  returns	  home,	  he	  begins	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  boy’s	  opinion	  and	  launches	  a	  
dialectical	  inquiry:	  “His	  question	  did	  set	  me	  thinking	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  freedom”	  he	  writes;	  
“Why	  do	  we	  believe	  what	  we	  believe,	  and	  why	  do	  we	  do	  what	  we	  do?”	  Niebuhr	  begins	  with	  
his	  own	  particular	  experiences,	  first	  noting	  that	  if	  the	  religion	  of	  his	  parents	  and	  his	  
childhood	  home	  had	  been	  harsh	  and	  unlovely	  he	  would	  probably	  have	  been	  where	  the	  
young	  boy	  was,	  “in	  a	  position	  of	  rebellion	  against	  religion.”	  Then	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  if	  he	  
had	  not	  “had	  the	  aid	  of	  this	  helpful	  professor	  and	  that	  illuminating	  book”	  when	  his	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“religious	  convictions	  were	  undergoing	  adjustment”	  he	  might	  have	  discarded	  religion	  all	  
together.	  After	  noting	  a	  few	  more	  examples	  pertaining	  to	  his	  own	  views	  and	  those	  of	  the	  
class-­‐conscious	  workers	  he	  preaches	  to,	  Niebuhr	  concludes	  by	  universalizing	  the	  reflection	  
into	  abstract	  conceptual	  terms:	  “What	  we	  know	  as	  truth	  is	  determined	  by	  peculiar	  and	  
individual	  perspectives.	  Pressures	  of	  environment,	  influences	  of	  heredity,	  and	  excellencies	  
and	  deficiencies	  of	  teachers	  help	  determine	  out	  life	  philosophies.”	  Lastly,	  Niebuhr	  arrives	  at	  
a	  new	  principle	  by	  way	  of	  this	  Platonic	  inquiry,	  one	  that	  happens	  to	  be	  framed	  in	  Hegelian	  
dialectical	  terms,	  and	  yet	  sounds	  as	  Socratic	  as	  one	  can	  possibly	  sound!:	  
We	  ought	  therefore	  to	  hold	  them	  (truths)	  with	  decent	  humility	  and	  a	  measure	  of	  
skepticism.	  But	  if	  we	  permit	  ourselves	  to	  be	  tempted	  into	  a	  complete	  subjectivism	  
and	  skepticism	  by	  these	  facts,	  we	  put	  an	  end	  to	  all	  philosophy	  and	  ultimately	  to	  
civilization	  itself.	  For	  civilization	  depends	  upon	  the	  vigorous	  pursuit	  of	  the	  highest	  
values	  by	  people	  who	  are	  intelligent	  enough	  to	  know	  that	  their	  values	  are	  qualified	  
by	  their	  interests	  and	  corrupted	  by	  their	  prejudices.	  (Leaves,	  100)	  
	  
Niebuhr’s	  conclusion	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  Jaeger’s	  analysis	  of	  Socratic	  dialogue.	  It’s	  typical	  
subject,	  was	  “namely,	  the	  highest	  values	  in	  human	  life”	  (Leaves,	  63).	  
The	  history	  of	  the	  first	  use	  of	  dialectic	  as	  a	  communicative	  techne	  is	  instructive	  for	  
considering	  the	  relationship	  between	  mythic	  narratives	  and	  dialectical	  inquiries	  
concerning	  supernatural	  causes	  and	  effects.	  Eric	  Havelock	  argues	  that	  the	  transition	  from	  
the	  pre-­‐Homeric	  oral	  culture	  of	  memory	  to	  the	  literate	  culture	  of	  Greece	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
separation	  of	  the	  listener	  from	  the	  spoken	  word	  that	  allowed	  for	  the	  development	  of	  self-­‐
consciousness	  and	  the	  breaking	  of	  habits	  of	  poetic	  identification	  (1963,	  208-­‐9).	  Originally,	  
according	  to	  Havelock,	  the	  break	  took	  place	  in	  the	  simple	  form	  of	  an	  interrogative	  
addressed	  to	  the	  poet;	  the	  listener	  asked	  the	  speaker	  to	  repeat	  himself	  and	  explain	  what	  he	  
meant,	  e.g.	  “Say	  what?”	  The	  original	  form	  of	  the	  dialectical	  question	  was	  to	  force	  a	  speaker	  
to	  repeat	  himself	  “with	  the	  underlying	  assumption	  that	  there	  was	  something	  unsatisfactory	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about	  his	  original	  statement,	  and	  it	  had	  better	  be	  rephrased”	  (ibid.).	  As	  this	  happened,	  as	  
poetry	  was	  forced	  to	  enter	  the	  realm	  of	  prosaics,	  the	  conception	  of	  “me	  thinking	  about	  
Achilles”	  rather	  than	  “me	  identifying	  with	  Achilles”	  was	  born	  (ibid.).	  
Though	  there	  are	  wide	  differences	  between	  the	  Greeks	  analyzed	  by	  Havelock	  and	  
Niebuhr’s	  audiences,	  Havelock’s	  analysis	  is	  instructive;	  as	  is	  Mircea	  Eliade’s	  summation	  of	  
the	  mythic	  vs.	  dialectic	  distinction:	  “Myth”	  he	  writes,	  “expresses	  in	  action	  and	  drama	  what	  
metaphysics	  and	  theology	  define	  dialectically”	  (1996,	  418).	  Niebuhr’s	  use	  of	  Christian	  
myths	  in	  sermons	  and	  sermonic	  essays	  attests	  to	  Havelock	  and	  Eliade’s	  claims;	  they	  
function	  there	  as	  dramatic	  expressions	  of	  ultimate	  values	  that	  elude	  the	  rational	  expression	  
of	  dialectic	  inquiries.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  logically	  true	  that	  that	  our	  destiny	  is	  shared	  with	  the	  
first	  man’s,	  with	  Adam’s,	  with	  the	  builders	  of	  the	  tower	  of	  Babel,	  with	  Paul,	  with	  the	  
prodigal	  son,	  and	  with	  all	  believers,	  and	  the	  Church,	  because	  death	  is	  the	  end	  of	  us	  all;	  yet,	  
it	  is	  also	  true	  beyond	  that	  logical	  analysis,	  for	  in	  mythic	  terms,	  we	  do	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  
shared	  beginning,	  a	  creator	  that	  binds	  us	  all	  and	  a	  telos	  that	  reaches	  beyond	  the	  grave—
whether	  it	  be	  in	  a	  resurrection	  of	  the	  body	  or	  in	  classical	  notions	  of	  earthly	  immortality.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  Niebuhr’s	  explicitly	  theological	  works	  were	  addressed	  to	  audiences	  where	  
the	  “Say	  what?”	  was	  implicit,	  if	  not	  explicit,	  because	  of	  their	  logocentric	  scholastic	  
perspectives.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  we	  looked	  at	  the	  stories	  in	  the	  Bible	  
Niebuhr	  thought	  contained	  permanent	  truths	  that	  couldn’t	  be	  explicated	  rationally	  without	  
ending	  in	  logical	  absurdity.	  But	  Niebuhr	  was	  not	  Homer,	  and	  his	  audiences	  were	  not	  oral	  
cultures;	  there	  was	  an	  underlying	  logic	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  arguments	  that	  meant	  audiences	  were	  
bound	  to	  utter	  the	  literate	  interrogative,	  “Say	  what?”	  Thus,	  Niebuhr	  was	  always	  ready	  and	  
willing	  to	  extrapolate	  on	  the	  myths	  dialectically;	  nay,	  he	  insisted	  on	  such	  extrapolations—
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though	  he	  always	  pointed	  out	  their	  limits.	  In	  this	  chapter	  then,	  we	  look	  at	  how	  Niebuhr	  
used	  Plato’s	  dialectical	  method	  to	  address	  the	  problematic	  elements	  in	  Biblical	  myths	  and	  
to	  seek	  out,	  not	  the	  truth,	  but	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  truth,	  i.e.	  not	  wisdom,	  but	  knowledge.	  
Havelock’s	  analysis	  and	  its	  similarities	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  situation	  is	  important	  because	  it	  
shows	  that	  just	  because	  Niebuhr	  is	  talking	  about	  a	  Christian	  “concept,”	  he	  is	  not	  necessarily	  
using	  mythic	  narratives	  “mythically”	  or	  “poetically.”	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  the	  basic	  distinction	  
between	  myth	  and	  theology,	  the	  latter	  being	  the	  dialectical	  investigation	  of	  the	  former.	  It	  is	  
not	  the	  subject	  but	  the	  method	  of	  inquiry	  that	  differentiates	  the	  mythic—and	  the	  analytical	  
and	  rhetorical	  for	  that	  matter—from	  the	  dialectical.	  If	  the	  starting	  point	  is	  a	  commonly	  held	  
opinion	  that	  creates	  two	  conflicting	  propositions	  and	  these	  propositions	  are	  broadened	  
into	  universalized	  concepts	  and	  their	  consequences	  are	  traced	  out	  to	  find	  out	  if	  they	  are	  
desirable,	  then	  we	  have	  a	  dialectical	  argument.	  Interestingly	  enough,	  we	  also	  are	  left	  with	  a	  
more	  “realistic”	  view	  of	  the	  situation.	  
When	  we	  look	  at	  Niebuhr’s	  use	  of	  dialectic,	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  the	  “realism”	  aspect	  of	  
the	  “pragmatic	  Christian	  realism”	  label	  he	  is	  often	  given.	  When	  man	  needs	  to	  make	  sense	  
out	  of	  his	  place	  in	  history,	  when	  he	  needs	  meaning	  to	  the	  vast	  dramas	  of	  life,	  he	  reaches	  out	  
for	  a	  mythic	  narrative.	  When	  man	  desires	  to	  understand	  the	  chaos	  and	  conflicts	  of	  this	  
world	  rationally,	  when	  the	  principles	  of	  his	  myths	  butt	  up	  against	  the	  realities	  of	  this	  world,	  
he	  explores	  them	  rationally	  in	  order	  to	  harmonize	  his	  thoughts	  and	  values	  with	  the	  
appearances	  he	  encounters	  daily,	  using	  the	  dialectical	  method.	  Dialectic	  is	  used	  to	  survey	  
the	  world	  as	  realistically	  as	  possible;	  it	  seeks	  truth	  over	  deception	  by	  peeling	  away	  the	  
layers	  of	  reality	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  world.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  topic	  of	  a	  
dialectical	  inquiry	  is	  limited	  to	  one,	  though	  it	  covers	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  subtopics.	  McKeon	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notes	  that,	  in	  Plato’s	  view,	  “dialectic	  simultaneously	  defines	  terms,	  clarifies	  minds,	  and	  
discovers	  truths	  about	  things;	  it	  is	  the	  method	  of	  any	  science	  that	  treats	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
things”	  (1954,	  4).	  It	  may	  be	  the	  nature	  of	  things	  that	  the	  awful	  grace	  of	  god	  grants	  us	  
wisdom	  through	  suffering,	  it	  may	  be	  natural	  that	  Zeus	  causes	  it	  to	  rain,	  or	  that	  when	  
perfect	  love,	  like	  that	  of	  Christ,	  enters	  the	  natural	  realm	  it	  destroys	  itself	  because	  it	  
necessarily	  relinquishes	  its	  power.	  In	  other	  words,	  where	  the	  realistic	  analysis	  of	  the	  
natural	  world	  results	  in	  logical	  absurdity,	  one	  must	  look	  to	  a	  higher	  principle,	  which	  comes	  
from	  one’s	  religious	  perspective—whether	  it	  be	  Marxism,	  Romanticism,	  Patriotism,	  or	  
Christianity.	  One’s	  first	  principle	  will	  always	  supersede	  the	  entire	  dialectic	  and	  cannot	  be	  
included	  in	  the	  inquiry	  itself.	  The	  ultimate	  terms	  of	  Christianity	  are	  Niebuhr’s	  highest	  terms	  
and	  in	  his	  opinion,	  history	  and	  the	  facts	  of	  experience	  verify	  them	  as	  such.	  
The	  terms	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  “dialectic	  inquiries”	  are	  “dialectical	  terms.”	  Recalling	  the	  
difference	  between	  Platonic	  dialectic	  and	  Hegelian	  dialectics,	  we	  may	  also	  now	  invoke	  
Bentham’s	  distinction	  between	  “real	  entities”	  and	  the	  “fictitious	  entities”	  of	  the	  law—the	  
latter	  made	  up	  of	  what	  Burke	  calls	  “dialectical	  terms”	  (1989,	  193).	  They	  have	  no	  strict	  
location	  as	  do	  terms	  for	  “real	  entities,”	  i.e.	  terms	  for	  things	  that	  can	  be	  seen,	  touched,	  
smelled,	  or	  thrown,	  etc.	  In	  contrast	  to	  these	  terms	  that	  belong	  to	  the	  order	  of	  motion	  and	  
perception,	  dialectical	  terms	  are	  words	  for	  essence	  and	  principle	  (ibid.).	  They	  are	  “titular”	  
words	  like	  “capitalism”	  and	  necessarily	  lack	  a	  positive	  referent.	  If	  one	  traces	  out	  these	  
terms	  into	  positive	  details,	  one	  will	  immediately	  notice	  that	  they	  are	  also	  “polar”	  terms	  
because	  they	  depend	  upon	  another	  term	  for	  their	  distinctive	  traits,	  e.g.	  “capitalism,	  set	  
beside	  “socialism,”	  looks	  very	  different	  from	  “capitalism,”	  set	  beside	  “feudalism”	  (ibid.).	  
Dialectical	  terms	  refer	  to	  ideas	  and	  not	  things	  and	  as	  Bentham	  notes,	  they	  are	  more	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concerned	  with	  action	  and	  attitude	  than	  with	  perception;	  they	  fall	  under	  the	  head	  of	  ethics	  
and	  form	  rather	  than	  knowledge	  or	  information.	  Finally,	  we	  note	  in	  passing	  that	  when	  these	  
dialectical	  terms	  are	  placed	  into	  a	  hierarchical	  order	  of	  priority,	  leaving	  the	  jangling	  
relation	  of	  dialectical	  opposites,	  they	  become	  “ultimate	  terms”—ideological	  weapons	  for	  
the	  rhetorical	  battlefield	  (ibid.,	  196).	  With	  that	  said,	  we	  may	  now	  proceed	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  
dialectic	  inquiries	  into	  his	  “dialectical”	  terms	  and,	  where	  appropriate,	  denote	  how	  Niebuhr	  
negotiates	  the	  tension	  between	  jangling	  and	  hierarchical	  “fictitious	  entities”—though	  as	  
Niebuhr	  points	  out:	  there	  is	  nothing	  fictitious,	  for	  example,	  about	  self-­‐realization	  through	  
self-­‐sacrifice—though	  it	  is	  never	  guaranteed.	  
Love:	  The	  Law	  of	  Life	  
	  
The	  ethic	  of	  Jesus	  is	  the	  perfect	  fruit	  of	  prophetic	  religion.	  Its	  ideal	  of	  love	  has	  the	  
same	  relation	  to	  the	  facts	  and	  necessities	  of	  human	  experience	  as	  the	  God	  of	  
prophetic	  faith	  has	  to	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  drawn	  from,	  and	  relevant	  to,	  every	  moral	  
experience.	  It	  is	  immanent	  in	  life	  as	  God	  is	  immanent	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  transcends	  the	  
possibilities	  of	  human	  life	  in	  its	  final	  pinnacle	  as	  God	  transcends	  the	  world.	  It	  must,	  
therefore,	  be	  confused	  neither	  with	  the	  ascetic	  ethic	  of	  world-­‐denying	  religions	  nor	  
with	  the	  prudential	  morality	  of	  naturalism,	  designed	  to	  guide	  good	  people	  to	  success	  
and	  happiness	  in	  this	  world.	  
⎯R.	  Niebuhr,	  An	  Interpretation	  of	  Christian	  Ethics	  
Suppose	  you	  had	  no	  knowledge	  about	  or	  interest	  in	  Jesus	  Christ,	  no	  interest	  in	  religious	  
myths,	  and	  no	  faith	  in	  an	  immanent/transcendent	  God.	  “Dr.	  Niebuhr,”	  you	  might	  ask,	  “What	  
does	  any	  of	  this	  have	  to	  do	  with	  me?”	  Though	  Jesus	  is	  the	  perfect	  symbol	  of	  the	  love	  ideal	  in	  
history,	  Niebuhr	  would	  have	  responded,	  as	  he	  often	  did,	  by	  demonstrating	  both	  empirically	  
and	  dialectically	  that	  the	  love	  ideal	  is	  the	  law	  of	  life.	  
One	  need	  not	  be	  a	  religious	  believer	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  to	  recognize	  that	  love	  is	  
indeed	  the	  law	  of	  life.	  “Perhaps	  the	  clearest	  proof	  that	  the	  law	  of	  love”	  is	  the	  law	  of	  life	  is	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found	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  societies	  consistently	  elaborate	  their	  minimal	  moral	  standards	  into	  
higher	  standards	  (ICE,	  65).	  Every	  society	  prohibits	  murder	  and	  theft,	  but	  every	  society	  tries	  
to	  go	  beyond	  these	  negative	  prohibitions	  as	  well.	  They	  are	  not	  enough	  for	  us.	  It	  is	  true,	  that	  
only	  negative	  commands	  can	  be	  enforced	  legally.	  “But	  the	  moral	  codes	  and	  ideals	  of	  every	  
advanced	  society	  demand	  more	  than	  mere	  prohibitions	  of	  theft	  and	  murder.	  Higher	  
conceptions	  of	  justice	  are	  developed.”	  Thus,	  the	  right	  to	  live	  gets	  transmuted	  into	  the	  right	  
to	  secure	  goods,	  to	  own	  property,	  to	  have	  equal	  opportunities	  to	  do	  both	  of	  these.	  Equality	  
is	  always	  the	  regulative	  principle	  of	  justice	  and	  in	  this	  ideal,	  the	  law	  of	  love	  is	  echoed.	  It	  is	  
the	  law	  of	  love	  that	  is	  revealed	  in	  it	  because	  it	  is	  rationally	  absurd.	  No	  logical	  argument	  can	  
be	  made	  for	  equality	  as	  the	  highest	  principle	  of	  justice	  without	  assuming	  certain	  
presuppositions	  that	  cannot	  be	  gotten	  at	  with	  reason.	  We	  start	  with	  that	  presupposition	  
because	  we	  know,	  in	  our	  heart	  of	  hearts,	  that	  it	  is	  the	  law	  of	  our	  spirits.	  
More	  evidence	  that	  the	  law	  of	  love	  is	  the	  law	  of	  life	  is	  found	  in	  the	  symbols	  of	  the	  law	  
in	  love	  in	  nature,	  the	  most	  adequate	  one	  being	  that	  in	  nature	  we	  feel	  and	  observe	  a	  
“conscious	  impulse	  of	  unity	  between	  life	  and	  life	  (ICE,	  23).	  Since	  all	  moral	  demands	  are	  
actually	  demands	  of	  unity,	  “in	  one	  sense	  the	  ethic	  of	  which	  results	  from	  the	  command	  of	  
love	  is	  related	  to	  any	  possible	  ethical	  system	  (ibid.).	  Individuals	  know,	  deep	  down,	  that	  the	  
law	  of	  love	  is	  indeed	  the	  law	  of	  life	  because	  every	  self	  “seeks	  to	  relate	  itself	  harmoniously	  to	  
other	  selves	  and	  other	  unities.”	  However,	  this	  is	  precisely	  where	  the	  limits	  of	  natural	  
symbols	  reach	  their	  limits.	  
	   The	  love	  ideal	  distinguishes	  itself	  from	  every	  form	  of	  naturalism	  and	  prudence	  in	  its	  
attitude	  toward	  this	  force	  of	  egoism.	  When	  naturalists	  such	  as	  L.T.	  Hobhouse	  define	  the	  
good	  as	  “harmony	  in	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  vital	  capacity,”	  they	  define	  it	  correctly,	  according	  to	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Niebuhr;	  “but	  every	  naturalistic	  ethic	  can	  demand	  no	  more	  than	  harmony	  within	  chaos,	  
love	  within	  the	  possibilities	  set	  by	  human	  egoism”	  (ibid.)	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  this	  type	  of	  
“prudential	  ethic”	  is	  based	  on	  the	  illusion	  that	  some	  basic	  natural	  harmony	  between	  life	  
exists,	  or	  it	  is	  forced	  to	  sanction	  egotistical	  and	  self-­‐seeking	  behaviors	  as	  “natural.”	  The	  love	  
ideal	  is	  unlike	  Adam	  Smith’s	  ethic,	  which	  regards	  egoism	  as	  harmless	  because	  it	  is	  
imbedded	  in	  a	  pre-­‐established	  harmony;	  unlike	  utilitarianism,	  which	  regards	  egoism	  as	  
impotent	  because	  reason	  can	  transmute	  its	  anarchies	  into	  an	  ordered	  whole;	  and	  unlike	  
Thomas	  Hobbes’	  ethic,	  which	  regards	  egoism	  as	  the	  basic	  reality	  of	  human	  existence.	  How	  
is	  it	  unlike	  them?	  It	  has	  nothing	  to	  say	  about	  them	  at	  all…	  
	   The	  love	  ideal	  (embodied	  by	  Jesus	  but	  not	  exclusive	  to	  those	  who	  follow	  him—in	  
fact,	  regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  “Christians”	  often	  ignore	  it)	  doesn’t	  deal	  with	  the	  immediate	  
moral	  problems	  of	  everyday	  life	  at	  all—“the	  problem	  of	  arranging	  some	  kind	  of	  armistice	  
between	  various	  contending	  factions	  and	  forces”	  (ibid.).	  “It	  has	  nothing	  to	  say	  about	  the	  
relativities	  of	  politics	  and	  economics,”	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “nor	  of	  the	  necessary	  balances	  of	  
power	  which	  exist	  in	  even	  the	  most	  intimate	  social	  relationships”	  like	  those	  between	  
coworkers,	  neighbors	  or	  PTA	  members.	  The	  absolute	  perfectionism	  of	  the	  love	  ethic	  sets	  
itself,	  not	  only	  against	  the	  egoism	  of	  individuals,	  but	  also	  against	  the	  necessary	  and	  prudent	  
defenses	  against	  the	  egotistical	  expressions	  of	  others.	  It	  has	  no	  connection	  to	  the	  
“horizontal	  points	  of	  a	  political	  or	  social	  ethic	  or	  with	  the	  diagonals	  which	  a	  prudential	  
individual	  ethic	  draws	  between	  the	  moral	  ideal	  and	  the	  facts	  of	  a	  given	  situation”	  (ibid.,	  
24).32	  The	  love	  ideal	  has	  only	  a	  vertical	  dimension,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “between	  the	  loving	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  We	  will	  explore	  this	  idea	  further	  in	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  our	  analysis	  but	  for	  now	  let	  us	  
note	  that,	  we	  may	  conclude	  from	  Niebuhr’s	  interpretation	  of	  Jesus’	  ethic	  that	  the	  love	  ideal	  
has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric—even	  a	  distinctively	  Christian	  one.	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will	  of	  God	  and	  the	  will	  of	  man,”	  or	  to	  extract	  the	  mythic	  element,	  between	  the	  ultimate	  
source	  of	  life’s	  meaning	  and	  harmony,	  and	  one’s	  own	  desire	  to	  be	  at	  peace	  with	  and	  part	  of	  
Its	  purposes.	  
Agape’s	  polar	  term,	  its	  dialectical	  opposite,	  is	  not	  “hate”;	  it	  is	  not	  conceptual	  at	  all	  in	  
fact.	  It	  is	  a	  positive	  term	  that	  can	  only	  stand	  in	  contradiction	  to	  “not-­‐love,”	  just	  as	  “dog”	  can	  
only	  understood	  beside	  “not-­‐dog.”	  “Not-­‐perfect-­‐love”	  is	  every	  human	  action	  in	  this	  world,	  
even	  those	  that	  approximate	  it.	  The	  love	  commandment,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  is	  the	  
commandment	  that	  demands	  ideational	  perfection.	  Its	  counterpart,	  recalling	  the	  
permanent	  truth	  Niebuhr	  finds	  in	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  Fall	  is	  Sin;	  “it	  stands	  in	  juxtaposition	  to	  
the	  fact	  of	  sin.	  It	  helps,	  in	  fact,	  to	  create	  the	  consciousness	  of	  sin”	  (ibid.,	  39).	  Agape	  love	  
rigorously	  judges	  all	  natural	  forms	  of	  love	  in	  human	  life.	  This	  begins	  with	  a	  judgment	  on	  
man’s	  self-­‐assertion,	  which	  is	  fundamentally	  rooted	  in	  the	  “natural	  will	  to	  survive.”	  Though	  
the	  will	  to	  survive	  is	  not	  a	  bad	  thing	  essentially,	  man’s	  freedom,	  imagination	  and	  creativity,	  
when	  added	  to	  this	  will-­‐to-­‐survive,	  become	  a	  will-­‐to-­‐power	  and	  result	  in	  his	  expansion	  of	  
this	  natural	  impulse	  into,	  what	  is	  essentially	  “self-­‐love.”	  It	  manifests	  itself	  in	  man’s	  love	  of	  
possessions	  and	  in	  man’s	  love	  of	  himself—especially	  the	  self-­‐love	  of	  “good”	  people.	  
We	  can	  imagine	  Socrates’	  face	  upon	  hearing	  such	  propositions	  like	  “The	  love	  ideal	  is	  
the	  law	  of	  life.”	  “Hold	  on!	  Hold	  on!”	  we	  can	  hear	  Socrates	  say:	  “What	  is	  love?!	  What	  is	  an	  
ideal!?	  What	  is	  a	  law!?	  You	  must	  define	  your	  terms!”	  Niebuhr	  would	  oblige	  Socrates,	  as	  he	  
has	  all	  of	  the	  readers	  who’ve	  cherished	  his	  dialectical	  inquires	  since.	  We	  must	  note	  from	  
the	  very	  beginning	  that	  Niebuhr	  always	  insisted	  that	  justice	  and	  love	  were	  forever	  bound	  to	  
one	  another	  dialectically,	  though	  not	  as	  polar	  terms.	  “In	  so	  far	  as	  justice	  admits	  the	  claims	  
of	  the	  self,	  it	  is	  something	  less	  than	  love,	  ”	  he	  writes;	  “Yet	  it	  cannot	  exist	  without	  love	  and	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remain	  justice.	  For	  without	  the	  “grace”	  of	  love,	  justice	  always	  denigrates	  into	  something	  
less	  than	  justice.”33	  This	  is	  just	  one	  of	  many	  examples	  from	  Niebuhr’s	  writings	  that	  we	  will	  
come	  across,	  where	  love	  and	  justice	  collide	  in	  dialectical	  inquiry.	  In	  the	  following	  analysis,	  
we	  will	  do	  our	  best	  to	  note	  Niebuhr’s	  analysis	  of	  these	  terms	  in	  isolation	  and	  where,	  for	  
instance,	  justice	  finds	  its	  way	  into	  our	  conversations	  on	  love,	  note	  it	  only	  in	  passing.	  In	  our	  
analysis	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  dialectic	  of	  justice,	  we	  will	  collide	  once	  again	  with	  love	  and	  it	  is	  there	  
where	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  will	  become	  more	  explicit	  and,	  hopefully,	  
beneficial	  to	  my	  readers.	  
When	  we	  talk	  about	  love	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  we	  must	  talk	  maturely,	  or	  we	  will	  
become	  sentimental.34	  Speaking	  to	  the	  church,	  he	  argues	  that	  we	  must	  not	  say	  Christians	  
are	  all	  potential	  martyrs	  or	  that	  they	  are	  more	  unselfish	  than	  others.	  Modestly	  and	  basically,	  
love	  means	  simply,	  “that	  life	  has	  no	  meaning	  except	  in	  terms	  of	  responsibility;	  
responsibility	  toward	  our	  family,	  toward	  our	  nation,	  toward	  our	  civilization	  and,	  now,	  by	  
the	  pressures	  of	  history,	  toward	  the	  universe	  of	  mankind	  which	  includes	  our	  enemies”	  
(ibid.,	  35).	  There	  are	  possibilities	  of	  realizing	  pinnacles	  of	  love	  beyond	  this	  simple	  meaning.	  
But	  in	  this	  sermonic	  essay,	  Niebuhr	  only	  mentions	  two	  of	  them	  and	  his	  analysis	  of	  them	  
takes	  up	  only	  two	  small	  written	  pages.	  It	  isn’t	  a	  dialectical	  inquiry	  at	  all,	  but	  is	  a	  rhetorical	  
one.	  Niebuhr,	  pulling	  from	  I	  Corinthians,	  is	  preaching	  a	  message	  about	  faith,	  hope	  and	  love	  
as	  responses	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  meaningless	  in	  an	  absurd	  world.	  Camus	  makes	  an	  appearance	  
in	  the	  sermon;	  so	  too	  do	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  and	  John	  Adams;	  so	  to	  does	  an	  example	  about	  
family	  life	  and	  forgiveness.	  Though	  this	  summary	  definition	  is	  nice,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  drastic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  (Niebuhr	  1992)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  L&J).	  
34	  (Niebuhr	  1991)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  J&M).	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the	  change	  is	  when	  he	  is	  writing	  for	  an	  academic	  audience	  and	  performing	  a	  dialectical	  
inquiry	  by	  looking	  at	  another	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  inquiries	  into	  love.	  
Niebuhr’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  love	  ideal	  in	  Christian	  Realism	  and	  Political	  Problems	  his	  
dialectical	  masterpiece	  on	  the	  subject,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  reprinted	  in	  The	  Essential	  
Reinhold	  Niebuhr	  supports	  this	  claim.	  The	  inquiry	  makes	  up	  only	  one	  of	  its	  many	  chapters,	  
“Love	  and	  Law	  in	  Protestantism	  and	  Catholicism.”	  Niebuhr	  begins	  in	  true	  dialectic	  fashion:	  
“The	  analysis	  of	  this	  issue	  may	  well	  begin	  with	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  law”	  (ERN,	  147).	  
The	  question	  must	  be	  considered	  subjectively	  and	  materially,	  he	  argues.	  Subjectively,	  law	  is	  
a	  form	  of	  constraint	  or	  coercion	  or,	  “as	  Aquinas	  puts	  it,	  it	  is	  the	  direction	  of	  to	  ‘perform	  
virtuous	  acts	  by	  reason	  of	  some	  outward	  cause.’”	  This	  compulsion	  may	  come	  from	  the	  
“force	  and	  prestige	  of	  the	  mores	  and	  customs	  of	  a	  community”	  which	  compel	  its	  citizens	  to	  
act	  contrary	  to	  their	  inclinations.	  But	  the	  compulsion	  of	  law	  also	  comes	  from	  an	  inner	  
element:	  “the	  compulsion	  of	  conscience,	  the	  force	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  obligation.”	  There	  is	  a	  
constant	  tension	  then,	  in	  every	  personality,	  between	  duty	  and	  inclination,	  felt	  both	  
internally	  and	  externally.	  Where	  this	  tension	  doesn’t	  exist,	  it	  is	  dissolved	  into	  love	  (ibid.,	  
148).	  “Materially,	  law	  represents	  the	  detailed	  prescription	  of	  duties	  and	  obligations	  which	  
the	  self	  owes	  to	  itself,	  to	  God,	  and	  to	  its	  neighbors.”	  This	  is	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  “positive	  law”	  
and	  it	  gains	  its	  force	  through	  its	  specificity;	  thus,	  many	  of	  these	  laws	  are	  annulled	  due	  to	  
their	  “vagueness”	  by	  bodies	  like	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  Thus,	  there	  are	  material	  laws,	  which	  
need	  not	  be	  written	  down,	  in	  specific	  “thou	  shalt	  nots”	  but	  are	  nevertheless	  compulsory.	  
Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  we	  all	  accept	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  laws	  that	  are	  not	  particularly	  
detailed	  materially	  and	  yet	  are	  more	  specific	  than	  the	  “law	  of	  love.”	  These	  laws	  are	  
generated	  by	  the	  customs	  and	  mores	  of	  a	  community	  and	  may	  rise	  to	  “universal	  norms	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which	  seem	  to	  have	  their	  source	  not	  in	  particular	  communities	  but	  in	  the	  common	  
experience	  of	  mankind”	  (ibid.).	  
	   To	  understand	  how	  love	  is	  related	  to	  the	  law,	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  we	  must	  consider	  
it	  in	  both	  the	  subjective	  and	  material	  dimensions	  of	  both	  love	  and	  law.	  He	  writes:	  
Subjectively,	  the	  question	  is	  how	  the	  experience	  of	  love,	  in	  which	  the	  “ought”	  is	  
transcended,	  nevertheless	  contains	  a	  “thou	  shalt.”	  Materially,	  the	  question	  is	  how	  
the	  indeterminate	  possibilities	  of	  love	  are	  related	  to	  the	  determinate	  and	  specified	  
obligations	  defined	  by	  law.	  (ibid.,	  149)	  
	  
This	  dialectical	  relation	  of	  love	  to	  law,	  “as	  both	  its	  fulfillment	  and	  its	  end	  (pleroma	  and	  
telos),	  as	  fulfilling	  all	  possibilities	  of	  law	  and	  yet	  standing	  in	  contradiction	  to	  it”	  is	  the	  basis	  
of	  the	  problem	  of	  all	  speculations	  on	  the	  relation	  of	  love	  to	  law.	  Though	  in	  this	  essay	  
Niebuhr	  is	  specifically	  interested	  in	  how	  these	  speculations	  get	  articulated	  in	  Catholic	  and	  
Protestant	  traditions,	  we	  may	  avail	  ourselves	  of	  these	  specific	  concerns	  and	  draw	  on	  
Niebuhr’s	  own	  dialectical	  inquiry,	  found	  woven	  into	  the	  threads	  of	  this	  essay.	  
	   The	  subjective	  dimension	  of	  the	  love/law	  dialectic	  is	  found	  in	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  
“push”	  of	  duty	  and	  the	  “pull”	  of	  grace	  (ibid.,	  150).	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  when	  the	  law	  of	  love	  
comes	  to	  us	  as	  a	  “thou	  shalt”	  it	  is	  obviously	  a	  law.	  Love,	  as	  a	  law	  in	  this	  case,	  need	  not	  be	  
specific	  but	  “is	  simply	  the	  summary	  of	  all	  our	  obligations.”	  Yet	  love	  may	  also	  mean	  a	  perfect	  
harmony	  between	  our	  duty	  and	  our	  inclinations,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  duty	  is	  not	  felt	  as	  duty	  at	  
all,	  i.e.	  as	  the	  Biblical	  expression	  says,	  “we	  love	  the	  things	  that	  thou	  commandest.”	  This	  
latter	  feeling	  is	  what	  we	  may	  call	  the	  “pull”	  of	  grace,	  while	  the	  former,	  the	  sense	  of	  
obligation	  from	  a	  commandment,	  is	  called	  the	  “push”	  of	  duty.	  The	  “pull”	  of	  grace	  is	  a	  
significant	  factor	  in	  relationships	  like	  those	  between	  family	  members	  where	  we	  may	  seek	  
the	  good	  of	  wife	  or	  child	  without	  a	  sense	  of	  obligation.	  The	  “push”	  of	  duty,	  the	  “ought,”	  is	  
more	  relevant	  in	  our	  love	  for	  those	  beyond	  our	  social	  circles,	  as	  when	  we	  love	  “mankind.”	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Pure	  obligation,	  however,	  is	  never	  enough.	  It	  isn’t	  completely	  impotent	  but	  it	  is	  “more	  
impotent	  than	  generally	  recognized”	  Niebuhr	  writes	  (ibid.,	  153).	  This	  is	  why,	  he	  argues,	  
that	  moralistic	  sermons	  that	  tell	  us	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  are	  almost	  always	  boring.	  This	  is	  
also	  why	  modern	  psychiatry	  approaches	  juvenile	  delinquency	  from	  the	  side	  of	  “common	  
grace;”	  it	  doesn’t	  preach	  to	  them	  about	  what	  they	  ought	  to	  do,	  or	  that	  they	  ought	  to	  “accept	  
themselves,”	  but	  insist	  that	  they	  must	  find	  security	  in	  the	  love	  of	  others,	  which	  will	  then	  
give	  them	  the	  freedom	  to	  “let	  go”	  and	  love	  others.	  Finally,	  this	  also	  reveals	  how	  the	  law	  of	  
love	  can	  become	  a	  “loveless”	  instrument,	  as	  it	  does	  when	  pastors	  chide	  their	  congregations	  
or	  parents	  chide	  their	  children	  for	  not	  meeting	  the	  ultimate	  possibilities	  of	  the	  law	  of	  love,	  
like	  self-­‐sacrifice	  and	  forgiveness,	  as	  if	  these	  were	  simple	  accomplishments	  of	  the	  will.	  This	  
castigation	  represents	  a	  failure	  to	  recognize	  that,	  “on	  the	  subjective	  side,	  love	  is	  a	  curious	  
compound	  of	  willing	  through	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  obligation	  and	  of	  willing	  not	  by	  
the	  strength	  of	  our	  will	  but	  by	  the	  strength	  which	  enters	  the	  will	  through	  grace”	  (ibid.).	  In	  
other	  words,	  when	  we	  insist	  that	  the	  law	  of	  love	  is	  a	  simple	  possibility	  to	  be	  actualized	  in	  
every	  historical	  situation,	  we	  have	  not	  accounted	  for	  man’s	  love	  of	  self	  and	  have	  ignored	  
the	  aspect	  of	  love	  that	  requires	  grace.	  
	   Having	  subjectively	  considered	  that	  love	  and	  law	  are	  defined	  dialectically	  as	  grace	  
and	  duty,	  we	  may	  now	  consider	  the	  problem	  in	  its	  material	  dimensions.	  Niebuhr	  defines	  
the	  problem	  this	  way:	  “Materially	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  relation	  of	  love	  as	  the	  sum	  and	  total	  of	  
all	  law	  and	  of	  love	  as	  defining	  indeterminate	  possibilities,	  transcending	  law”	  (ibid.,	  154).	  
These	  indeterminate	  possibilities	  exist	  because	  they	  are	  correlated	  to	  man’s	  indeterminate	  
freedom.	  Niebuhr’s	  thought	  here	  intersects	  nicely	  with	  what	  Hannah	  Arendt	  calls	  man’s	  
condition	  of	  “natality.”	  Every	  human	  action	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  miraculous.	  Every	  human	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being	  that	  is	  born	  represents	  a	  radically	  new	  and	  novel	  phenomenon	  that	  may	  achieve	  the	  
unprecedented.	  In	  other	  words,	  man	  will	  continually	  surprise	  you;	  he	  never	  ceases	  to	  
amaze	  us.	  In	  so	  far	  as	  some	  aspects	  of	  man	  are	  determined	  and	  natural,	  we	  may	  state	  the	  
norms	  to	  which	  his	  actions	  ought	  to	  conform	  and	  fulfill.	  But	  in	  so	  far	  as	  he	  is	  free	  to	  make	  
history,	  to	  change	  his	  environment,	  to	  create	  new	  injustices	  and	  new	  approximations	  of	  the	  
love	  ideal,	  no	  such	  strict	  standards	  or	  laws	  can	  confine	  him	  and	  the	  law	  of	  love	  transcends	  
the	  laws	  of	  justice.	  
	   There	  are	  four	  points	  where	  we	  can	  clearly	  see	  the	  love	  ideal	  transcend	  the	  law.	  The	  
first	  point	  is	  when	  love	  is	  considered	  as	  universalistic.	  “The	  freedom	  of	  man	  over	  every	  
historic	  situation”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “means	  that	  his	  obligation	  to	  others	  cannot	  be	  limited	  to	  
partial	  communities	  of	  nature	  and	  history,	  to	  family,	  tribe,	  or	  nation”	  (ibid.).	  Niebuhr	  
recalls	  the	  Biblical	  statement	  of	  this	  truth:	  “If	  ye	  love	  them	  that	  love	  you	  what	  thanks	  have	  
ye?”	  Love	  doesn’t	  legitimate	  natural	  boundaries	  and	  is	  universal	  in	  its	  scope.	  This	  is,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  considered	  in	  the	  afore	  mentioned	  subjective	  aspect	  of	  love	  as	  a	  “sum	  total	  of	  all	  
our	  obligations.”	  Niebuhr	  concludes,	  after	  surveying	  how	  Augustine,	  Stoicism,	  and	  
Kierkegaard	  understand	  love,	  that	  the	  universalistic	  aspect	  of	  love	  is	  paradoxically	  “both	  
within	  and	  beyond	  the	  love	  commandment	  as	  law.”	  “It	  represents	  the	  outer	  circumference	  
of	  the	  totality	  of	  our	  obligations	  and	  to	  our	  neighbors	  and	  to	  God,”	  he	  writes;	  “It	  includes	  all	  
of	  them	  but	  also	  goes	  beyond	  anything	  that	  can	  be	  specifically	  defined”	  (ibid.,	  159).	  In	  other	  
words,	  as	  Niebuhr	  notes	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  this	  section,	  this	  element	  of	  love	  may	  really	  
belong	  to	  the	  element	  of	  law.	  We	  are	  left	  in	  a	  vague	  sort	  of	  middle	  ground	  here,	  perhaps	  
recalling	  what	  Simone	  de	  Beauvoir	  would	  call,	  “the	  ethics	  of	  ambiguity.”	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The	  second	  point	  we	  find	  that	  love	  transcends	  law	  is	  in	  its	  sacrificial	  aspects.	  It	  
manifests	  when	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  self	  in	  history	  becomes	  problematic.	  This	  occurs	  
because	  man	  has	  some	  freedom	  over	  his	  self	  as	  contingent	  and	  natural	  in	  history.	  Niebuhr	  
again	  uses	  Jesus’s	  words	  to	  capture	  this	  truth,	  but	  he	  just	  as	  well	  could	  have	  achieved	  the	  
desired	  effect	  by	  quoting	  from	  Plato’s	  Apology	  or	  Phaedo:	  “Fear	  not	  them	  which	  are	  able	  to	  
kill	  the	  body,	  but	  rather	  those	  that	  are	  able	  to	  destroy	  both	  soul	  and	  body	  in	  hell”	  and	  
“Whosoever	  loseth	  his	  life	  will	  find	  it”	  (ibid.,	  159).	  Niebuhr	  doesn’t	  use	  the	  Johannine	  
version	  of	  self-­‐sacrifice	  but	  its	  poetic	  qualities	  make	  it	  worthwhile	  to	  mention:	  “Greater	  
love	  hath	  no	  man	  than	  this:	  that	  he	  lay	  down	  his	  life	  for	  his	  friends”	  (We	  should	  
immediately	  see	  why	  Niebuhr	  avoids	  John’s	  paraphrase	  of	  Christ’s	  words;	  it	  has	  violated	  
the	  universalistic	  element	  in	  agape	  love	  by	  including	  the	  qualifier	  “for	  his	  friends”).	  Though	  
the	  love	  commandment	  promises	  self-­‐realization	  through	  self-­‐sacrifice,	  this	  commandment	  
transcends	  the	  law	  and	  history	  because	  its	  historical	  success	  is	  not	  a	  guarantee.	  If	  one	  loses	  
oneself	  in	  order	  to	  find	  oneself,	  if	  one	  loves	  as	  a	  means	  to	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  end,	  one	  cannot	  
achieve	  the	  end	  desired.	  Thus	  considered,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  its	  illogicality	  makes	  sacrificial	  
love	  the	  second	  pinnacle	  of	  love,	  which	  represents	  both	  the	  completion,	  and	  the	  annulment	  
of	  love	  as	  law	  (ibid.).	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  
[Sacrificial	  love]	  is	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  law	  of	  love	  because	  perfect	  love	  has	  no	  
logical	  limit	  short	  of	  the	  readiness	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  self	  for	  the	  other.	  Yet	  it	  is	  a	  point	  
which	  stands	  beyond	  all	  law,	  because	  the	  necessity	  of	  sacrificing	  one’s	  life	  for	  
another	  cannot	  be	  formulated	  as	  an	  obligation,	  nor	  can	  it	  be	  achieved	  under	  the	  
whip	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  obligation.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
Law	  then,	  in	  the	  determinate	  sense,	  stops	  at	  distributive	  justice	  and	  mutual	  love;	  yet,	  a	  
“sensitive	  conscience”	  will	  be	  uneasy	  when	  another	  life	  is	  taken	  even	  in	  self-­‐defense	  or	  
when	  a	  common	  peril	  results	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  another’s	  life	  but	  not	  one’s	  own	  (ibid.,	  160).	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Perfect	  and	  self-­‐sacrificing	  love,	  then,	  is	  demonstrated	  as	  the	  true	  law	  of	  life	  whenever	  one	  
experience	  those	  feelings	  of	  “survivor’s	  guilt”	  after	  a	  tragedy	  as	  when	  the	  sole	  survivor	  
after	  an	  automobile	  wreck	  is	  left	  tearfully	  asking,	  “Why	  them?	  Why	  not	  me?”	  Again,	  the	  law	  
of	  sacrificial	  love	  transcended	  even	  the	  starkest	  embodiment	  of	  evil	  sense	  Hitler	  when,	  
though	  some	  celebrated	  in	  the	  streets,	  sensitive	  conscience’s	  felt	  a	  sense	  of	  sadness	  when	  
images	  of	  Osama	  bin	  Laden’s	  dead	  body	  appeared	  on	  our	  televisions.	  
	   Sacrificial	  or	  “unprudential	  love,”	  which	  doesn’t	  calculate	  mutual	  advantages,	  is	  
dialectically	  related	  to	  both	  “mutual	  love”	  (philia)	  and	  “distributive	  justice.”	  In	  both,	  man	  
considers	  himself	  one	  among	  many	  equals	  in	  a	  group	  and,	  using	  reason,	  calculates	  and	  
appropriates	  the	  values	  of	  life	  as	  justly	  as	  possible	  to	  achieve	  reciprocity	  of	  advantages.	  
This	  “will	  to	  do	  justice”	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  is	  a	  “form	  of	  love”	  because	  it	  affirms	  the	  interests	  of	  
one’s	  neighbors	  (ibid.,	  160).	  Likewise,	  mutual	  love	  is	  also	  a	  form	  of	  love	  because	  it	  
enhances	  the	  life	  of	  the	  other.	  However,	  these	  expressions	  of	  love	  always	  fall	  short	  of	  agape	  
love,	  the	  self-­‐sacrificing	  and	  universal	  love	  ideal,	  because	  in	  them,	  the	  self	  always	  claims	  
“an	  equal	  share”	  for	  himself.	  We	  find	  then,	  that	  agape	  love	  cannot	  be	  “embodied	  in	  any	  
moral	  code”	  nor	  can	  it	  be	  achieved	  by	  the	  compulsion	  of	  obligations;	  and	  yet,	  we	  also	  find	  
that	  it	  is	  nevertheless,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  both	  common	  sense	  and	  even	  the	  pagan	  reverence	  
for	  heroic	  sacrifice,	  that	  “such	  heedless	  love”	  is	  “the	  final	  norm	  of	  love”	  (ibid.).	  
	   We	  can’t	  separate	  agape	  from	  its	  natural	  brethren,	  eros	  and	  philia,	  by	  drawing	  a	  neat	  
line.	  The	  dialectics	  of	  love	  are	  messy;	  we	  may	  simply	  assert	  that	  agape	  transcends	  the	  line	  
of	  natural	  love	  all	  together.	  But	  it	  is	  instructive	  that	  when	  we	  look	  closer	  at	  the	  way	  mutual	  
love	  is	  genuinely	  practiced,	  we	  find	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  denigrate	  into	  a	  strict,	  rigid,	  excessive	  
calculation	  of	  mutual	  advantages.	  We	  are,	  in	  other	  words,	  often	  willing	  to	  let	  things	  slide.	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On	  the	  material	  side,	  for	  instance,	  consider	  the	  way	  expenses	  are	  often	  negotiated	  between	  
roommates	  or	  friends	  on	  a	  road	  trip.	  Upon	  departure,	  I	  may	  fill	  up	  the	  gas	  tank	  of	  my	  car	  
and	  spend	  $50.	  On	  the	  return	  trip	  home,	  my	  friend	  may	  fill	  up	  my	  gas	  tank	  and	  it	  only	  cost	  
$48.	  Assuming	  that	  I	  even	  look	  to	  see	  how	  much	  my	  friend	  spent	  on	  his	  fill-­‐up—and	  it	  is	  
highly	  likely	  I	  wouldn’t—it	  would	  seem	  petty	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  friend	  give	  me	  an	  extra	  $1	  to	  
make	  the	  expenditures	  equal.	  It	  would	  be	  more	  than	  petty	  if,	  supposing	  the	  friend	  were	  
robbed	  the	  night	  before,	  if	  I	  told	  him	  he	  couldn’t	  go	  on	  the	  trip	  because	  he	  didn’t	  have	  any	  
money.	  With	  roommates,	  a	  too	  strict	  weighing	  of	  mutual	  advantages	  can	  make	  life	  in	  the	  
home	  intolerable.	  Perhaps	  nothing	  demonstrates	  that	  one	  doesn’t	  truly	  love	  a	  roommate	  
like	  the	  insistence	  on	  a	  strict	  equality	  in	  cabinet	  space,	  fridge	  space,	  and	  that	  “what’s	  mine	  
is	  mine	  and	  what’s	  yours	  is	  yours.”	  If	  this	  were	  the	  highest	  manifestation	  of	  love,	  we	  would	  
find	  married	  couples	  practicing	  the	  same	  rational	  prudence,	  which	  common	  sense	  tells	  us	  
would	  be	  absurd.	  This	  demonstrates	  then,	  that	  in	  moments	  of	  philia	  the	  hints	  and	  traces	  of	  
the	  heedless	  and	  uncalculating	  love	  of	  agape	  can	  be	  found.	  If	  this	  were	  not	  the	  case,	  we’d	  be	  
left	  with	  Aristotle’s	  solution,	  maintaining	  friendships	  only	  with	  equals.	  
	   The	  line	  between	  natural	  love	  and	  agape	  love	  is	  also	  messy	  on	  the	  subjective	  side.	  
The	  sense	  of	  obligation	  may	  “prompt	  men	  into	  a	  hazardous	  cause”	  Niebuhr	  argues;	  “but	  the	  
final	  act	  of	  sacrifice	  by	  which	  a	  soldier	  gives	  his	  life	  for	  his	  comrade	  is,	  as	  even	  the	  army	  
rightly	  surmises,	  ‘beyond	  the	  call	  of	  duty’”	  (ibid.,	  161).	  The	  ultimate	  sacrifice	  of	  one’s	  life	  for	  
another	  can’t	  be	  gotten	  at	  by	  obligation	  and	  duty.	  “It	  is	  possible	  only	  by	  an	  accretion	  of	  
strength	  to	  the	  will	  which	  is	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  grace.”	  Again,	  Niebuhr	  traces	  the	  idea	  of	  love	  as	  
self-­‐sacrifice	  through	  its	  conceptual	  historical	  expositions,	  noting	  where	  Catholicism,	  
D’Arcy,	  Nygren,	  Luther,	  and	  Social	  Gospelers	  have	  wrongly	  interpreted	  self-­‐sacrificing	  love.	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His	  criticisms	  of	  these	  thinkers	  begins	  by	  pointing	  out	  their	  efforts	  “do	  justice	  to	  the	  
dialectical	  relation”	  but	  ultimately,	  they	  make	  a	  dialectical	  error.	  We	  need	  only	  note,	  for	  
example,	  Catholicism’s	  mistake:	  “It	  declares	  that	  this	  perfection	  is	  possible	  only	  by	  grace.	  
But	  it	  makes	  grace	  to	  mean	  the	  ‘fitness’	  of	  man	  to	  embrace	  monastic	  poverty,	  in	  which	  he	  
cannot	  call	  anything	  his	  own”	  (ibid.,	  161-­‐2).	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  sacrificial	  dimension	  of	  
love	  becomes	  a	  call	  to	  perfection	  and	  logically,	  this	  is	  “yet	  another	  and	  more	  rigorous	  
statement	  of	  love	  as	  law,”	  which	  Niebuhr,	  at	  this	  point	  in	  his	  analysis,	  has	  gone	  to	  great	  
dialectical	  pains	  to	  show	  is	  not	  actually	  the	  case.	  
	   The	  third	  area	  where	  we	  find	  the	  love	  ideal	  transcending	  law	  is	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  
forgiveness.	  Forgiveness	  is	  to	  punitive	  justice	  what	  sacrificial	  love	  is	  to	  distributive	  justice;	  
that	  is,	  both	  its	  completion	  and	  its	  annulment	  (ibid.,	  164).	  Forgiveness	  completes	  punitive	  
justice	  because	  it	  is	  a	  rigorous	  analysis	  of	  all	  the	  factors	  involved	  in	  a	  wrong	  act	  and	  leads	  
to	  an	  understanding	  of	  all	  the	  extenuating	  circumstances	  and	  causal	  preconditions	  that	  
lead	  up	  to	  the	  crime.	  “Imaginative	  justice,”	  one	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  favorite	  and	  more	  profound	  
terms,	  “moves	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  forgiveness,	  or	  at	  least	  to	  remedial	  rather	  than	  punitive	  
justice.”	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  forgiveness	  is	  also	  a	  contradiction	  to	  punitive	  justice	  because	  
forgiveness	  represents	  a	  “morality	  beyond	  morality.”35	  Agape	  love	  is	  like	  the	  impartialities	  
of	  nature	  in	  which	  the	  rain	  falls	  on	  the	  just	  and	  the	  unjust	  and	  the	  sun	  rises	  and	  sets	  on	  
both	  good	  and	  evil.	  Agape,	  like	  nature,	  doesn’t	  discriminate	  between	  those	  it	  encounters.	  
Forgiveness	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  just	  and	  the	  unjust,	  more	  specifically,	  to	  the	  neighbor	  and	  to	  
the	  enemy.	  There	  are	  no	  nice	  discriminations	  and	  calculations	  concerning	  “merit	  and	  
demerit	  in	  forgiveness,	  any	  more	  than	  there	  is	  a	  nice	  discrimination	  of	  interests	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Niebuhr	  borrows	  an	  idea	  from	  Berdyaev	  here	  but,	  in	  typical	  Niebuhrian	  fashion,	  there	  is	  
no	  citation	  to	  reference.	  
	   141	  
sacrificial	  love”	  (ibid.,	  165).	  What	  forgiveness	  really	  comes	  down	  to,	  Niebuhr	  notes	  
elsewhere,	  is	  “mutual	  forbearance”	  (J&M,	  36).	  This	  spirit	  of	  mutual	  forbearance	  can	  be	  
found	  in	  every	  family	  unit,	  where	  we	  see	  it	  best	  expressed	  in	  a	  “certain	  sense	  of	  humor.”	  
Families	  can’t	  exist	  purely	  by	  the	  sense	  of	  justice	  and	  laws.	  Thus,	  we	  all	  know	  intuitively	  
that	  forgiveness	  is	  a	  law	  of	  love	  that	  transcends	  law	  and	  enters	  purely	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  
grace.	  
	   Niebuhr	  doesn’t	  just	  pick	  and	  choose	  verses	  from	  the	  Bible	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  
preordained	  point.	  His	  dialectic	  is	  honestly	  multi-­‐sided.	  Every	  proposition	  has	  some	  truths	  
and	  falsehoods	  and	  Niebuhr	  is	  always	  quick	  to	  qualify	  his	  previous	  dialectic	  with	  another.	  
His	  analysis	  of	  forgiveness	  highlights	  this.	  We	  just	  noted	  in	  what	  ways	  forgiveness	  is	  a	  
completion	  of	  law	  and	  then,	  we	  noted	  how	  it	  actually	  transcends	  the	  law.	  But	  Niebuhr	  has	  
more	  to	  say,	  just	  in	  case	  the	  reader	  thinks	  that	  we’ve	  started	  with	  one	  proposition	  and,	  in	  
moving	  to	  another,	  left	  the	  other	  behind.	  He	  follows	  his	  last	  analysis	  up	  with	  another	  
qualifying	  dialectic:	  “Yet	  even	  forgiveness	  comes	  partially	  into	  the	  category	  of	  love	  as	  law”	  
(ERN,	  165).	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  we	  are	  warned	  that	  if	  we	  don’t	  forgive	  others	  out	  heavenly	  
Father	  wont	  forgive	  us.	  Thus,	  forgiveness	  here	  enters	  a	  category	  like	  those	  of	  the	  “rights	  of	  
man”	  in	  which	  we	  owe	  forgiveness	  to	  our	  brother;	  or	  rather,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  we	  owe	  it	  to	  
God.	  Forgiveness	  then,	  is	  also	  a	  commandment	  and	  thus	  we	  arrive	  at	  the	  conclusion	  “that	  
even	  on	  this	  pinnacle	  of	  grace	  law	  is	  not	  completely	  transcended”	  (ibid.).	  If	  the	  reader	  at	  
this	  point	  feels	  a	  bit	  of	  conceptual	  rigor	  mortis	  then	  the	  point	  that	  Niebuhr	  is	  truly	  a	  master	  
dialectician	  holds	  true.	  If	  one	  is	  looking	  for	  some	  hard	  truths	  you	  can	  run	  out	  into	  the	  world	  
and	  do	  something	  with,	  one	  shouldn’t	  be	  discussing	  things	  with	  an	  “electric	  eel.”	  Dialectical	  
dialysis	  (from	  the	  Greek	  dialusis)	  removes	  those	  ideological	  impurities	  from	  an	  conceptual	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inquiry,	  thereby	  filtering	  out	  the	  active	  ingredients	  of	  the	  logos	  that	  promote	  fanatical	  
action.	  Dialysis	  leads	  then	  to	  paralysis,	  not	  kinesis.	  Of	  course	  a	  genuine	  inquiry	  is	  never	  
completely	  free	  from	  ideology	  or	  “cookery.”	  But	  over	  and	  over	  again,	  Niebuhr’s	  dialectical	  
inquiries,	  like	  Socrates’s,	  run	  ideas	  through	  the	  conceptual	  sieve	  enough	  times,	  where	  the	  
“taint”	  of	  such	  impurities	  are	  remote	  and	  their	  active	  ingredients	  are	  cooked	  out.	  
	   The	  fourth	  and	  final	  place	  where	  love	  transcends	  law,	  is	  found	  in	  empathy.	  
Whenever	  an	  individual	  “penetrates	  imaginatively	  and	  sympathetically	  into	  the	  life	  of	  
another”	  one	  sees	  the	  “final	  pinnacle	  of	  grace	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  love”	  (ibid.,	  166).	  Here,	  
Niebuhr	  critiques	  both	  nods	  to	  and	  critiques	  the	  work	  Buber	  and	  Brunner,	  noting	  that	  this	  
aspect	  of	  agape	  is	  equivalent	  to	  Buber’s	  I	  and	  Thou	  and	  Brunner’s	  Divine	  Imperative	  (ibid.,	  
167).	  However,	  Niebuhr	  points	  out	  that	  it	  is	  not,	  as	  the	  Catholic	  counsels	  of	  perfection	  
argue,	  the	  “very	  substance”	  of	  this	  aspect	  of	  agape.	  If	  it	  were	  the	  very	  substance	  of	  it,	  
Niebuhr	  argues,	  then	  love	  would	  no	  longer	  include	  “the	  general	  spirit	  of	  justice	  which	  
expresses	  itself	  in	  the	  structures,	  laws,	  social	  arrangements,	  and	  economic	  form”	  men	  use	  
to	  regulate	  their	  common	  lives	  and	  establish	  tolerable	  harmony	  with	  one	  another.	  Niebuhr	  
insists	  that	  on	  the	  contrary,	  “The	  love	  which	  wills	  justice	  must	  not	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  
realm	  of	  Agape”	  (ibid.).	  An	  act	  of	  personal	  kindness	  is	  not	  more	  agape-­‐like	  that	  a	  
statesman’s	  scheme	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  more	  justice.	  Niebuhr	  concludes	  that	  the	  effort	  by	  
those	  like	  Buber	  to	  “confine	  Agape	  to	  the	  love	  of	  personal	  relations	  and	  to	  place	  all	  the	  
structures	  and	  artifices	  of	  justice	  outside	  that	  realm	  makes	  [agape]	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  
problems	  of	  man’s	  common	  life”	  (ibid.).	  But	  once	  again,	  Niebuhr	  isn’t	  done…	  
	   “On	  the	  other	  hand”	  writes	  Niebuhr—perhaps	  more	  than	  any	  thinker	  has	  ever	  
written	  four	  words	  in	  the	  same	  order—“it	  is	  true	  that	  beyond	  and	  above	  every	  human	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relation	  as	  ordered	  by	  a	  fixed	  structure	  of	  justice,	  by	  custom,	  tradition,	  and	  legal	  enactment,	  
there	  remain	  indeterminate	  possibilities	  of	  love	  in	  the	  individual	  and	  personal	  encounters	  
of	  those	  who	  are	  in	  the	  structure”	  (ibid.,	  167-­‐8).	  No	  structure	  of	  justice	  can	  decide,	  in	  the	  
final	  analysis,	  whether	  men	  meet	  with	  imagination	  or	  ambitions	  of	  dominion,	  with	  
generosity	  or	  envy,	  with	  humility	  or	  with	  pride.	  Humans	  can	  corrupt	  the	  highest	  system	  of	  
justice	  and	  they	  can	  redeem	  the	  worst.	  Perhaps	  the	  highest	  system	  of	  justice	  ever	  created	  
was	  American	  democracy,	  forever	  tainted	  by	  slavery.	  This	  same	  system	  was	  ultimately	  
redeemed	  by,	  as	  we	  will	  explore	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  this	  dissertations’	  conclusion,	  individuals	  
who	  marched	  with	  Dr.	  King,	  out	  of	  both	  love	  and	  a	  desire	  for	  justice.	  To	  take	  the	  empathetic	  
love	  out	  of	  the	  march	  from	  Selma	  to	  Washington	  is	  to	  convert	  it	  downwards	  into	  something	  
less	  than	  legislative	  justice.	  It	  was	  about	  Jim	  Crow	  laws	  but	  agape	  was	  there,	  hovering	  
above	  and	  in	  the	  hearts	  of	  each	  marcher.	  
	   Niebuhr’s	  analysis	  of	  empathetic	  love	  was	  pretty	  far	  ahead	  of	  its	  time.	  Niebuhr	  
understood	  the	  problems	  that	  come	  from	  “creative	  understanding,”	  the	  “live-­‐entering”	  of	  
one	  into	  another	  in	  a	  way	  that	  wasn’t	  “limited,”	  “finalized”	  “predetermined”	  and	  
unethical—so	  we	  return	  here	  to	  a	  place	  where	  Niebuhr	  crosses	  thought-­‐paths	  with	  
Bakhtin.36	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Briefly	  we	  may	  note	  the	  thought-­‐crossing:	  In	  Bakhtin’s	  idea	  of	  “live-­‐entering”	  Morson	  
and	  Emerson	  (1990)	  write,	  “one	  simultaneously	  renounces	  and	  exploits	  one’s	  surplus;	  one	  
brings	  into	  interaction	  both	  perspectives	  simultaneously	  and	  creates	  an	  ‘architectonics’	  of	  
vision	  reducible	  to	  neither.	  This	  architectonics	  produces	  new	  understanding”	  (54).	  Bakhtin	  
mostly	  abandoned	  this	  vocabulary	  later	  and	  replaced	  it	  with	  his	  ideas	  on	  dialogue.	  But	  his	  
notion	  of	  new	  understanding	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  his	  later	  terminology	  of	  “creative	  
understanding.”	  Like	  empathy,	  creative	  understanding	  happens	  when	  one	  enters	  into	  the	  
lived	  experience	  of	  another	  while	  not	  renouncing	  one’s	  own	  position	  outside	  the	  other	  in	  
time,	  space,	  and	  culture.	  This	  outsideness	  creates	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  dialogue	  that	  helps	  us	  
understand	  culture	  in	  a	  profound	  and	  more	  ethical	  way.	  Dialogue,	  Morson	  and	  Emerson	  
write,	  “educates	  each	  side	  about	  itself	  and	  about	  the	  other,	  and	  it	  not	  only	  discovers	  but	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The	  commandment	  to	  love	  thy	  neighbor	  as	  the	  self	  must	  finally	  culminate	  in	  the	  
individual	  experience	  in	  which	  one	  self	  seeks	  to	  penetrate	  deeply	  into	  the	  mystery	  
of	  the	  other	  self	  and	  yet	  stand	  in	  reverence	  before	  a	  mystery	  which	  he	  has	  no	  right	  
to	  penetrate.	  (168)	  
	  
This	  empathetic	  aspect	  of	  agape	  is	  part	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nature	  because	  in	  nature	  man	  has	  an	  
indeterminate	  freedom	  that	  demands	  and	  requires	  at	  least	  a	  minimal	  amount	  of	  this	  
intimacy.	  However,	  no	  law	  can	  compel	  man	  to	  practice	  empathy	  and	  no	  sense	  of	  obligation	  
“can	  provide	  the	  imagination	  and	  forbearance”	  by	  which	  it	  is	  accomplished.	  We	  may	  also	  
note	  with	  Niebuhr	  that	  this	  intimacy	  is	  related	  to	  sacrificial	  love	  as	  well,	  because	  the	  
entering	  into	  another’s	  life	  necessarily	  means	  “the	  sacrificial	  abandonment	  of	  the	  claims	  of	  
the	  self	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  other”	  (ibid.,	  169).	  
	   Niebuhr	  makes	  one	  final	  note	  about	  empathetic	  agape.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  personal	  
friendship	  is	  where	  one	  finds	  the	  pinnacles	  of	  Agape	  and	  it	  must	  follow	  then,	  Niebuhr	  
argues,	  that	  a	  sexual	  partnership	  has	  a	  natural	  basis	  for	  agape	  far	  beyond	  other	  
partnerships.	  We	  should	  note	  that	  in	  the	  1950’s	  Niebuhr	  would	  have	  been	  treading	  on	  thin	  
ice	  addressing	  Christian	  audiences	  about	  sex.	  That	  this	  is	  the	  case	  is	  exactly	  why	  he	  
addresses	  is.	  In	  Niebuhr’s	  opinion,	  sexual	  union	  as	  a	  parable,	  symbol	  and	  basis	  of	  agape	  
was	  going	  underappreciated	  in	  Christian	  thought	  because	  of	  the	  generally	  negative	  attitude	  
toward	  sex	  that	  it	  inherited	  from	  Greek	  thought,	  and	  because	  the	  particularity	  of	  the	  sexual	  
union	  makes	  it	  suspect	  to	  agape’s	  universalism	  (ibid.,	  169).	  Though	  no	  particular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
activates	  potentials”	  that	  are	  “realizable	  only	  through	  future	  activity	  and	  dialogue.”	  The	  
prophet	  does	  this	  by	  invoking	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Word.	  This	  is	  because	  “no	  living	  word,”	  
writes	  Bakhtin,	  “relates	  to	  its	  object	  in	  a	  singular	  way.”	  He	  continues:	  “Between	  the	  word	  
and	  its	  object,	  between	  the	  word	  and	  the	  speaking	  subject,	  there	  exists	  an	  elastic	  
environment	  of	  other,	  alien	  words	  about	  the	  same	  object,	  the	  same	  theme,	  and	  this	  is	  an	  
environment	  that	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  penetrate.	  It	  is	  precisely	  in	  the	  process	  of	  living	  
interaction	  with	  this	  specific	  environment	  that	  the	  word	  may	  be	  individualized	  and	  given	  
stylistic	  shape.”	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relationship	  can	  exhaust	  the	  meaning	  of	  agape,	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  the	  marital	  union	  is	  an	  
instructive	  symbols	  of	  how	  a	  something	  that	  is	  natural,	  can	  be	  “endlessly	  transfigured	  by	  
grace,”	  revealing	  to	  us	  how	  “the	  possibilities	  of	  love	  as	  law	  and	  love	  at	  the	  limits	  of	  law	  and	  
love	  beyond	  the	  limits	  [of	  law]”	  and	  demonstrating	  the	  truth	  of	  “the	  logic	  of	  love	  as	  law	  and	  
love	  as	  grace”	  (ibid.,	  170).	  
	   Agape	  love	  and	  law,	  to	  summarize	  Niebuhr’s	  dialectical	  inquiry,	  must	  be	  analyzed	  in	  
both	  subjective	  and	  objective	  spheres.	  In	  the	  subjective	  sphere	  we	  have	  the	  feelings	  of	  
obligation	  (law)	  and	  grace	  (love).	  In	  the	  objective	  sphere	  we	  approach	  the	  abstract	  concept	  
of	  law	  to	  its	  highest	  possibilities	  of	  perfection,	  love.	  In	  the	  subjective	  sphere,	  it	  was	  argued	  
that	  love	  and	  law	  existed	  in	  a	  phenomenological	  and	  dialectical	  relationship	  defined	  as	  the	  
“push”	  of	  duty	  and	  the	  “pull”	  of	  grace.	  On	  the	  material	  side	  of	  the	  inquiry,	  four	  areas	  where	  
love	  fulfilled	  law,	  transcended	  law	  and	  annulled	  law,	  were	  analyzed.	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  
from	  the	  Biblical	  perspective,	  agape	  love	  is	  universalistic,	  self-­‐sacrificing,	  forgiving	  and	  
empathetic.	  
Love:	  “The	  Impossible	  Possibility”	  
	  
Man,	  as	  the	  creature	  of	  both	  necessity	  and	  freedom,	  must,	  like	  Moses,	  always	  perish	  
outside	  the	  promised	  land.	  He	  can	  see	  what	  he	  cannot	  reach.	  
⎯R.	  Niebuhr,	  An	  Interpretation	  of	  Christian	  Ethics	  
	  
	  
We	  might,	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  Kenneth	  Burke,	  rephrase	  Niebuhr’s	  analysis.	  It	  isn’t	  that	  
man	  can	  see	  what	  he	  cannot	  reach;	  it	  is	  more	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  man,	  a	  user	  of	  symbols	  and	  
inventor	  of	  the	  negative,	  can	  conceptualize	  what	  he	  sees	  into	  ideas	  he	  cannot	  reach.	  Agape	  
love	  is	  one	  such	  conceptualization.	  It	  is	  just	  as	  important,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  that	  we	  know	  
“what	  is	  impossible	  as	  what	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  moral	  demands	  under	  which	  all	  human	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beings	  stand”	  (ICE,	  83).	  This	  is	  the	  task	  Niebuhr	  undertook	  constantly	  and	  we	  will	  now	  turn	  
our	  attention	  to	  how	  he	  proceeds,	  from	  a	  dialectical	  analysis	  of	  love,	  through	  a	  realistic	  
survey	  of	  the	  human	  scene,	  to	  a	  dialectical	  inquiry	  of	  justice.	  
Agape	  is	  both	  universalistic	  and	  perfectionistic.	  It	  is	  universalistic	  for	  two	  reasons.	  
First,	  agape	  is	  impartial	  and	  equally	  distributed	  for	  a	  transcendent	  reason,	  and	  secondly,	  it	  
is	  equally	  critical	  of	  all	  objects	  of	  devotion.	  For	  instance,	  Stoic	  universalism	  declares	  that	  we	  
love	  universally	  because	  we	  are	  all	  equally	  part	  of	  the	  divine	  community	  since	  we	  all	  have	  
elements	  of	  the	  logos.	  This	  idea	  ultimately	  ends	  in	  an	  aristocratic	  condescension	  because	  
only	  the	  intelligent	  are	  really	  included	  (ICE,	  30).	  In	  contrast	  to	  Stoic	  universalism,	  agape	  
universalism	  insists	  that	  the	  reason	  one	  should	  love	  everyone	  is	  because	  God	  loves	  
everyone	  and	  the	  reason	  to	  forgive	  everyone	  is	  because	  God	  forgives	  everyone.	  In	  other	  
words,	  one	  loves	  with	  agape	  because	  one	  senses	  and	  feels	  that	  the	  agape	  love	  they	  feels,	  
sense,	  and	  know	  in	  their	  being,	  comes	  from	  a	  transcendent	  source,	  and	  they	  seek	  to	  align	  
their	  own	  wills	  with	  that	  source’s	  Will.	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  universalistic	  element	  found	  in	  the	  
reason	  for	  agape,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  objects	  of	  agape.	  Agape	  concludes	  that	  the	  love	  of	  anyone	  
and	  anything,	  here	  in	  this	  world,	  whether	  it	  is	  nation,	  family	  or	  self,	  is	  wrong.	  In	  agape	  love,	  
the	  natural	  devotion	  man	  feels	  toward	  his	  husband,	  wife,	  daughter,	  or	  son,	  are	  deemed	  the	  
roots	  of	  unethical	  and	  unjust	  love;	  they	  are	  ultimately	  extensions	  of	  self-­‐love.	  Accordingly,	  
Niebuhr	  argues	  “surely	  this	  is	  not	  an	  ethic	  which	  can	  give	  us	  specific	  guidance	  in	  the	  
detailed	  problems	  of	  social	  morality	  where	  the	  relative	  claims	  of	  family,	  community,	  class,	  
and	  nation	  must	  be	  constantly	  weighed”	  (ibid.,	  31).	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  design,	  as	  Tolstoy	  
tried	  to	  do	  when	  he	  objected	  to	  jails,	  a	  socio-­‐moral	  policy	  based	  on	  the	  insights	  of	  agape	  
love.	  “Society	  must	  punish	  criminals”	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “But	  this	  fact	  does	  not	  invalidate	  the	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insight	  which	  sees	  the	  relative	  good	  and	  the	  relative	  evil	  in	  both	  judges	  and	  criminals	  from	  
a	  high	  perspective	  (ibid.,	  29).	  The	  rigorous	  perfectionism	  and	  universalism	  of	  agape	  love	  
can	  never	  be	  fulfilled	  or	  realized	  in	  our	  own	  time.	  Agape	  love,	  Niebuhr	  concludes,	  “may	  
offer	  valuable	  insights	  to	  and	  sources	  of	  criticism	  for	  a	  prudential	  social	  ethic	  which	  deals	  
with	  the	  present	  realities;	  but	  no	  such	  social	  ethic	  can	  be	  directly	  derived	  from	  a	  pure	  
religious	  ethic”	  (ibid.,	  32).	  Agape	  love	  is	  never	  capable	  of	  actualization	  or	  realization	  in	  
man’s	  present	  existence.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  agape	  love	  is	  relevant	  to	  man’s	  existence	  or	  it	  would	  not	  be	  felt	  as	  
the	  law	  of	  this	  life	  nor	  would	  it	  be	  revealed	  to	  him,	  as	  the	  divine	  will	  reveals	  it.	  This	  is	  why	  
the	  Bible	  places	  agape’s	  realization	  at	  the	  end	  of	  time,	  in	  eschatology.	  “Placing	  the	  
fulfillment	  at	  the	  end	  of	  time	  and	  not	  in	  a	  realm	  above	  temporality	  is	  to	  remain	  true	  to	  the	  
genius	  of	  prophetic	  religion	  and	  state	  mythically	  what	  cannot	  be	  stated	  rationally”	  (ibid.,	  
35).	  If	  stated	  rationally,	  the	  result	  is	  the	  complete	  dualistic	  split	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	  between	  time	  and	  eternity,	  and	  the	  eternal	  becomes	  irrelevant	  in	  the	  here	  and	  
now.	  Stating	  the	  matter	  mythically	  does	  “justice	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  eternal	  can	  only	  be	  
fulfilled	  in	  the	  temporal”	  argues	  Niebuhr;	  “But	  since	  myth	  is	  forced	  to	  state	  a	  paradoxical	  
aspect	  of	  reality	  in	  terms	  of	  concepts	  connoting	  historical	  sequence,	  it	  always	  leads	  to	  
historical	  illusions”	  (ibid.,	  36).	  We	  call	  these	  historical	  illusions	  idealism,	  “apocalypticisms”	  
and	  “utopianisms”	  But,	  as	  Niebuhr	  tells	  us:	  
The	  apocalypse	  is	  a	  mythical	  expression	  of	  the	  impossible	  possibility	  under	  which	  
all	  human	  life	  stands.	  The	  kingdom	  of	  God	  is	  always	  at	  hand	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  
impossibilities	  are	  really	  possible,	  and	  lead	  to	  new	  actualities	  in	  given	  moments	  of	  
history.	  Nevertheless	  every	  actuality	  of	  history	  reveals	  itself,	  after	  the	  event,	  as	  only	  
an	  approximation	  of	  the	  ideal;	  and	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  is	  therefore	  not	  here.	  It	  is	  in	  
fact	  always	  coming	  but	  never	  here.	  (ibid.)	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Thus,	  we	  have	  come	  full	  circle	  in	  the	  dialectic	  of	  agape	  love	  and	  in	  fact,	  it	  is	  here	  we	  see	  
where	  every	  dialectical	  inquiry	  begins.	  After	  the	  event	  says	  Niebuhr,	  after	  we	  say	  “That	  was	  
agape	  love”	  or	  “surely	  this	  must	  be	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God,”	  we	  may,	  by	  defining	  our	  terms	  
and	  inquiring	  into	  concepts—by	  asking,	  “Well	  what	  is	  agape	  love,	  exactly?”	  or,	  “What	  do	  
you	  mean	  by	  Kingdom	  of	  God?”—and	  inevitably	  we	  find	  that	  the	  terms	  transcend	  our	  own	  
time,	  though	  they	  speak	  to	  our	  temporal	  experiences,	  dialogues,	  and	  spirits.	  In	  other	  words,	  
no	  matter	  what	  happens	  here	  and	  now,	  if	  man	  is	  still	  around	  to	  survey	  the	  scene	  afterward,	  
he	  will	  inquire	  about	  the	  events	  of	  the	  past,	  he	  will	  dialectically	  measure	  them	  up	  against	  
an	  ultimate	  term	  or	  ideal,	  and	  he	  will	  always	  judge	  those	  past	  events	  as	  inadequate	  
realizations	  of	  the	  concept.	  Man	  is	  “goaded	  by	  a	  spirit	  of	  perfection”	  writes	  Kenneth	  Burke;	  
and	  thus,	  the	  ideal	  will	  always	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  actual	  and,	  so	  long	  as	  man	  also	  uses	  
earthly	  symbols	  to	  define	  “perfection,”	  the	  Good,	  and	  the	  ultimate,	  he	  is	  destined,	  after	  a	  
dialectical	  inquiry,	  to	  come	  up	  short.	  
	   The	  love	  ideal	  of	  agape	  is	  “more	  than	  the	  product	  of	  a	  morbidly	  sensitive	  religious	  
fantasy”	  (ibid.,	  38).	  If	  we	  consider	  human	  life	  in	  its	  fullest	  dimension,	  we	  discover	  that	  it	  
includes	  “not	  only	  an	  impossible	  ideal,	  but	  realities	  of	  sin	  and	  evil	  which	  are	  more	  than	  
simple	  imperfections.”	  It	  isn’t	  man’s	  imperfect	  nature	  that	  causes	  him	  to	  harm	  others;	  it	  is	  
his	  willingness	  to	  love	  himself	  more	  than	  others.	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  “Anything	  less	  than	  
perfect	  love	  in	  human	  life	  is	  destructive	  of	  life.	  All	  human	  life	  stands	  under	  an	  impending	  
doom	  because	  it	  does	  not	  live	  by	  the	  law	  of	  love.	  Egoism	  is	  always	  destructive.	  The	  wages	  of	  
sin	  is	  death.”	  Our	  world	  testifies	  to	  this	  truth;	  we	  know	  that	  when	  America	  loves	  itself	  more	  
it	  breeds	  destructive	  nationalist	  sentiments	  and	  when	  the	  white	  man	  loves	  himself	  more	  
than	  the	  black	  one	  he	  breeds	  hatred	  in	  himself	  and	  resentment	  that	  leads	  to	  vengeance	  in	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his	  enemy.	  The	  peace	  of	  this	  world	  is	  achieved	  by	  strife,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  echoing	  Augustine;	  
“The	  peace	  of	  the	  city	  of	  God	  can	  use	  and	  transmute	  the	  lesser	  and	  insecure	  peace	  of	  the	  
city	  of	  the	  world;	  but	  that	  can	  be	  done	  only	  if	  the	  peace	  of	  the	  world	  is	  not	  confused	  with	  
the	  ultimate	  peace	  of	  God”	  (ibid.).	  “Confronted	  with	  this	  situation	  humanity	  always	  faces	  a	  
double	  task”	  Niebuhr	  argues	  (ibid.).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  must	  “reduce	  the	  anarchy	  of	  the	  
world	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  immediately	  sufferable	  order	  and	  unity;”	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  
must	  set	  these	  tentative,	  relative,	  and	  insecure	  unities	  under	  the	  criticism	  of	  the	  ultimate	  
ideal:	  agape	  love	  (ibid.)	  
What	  is	  the	  relationship	  then,	  between	  love	  and	  law	  as	  such.	  Laws	  as	  such,	  norms	  of	  
conduct	  prescribed	  by	  custom,	  legal	  enactments,	  scriptural	  injunctions,	  rational	  intuition,	  
prescribe	  duties	  and	  obligations	  “without	  seeming	  reference	  to	  the	  ultimate	  spirit	  of	  law,	  
namely,	  love”	  (CRPP,	  170).	  Niebuhr,	  in	  dialogue	  with	  himself,	  asks:	  “What	  is	  the	  standing	  of	  
such	  law	  in	  a	  Christian	  scheme	  of	  ethics	  and	  how	  is	  it	  related	  to	  it?”	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  
Niebuhr	  doesn’t	  pull	  an	  authoritarian	  verse	  from	  the	  Bible	  but	  sets	  out	  to	  define	  the	  nature	  
of	  the	  law	  dialectically.	  Every	  such	  law,	  he	  writes,	  will	  have	  two	  characteristics.	  First,	  it	  will	  
state	  man’s	  obligations	  to	  his	  neighbor	  in	  minimal	  and	  negative	  terms,	  i.e.	  “Thou	  shalt	  not	  
steal.”	  Secondly,	  it	  will	  states	  these	  obligations	  “in	  terms	  which	  presuppose	  the	  fact	  of	  sin	  
and	  self-­‐interest,”	  the	  complexity	  of	  claims	  and	  counterclaims	  arbitrated	  by	  some	  “rule	  of	  
reason”	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  ultimate	  scruples	  of	  love	  (ibid.,	  171).	  Law	  is	  thus	  defined	  by	  
what	  it	  does.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  law,	  no	  matter	  its	  conceptions,	  accepts	  and	  regulates	  self-­‐
interest,	  prohibiting	  only	  its	  most	  excessive	  forms.	  It	  doesn’t	  ask	  one	  to	  love	  the	  neighbor	  
but	  asks	  one	  not	  kill	  him;	  it	  doesn’t	  command	  one	  to	  seek	  her	  neighbor’s	  well	  being	  but	  
only	  asks	  one	  respect	  his	  rights.	  “Broadly	  speaking”	  then,	  “the	  end	  of	  law	  is	  justice”	  Niebuhr	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argues;	  “but	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  justice	  is	  related	  to	  love”	  (ibid.).	  Niebuhr	  is	  done	  
with	  the	  dialusis	  and	  paralysis	  is	  on	  the	  way:	  
Thus	  there	  is	  a	  dialectical	  relation	  between	  love	  and	  law	  even	  as	  there	  is	  between	  
love	  beyond	  law	  and	  love	  as	  law.	  It	  might	  be	  stated	  as	  follows:	  The	  law	  seeks	  for	  a	  
tolerable	  harmony	  of	  life	  with	  life,	  sin	  presupposed.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  an	  
approximation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  love	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  an	  instrument	  of	  love	  on	  the	  
other	  hand.	  Consequently	  the	  distinction	  between	  law	  and	  love	  is	  less	  absolute	  and	  
more	  dialectical	  than	  conceived	  in	  either	  Catholic	  or	  Reformation	  thought.	  (ibid.,	  
171-­‐2)	  
	  
So	  you	  see	  dear	  Phaedrus,	  dear	  Pausanias,	  Eryximachus	  and	  Aristophanes,	  dear	  Agathon	  
and	  Alcibiades,	  dear	  Catholics	  and	  dearly	  beloved	  Protestants,	  your	  thoughts	  on	  the	  nature	  
of	  love	  weren’t	  quite	  right.	  Of	  course	  they	  weren’t	  entirely	  wrong	  either;	  it’s	  just	  that	  love	  is	  
a	  more	  complex	  term	  than	  was	  first	  assumed.	  
Justice:	  Proximate	  Solutions	  to	  Insoluble	  Problems	  
	  
Human	  nature	  is,	  in	  short,	  a	  realm	  of	  infinite	  possibilities	  of	  good	  and	  evil	  because	  of	  
the	  character	  of	  human	  freedom.	  The	  love	  that	  is	  the	  law	  of	  its	  nature	  is	  a	  boundless	  
self-­‐giving.	  The	  sin	  that	  corrupts	  its	  life	  is	  a	  boundless	  assertion	  of	  the	  self.	  Between	  
these	  two	  forces	  all	  kinds	  of	  ad	  hoc	  restraints	  may	  be	  elaborated	  and	  defined.	  We	  
may	  call	  this	  natural	  law.	  But	  we	  had	  better	  realize	  how	  very	  tentative	  it	  is.	  
Otherwise	  we	  shall	  merely	  sanction	  some	  traditional	  relation	  between	  myself	  and	  
my	  fellow	  man	  as	  a	  ‘just’	  relation,	  and	  quiet	  the	  voice	  of	  conscience	  which	  speaks	  to	  
me	  of	  higher	  possibilities.	  What	  is	  more,	  we	  may	  stabilize	  sin	  and	  make	  it	  
institutional;	  for	  it	  will	  be	  discovered	  invariably	  that	  my	  definition	  of	  justice	  
guarantees	  certain	  advantages	  to	  myself	  to	  which	  I	  have	  no	  absolute	  right,	  but	  with	  
which	  I	  have	  been	  invested	  by	  the	  accidents	  of	  history	  and	  the	  contingencies	  of	  
nature	  and	  which	  the	  ‘old	  Adam’	  in	  me	  is	  only	  too	  happy	  to	  transmute	  into	  absolute	  
rights.	  
⎯R.	  Niebuhr,	  “Christian	  Faith	  and	  Natural	  Law”	  
Agape	  love	  and	  justice	  are	  both	  prone	  to	  conceptual	  and	  definitional	  abuse	  in	  the	  public	  
sphere.	  Agape	  love	  gets	  abused	  when	  it’s	  used	  as	  an	  absolute	  moral	  guide	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  
politics	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  it	  is	  used	  as	  only	  a	  personal	  ideal	  that	  
has	  no	  bearing	  whatsoever	  on	  the	  laws	  that	  order	  our	  collective	  activities.	  In	  contrast	  to	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these	  two	  errors,	  justice	  is	  abused	  differently.	  Justice	  is	  never	  in	  danger	  of	  being	  considered	  
either	  completely	  irrelevant.	  Sometimes	  it	  is	  wrongly	  used	  to	  define	  the	  highest	  moral	  
standards,	  as	  when	  the	  “oughts”	  of	  laws	  become	  our	  highest	  measure	  of	  ethical	  action.	  
More	  often	  however,	  sense	  love	  is	  the	  law	  of	  life	  and	  the	  latter	  abuse,	  upon	  close	  
examination,	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  only	  a	  theoretical	  abuse,	  the	  abuse	  of	  the	  justice	  ideal	  takes	  place	  
when	  an	  actualization	  of	  justice	  is	  considered	  or	  professed	  to	  be	  justice’s	  perfect	  and	  final	  
form.	  What	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  be	  natural,	  normative,	  universal,	  or	  absolute,	  is	  always	  
tainted	  by	  the	  self-­‐interests	  of	  those	  who	  profess	  it	  to	  be	  absolute.	  “Every	  appeal	  to	  moral	  
standards	  thus	  denigrates	  into	  a	  moral	  justification	  of	  the	  self	  against	  the	  enemy.	  Parties	  to	  
a	  dispute	  inevitably	  make	  themselves	  judges	  over	  it	  and	  thus	  fall	  into	  the	  sin	  of	  pretending	  
to	  be	  God”	  (ICE,	  77).	  In	  other	  words,	  justice,	  truth,	  equality,	  freedom,	  are	  always	  our	  justice,	  
truth,	  equality,	  or	  freedom.	  A	  substantial	  portion	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  writings	  was	  spent	  critiquing	  
the	  various	  relative	  claims	  of	  justice	  from	  the	  standard	  of	  both	  its	  own	  absolute	  ideal,	  and	  
its	  higher	  order	  ideal,	  agape	  love.	  
	   “Justice,”	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “requires	  discriminate	  judgments	  between	  conflicting	  
claims”	  (J&M,	  28).	  Ethical	  judges	  will	  be	  more	  critical	  of	  their	  own	  claims	  than	  the	  claims	  of	  
the	  other,	  though	  it	  will	  not	  dismiss	  its	  own	  claims	  out	  of	  hand.	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  
without	  this	  self-­‐criticism	  “all	  justice	  becomes	  corrupted	  into	  a	  refined	  form	  of	  self-­‐seeking.”	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  counters,	  if	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  individual	  or	  collective	  self	  are	  not	  
considered	  as	  well,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  justice	  at	  all.	  Though	  an	  “ecstatic	  form	  of	  agape”	  may	  
propel	  one	  to	  reach	  ultimate	  heroic	  moral	  achievements	  (like	  say,	  martyrdom),	  no	  such	  
ecstatic	  form	  can	  define	  the	  “common	  possibilities	  of	  tolerable	  harmony	  of	  life	  with	  life.”	  
Niebuhr	  summarizes	  the	  situation	  aphoristically:	  “In	  so	  far	  as	  justice	  admits	  the	  claims	  of	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the	  self,	  it	  is	  something	  less	  than	  love.	  Yet	  it	  cannot	  exist	  without	  love	  and	  remain	  justice.	  
For	  without	  the	  ‘grace’	  of	  love,	  justice	  always	  denigrates	  into	  something	  less	  than	  justice”	  
(ibid.).	  Justice	  requires,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  self	  be	  entertained	  and	  
resisted.	  
When	  faced	  with	  conflicting	  claims,	  we	  typically	  want	  the	  world	  to	  be	  black	  and	  
white,	  cut	  and	  dry,	  yay	  or	  nay.	  We	  reach	  into	  our	  conceptual	  grab	  bag	  and	  look	  for	  
something	  that,	  like	  a	  rulebook,	  that	  will	  just	  tell	  us	  what	  to	  do.	  But	  this	  can	  never	  be	  the	  
case	  according	  to	  the	  Niebuhrian	  perspective,	  if	  one	  desires	  a	  just	  and	  loving	  society.	  It	  may	  
be	  possible,	  at	  times,	  between	  one	  man	  and	  another;	  but	  justice	  becomes	  more	  complex	  
because	  it	  must	  arbitrate	  between	  the	  claims	  of	  various	  “others,”	  i.e.	  between	  my	  family	  
and	  my	  nation,	  between	  my	  nation	  and	  another	  nation,	  between	  one	  segment	  of	  my	  
community	  and	  another.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  pulpit	  is	  often	  so	  boring	  and	  irrelevant	  to	  “the	  
practical	  man	  of	  affairs”	  who	  often	  has	  a	  more	  precise	  sense	  of	  justice,	  acquired	  by	  “feeling	  
his	  way	  through	  the	  endless	  relativities	  of	  human	  relations”	  (ibid.,	  28).	  “Practical	  
experience,”	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “has	  made	  them	  sensitive	  to	  the	  complex	  web	  of	  values	  and	  
interests	  in	  which	  human	  decisions	  are	  reached,	  while	  the	  professional	  teachers	  of	  religion	  
and	  morals	  deal	  with	  simple	  counters	  of	  black	  and	  white”.	  This	  man	  may	  be	  morally	  
heedless	  and	  confuse	  his	  own	  collective	  self-­‐interest	  for	  some	  selfless	  virtue,	  as	  when	  a	  
conservative	  politician,	  who	  is	  also	  a	  business	  man,	  claims	  that	  cutting	  taxes	  will	  lead	  to	  
national	  economic	  prosperity	  (Factually	  speaking,	  this	  economic	  hypothesis	  may	  be	  correct,	  
mind	  you;	  we	  are	  only	  concerned	  here	  with	  the	  capitalist’s	  self-­‐interest	  in	  the	  matter,	  and	  
how	  he	  hides	  this	  self-­‐interest	  behind	  “the	  common	  good”).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  man	  
may	  be	  well	  schooled	  in	  justice	  and	  would	  thus	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  listen	  to	  a	  preacher	  who	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only	  confuses	  the	  issues	  by	  making	  “moral	  distinctions	  which	  do	  not	  fit	  the	  complexities	  of	  
life”	  (ibid.,	  29).	  
Niebuhr	  insists	  that	  “the	  realm	  of	  justice”	  is	  a	  “realm	  of	  tragic	  choices,	  which	  are	  
seldom	  envisaged	  in	  a	  type	  of	  idealism	  in	  which	  all	  choices	  are	  regarded	  as	  simple”	  (ibid.).	  
There	  are	  times	  when	  we	  must	  choose	  a	  larger	  good	  over	  a	  smaller	  one,	  “without	  the	  hope	  
that	  the	  smaller	  one	  will	  be	  preserved	  in	  the	  larger	  one.”	  We	  may,	  for	  example,	  be	  forced	  to	  
choose	  equality	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  freedom	  or	  freedom	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  equality.	  There	  are	  other	  
times	  where	  we	  must	  “risk	  a	  terrible	  evil,”	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “in	  the	  hope	  of	  avoiding	  an	  
imminent	  peril	  (such	  as	  subjugation	  to	  tyranny).”	  Israel’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  Iranian	  situation	  
may	  suffice	  as	  a	  modern	  example,	  while	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  lesson	  in	  the	  relativity	  of	  all	  justice;	  
for	  though	  every	  democratic	  country	  may	  view	  Iran	  as	  a	  potential	  threat,	  only	  Israel	  views	  
such	  a	  threat	  as	  imminent,	  because	  only	  Israel	  is	  directly	  threatened	  by	  their	  nuclear	  
program.	  There	  is	  never	  a	  guarantee	  that	  our	  choices	  will	  be	  the	  right	  ones.	  Niebuhr	  
acknowledges	  that	  “Subsequent	  events	  may	  prove	  the	  risk	  to	  have	  been	  futile	  and	  the	  
choice	  to	  have	  been	  wrong.”	  If	  there	  is	  a	  world	  left	  after	  such	  a	  tragic	  choice,	  or	  at	  least	  
“enough	  of	  a	  world,”	  the	  idealists	  who	  remain	  will	  accuse	  the	  realists	  of	  making	  the	  wrong	  
choice;	  though	  they	  only	  remain,	  saved	  from	  tyranny,	  because	  the	  tragic	  choice	  was	  made.	  
Justice	  demonstrates	  another	  paradox	  of	  ethics,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  the	  
highest	  result	  of	  ethical	  action	  can	  never	  be	  its	  desired	  result;	  “It	  must	  be	  its	  byproduct”	  
Niebuhr	  argues	  (ibid.,	  31).	  If	  gaining	  the	  self	  is	  the	  only	  motive	  for	  losing	  oneself	  in	  love,	  
one	  will	  not	  have	  gained	  anything.	  Likewise,	  if	  justice	  is	  the	  goal	  one	  seeks	  because	  equality	  
is	  the	  thing	  one	  aims	  at,	  one	  is	  left	  with	  rigid	  self-­‐interested	  claims	  that	  are	  in	  a	  continuous	  
battle	  with	  one	  another.	  If	  one	  aims	  at	  love,	  however,	  one	  will	  likely	  end	  up	  somewhere	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around	  justice,	  as	  those	  who	  marched	  with	  Dr.	  King	  might	  attest.	  Additionally,	  we	  may	  say	  
that	  if	  one	  aims	  only	  at	  love	  of	  men,	  one	  will	  come	  up	  against	  those	  who	  do	  not	  qualify.	  In	  
order	  to	  love	  all	  men,	  one	  must	  love	  the	  ultimate	  idea	  of	  agape	  love,	  its	  harmonious	  source	  
of	  existence	  and	  order.	  We	  may	  sum	  up	  the	  situation	  as	  such:	  by	  loving	  God,	  man	  is	  able	  to	  
love	  all	  men;	  by	  loving	  all	  men,	  man	  is	  able	  to	  achieve	  a	  more	  ethical	  and	  uninterested	  
justice;	  by	  seeking	  a	  loving	  justice,	  one	  is	  able	  to	  achieve	  a	  tolerable	  harmony	  between	  
selfish	  claims	  of	  competing	  wills.	  
This	  is	  what	  Niebuhr	  means	  we	  writes	  that	  Justice	  “that	  is	  only	  justice	  is	  less	  than	  
justice”	  (ibid.,	  32).	  Niebuhr	  word	  for	  justice	  that	  is	  more	  than	  justice	  is	  “imaginative	  justice.”	  
He	  writes,	  “Only	  imaginative	  justice,	  that	  is,	  love	  that	  begins	  by	  espousing	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  
other	  rather	  than	  the	  self,	  can	  achieve	  a	  modicum	  of	  fairness.”	  This	  then,	  is	  the	  unattainable	  
ideal	  of	  agape	  as	  well;	  for	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  any	  “attempt	  to	  follow	  this	  ideal	  in	  a	  world	  
that	  is,	  particularly	  in	  its	  group	  relationships,	  hardly	  human	  and	  certainly	  not	  divine,”	  leads	  
inevitably	  where	  it	  led	  Jesus—“to	  the	  cross”	  (ibid.,	  33).	  This	  type	  of	  ethic	  may	  be	  useful	  but	  
it	  isn’t	  the	  way	  to	  achieve	  social	  justice.	  
The	  struggle	  for	  social	  justice	  must	  violate	  the	  pure	  ethic	  of	  love	  because	  it	  is	  a	  battle	  
between	  competing	  assertions	  of	  rights	  and	  it	  demands	  the	  use	  of	  coercion.	  There	  is	  no	  
possibility	  of	  a	  society	  simply	  giving	  up	  its	  self-­‐interests	  for	  those	  of	  another.	  Imagine,	  for	  
example,	  if	  the	  US	  foreign	  policy	  shifted	  tomorrow	  and	  the	  president	  addressed	  the	  nation	  
by	  stating	  that	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  love	  and	  self-­‐sacrifice,	  we’ve	  decided	  that	  all	  of	  the	  nation’s	  
oil	  supply	  is	  going	  to	  be	  sold	  to	  China	  and	  the	  proceeds	  are	  going	  to	  be	  used	  to	  feed	  starving	  
children	  in	  India	  and	  Africa.	  Likewise,	  there	  is	  no	  possibility	  of	  a	  social	  struggle	  without	  
coercion,	  which	  also	  violates	  the	  pure	  ethic	  of	  agape.	  Yet,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  stay	  in	  society,	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Niebuhr	  argues,	  we	  must	  participate	  in	  these	  struggles.	  He	  writes,	  “Neutrality	  in	  a	  social	  
struggle	  between	  entrenched	  and	  advancing	  social	  classes	  really	  means	  alliance	  with	  the	  
entrenched	  position.	  In	  the	  social	  struggle	  we	  are	  either	  on	  the	  side	  of	  privilege	  or	  need.	  No	  
ethical	  perfectionism	  can	  save	  us	  from	  that	  choice”	  (ibid.,	  40).	  
The	  struggle	  for	  justice	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  both	  “punitive”	  and	  “distributive”	  modes	  
of	  justice.	  Distributive	  justice	  stands	  under	  a	  principle	  of	  criticism	  that	  is	  “equality.”	  
Niebuhr	  calls	  equality	  a	  “rational,	  political	  version	  of	  the	  law	  of	  love”	  and	  thus,	  it	  also	  has	  a	  
measure	  of	  transcendence	  like	  love	  (ICE,	  65).	  In	  other	  words,	  “It	  ought	  to	  be,	  but	  it	  never	  
will	  be	  fully	  realized.”	  Social	  prudence,	  Niebuhr	  attests,	  will	  always	  qualify	  equality	  and	  
even	  the	  most	  equalitarian	  society	  will	  dispense	  with	  some	  special	  rewards	  as	  
“inducements	  to	  diligence.”	  A	  rigorous	  equalitarianism	  must	  reach	  its	  pinnacle	  by	  insisting	  
that	  these	  privileges	  not	  be	  passed	  down	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  another,	  perpetuating	  
their	  inequalities.	  Though	  it	  will	  never	  be	  actualized	  as	  an	  ideal,	  equality	  then	  stands	  as	  a	  
principle	  of	  criticism	  over	  every	  scheme	  of	  justice	  and	  “is	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  love	  
involved	  in	  all	  moral	  judgments”	  (ibid.,	  66).	  This	  principle	  however,	  doesn’t	  exhaust	  the	  
possibilities	  of	  distributive	  justice.	  Consider	  the	  fact	  that	  we,	  as	  a	  society,	  have	  taken	  a	  
public	  school	  system	  that	  was	  built	  on	  “equal	  education	  for	  all”	  and	  added	  programs	  to	  it	  
for	  children	  who	  are	  both	  handicapped	  and	  highly	  gifted.	  This	  is	  what	  Niebuhr	  means	  when	  
he	  argues	  that,	  “imaginative	  justice	  leads	  beyond	  equality	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  special	  
needs”	  of	  the	  lives	  of	  others	  (ibid.).	  
Corrective	  justice	  also	  reveals	  this	  same	  scale	  of	  ascending	  possibilities.	  “Society,”	  
Niebuhr	  writes,	  “begins	  by	  regulating	  vengeance	  and	  soon	  advances	  to	  the	  state	  of	  
substituting	  public	  justice	  for	  private	  vengeance”	  (ibid.,	  67).	  What	  is	  public	  justice	  but	  the	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recognition	  that	  an	  accused	  person	  deserves	  a	  more	  disinterested	  and	  objective	  judgment	  
than	  that	  which	  the	  injured	  accuser	  will	  give	  him?	  These	  modern	  standards	  of	  punitive	  
justice	  reduce	  but	  do	  not	  eliminate	  the	  element	  of	  vengeance	  in	  justice.	  This	  same	  logic	  
presses	  the	  conception	  of	  justice	  onward,	  toward	  the	  elimination	  of	  vengeance	  all	  together.	  
“The	  criminal	  is	  recognized	  to	  have	  rights	  as	  a	  human	  being”	  in	  spite	  of	  violating	  society’s	  
laws	  and	  therefore,	  modern	  psychiatry	  and	  criminology	  focus	  on	  locating	  the	  source	  of	  the	  
anti-­‐social	  conduct	  in	  order	  to	  correct	  it.	  Instead	  of	  just	  punishing	  criminals,	  modern	  man	  
desires	  to	  reform	  them.	  This	  logic	  eventually	  leads	  back	  to	  the	  agape	  commandment,	  “love	  
your	  enemies.”	  These	  more	  imaginative	  reformation	  ideals	  will	  never	  be	  fully	  realized,	  
Niebuhr	  argues,	  because	  “genuine	  forgiveness	  requires	  a	  contrite	  recognition	  of	  the	  
sinfulness	  of	  the	  self,”	  and	  because	  collective	  behavior	  can	  never	  be	  imaginative	  enough	  to	  
assure	  more	  than	  minimal	  actualizations	  of	  the	  ideal	  (ibid.,	  67).	  What	  this	  means,	  Niebuhr	  
concludes,	  is	  that	  all	  standards	  of	  corrective	  justice	  stand	  somewhere	  between	  two	  poles;	  
they	  are	  organically	  related	  to	  primitive	  vengeance	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  ideal	  of	  
forgiving	  one	  another	  on	  the	  other.	  There	  are	  no	  absolute	  limits	  over	  how	  much	  closer	  
justice	  may	  edge	  toward	  the	  latter	  pole.	  But	  it	  is	  certain,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “that	  every	  
achievement	  will	  remain	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  approximation”	  (ibid).	  
Thus,	  the	  struggle	  for	  justice	  reveals	  both	  the	  possibilities	  and	  limits	  	   of	  human	  
existence,	  just	  as	  profoundly	  as	  does	  the	  search	  for	  truth	  reveal	  these	  to	  him	  (NDMII,	  244).	  
One	  might	  argue,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  that	  in	  some	  respects	  it	  reveals	  them	  even	  more	  
profoundly	  because	  unlike	  the	  “intellectual	  quest,”	  the	  struggle	  for	  justice	  more	  obviously	  
“engages	  all	  human	  vitalities	  and	  powers.”	  We	  embark	  on	  this	  struggle	  because	  we	  are	  
obligated	  to	  build	  and	  perfect	  our	  communities,	  not	  only	  because	  community	  is	  a	  necessary	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establishment	  for	  order	  and	  harmonious	  existences,	  but	  also	  because	  man	  is	  fulfilled	  in	  
communal	  life.	  Niebuhr	  sums	  up	  man’s	  relationship	  to	  communities	  as	  such:	  “Love	  is	  
therefore	  the	  primary	  law	  of	  his	  nature;	  and	  brotherhood	  the	  fundamental	  requirement	  of	  
his	  social	  existence	  (ibid.).	  We	  may	  add	  one	  element	  to	  this	  in	  order	  to	  discover	  why	  justice	  
requires	  a	  struggle,	  and	  that	  is	  man’s	  freedom	  and	  vitality.	  Man	  constantly	  tries	  to	  grow	  his	  
community	  in	  breadth	  and	  man	  constantly	  criticizes	  his	  community	  from	  a	  higher	  ideal.	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  task	  of	  creating	  a	  just	  society	  and	  avoiding	  the	  chaos	  of	  anarchy	  
continually	  grows	  broader	  and	  broader	  in	  scope.	  “The	  fence	  and	  the	  boundary	  line	  are	  the	  
symbols	  of	  the	  spirit	  of	  justice,”	  Niebuhr	  writes;	  these	  “set	  limits	  upon	  each	  man’s	  interest	  
to	  prevent	  one	  from	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  other”	  (ibid.,	  252).	  We	  can	  see	  that	  this	  
harmony	  is,	  as	  Niebuhr	  calls	  it,	  only	  an	  approximation	  of	  brotherhood;	  “It	  is	  the	  best	  
possible	  harmony	  within	  the	  conditions	  created	  by	  human	  egoism.”	  This	  harmony	  we	  may	  
fairly	  call,	  “equality.”	  
	   According	  to	  Niebuhr,	  when	  we	  say	  “higher	  justice,”	  we	  always	  mean,	  “more	  equal	  
justice”	  (ibid.,	  254).	  	  It	  is	  in	  these	  discussions	  where	  we	  find	  one	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  favorite	  terms,	  
“the	  ideological	  taint.”	  Those	  who	  do	  not	  have	  any	  always	  frown	  upon	  special	  privileges	  
and	  likewise,	  those	  who	  have	  them	  are	  always	  “uneasy	  in	  their	  conscience	  about	  it.”	  Herein	  
lies	  the	  ideological	  taint.	  In	  the	  underprivileged,	  it	  manifest	  itself	  when	  they	  raise	  the	  
principle	  of	  equality	  to	  the	  definitive	  principle	  of	  justice	  without	  recognizing	  the	  
differences	  of	  need	  or	  of	  social	  function	  make	  such	  a	  demand	  impossible.	  In	  the	  latter	  
group,	  the	  inequality	  of	  privilege	  gets	  justified	  as	  the	  rewards	  for	  an	  inequality	  of	  social	  
function.	  Niebuhr	  notes	  elsewhere	  that	  the	  very	  need	  to	  justify	  it	  at	  all,	  instead	  of	  
dismissing	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  justification	  all	  together,	  reveals	  some	  uneasy	  conscience	  in	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the	  privileged.	  Even	  if	  this	  were	  not	  the	  case,	  we	  may	  note	  that	  they	  will	  always	  try	  to	  hide	  
the	  historic	  fact	  that	  those	  who	  held	  their	  positions	  of	  power	  before	  them	  invariably	  used	  
their	  social	  power	  to	  get	  “excessive	  privileges	  not	  required	  by	  their	  function;	  and	  certainly	  
not	  in	  accord	  with	  differences	  of	  need”	  (ibid.,	  255).	  What	  we	  are	  left	  with	  is	  a	  continual	  
cycle,	  in	  which	  one	  group	  insist	  that	  equality	  is	  the	  absolute	  norm	  of	  society,	  while	  the	  
other	  insists	  that	  it	  is	  an	  impossible	  ideal	  that	  can’t	  be	  actualized	  fully;	  furthermore,	  this	  is	  
the	  very	  thing	  that	  demonstrates	  the	  ideological	  taint	  present	  whenever	  a	  generally	  valid	  
principle	  is	  applied	  to	  a	  given	  situation—even	  when	  the	  principle	  itself	  should	  conceptually	  
transcend	  over	  partial	  interests.	  This	  means	  that	  every	  structure	  of	  justice,	  according	  to	  
Niebuhr,	  is	  intended	  to	  give	  one	  group	  and	  advantage	  over	  another;	  “or	  if	  that	  is	  not	  their	  
intention,	  it	  is	  at	  least	  the	  unvarying	  consequence”	  (ibid.,	  256).	  
We’ve	  already	  discussed	  the	  relationship	  between	  love	  and	  law.	  The	  singular	  
individual	  uses	  laws,	  norms	  and	  commands	  to	  regulate	  his	  self-­‐interests	  in	  relationship	  to	  
another’s	  interests,	  others’	  interests,	  national	  interests,	  and	  the	  world’s	  interests.	  However,	  
when	  that	  individual	  combines	  his	  own	  interest	  with	  another	  individual’s	  interest—when	  
the	  situation	  is	  no	  longer	  between	  the	  one	  and	  the	  many	  but	  is	  between	  the	  several	  and	  the	  
few,	  the	  mass	  and	  the	  mob,	  capital	  and	  labor,	  nation	  and	  nation—we	  move	  from	  the	  realm	  
of	  love	  and	  law	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  law	  and	  justice.	  It	  is	  when	  this	  happens	  that	  “even	  the	  most	  
perfect	  love	  requires	  a	  rational	  estimate	  of	  conflicting	  needs	  and	  interests”	  (ibid.,	  248).	  
Justice	  then,	  is	  the	  organizing	  principle	  that	  systematizes	  and	  institutionalizes	  singular	  
laws.	  Though	  it	  has	  positive	  elements,	  as	  in	  those	  moments	  where	  love	  and	  law	  seem	  to	  
cross	  paths,	  it	  is	  necessary	  at	  all	  because	  of	  its	  negative	  nature.	  Communities	  will	  take	  
advantage	  of	  each	  other	  and	  they	  are	  always	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  weal	  of	  their	  own	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than	  the	  weal	  of	  others.	  Thus,	  systems	  of	  justice	  must	  make	  hard	  distinctions	  between	  the	  
rights	  and	  interests	  of	  various	  members	  and	  groups	  in	  the	  community.	  Yet	  structures	  of	  
justice	  are	  more	  than	  just	  natural	  and	  positive	  laws,	  more	  than	  “the	  order	  of	  a	  legal	  system.”	  
The	  harmony	  of	  communities	  requires	  much	  more	  than	  just	  laws	  and	  ordinances	  (ibid.,	  
257).	  When	  we	  analyze	  structures	  of	  justice,	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  the	  “given	  tensions	  and	  
equilibria	  of	  life	  and	  power,	  as	  worked	  out	  by	  the	  unconscious	  interactions	  of	  social	  life”	  
and	  of	  which,	  structures	  of	  justice	  are	  just	  explicit	  formulations.	  In	  other	  words,	  human	  
communities	  are	  never	  mere	  constructions	  of	  conscience	  or	  reason,	  they	  are	  more	  than	  
artifacts;	  they	  are	  also	  organisms.	  
This	  natural	  element	  in	  human	  communities	  means	  that	  they	  are	  “more	  or	  less	  
stable	  or	  precarious	  harmonies	  of	  human	  vital	  capacities.”	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  human	  
communities	  are	  governed	  by	  power	  (ibid.).	  This	  point	  is	  crucial	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  
Niebuhr’s	  use	  of	  rhetoric	  as	  “ethical	  coercion.”	  Niebuhr	  points	  out	  that	  this	  power	  is	  not	  
merely	  the	  “coercing	  and	  organizing	  power	  of	  government,”	  but	  is	  also	  the	  “balance	  of	  
vitalities	  and	  forces	  in	  any	  given	  social	  situation.”	  These	  are	  the	  two	  elements	  of	  communal	  
life,	  what	  Niebuhr	  calls	  the	  “central	  organizing	  principle	  and	  power”	  and	  the	  “equilibrium	  
of	  power”	  (ibid.).	  They	  are	  essential	  and	  perennial	  elements	  in	  every	  community	  
organization;	  furthermore,	  “no	  moral	  or	  social	  advance	  can	  redeem	  society	  from	  its	  
dependence	  upon	  these	  two	  principles”	  (ibid.).	  These	  are	  strong	  words	  from	  Niebuhr,	  
strong	  enough	  that	  we	  should	  reflect	  on	  them	  for	  a	  moment…	  
This	  idea	  is	  the	  guiding	  principle	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  most	  famous	  work	  Moral	  Man	  and	  
Immoral	  Society.	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  that	  text,	  Niebuhr	  starts	  from	  this	  very	  premise,	  that	  
“the	  relations	  between	  groups”	  must	  always	  be	  political,	  rather	  than	  ethical,	  which	  means	  
	   160	  
that	  the	  proportion	  of	  power	  that	  each	  group	  possesses,	  the	  “coercive	  factor”	  in	  these	  
relationships,	  will	  always	  determine	  their	  outcomes	  more	  than	  any	  rational	  or	  moral	  
appraisal	  of	  the	  comparative	  needs	  of	  each	  group	  (xxiii).	  Niebuhr’s	  ultimate	  purpose	  was	  
thus,	  in	  Moral	  Man	  and	  elsewhere,	  to	  find	  “political	  methods	  which	  will	  offer	  the	  most	  
promise	  of	  achieving	  an	  ethical	  social	  goal	  for	  society”	  (xxiv).	  These	  resources	  would	  have	  
to	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  moral	  resources	  and	  possibilities	  in	  human	  nature,	  exploiting	  “every	  
latent	  moral	  capacity	  in	  man.”	  Secondly,	  they	  must	  take	  account	  of	  man’s	  natural	  
limitations,	  particularly	  collective	  man’s	  limitations.	  Though	  Niebuhr’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  
resources	  would	  vary	  over	  time,	  it	  was	  his	  conclusions	  about	  power	  and	  coercion,	  lessons	  
taught	  battling	  Ford	  for	  workers’	  rights,	  which	  he	  never	  forgot.	  Though	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  
solution	  would	  vary	  over	  time—he	  later	  lamented	  his	  conclusion	  to	  Moral	  Man,	  where	  he	  
implicitly	  suggested	  that	  the	  solution	  lay	  in	  Nietzschean-­‐type	  illusions	  which	  could	  control	  
and	  manipulate	  the	  masses—his	  solution	  would	  always	  remain,	  I	  will	  show,	  a	  deeply	  
rhetorical	  one	  that	  poetically	  built	  upon	  shared	  myths	  and	  dialectic	  inquiry.	  
Why	  is	  this	  the	  “destiny	  of	  man”?	  Why	  are	  power	  and	  coercion	  fated	  to	  play	  a	  power	  
in	  collective	  existence?	  There	  are	  two	  reasons:	  egoism	  and	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  self.	  First,	  man	  is	  
a	  sinner.	  Here,	  we	  mean	  man’s	  egoism,	  pride,	  or	  self-­‐love.	  Man	  tends	  to	  regard	  himself	  as	  
more	  important	  than	  anyone	  else.	  This	  element	  is	  so	  strong,	  that	  no	  moral	  or	  rational	  
suasion	  (we	  italicize	  here	  to	  foreshadow	  our	  final	  chapter)	  suffices	  to	  restrain	  one	  person	  
from	  taking	  advantage	  of	  another.	  Secondly,	  man’s	  vitality	  and	  his	  reason	  are	  unified.	  The	  
body	  and	  mind	  aren’t	  split.	  Man’s	  natural	  impulses	  and	  his	  reason	  are	  not	  in	  conflict.	  This	  
means	  that	  man’s	  egoistic	  purposes	  will	  be	  pursued	  with	  all	  the	  vital	  resources	  that	  his	  will	  
or	  his	  collective-­‐will,	  may	  control.	  Combatting	  these	  anti-­‐social	  purposes	  requires	  the	  full	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armament	  of	  the	  resources	  of	  social	  restraints.	  One	  will	  note	  that	  not	  every	  struggle	  is	  
characterized	  by	  a	  full	  onslaught	  of	  unified	  vitality	  and	  reason;	  not	  every	  argument	  ends	  
“below	  the	  belt,”	  if	  you	  will.	  True	  enough,	  Niebuhr	  would	  agree;	  but	  we	  must	  note,	  “in	  every	  
conflict	  of	  interest	  the	  possibility	  of	  marshalling	  every	  possible	  resource	  on	  either	  side	  is	  
implied.”37	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  a	  superior	  authority	  and	  power	  subdues	  most	  of	  our	  
conflicts	  with	  one	  another	  before	  overt	  appeals	  to	  force	  or	  the	  actual	  use	  of	  force	  are	  made,	  
whether	  violent	  or	  non-­‐violent	  (MM,	  259).	  This	  doesn’t	  change	  the	  fact	  however,	  that	  the	  
calculation	  of	  our	  opponents’	  available	  resources	  and	  his	  calculation	  of	  ours,	  is	  just	  as	  
determinative	  of	  the	  struggle’s	  outcome	  as	  anything	  else	  involved.	  We	  need	  look	  no	  further	  
than	  the	  typical	  bar	  scuffle	  to	  see	  evidence	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  claim.	  Whenever	  a	  man	  spins	  
around	  angrily	  to	  see	  who	  has	  stumbled	  into	  him	  and	  spilt	  his	  beer,	  the	  size	  and	  aggression	  
of	  the	  man	  behind	  him	  will	  be	  just	  as	  determinative	  of	  the	  outcome	  as	  anything	  the	  two	  say	  
to	  one	  another.	  This	  is	  why	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “The	  threat	  of	  force,	  whether	  by	  the	  official	  and	  
governmental	  representatives	  or	  by	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  dispute	  in	  a	  community	  is	  a	  potent	  
instrument	  in	  all	  communal	  relations.”	  Usually,	  even	  the	  drunkest	  man	  will	  rationalize	  or	  
talk	  himself	  out	  of	  fighting	  a	  professional	  boxer	  in	  a	  bar,	  no	  matter	  how	  large	  the	  grievance.	  
When	  one	  group	  increases	  the	  possibility	  of	  forceful	  resistance,	  it	  increases	  the	  
prospect	  of	  a	  solution	  without	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  This	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  nuclear	  arms	  race	  
and	  it	  is	  also	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  debate	  concerning	  president	  Obama’s	  Iran	  policy,	  i.e.	  it	  is	  
felt	  by	  some	  that	  his	  statements	  about	  Iran	  are	  too	  soft	  and	  that	  Iran	  is	  not	  persuaded	  he	  
will	  actually	  use	  the	  military	  to	  stop	  their	  acquisition	  of	  nuclear	  capabilities.	  Obama	  is	  
likewise	  forced	  to	  balance	  the	  need	  to	  be	  threatening	  with	  the	  desire	  to	  not	  back	  them	  into	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Arendt	  calls	  “power”	  that	  which	  keeps	  the	  public	  realm,	  “the	  potential	  space	  of	  
appearance	  between	  acting	  and	  speaking	  men,”	  in	  existence.	  See:	  (2005)	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a	  corner	  and	  make	  them	  lash	  out.	  Thus,	  if	  the	  large	  man	  in	  the	  bar	  keeps	  coming	  toward	  the	  
small	  man	  and	  then	  he	  raises	  his	  fist,	  his	  meager	  intention	  to	  scare	  the	  little	  man	  may	  
backfire,	  and	  he	  may	  get	  struck	  with	  a	  pool	  cue—an	  obvious	  miscalculation	  regarding	  the	  
little	  man’s	  “available	  resources”	  being	  made	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  big	  man.	  Anyway,	  the	  point	  
is	  that	  “the	  rational	  calculation	  of	  the	  powers	  and	  vitalities,	  involved	  in	  a	  social	  situation,”	  is	  
“an	  inevitable	  accompaniment	  of	  the	  rational	  calculation	  of	  rights	  and	  interests,	  involved	  in	  
a	  socio-­‐moral	  problem”	  (ibid.,	  260).	  It	  is	  a	  mere	  coincidence	  of	  history	  that	  the	  few	  world	  
powers	  with	  nuclear	  weapons	  are,	  today,	  the	  only	  powers	  allowed	  to	  protect	  themselves	  to	  
the	  best	  of	  their	  abilities.	  In	  other	  words,	  Iran	  doesn’t	  have	  the	  right	  to	  defend	  itself	  with	  
nuclear	  weapons	  simply	  because	  they	  don’t	  already	  have	  a	  nuclear	  weapon	  to	  use	  in	  their	  
fight	  for	  that	  right.	  Any	  such	  sanctions	  against	  the	  US	  would	  of	  course	  be	  in	  vain	  for	  the	  
inverse	  reason.	  
Now	  that	  we’ve	  seen	  how	  man’s	  community	  life	  is	  ruled	  by	  matters	  of	  justice,	  and	  
that	  justice	  is	  ruled	  by	  a	  principle	  of	  equality,	  which	  comes	  from	  the	  balance	  of	  two	  forms	  
of	  power—the	  organizations	  of	  power	  and	  equilibria	  of	  social	  power—let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  
the	  different	  types	  of	  power	  in	  social	  life.	  
Conclusion	  
	  
I	  think	  I	  have	  solved	  the	  Sunday	  night	  service	  problem	  for	  good.	  I	  give	  a	  short	  
address	  or	  sermon	  upon	  a	  more	  or	  less	  controversial	  moral	  issue,	  or	  upon	  a	  
perplexing	  religious	  question,	  and	  after	  closing	  the	  service	  we	  have	  a	  half-­‐hour	  to	  
forty-­‐five	  minutes	  of	  discussion…	  I	  am	  absolutely	  convinced	  that	  such	  discussions	  
come	  to	  grips	  with	  life’s	  real	  problems	  much	  more	  thoroughly	  than	  any	  ex	  cathedra	  
utterance	  from	  the	  pulpit.	  For	  one	  thing	  the	  people	  themselves	  make	  the	  application	  
of	  general	  principles	  to	  specific	  experiences.	  Then,	  too,	  they	  inevitably	  explore	  the	  
qualifications	  which	  life	  seems	  to	  make	  upon	  every	  seemingly	  absolute	  principle.	  
⎯R.	  Niebuhr,	  Leaves	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Niebuhr	  calls	  attention	  to	  the	  dialectical	  aspect	  of	  these	  Sunday	  night	  discussions	  in	  his	  
journal	  entry.	  “Again	  and	  again,”	  Niebuhr	  recorded	  in	  his	  journal,	  “thoughtful	  mothers	  have	  
thrown	  light	  upon	  the	  problems	  of	  democracy,	  the	  place	  of	  coercion	  in	  life	  and	  the	  efficacy	  
of	  trust	  out	  of	  experience	  gained	  in	  their	  work	  with	  children”	  (Leaves,	  116-­‐7).	  Niebuhr	  
found	  the	  dialectical	  aspects	  of	  these	  discussions	  to	  be	  their	  most	  interesting	  characteristic,	  
noting	  his	  fascination	  with	  the	  way	  “every	  type	  of	  experience	  could	  be	  used	  to	  illustrate	  a	  
general	  truth”	  (ibid).	  If	  only	  there	  were	  more	  thoughtful	  people	  like	  these,	  he	  lamented…	  
“But	  discussion	  requires	  time	  and	  it	  doesn’t	  mean	  much	  to	  people	  who	  are	  looking	  for	  
‘inspiration’	  rather	  than	  guidance.”	  Niebuhr	  concludes:	  
I	  suppose	  there	  is	  still	  a	  place	  for	  inspirational	  addresses.	  But	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  so	  
many	  traditional	  moral	  ideas	  are	  in	  solution	  and	  so	  many	  others	  are	  generally	  
accepted	  and	  never	  applied,	  this	  kind	  of	  honest	  searching	  with	  others,	  rather	  than	  
for	  them,	  is	  particularly	  rewarding.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
Niebuhr’s	  reflection	  is	  a	  characteristically	  rhetorical	  one.	  How	  do	  universal	  ideas	  impact	  
our	  world?	  What	  happens	  when:	  The	  universal	  clashes	  with	  the	  contingent?	  When	  
permanent	  truths,	  transcendent	  ideals	  and	  crises	  collide	  into	  a	  demand	  for	  a	  situated	  
judgment?	  When	  the	  time	  for	  telling	  stories	  and	  discussing	  ideas	  has	  come	  and	  gone?	  When	  
kairos	  comes	  profanely	  crashing	  through	  the	  front	  doors	  of	  our	  sacred	  house	  of	  worship	  
and	  our	  hallowed	  halls	  of	  academia?	  
Appearances	  are	  the	  beginning	  of	  all	  inquiry.	  They	  do	  not	  come	  to	  us	  the	  same	  way	  
every	  time;	  as	  Farrell	  notes,	  “there	  are	  multiple	  sorts	  of	  ‘truths’	  and	  relationships	  in	  the	  
world	  of	  phainomena”	  (1993,	  25).	  This	  means	  that	  there	  must	  be	  multiple	  ways	  of	  
approaching	  these	  appearances,	  depending	  on	  how	  they	  appear.	  Analytic,	  we’ve	  said,	  is	  the	  
“systematic	  form	  of	  inquiry…	  concerned	  with	  the	  grammatical	  relations	  among	  subjects	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and	  predicates.”	  Farrell	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  an	  eclipse;	  it	  is,	  “the	  privation	  of	  the	  moon’s	  
light	  by	  the	  interposition	  of	  the	  earth.”	  The	  second	  method	  of	  inquiry	  made	  up	  the	  
substance	  of	  our	  previous	  chapter,	  dialectic.	  Dialectic,	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  inquiry	  (not	  Hegelian	  
dialectics)	  is	  characterized	  by	  “dichotomous	  relationships	  among	  general	  propositions	  
linked	  by	  question	  and	  answer.”	  Like	  analytic,	  dialectic	  leaves	  us	  with	  a	  “gap	  in	  the	  world	  of	  
appearances”	  (ibid.,	  25).	  Thus,	  Aristotle	  offers	  us	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  third	  way	  to	  attend	  to	  
appearances.	  Rhetoric	  gives	  appearances	  a	  sense	  of	  duration,	  “an	  existence	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  
persist	  beyond	  our	  current	  attention	  span”	  (ibid.,	  32).	  Rhetoric	  articulates	  the	  “mood”	  of	  
appearances,	  e.g.	  the	  appearances	  as	  necessity,	  possibility,	  and	  contingency.	  Rhetoric	  begins	  
with	  the	  interpretations	  of	  appearances	  articulated	  in	  the	  interested	  common	  opinions.	  It	  
reconsiders	  the	  appearances	  as	  signs,	  probabilities	  and	  examples,	  making	  them	  the	  
material	  of	  public	  argument	  (ibid.).	  As	  such,	  the	  appearances	  seem	  to	  take	  on	  a	  life	  of	  their	  
own,	  becoming	  agents	  themselves	  that	  invite	  participatory	  responses.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  
audience	  becomes	  an	  agent	  of	  change,	  for	  when	  rhetoric	  reconfigures	  appearances	  as	  
invitations	  to	  participate,	  an	  ethical	  possibility	  emerges;	  not	  only	  an	  ethical	  possibility,	  
however,	  but	  also	  an	  aesthetic	  one.	  
The	  reason	  for	  the	  aesthetic	  dimension	  of	  these	  appearances	  is,	  according	  to	  
Niebuhr,	  that	  the	  “realm	  of	  justice	  is	  also	  a	  realm	  of	  tragic	  choices,	  which	  are	  seldom	  
envisaged	  in	  a	  type	  of	  idealism	  in	  which	  all	  choices	  are	  regarded	  as	  simple”	  (L&J,	  29).	  
Justice	  is	  where	  choices	  are	  made	  between	  two	  goods	  or	  two	  evils,	  for	  “sometimes	  we	  must	  
risk	  a	  terrible	  evil	  (such	  as	  atomic	  war)	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  avoiding	  imminent	  peril	  (such	  as	  
subjugation	  to	  tyranny.”	  The	  tragic	  character	  of	  these	  moral	  choices,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  the	  
contradiction	  between	  various	  equal	  values	  of	  our	  devotion,	  and	  the	  incompleteness	  of	  our	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moral	  striving,	  prove	  that	  in	  this	  life,	  if	  we	  merely	  hope	  and	  dream	  of	  Christ	  and	  the	  
kingdom	  of	  God,	  then	  “we	  are	  of	  all	  men	  most	  miserable.”	  “No	  possible	  historic	  justice	  is	  
sufferable	  without	  Christian	  hope.	  But	  any	  illusion	  of	  a	  world	  of	  perfect	  love	  without	  these	  
imperfect	  harmonies	  of	  justice	  must	  ultimately	  turn	  the	  dream	  of	  love	  into	  a	  nightmare	  of	  
tyranny	  and	  injustice”	  (ibid.,	  29).	  It	  is	  with	  this	  conclusion	  that	  can	  turn	  to	  what	  I	  argue	  is	  
Niebuhr’s	  solution	  for	  these	  problems:	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr’s	  Christian	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric—
grammatically	  substituted,	  it	  is	  synonymous	  with	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr’s	  “mythically	  informed,	  
dialectically	  discriminating,	  just	  and	  loving	  attitude,	  embodied	  in	  a	  symbolic	  response	  to	  
collective	  and	  contingent	  appearances.”	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Chapter	  4	  
A	  Christian	  Ethics	  of	  Rhetoric	  
	  
Moses	  was	  keeping	  the	  flock	  of	  his	  father-­‐in-­‐law	  Jethro,	  the	  priest	  of	  Midian;	  he	  led	  
his	  flock	  beyond	  the	  wilderness,	  and	  came	  to	  Horeb,	  the	  mountain	  of	  God.	  There	  the	  
angel	  of	  the	  Lord	  appeared	  to	  him	  in	  a	  flame	  of	  fire	  out	  of	  a	  bush;	  he	  looked,	  and	  the	  
bush	  was	  blazing,	  yet	  it	  was	  not	  consumed.	  
⎯Exodus	  3:1-­‐2	  
	  
Appearances	  come	  to	  us	  in	  all	  shapes	  and	  sizes,	  at	  the	  most	  unexpected	  times	  and	  in	  
the	  most	  unexpected	  places.	  They	  aren’t	  mere	  sensorial	  perceptions	  or	  experiences.	  
Phainomena	  call	  out	  to	  us	  from	  the	  everydayness	  of	  trudge	  and	  toil;	  they	  speak	  to	  us;	  they	  
demand	  something	  from	  us;	  we	  must	  attend	  to	  them.	  So	  it	  was	  for	  Moses,	  who	  is	  still	  today,	  
over	  three	  thousand	  years	  later,	  a	  profitable	  and	  renewable	  model	  for	  contemporary	  social-­‐
movement	  leaders.	  Moses,	  who	  was	  once	  a	  Hebrew	  baby	  floating	  down	  the	  Nile	  river	  in	  a	  
basket,	  once	  the	  crown-­‐prince	  of	  Egypt,	  once	  a	  fugitive	  banished	  from	  Egypt	  after	  
murdering	  an	  Egyptian	  slave-­‐driver,	  is	  now	  a	  shepherd	  tending	  his	  in-­‐law’s	  cattle.	  He	  
comes	  across	  a	  bush	  that	  looks	  as	  if	  it	  is	  burning,	  yet	  not	  burning-­‐up	  and	  he	  says	  to	  his	  
himself:	  “I	  must	  turn	  aside	  and	  look	  at	  this	  great	  sight,	  and	  see	  why	  the	  bush	  is	  not	  burned	  
up”	  (Exodus	  3:3).	  Moses	  is	  attentive	  to	  the	  new	  appearance	  and	  thus,	  he	  undertakes	  an	  
analytic	  inquiry;	  he	  desires	  to	  know	  the	  cause	  and	  effect	  of	  this	  natural	  phenomenon.	  
The	  story	  continues:	  “When	  the	  Lord	  saw	  that	  he	  had	  turned	  aside	  to	  see,	  God	  called	  
to	  him	  out	  of	  the	  bush,	  “Moses,	  Moses!”	  This	  appearance	  was	  more	  than	  Moses	  bargained	  
for;	  not	  only	  was	  it	  violating	  the	  laws	  of	  nature,	  it	  was	  now	  speaking	  audibly.	  Yet,	  Moses	  
attends	  to	  it;	  he	  is	  perceptive	  and	  he	  is	  open	  to	  new	  possibilities.	  Moses	  responds,	  “Here	  I	  
am.”	  He	  doesn’t	  run	  out	  of	  fear.	  He	  doesn’t	  dismiss	  the	  voice	  by	  either	  subsuming	  it	  
dogmatically	  into	  previous	  categorical	  interpretations—“That	  must	  be	  the	  wind”—or	  by	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retreating	  from	  the	  appearance	  into	  the	  depths	  of	  his	  consciousness—“I	  must	  be	  losing	  my	  
mind;”	  Moses	  is	  available	  for	  newness.	  He	  doesn’t	  assume	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  are	  
inviolable	  or	  that	  what	  was,	  is	  bound	  to	  remain	  what	  is;	  Moses	  has	  a	  pluralistic	  approach	  to	  
the	  world	  of	  appearances.	  
Since	  Moses	  has	  inquired	  into	  this	  new	  appearance	  and	  demonstrated	  that	  he	  is	  
attentive	  to	  it,	  a	  dialogue	  becomes	  possible;	  so	  the	  bush	  that	  is	  God	  speaks:	  “Come	  no	  
closer!	  Remove	  the	  sandals	  from	  your	  feet,	  for	  the	  place	  on	  which	  you	  are	  standing	  is	  holy	  
ground…I	  am	  the	  God	  of	  your	  father,	  the	  God	  of	  Abraham,	  the	  God	  of	  Isaac,	  and	  the	  God	  of	  
Jacob.”	  Verse	  6	  tells	  us	  Moses’s	  response:	  “Moses	  hid	  his	  face,	  for	  he	  was	  afraid	  to	  look	  at	  
God.”	  The	  status	  of	  Moses’s	  inquiry	  has	  just	  changed	  dramatically,	  for	  he	  has	  discovered	  
that	  this	  appearance	  is	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  subject-­‐predicate	  analysis.	  Here,	  we	  are	  in	  the	  
realm	  of	  mythos.	  The	  voice	  has	  just	  linked	  itself	  to	  all	  of	  Hebrew	  history.	  This	  God	  is	  the	  
God	  of	  Moses’s	  people,	  their	  tradition,	  their	  past,	  and	  their	  blood.	  
This	  mythic	  God	  of	  the	  Hebrews	  declares	  to	  Moses	  that	  he	  has	  plans	  to	  free	  the	  
Israelites	  and	  that	  he,	  Moses,	  will	  be	  the	  instrumental	  leader	  of	  this	  rebellion.	  Moses	  argues	  
with	  God	  and	  the	  conversation	  isn’t	  one-­‐sided.	  Moses	  worries	  that	  the	  Israelites	  will	  want	  
more	  than	  a	  mythic	  narrative:	  “If	  I	  come	  to	  the	  Israelites	  and	  say	  to	  them,	  ‘The	  God	  of	  your	  
ancestors	  has	  sent	  me	  to	  you,’	  and	  they	  ask	  me,	  ‘What	  is	  his	  name?’	  what	  shall	  I	  say	  to	  
them?”	  (3:14).	  The	  profundity	  of	  God’s	  response	  cannot	  be	  overstated.	  It	  was	  a	  radical	  one,	  
in	  every	  sense	  of	  the	  word	  “radical.”	  His	  answer	  marks	  the	  historical	  transition	  from	  
polytheism	  to	  monotheism.	  God	  says	  to	  Moses,	  “I	  AM	  WHO	  I	  AM.	  Thus	  you	  shall	  say	  to	  the	  
Israelites,	  ‘I	  AM	  has	  sent	  me	  to	  you.’”	  Just	  like	  that,	  we’ve	  move	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  mythos	  to	  
the	  realm	  of	  definition,	  universals,	  names.	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Moses	  has	  other	  concerns	  now.	  He	  worries	  the	  Egyptians	  wont	  believe	  him	  and	  he	  
insists	  that	  his	  ability	  to	  speak	  in	  public	  is	  poor	  at	  best;	  he	  is	  slow	  of	  tongue	  and	  slow	  of	  
speech.	  Thus,	  a	  rhetorical	  inquiry	  begins;	  what	  is	  the	  best	  course	  of	  action	  to	  proceed	  with?	  
The	  definitions	  of	  universals	  impact	  the	  contingencies	  of	  rhetorical	  appearances;	  they	  are	  
important	  factors	  in	  choosing	  the	  right	  course	  of	  action.	  Moses	  doesn’t	  yet	  understand	  that	  
since	  the	  essence	  of	  this	  God	  is	  “I	  AM”	  it	  means	  the	  essence	  of	  Moses	  is	  “I	  AM’s	  VOICE.”	  Thus,	  
when	  Moses	  objects,	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  appearance	  comes	  again	  to	  the	  forefront:	  “Who	  
gives	  speech	  to	  mortals?	  Who	  makes	  them	  mute	  or	  deaf,	  seeing	  or	  blind?	  Is	  it	  not	  I,	  the	  
LORD?	  Now	  go,	  and	  I	  will	  be	  with	  your	  mouth	  and	  teach	  you	  what	  you	  are	  to	  speak.”	  Having	  
traversed	  through	  the	  analytic,	  mythic,	  and	  dialectic	  aspects	  of	  this	  narrative,	  we	  arrive	  at	  
the	  time	  for	  rhetorical	  inquiry.	  What	  is	  the	  best	  course	  of	  action	  to	  achieve	  the	  ends	  in	  
view?	  
Moses	  makes	  a	  final	  plea:	  “O	  my	  Lord,	  please	  send	  someone	  else.”	  The	  call	  to	  ethical	  
action	  is	  a	  burdensome	  one.	  The	  right	  thing	  to	  do	  and	  the	  hard	  thing	  to	  do	  are	  almost	  
always	  the	  same.	  It	  isn’t	  a	  stretch	  to	  say	  that	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  that	  Moses	  was	  
removed	  from	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  Israelite	  suffering.	  As	  a	  slave	  in	  Egypt	  he	  had	  been	  
compelled	  to	  ethical	  action	  by	  killing	  a	  soldier	  who	  had	  hurt	  an	  elderly	  slave	  woman.	  But	  
hear,	  up	  in	  the	  mountains	  with	  his	  sheep,	  they	  were	  out	  of	  sigh	  and	  out	  of	  mind.	  Thus,	  the	  
ethical	  impetus	  for	  action	  wasn’t	  stirred	  in	  Moses’	  bones.	  This	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  story.	  Eliade	  reminds	  us	  that	  myths	  are	  paradigmatic	  models	  for	  human	  
action.	  This	  is	  double-­‐layered	  in	  this	  first	  social	  movement	  narrative.	  Moses	  is	  the	  
paradigmatic	  model	  for	  social	  leaders	  today.	  However,	  we	  should	  note	  that	  Moses	  is	  
enacting	  the	  paradigmatic	  model	  of	  God’s	  action	  as	  well.	  Just	  as	  we	  love	  all	  mankind	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because	  God	  loves	  them,	  so	  too	  we	  pay	  attention	  to	  appearances	  because	  God	  pays	  
attention	  to	  them.	  After	  God	  tells	  Moses	  who	  He	  is,	  he	  continues:	  
I	  have	  observed	  the	  misery	  of	  my	  people	  who	  are	  in	  Egypt;	  I	  have	  heard	  their	  cry	  on	  
account	  of	  their	  taskmasters.	  Indeed,	  I	  know	  their	  sufferings,	  and	  I	  have	  come	  down	  
to	  deliver	  them	  from	  the	  Egyptians,	  and	  to	  bring	  them	  up	  out	  of	  that	  land	  to	  a	  good	  
and	  broad	  land,	  a	  land	  flowing	  with	  milk	  and	  honey…	  the	  cry	  of	  the	  Israelites	  has	  
now	  come	  to	  me;	  I	  have	  also	  seen	  how	  the	  Egyptians	  oppress	  them.	  So	  come,	  I	  will	  
send	  you	  to	  Pharaoh	  to	  bring	  my	  people,	  the	  Israelites,	  out	  of	  Egypt.	  (Exodus	  3:7-­‐10)	  
	  
We	  should	  pay	  attention	  to	  appearances	  because	  God	  pays	  attention	  to	  appearances.	  He	  
sees	  misery,	  He	  hears	  lamentations,	  and	  He	  knows	  their	  pathos.	  Not	  only	  does	  He	  pay	  
attention	  to	  their	  appearances	  but	  he	  addresses	  the	  subject	  predicate	  relationships	  as	  
well—I	  see	  how	  the	  Egyptians	  oppress	  them.	  First	  an	  appearance,	  then	  an	  analysis	  of	  cause	  
and	  effect,	  then	  a	  feeling	  of	  ethical	  contingency	  by	  way	  of	  a	  dialectical	  evaluation	  (that	  is	  
oppression),	  then	  judgment	  and	  action—the	  solution	  is	  to	  bring	  the	  people	  out	  of	  Egypt	  
and	  the	  means	  to	  do	  it	  are	  to	  send	  you	  to	  speak	  on	  my	  behalf.	  
	   God’s	  response	  to	  appearances	  is	  a	  model	  for	  Moses’s	  response	  to	  appearances,	  and	  
Moses’s	  response,	  as	  a	  mythic	  narrative,	  is	  a	  paradigmatic	  model	  for	  how	  the	  Judaic-­‐
Christian	  tradition,	  and	  those	  that	  borrow	  from	  it,	  respond	  to	  appearances	  as	  well.	  If	  we	  
could	  qualify	  this	  cycle	  of	  inquiry	  with	  an	  adjective,	  God	  and	  Moses’s	  model	  inquiries,	  used	  
by	  leaders	  like	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.,	  it	  would	  have	  to	  be	  the	  adjective	  “ethical.”	  We	  can	  
proceed	  from	  that	  shared	  opinion	  and	  ask	  what	  we	  would	  have	  to	  remove	  from	  the	  model	  
that	  would	  make	  us	  remove	  this	  adjective	  as	  well.	  Clearly,	  analytic,	  mythic,	  and	  dialectics	  
aren’t	  enough.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  jump	  ahead	  to	  the	  final	  action	  and	  make	  the	  intervention	  into	  
the	  situation,	  the	  actual	  praxis	  of	  social	  change,	  the	  ethical	  qualifier;	  but	  that	  holds	  true	  
only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  we	  give	  more	  weight	  to	  the	  external	  goods	  of	  action	  in	  the	  here	  an	  now.	  
What	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  here,	  is	  that	  the	  rhetorical	  aspects	  of	  God’s	  argument	  with	  himself,	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demonstrated	  in	  his	  speech	  to	  Moses	  regarding	  how	  he	  came	  to	  this	  decision,	  and	  that	  
Moses’s	  argument	  with	  God,	  were	  precursors	  to	  the	  actual	  “public”	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  social	  
movement;	  and	  that	  these	  precursors	  were	  a	  communal	  practice	  between	  God	  and	  himself,	  
and	  God	  and	  Moses,	  that	  contain	  internal	  goods	  to	  the	  practice	  itself.	  This	  is	  the	  model	  of	  
rhetorical	  inquiry	  that	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr	  gives	  us.	  That	  this	  is	  the	  case	  will	  be	  
demonstrated	  by	  looking	  at	  Niebuhr’s	  formulation	  of	  prophetic	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  unique	  ethical	  
practice	  and	  aesthetic	  response	  to	  appearances.	  To	  do	  this,	  we	  must	  first	  lay	  out	  exactly	  
what	  we	  mean	  by	  rhetoric,	  for	  it	  is,	  if	  nothing	  else,	  a	  highly	  contested	  term.	  
Rhetoric:	  Attending	  to	  Appearances	  Collectively,	  Ethically,	  and	  Aesthetically	  
	  
Our	  understanding	  of	  how	  Niebuhr	  views	  the	  relationship	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  
ethics	  is	  dependent	  upon	  our	  theory	  of	  rhetoric.	  We	  must,	  I	  argue,	  begin	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  
rhetoric	  that	  starts	  with	  appearances,	  for	  analysis	  to	  maintain	  integrity	  with	  Niebuhr’s	  
worldview,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  drawing	  out	  its	  implications	  in	  a	  unique	  way.38	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Any	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  rhetoric	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  inadequate.	  The	  term	  is	  so	  
contested	  that	  perhaps	  the	  best	  we	  can	  do	  is	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  major	  themes	  and	  
strands	  of	  thought	  in	  the	  long	  and	  tumultuous	  history	  of	  rhetoric.	  The	  following	  is	  a	  brief	  
summary	  of	  the	  more	  thorough	  examination	  of	  the	  history	  of	  rhetorical	  theory	  presented	  
in:	  (Grey	  2011)	  The	  Greeks	  conducted	  the	  first	  systematic	  studies	  of	  rhetoric.	  Sappho	  said	  
that	  persuasion,	  Aphrodite’s	  daughter,	  was	  the	  one	  who	  “beguiled	  our	  mortal	  hearts.”	  Plato	  
noted	  that	  rhetoric	  was	  “the	  art	  of	  enchanting	  the	  soul.”	  Aristotle	  agreed	  with	  Plato:	  
rhetoric	  was	  indeed	  an	  art,	  a	  techne;	  he	  added	  however,	  it	  was	  also	  “the	  faculty	  of	  
discovering	  in	  any	  particular	  case	  all	  of	  the	  available	  means	  of	  persuasion,”	  thus	  making	  it	  a	  
“potential	  for	  doing,	  a	  power	  in	  its	  nascent	  stage,”	  a	  dynamis.	  The	  Romans	  didn’t	  move	  too	  
far	  past	  the	  Greeks	  in	  their	  investigations;	  much	  of	  what	  they	  knew	  they	  translated	  from	  
Aristotle	  and	  their	  contributions	  weren’t	  necessarily	  unique,	  as	  much	  as	  they	  were	  more	  
contemporary.	  Cicero	  argued	  that	  rhetoric	  was	  simply	  “speech	  designed	  to	  persuade”	  and	  
that	  as	  an	  art,	  it	  could	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  five	  lesser	  arts:	  “invention,	  disposition,	  
elocution,	  memoria,	  and	  pronunciation.”	  Quintilian	  argued	  “Oratory	  is	  the	  power	  of	  judging	  
and	  discoursing	  on	  civil	  matters	  that	  are	  put	  before	  it	  with	  certain	  persuasiveness,	  action	  of	  
the	  body,	  and	  delivery.”	  During	  medieval	  times	  Augustine	  argued	  that	  noble	  rhetoric	  was	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concerned	  with	  spreading	  the	  word	  of	  God	  and	  that	  every	  such	  treatment	  of	  Scripture	  
depended	  on	  two	  things:	  “the	  means	  of	  discovering	  what	  the	  thought	  may	  be,	  and	  the	  
means	  of	  expressing	  what	  the	  thought	  it.”	  Augustine	  thereby	  made	  explicit	  the	  critical,	  
interpretive,	  hermeneutical	  task	  of	  the	  preacher-­‐rhetor,	  which	  is	  still	  used	  in	  pulpits	  today.	  
Bacon’s	  definition	  may	  have	  been	  the	  most	  poignant	  to	  come	  out	  of	  the	  Renaissance	  and	  I	  
would	  suggest,	  though	  only	  as	  a	  loose	  hypothesis,	  that	  it	  is	  the	  most	  succinct	  summary	  of	  
both	  St.	  Paul’s	  and	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr’s	  unarticulated	  rhetorical	  theories.	  Bacon	  writes,	  “The	  
duty	  and	  office	  of	  Rhetoric	  is	  to	  apply	  Reason	  to	  Imagination	  for	  the	  better	  moving	  of	  the	  
will.”	  Like	  every	  period	  before	  it	  and	  every	  period	  after	  it,	  the	  Enlightenment	  too	  brought	  
both	  positive	  and	  negative	  summations	  of	  the	  art.	  Vico	  argued	  that	  eloquence	  is,	  in	  effect,	  
“wisdom,	  ornately	  and	  copiously	  delivered	  in	  words	  appropriate	  to	  the	  common	  opinion	  of	  
mankind;”	  while	  Locke	  argued	  that	  rhetoric	  was	  “that	  powerful	  instrument	  of	  error	  and	  
deceit.”	  A.N.	  Whitehead,	  standing	  at	  the	  precipice	  of	  modernity,	  emphasized	  the	  more	  
democratic	  functions	  of	  rhetoric	  in	  his	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  Greeks;	  he	  writes,	  “The	  
creation	  of	  the	  world—said	  Plato—is	  the	  victory	  of	  persuasion	  over	  force.	  The	  worth	  of	  
men	  consists	  in	  their	  liability	  to	  persuasion”—thereby	  condemning	  current	  day	  politicians	  
on	  both	  the	  left	  and	  right	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle.	  Kenneth	  Burke,	  by	  almost	  any	  standard	  one	  can	  
use	  to	  measure	  such	  things,	  was	  modernity’s	  the	  most	  influential	  rhetorical	  theorist.	  No	  
one,	  perhaps	  since	  Aristotle,	  has	  added	  more	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  artistic	  aspects	  of	  
the	  rhetorical	  form.	  Drawing	  from	  the	  works	  of	  Nietzsche,	  Freud,	  and	  Marx,	  Burke	  wrestled	  
rhetoric	  from	  Plato	  by	  turning	  him	  on	  his	  head,	  arguing	  that	  rhetoric	  was	  everywhere,	  even	  
in	  the	  discourses	  of	  experts	  who	  used	  rhetoric	  to	  debunk	  rhetoric.	  Burke	  argued	  that	  the	  
best	  approach	  to	  rhetoric	  was	  a	  dramatic	  one	  because	  language	  was	  essentially	  “symbolic	  
action.”	  It	  is	  man’s	  nature	  to	  respond	  to	  symbols,	  Burke	  argued,	  and	  rhetoric	  was	  
essentially	  the	  organization	  of	  these	  symbols	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  cooperative	  action.	  As	  
Grey	  notes,	  Burke	  would	  famously	  anticipate	  the	  Holocaust	  by	  studying	  Hitler’s	  rhetoric,	  
“finding	  in	  it	  an	  identification/separation	  dynamic	  that	  anticipated	  the	  attempt	  to	  purify	  
German	  culture”	  (12).	  Richard	  Weaver	  echoed	  Burke’s	  idea	  of	  “organizing”	  when	  he	  
insisted	  on	  rhetoric’s	  “ordering”	  aspects.	  In	  his	  brilliantly	  insightful	  reading	  of	  Plato’s	  
Phaedrus,	  Weaver	  argued	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  an	  “art	  of	  emphasis	  embodying	  an	  order	  of	  
desire.”	  Thus,	  rhetoric	  is	  given	  an	  advisory	  role;	  “it	  has	  the	  office	  of	  advising	  men	  with	  
referent	  to	  an	  independent	  order	  of	  goods	  and	  with	  reference	  to	  their	  particular	  situation	  
as	  it	  relates	  to	  these.”	  Lloyd	  Bitzer	  extended	  these	  analyses	  into	  the	  first	  notable,	  explicitly	  
“constructivist”	  definition.	  Rhetoric,	  for	  Bitzer,	  was	  “a	  mode	  of	  altering	  reality,	  not	  by	  the	  
direct	  application	  of	  energy	  to	  objects,	  but	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  discourse	  which	  changes	  
reality	  through	  the	  mediation	  of	  thought	  and	  action.”	  Robert	  Scott	  moves	  us	  from	  reality	  to	  
truth	  in	  his	  definition:	  “Man	  must	  consider	  truth	  not	  as	  something	  fixed	  and	  final	  but	  as	  
something	  to	  be	  created	  moment	  by	  moment	  in	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  he	  finds	  
himself	  and	  with	  which	  he	  must	  cope.”	  Rhetoric,	  Scott	  insisted,	  was	  epistemic;	  it	  was	  a	  
unique	  “way	  of	  knowing.”	  Once	  the	  floodgates	  of	  post-­‐modernity	  were	  opened,	  themes	  of	  
“power”	  and	  the	  commodification	  of	  discourse	  rushed	  in	  and	  imbued	  the	  study	  of	  rhetoric	  
with	  a	  tone	  of	  war	  and	  violence.	  Rhetoric	  became	  about	  the	  rhetorical	  criticism	  and	  
linguistic	  deconstruction	  of	  dominant,	  exclusionary,	  hegemonic,	  unfairly	  legitimized	  and	  
institutionalized	  rhetorics.	  Although	  it	  is	  admittedly	  reductionist	  to	  do	  so,	  for	  time	  and	  
space	  constraints,	  this	  quote	  from	  Foucault	  serves	  as	  an	  adequate	  stand-­‐in	  for	  the	  general	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Simply	  stated,	  appearances	  matter;	  in	  fact,	  if	  we’ve	  learned	  nothing	  else	  about	  Niebuhr	  up	  
to	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  that	  the	  God	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  prophetic	  religion	  commands	  us	  to	  care	  about	  
this	  world.	  This	  means	  that	  any	  theory	  of	  rhetoric	  adequate	  for	  our	  task	  must	  begin	  with	  
the	  same	  presupposition.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  aspects	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  Christianity	  was	  
that	  it	  was	  a	  revealed	  religion.	  This	  is	  what	  made	  appearances	  matter	  for	  Niebuhr.	  God	  was	  
in	  history	  and	  Christ	  entered	  history,	  so	  obviously	  the	  appearances	  of	  history	  counted	  for	  
something.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
theme	  of	  the	  period:	  “In	  every	  society	  the	  production	  of	  discourse	  is	  at	  once	  controlled,	  
selected,	  organized,	  and	  redistributed	  by	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  procedures	  whose	  role	  is	  to	  
ward	  off	  the	  powers	  and	  dangers,	  to	  gain	  mastery	  over	  its	  chance	  events,	  to	  evade	  its	  
ponderous,	  formidable	  materiality…	  discourse	  is	  the	  power	  which	  is	  to	  be	  seized.”	  Thus,	  
Foucault	  greatly	  expanded	  the	  breadth	  of	  what	  is	  understood	  as	  rhetorical	  by	  showing	  how	  
even	  so-­‐called	  “objective”	  or	  “neutral”	  discourses	  were	  power-­‐laden,	  persuasive	  rhetorics.	  
These	  discourses	  were	  used	  to	  define	  individuals	  and	  practices	  as	  deviant,	  such	  as	  the	  term	  
“homosexual,”	  demonstrating	  that	  rhetoric	  was	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  ways	  that	  power	  is	  
exercised	  over	  a	  group	  or	  community.	  The	  postmodern	  critique	  was	  damaging	  to	  rhetoric,	  
to	  say	  the	  least;	  and	  many	  have	  argued,	  after	  surveying	  the	  wreckage,	  that	  it	  was	  damaging	  
to	  society.	  Even	  those	  who	  once	  sang	  the	  praises	  of	  science	  studies,	  like	  Bruno	  Latour,	  point	  
out	  that	  the	  weapons	  of	  post-­‐modernity,	  like	  any	  weapon	  worth	  having,	  are	  being	  used	  
against	  them—as	  they	  were	  used	  by	  the	  Bush	  administration,	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  political	  
left,	  to	  discredit	  “global	  warming.”	  Naveh	  (2002)	  argues	  a	  bit	  more	  polemically	  than	  Latour.	  
By	  his	  estimation,	  postmodern	  thinkers	  invented	  a	  new	  jargon	  in	  order	  to	  radically	  
challenge	  prevailing	  concepts	  and	  methods,	  and	  they	  “purposefully	  obscured	  distinct	  
analytical	  tools	  and	  common	  methods	  of	  interpretation”	  (277).	  Transgressing	  disciplinary	  
lines	  and	  blurring	  the	  boundaries	  between	  text	  and	  context,	  subject	  and	  object,	  event	  and	  
representation,	  form	  and	  content,	  knowledge	  and	  language,	  reality	  and	  virtual	  reality,	  fact	  
and	  imagination,	  ideas	  and	  politics,	  these	  thinkers	  “endorsed	  and	  even	  increased	  cultural	  
anarchy	  by	  challenging	  the	  meaning,	  coherence,	  validity,	  and	  transparency	  of	  the	  human	  
experience.”	  They	  did	  fight	  hegemonic	  discourse,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  they	  admitted	  that	  
human	  relationships	  were	  essentially	  political,	  power	  relations.	  However,	  their	  new	  
vocabularies	  made	  their	  new	  interpretations	  even	  more	  obscure,	  and	  negations	  of	  any	  
meaningful	  anchors	  led	  them	  to	  “embrace	  moral	  relativism	  and	  epistemological	  chaos”	  
(279).	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   This	  means	  that	  both	  Socratic	  and	  Platonic	  theories	  of	  rhetoric	  will	  be	  found	  
wanting	  for	  our	  tasks.39	  A	  sophistic	  rhetorical	  theory	  that	  starts	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  
man	  is	  the	  measure	  of	  all	  things	  is	  inadequate.	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  man	  is	  the	  measure	  of	  
all	  political	  things,	  but	  he	  is	  hardly	  the	  standard	  for	  agape	  love	  or	  perfect	  justice	  because	  
his	  love	  and	  justice	  are	  always	  his	  love	  and	  justice.	  Even	  if	  Protagoras’	  argument	  were	  
merely	  an	  exercise	  in	  dissoi	  logoi,	  this	  irreverent	  playfulness	  with	  language	  and	  truth	  would	  
was	  anathema	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  more	  “reverent	  agnosticism.”	  Appearances	  mattered	  for	  
Niebuhr,	  but	  they	  weren’t	  all	  that	  mattered;	  or	  we	  might	  say,	  to	  use	  Niebuhr’s	  own	  terms,	  
they	  didn’t	  matter	  “ultimately.”	  However,	  any	  theory	  of	  rhetoric	  that	  begins	  with	  the	  
assumption	  that	  appearances	  are	  insignificant	  is	  equally	  unhelpful.	  Here	  we	  find	  Plato’s	  
belief	  that	  “form,	  the	  ultimate	  meaningful	  essence	  of	  a	  thing’s	  identity,	  was	  absolutely,	  
timelessly	  real”	  and	  thus,	  “it	  followed	  of	  necessity	  that	  all	  objects	  of	  social	  appearance	  
could	  only	  be	  shadows,	  illusions	  of	  this	  more	  profound,	  hidden	  truth.”	  All	  art	  then,	  
including	  the	  techne	  of	  rhetoric,	  was	  merely	  the	  practice	  of	  inventing	  appearances—an	  
imitation	  of	  an	  imitation—twice	  removed	  from	  its	  true	  nature.	  Rhetoric	  then,	  just	  as	  the	  
other	  arts,	  was	  not	  just	  to	  be	  critiqued	  and	  discounted	  as	  failing	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  
beautiful,	  the	  good,	  and	  the	  true;	  it	  was,	  as	  Farrell	  notes,	  to	  be	  “banished	  from	  the	  kingdom	  
of	  the	  ideal.”	  
	   Plato’s	  frustrations	  were	  justified.	  “The	  Homeric	  spell	  of	  mythos”	  was	  taking	  over	  
Greek	  culture;	  poetry	  hypnotically	  mesmerized	  citizens,	  rhetoric	  poisoned	  the	  soul	  and	  lied	  
to	  the	  Greek	  polis,	  manipulating	  both	  sight	  and	  sound	  through	  pleasing	  images.	  In	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Though	  some	  have	  problematized	  and	  reread	  both	  the	  Sophists	  and	  Platonic	  traditions,	  
allowing	  for	  some	  consideration	  of	  appearances,	  these	  counter-­‐readings	  are	  not	  yet	  
mainstream;	  regardless,	  the	  effort	  required	  to	  “stretch”	  these	  theories	  here	  would	  be	  
inefficient	  and	  unnecessary.	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words,	  Plato’s	  frustration	  with	  the	  arts,	  specifically	  rhetoric,	  was	  that	  they	  did	  their	  jobs	  
too	  well.	  Rhetoric	  worked.	  Had	  it	  not	  worked,	  he	  could	  have	  easily	  ignored	  it.	  From	  
Niebuhr’s	  perspective,	  Plato’s	  first	  mistake	  was	  making	  rational	  coherency,	  instead	  of	  
phronesis,	  the	  standard	  for	  judgments	  about	  truth.	  Plato	  didn’t	  have	  to	  follow	  the	  logic	  
through;	  he	  didn’t	  have	  to	  insist	  that	  if	  those	  things	  that	  don’t	  appear	  are	  true,	  then	  those	  
things	  that	  appear	  are	  false.	  He	  could	  have,	  as	  Niebuhr	  did,	  said	  “both/and.”	  Secondly,	  
Niebuhr	  would	  have	  insisted	  that	  rhetoric,	  as	  an	  art,	  requires	  imagination	  and	  creation,	  and	  
since	  it	  is	  man	  who	  does	  the	  imagining	  and	  creating—man	  who	  transmutes	  his	  will-­‐to-­‐live	  
in	  to	  a	  will-­‐to-­‐power—it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  every	  art	  is	  “both/and”	  as	  well:	  both	  good	  and	  
evil,	  both	  creative	  and	  destructive,	  both	  just	  and	  unjust.	  As	  it	  happens,	  we’ve	  a	  theory	  of	  
rhetoric	  that	  articulates	  something	  very	  akin	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  thoughts	  on	  these	  matters,	  which	  
instructively	  accounts	  for	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  
Unlike	  Plato,	  Aristotle	  wanted	  to	  save	  appearances;	  after	  all,	  what	  more	  is	  a	  human	  
being	  than	  an	  appearance	  and	  what	  dignity	  does	  it	  do	  a	  man	  to	  hate	  himself?	  Thus,	  
Aristotle	  begins	  book	  seven	  of	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics:	  
One	  ought,	  as	  with	  other	  things,	  when	  one	  has	  set	  forth	  the	  appearances	  
(phainomena),	  and	  has	  gone	  through	  the	  impasses	  a	  first	  time,	  to	  bring	  to	  light	  in	  
that	  way	  especially	  all	  the	  received	  opinions	  (ta	  endoxa)	  about	  these	  experiences,	  or	  
if	  not	  that,	  then	  most	  and	  the	  most	  authoritative	  of	  these	  opinions.	  For	  if	  the	  
difficulties	  are	  resolved,	  and	  something	  is	  left	  of	  the	  received	  opinions	  (endoxa),	  it	  
would	  have	  been	  made	  evident	  in	  an	  adequate	  way.	  (1145biii)	  
	  
According	  to	  Nussbaum,	  Aristotle	  defined	  appearance	  as	  a	  “loose	  and	  inclusive	  notion	  of	  
‘experience,’	  or	  the	  way(s)	  a	  human	  observer	  sees	  or	  ‘takes’	  the	  world”	  (Owen,	  Schofield,	  
and	  Nussbaum	  2006,	  244).	  Appearances	  for	  Aristotle	  were	  not	  mere	  sense	  perceptions:	  
“phainomena	  must	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  our	  beliefs	  and	  interpretations,	  often	  as	  revealed	  in	  
linguistic	  usage”	  (ibid.).	  For	  Aristotle,	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  true	  philosopher	  was	  to	  dedicate	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oneself	  to	  what	  Nussbaum	  calls	  the	  hard	  work	  of	  “struggling	  for	  an	  unconditional	  vantage	  
point	  outside	  of	  appearances”	  insofar	  as	  “philosophy	  is	  a	  worthwhile	  enterprise	  only	  if	  it	  
takes	  us	  away	  from	  the	  ‘cave’	  and	  up	  into	  the	  sunlight”	  (ibid.,	  258).	  
Farrell	  argues	  that	  the	  special	  contribution	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  is	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  
ethical	  “inquiry.”	  Aristotle	  senses	  that	  “appearances	  admit	  to	  a	  tension	  between	  their	  
stability	  and	  ‘the	  shifting	  way	  in	  which	  they	  appear’”	  (1993,	  27).	  The	  world	  is	  moving	  
underneath	  our	  feet.	  Farrell	  describes	  the	  process	  this	  way:	  
The	  particularity	  of	  things	  becomes	  a	  provocation.	  We	  cannot	  leave	  well	  enough	  
along.	  We	  also	  disagree	  about	  things.	  We	  may	  try	  to	  ignore	  them.	  We	  may	  take	  issue	  
as	  regards	  what	  they	  mean.	  Eventually—perhaps	  sooner	  than	  we	  wish—we	  may	  
have	  to	  own	  up	  to	  them,	  make	  judgments	  about	  them,	  and	  act	  on	  them.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
While	  analytic	  and	  dialectic	  can	  address	  stabilized	  concepts,	  new	  and	  novel	  appearances	  
come	  crashing	  down	  on	  us	  and	  present	  us	  with	  the	  characteristic	  aspect	  of	  rhetoric—that	  is,	  
shared	  contingency.	  Most	  of	  the	  time	  we	  are	  at	  home	  in	  the	  world	  of	  appearances;	  if	  we	  
were	  not,	  life	  would	  be	  quite	  insufferable	  as	  every	  drive	  to	  work	  would	  make	  for	  long	  and	  
difficult	  intellectual	  labor.	  But	  when	  the	  stakes	  go	  up	  and	  we	  have	  a	  particular	  interest	  in	  
the	  array	  of	  things	  around	  us,	  we	  aren’t	  likely	  to	  care	  what	  the	  general	  opinion	  about	  it	  is.	  
We	  find	  Aristotle	  and	  Niebuhr	  sharing	  an	  ultimate	  concern	  with	  ethics,	  not	  truth	  qua	  
truth;	  furthermore,	  we	  see	  how	  this	  transmutes	  into	  a	  concern	  with	  rhetoric.	  According	  to	  
Farrell,	  appearances	  are	  vital	  in	  rhetoric	  for	  a	  political	  reason,	  not	  an	  epistemological	  one—
it	  is	  precisely	  rhetorical	  discourse	  that	  “allows	  this	  plurality	  of	  appearances	  to	  be	  presented,	  
witnessed,	  regarded,	  qualified,	  and	  subverted	  by	  the	  perspectives	  of	  others”	  (ibid.,	  283).	  
Aristotle	  and	  Niebuhr	  seem	  to	  share	  a	  view	  of	  politics	  and	  appearances	  that	  is	  further	  
evidence	  by	  Nussbaum’s	  summary	  of	  Aristotle’s	  view	  of	  phainomena.	  She	  writes,	  “This,	  
then—if	  we	  may	  characterize	  it	  for	  ourselves	  using	  language	  not	  known	  to	  Aristotle	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himself—is	  a	  kind	  of	  realism,	  neither	  idealism	  of	  any	  sort	  nor	  skepticism…	  a	  realism	  that	  
articulates	  very	  carefully	  the	  limits	  within	  which	  any	  realism	  must	  live”	  (2006,	  246).	  
Nussbaum	  sums	  up	  Aristotle’s	  philosophy	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  sums	  up	  Niebuhr’s	  
approach	  to	  appearances	  as	  well:	  “Aristotelian	  philosophy,	  then,	  like	  (and	  as	  a	  part	  of)	  our	  
human	  nature,	  exists	  in	  a	  continual	  oscillation	  between	  too	  much	  order	  and	  disorder,	  
ambition	  and	  abandonment,	  excess	  and	  deficiency,	  the	  super-­‐human	  and	  the	  merely	  animal”	  
(ibid.,	  262).	  We	  could	  just	  as	  well	  substitute	  Niebuhr’s	  own	  dialectical	  oscillations	  between:	  
the	  ideal	  and	  the	  actual,	  love	  and	  justice,	  transcendence	  and	  immanence,	  detachment	  and	  
attachment,	  in	  the	  world	  but	  not	  of	  it.	  
The	  Ethics	  of	  Rhetorical	  Inquiry	  
	  
I	  am	  really	  beginning	  to	  like	  the	  ministry.	  I	  think	  since	  I	  have	  stopped	  worrying	  so	  
much	  about	  the	  intellectual	  problems	  of	  religion	  and	  have	  begun	  to	  explore	  some	  of	  
its	  ethical	  problems	  there	  is	  more	  of	  a	  thrill	  in	  preaching.	  The	  real	  meaning	  of	  the	  
gospel	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  most	  of	  the	  customs	  and	  attitudes	  of	  our	  day	  at	  so	  many	  
places	  that	  there	  is	  real	  adventure	  in	  the	  Christian	  message,	  even	  if	  you	  only	  play	  
around	  with	  its	  ideas	  in	  a	  conventional	  world.	  I	  can’t	  say	  that	  I	  have	  done	  anything	  
in	  my	  life	  to	  dramatize	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  gospel	  and	  the	  world.	  But	  I	  find	  it	  
increasingly	  interesting	  to	  set	  the	  two	  in	  juxtaposition	  at	  least	  in	  my	  mind	  and	  in	  the	  
minds	  of	  others.	  And	  of	  course	  ideas	  may	  finally	  lead	  to	  action.	  
⎯Niebuhr,	  Leaves	  
This	  reflection	  provides	  us	  a	  way	  into	  Niebuhr’s	  rhetorical	  theories	  and	  practices	  
that	  connect	  us	  up	  with	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric.	  Niebuhr’s	  many	  reflections	  on	  pulpit	  rhetoric,	  
much	  like	  the	  one	  here,	  rarely	  focus	  on	  a	  specific	  exigency	  pressing	  down	  upon	  the	  
congregation	  that	  demanded	  a	  specific	  judgment	  about	  an	  immediate	  course	  of	  action,	  e.g.	  
“should	  we	  march	  for	  the	  autoworkers	  this	  coming	  weekend	  or	  should	  we	  encourage	  them	  
to	  go	  on	  strike?”	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Niebuhr’s	  rhetorical	  reflections	  demonstrate	  that	  he	  
didn’t	  view	  the	  rhetorical	  task	  of	  the	  preacher	  as	  that	  of	  the	  statesman	  or	  prophet.	  This	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doesn’t	  mean,	  however,	  that	  he	  didn’t	  view	  the	  task	  as	  political.	  Politics	  was	  about	  power	  
relations	  and	  ethics	  for	  Niebuhr,	  while	  statecraft	  was	  about	  policies	  and	  legislation.	  
Niebuhr’s	  task,	  as	  he	  reveals	  here,	  was	  to	  set	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  gospel	  into	  juxtaposition	  with	  
the	  goings	  on	  of	  this	  world,	  not	  because	  it	  guides	  us	  about	  what	  to	  do	  in	  terms	  of	  policies,	  
but	  simply	  because	  it	  is	  “interesting.”	  He	  notes	  “ideas	  may	  finally	  lead	  to	  action,”	  but	  he	  
doesn’t	  sound	  very	  hopeful	  here;	  it	  almost	  sounds	  like	  the	  practical	  value	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  
practice	  is	  only	  an	  after	  thought.	  How	  can	  this	  be?	  How	  can	  rhetoric	  be	  conceived	  in	  such	  
non-­‐utilitarian	  terms?	  Isn’t	  rhetoric	  about	  deliberating	  about	  pressing	  matters	  and	  the	  best	  
courses	  of	  action?	  Commemorating	  heroic	  lives	  after	  they’ve	  passed	  on?	  Arguing	  about	  the	  
relative	  guilt	  or	  innocence	  of	  the	  accused	  in	  courtrooms?	  
The	  answer	  to	  these	  questions	  is	  found	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  rhetorical	  theory.	  
Rhetoric,	  in	  Greek	  thought,	  goes	  from	  a	  form	  of	  argument	  about	  what	  to	  do,	  to	  an	  ethical	  
cultural	  practice	  with	  internal	  goods	  of	  virtuous	  conduct.	  Farrell	  traces	  the	  history	  of	  
rhetoric	  from	  Protagoras	  to	  Isocrates	  to	  Aristotle,	  noting	  how	  its	  ethical	  components	  shift	  
with	  each	  thinker.	  Protagoras	  starts	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  ethics	  are	  teachable	  on	  
empirical	  grounds.	  Our	  public	  practices	  presuppose	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  recognizing	  what	  is	  
right,	  and	  of	  acting	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  is	  virtuous.	  The	  facts	  of	  our	  experience	  say	  this	  is	  so,	  
Protagoras	  seems	  to	  say;	  were	  ethics	  not	  teachable,	  then	  why	  do	  people	  get	  angry	  at	  each	  
other’s	  failings?	  The	  conclusion	  Protagoras’	  great	  speech	  reaches,	  though	  it	  is	  not	  without	  
its	  problems,	  is	  significant.	  The	  reason	  everyone	  can	  give	  advice	  on	  politics	  and	  that	  
everyone	  can	  be	  instructive	  about	  virtue,	  is	  because	  the	  democratic	  culture	  starts	  from	  the	  
assumption	  that	  we	  are	  all	  citizens	  and	  that	  all	  citizens	  are	  capable	  of	  civic	  and	  rhetorical	  
excellence.	  Thus,	  for	  Protagoras,	  “our	  civic	  and	  rhetorical	  conduct	  is	  unavoidably	  ethical	  in	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its	  significance”	  Farrell	  argues	  (1993,	  57).	  Just	  as	  everyone	  is	  a	  teacher	  of	  a	  community’s	  
native	  language,	  everyone	  is	  a	  teacher	  of	  how	  to	  be	  a	  good	  citizen,	  part	  of	  which	  means,	  
being	  a	  noble	  rhetor.	  
	   In	  Farrell’s	  analysis	  of	  Isocrates	  Antidosis,	  we	  find	  a	  more	  realistic	  analysis	  of	  the	  
ethics	  of	  the	  Greek	  community,	  though	  importantly,	  Isocrates	  is	  not	  a	  cynic.	  Isocrates	  
taught	  great	  and	  noble	  themes,	  more	  than	  hair-­‐splitting	  dialectics;	  much	  in	  the	  way	  that	  
Niebuhr	  insisted	  he	  was	  a	  pastor	  and	  not	  a	  theologian.	  Just	  like	  Niebuhr	  in	  Detroit,	  
Isocrates	  soon	  realized	  that	  his	  “Great	  and	  noble	  themes	  and	  lifelong	  dedication	  to	  the	  
formative	  art	  of	  rhetoric”	  were	  not	  enough	  (ibid.,	  59).	  Among	  tyrants	  and	  abusive	  policies,	  
Isocrates	  problem	  echoes	  Niebuhr’s:	  “how	  to	  use	  rhetoric	  to	  help	  revitalize	  its	  significance	  
as	  an	  ethical	  practice.”	  Isocrates	  chooses	  to	  ignore	  the	  “sycophants”	  and	  addresses	  his	  
solutions	  to	  the	  saving	  remnant	  of	  Greek	  culture,	  those	  “remaining	  honest	  persons	  in	  
Athens	  who	  have	  not	  been	  corrupted.”	  Isocrates	  writes:	  
My	  view	  of	  this	  question	  is,	  as	  it	  happens,	  very	  simple.	  For	  since	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  
nature	  of	  man	  to	  attain	  a	  science	  by	  the	  possession	  of	  which	  we	  can	  know	  positively	  
what	  we	  should	  do	  or	  what	  we	  should	  say,	  in	  the	  next	  resort	  I	  hold	  that	  man	  to	  be	  
wise	  who	  is	  able	  by	  his	  powers	  of	  conjecture	  to	  arrive	  generally	  at	  the	  best	  course.	  
(ibid.,	  268-­‐72).	  
Farrell	  notes	  that	  in	  Isocrates	  humble	  vision,	  “the	  Good	  is	  not	  implanted	  in	  our	  souls	  as	  
some	  prior	  truth”	  as	  it	  was	  for	  Protagoras;	  nor	  was	  it	  “forever	  removed	  from	  our	  lives”	  as	  it	  
was	  for	  Plato.	  Again,	  Niebuhr	  comes	  roaring	  forth	  in	  Farrell’s	  summation	  of	  Isocrates:	  
“Rather,	  it	  is	  approximated	  most	  of	  the	  time	  in	  our	  ongoing	  attempts	  to	  do	  the	  best	  we	  can	  
with	  what	  we	  have”	  (ibid.,	  59).	  No	  art	  can	  help	  us	  achieve	  the	  ideal.	  “The	  kind	  of	  art	  which	  
will	  implant	  honesty	  and	  justice	  in	  depraved	  natures	  has	  never	  existed	  and	  does	  not	  now	  
exist,”	  and	  anyone	  who	  professes	  such	  power	  will	  grow	  old	  and	  tired	  before	  any	  such	  art	  is	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found,	  Isocrates	  argues.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  art	  that	  best	  equips	  us	  for	  these	  human	  efforts	  at	  
approximating	  the	  ideal	  of	  justice	  is	  rhetoric.	  How	  does	  it	  do	  this?	  It	  is	  significantly	  not	  by	  
some	  didactic	  method	  that	  depends	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  persuade	  one	  another	  to	  do	  the	  right	  
thing.	  Instead,	  ethical	  conduct	  is	  the	  by-­‐product	  of	  rhetorical	  competence;	  it	  is	  a	  good	  
intrinsic	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  practice.	  The	  true	  advantage	  gained	  from	  rhetoric	  is	  not	  the	  
short-­‐term	  advantages	  of	  winning	  an	  argument,	  Isocrates	  insists;	  it	  is	  rather,	  “the	  true	  
advantage	  that	  comes	  from	  taking	  one’s	  craft	  seriously”	  (ibid.,	  60).	  Ethos	  then,	  for	  Isocrates,	  
was	  not	  a	  manipulative	  component	  of	  rhetoric;	  it	  was	  rather	  the	  by-­‐product	  of	  rhetoric—
learn	  the	  practice	  of	  justification	  through	  speech,	  and	  you	  will	  be	  justified;	  master	  the	  
practice	  of	  rhetoric,	  and	  virtue	  will	  follow	  (ibid.,	  61).	  
This	  is	  why	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  is	  instructive	  for	  inquiring	  into	  Niebuhr’	  view	  of	  
rhetoric	  as	  a	  “juxtaposing	  the	  gospel	  and	  the	  world;”	  because	  ideas	  may,	  after	  all,	  one	  day,	  
fingers	  crossed,	  lead	  to	  ethical	  action.	  Nowhere	  does	  Aristotle	  state	  explicitly	  that	  the	  goal	  
of	  rhetoric	  is	  to	  persuade.	  Instead,	  as	  Farrell	  argues,	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  presents	  us	  with	  
rhetoric	  as	  a	  “practice,”	  specifically	  a	  practice	  in	  judgment	  where	  certain	  appearances	  are	  
experienced	  as	  problematic	  (ibid.,	  94).	  Drawing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre40,	  
Farrell	  notes	  the	  distinction	  between	  goods	  internal	  to	  a	  practice	  and	  those	  that	  are	  
external.	  MacIntyre	  uses	  chess	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  practice	  with	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  
goods.	  Farrell	  notes	  that	  MacIntyre’s	  distinction	  is	  serviceable	  for	  rhetoric	  provided	  we	  
remember	  two	  things	  (ibid.,	  95).	  First,	  the	  internal	  goods	  of	  an	  activity	  aren’t	  necessarily	  
the	  reason	  one	  does	  the	  activity.	  We	  may	  recall	  Niebuhr’s	  point	  about	  the	  Christian	  ethic	  
here:	  if	  one	  loses	  oneself	  in	  order	  to	  find	  oneself,	  the	  agape	  ethic	  is	  self-­‐serving	  and	  the	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desired	  result	  evades	  you.	  Likewise,	  one	  can’t	  play	  chess	  just	  in	  order	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  
overcome	  adversity;	  one	  plays	  to	  capture	  the	  enemies	  King.	  
Second,	  the	  internal	  goods	  of	  a	  practice	  are	  not	  always	  “localized	  within	  the	  
autonomous	  agent	  alone”	  (ibid.,	  95).	  Farrell	  writes:	  “There	  is	  an	  unmistakable	  pedagogical	  
sense	  in	  which	  improved	  performance	  by	  the	  other	  improves	  the	  quality	  of	  play,	  one’s	  
appreciation	  for	  the	  game,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  resolve	  of	  one’s	  opponent”	  (ibid.).	  	  Aristotle’s	  
theory,	  according	  to	  Farrell,	  is	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  a	  practice	  of	  “relational	  goods,”	  which	  
requires	  another	  person	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  practiced	  and	  cultivated.	  Rhetoric,	  an	  activity	  with	  its	  
own	  intrinsic	  goods,	  is	  thus	  a	  practice—“a	  coherent,	  creative	  activity	  admitting	  certain	  
standards	  of	  accomplishment.	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  demonstrates	  how	  rhetoric,	  as	  a	  
community	  practice,	  is	  an	  activity	  with	  internal	  standards	  of	  excellence	  that,	  if	  achieved,	  
yield	  ethical	  conduct	  (ibid.,	  62).	  Rhetoric	  then,	  has	  ethical	  propensity	  because	  it	  engages	  
the	  particularity	  of	  appearances	  as	  contingencies	  in	  which	  the	  rhetor	  and	  audience	  have	  a	  
shared	  interest.	  
In	  Aristotle’s	  view,	  a	  fully	  realized	  noble	  rhetoric	  is	  a	  community	  practice	  among	  
those	  with	  a	  certain	  mutual	  regard	  for	  one	  another.	  	  The	  “preferred	  condition	  of	  audiences”	  
in	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  is	  one	  of	  “civic	  friendship,”	  in	  which	  “the	  partiality	  of	  regard	  is	  the	  
better	  part	  of	  prudential	  reason”	  (ibid.).	  This	  means	  that	  rhetoric,	  by	  Farrell’s	  estimation,	  
“is	  the	  principal	  art	  responsible	  for	  the	  shape	  and	  coloration	  of	  public	  character.”	  It	  
functions	  as	  such,	  when	  rhetoric	  is	  practiced	  as	  a	  dynamis,	  which	  like	  virtue,	  is	  a	  nascent	  
capacity	  for	  action	  that	  will	  one	  day	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  perform.	  Practicing	  rhetoric,	  in	  other	  
words,	  is	  how	  a	  community	  practices	  making	  judgments	  in	  crises	  by	  seeking	  out	  all	  the	  
available	  means	  for	  persuasion	  in	  a	  given	  contingency.	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The	  Aesthetics	  of	  Rhetorical	  Reconfiguration:	  Pathos,	  Tragedy	  and	  Irony	  
	  
Appearances	  shared	  by	  human	  beings	  are	  re-­‐presented	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  a	  practical	  
consciousness,	  which	  guides	  and	  legitimates	  collective	  human	  conduct.	  Rhetoric	  
regards	  appearances	  as	  the	  primary	  aesthetic	  material	  for	  the	  continual	  reinvention	  
of	  human	  agency,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  offers	  some	  preliminary	  construal	  of	  their	  ethical	  
possibility.	  
⎯Thomas	  Farrell,	  Norms	  of	  Rhetorical	  Culture	  
	  
The	  dynamis	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  lays	  dormant	  until	  we	  are	  faced	  with	  
“contingency.”	  Contingency	  deals	  with	  the	  probable	  and	  the	  uncertain,	  but	  it	  must	  not	  be	  
understood	  in	  material	  or	  logical	  terms	  alone.	  The	  former	  places	  it	  only	  in	  the	  world	  of	  
events;	  yet	  rhetoric	  always	  deals	  with	  the	  movement	  from	  “imminent	  uncertainty	  of	  chance	  
and	  fortune	  toward	  the	  eventual	  facticity	  of	  historical	  truth”	  (Farrell	  1993,	  77).	  The	  latter	  
emphasis	  leaves	  us	  with	  propositions	  alone;	  turning	  rhetoric	  into	  a	  mere	  form	  of	  logos—
flawed	  at	  best,	  Farrell	  notes.	  If	  we	  are	  to	  take	  Niebuhr’s	  work	  as	  rhetorical,	  then	  we	  must	  
acknowledge	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  definitions	  of	  contingency	  allow	  for	  Niebuhr’	  love	  ideal	  
as	  an	  “impossible	  possibility.”	  A	  broader	  understanding	  of	  contingency	  is	  necessary.	  	  
Originally,	  Aristotle	  distinguished	  contingency	  from	  the	  necessary	  and	  the	  
impossible.	  Contingents	  were	  things	  that	  were	  sometimes	  the	  case	  and	  sometimes	  not	  the	  
case.	  It	  is	  something	  whose	  truth	  is	  “intermittent”	  (ibid.).	  We	  don’t	  argue	  about	  things	  that	  
never	  will	  be	  or	  things	  that	  will	  be,	  regardless.	  These	  middle	  grounds	  are	  why	  rhetoric	  is	  
required	  to	  step	  in	  and	  perform	  an	  inquiry	  and	  they	  also	  show	  us	  why	  rhetoric	  is	  an	  ethical	  
matter.	  Contingencies	  swoop	  into	  our	  collective	  lives	  as	  detours	  and	  roadblocks	  in	  our	  
collective	  narratives.	  They	  are	  moral	  problems	  because	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  which	  ones	  will	  
be	  decisive	  for	  our	  public	  vindication	  (ibid.,	  78).	  They	  are	  rhetorical	  problems	  because	  “the	  
moral	  weight	  of	  appearances	  is	  not	  automatic”	  and	  thus,	  they	  demand	  a	  rhetor	  to	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reconfigure	  them	  with	  the	  audience	  (ibid.,	  49).	  Contingencies	  barge	  into	  our	  lives	  
unexpectedly	  and	  demand	  that	  we	  make	  a	  judgment.	  The	  recent	  narrative	  construction	  of	  
Joe	  Paterno	  at	  Penn	  State	  University	  is	  a	  reminder	  for	  all	  of	  us,	  that	  the	  story	  is	  still	  being	  
told	  and	  that	  fifty	  years	  of	  heroic	  action	  may	  be	  wiped	  away	  in	  a	  split-­‐second	  when	  all	  is	  
said	  and	  done.	  No	  one	  will	  ever	  have	  all	  the	  facts,	  nor	  will	  it	  know	  how	  the	  story	  will	  be	  told	  
years	  after	  the	  decision	  is	  made,	  when	  all	  the	  facts	  are	  in.	  This	  means,	  that	  rhetoric	  has	  a	  
narrative	  quality	  because	  it	  must	  weave	  all	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  facts	  into	  one	  story;	  in	  other	  
words,	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  an	  “ongoing	  narrative	  construction”	  of	  a	  community	  with	  partial	  
interests.	  
Rhetoric	  must	  be	  a	  partially	  interested	  practice	  and	  its	  norms	  must	  be	  its	  own	  
community’s	  norms.	  This	  is	  not,	  Farrell	  notes,	  a	  judgment	  against	  it;	  but	  is	  instead	  
rhetoric’s	  “aesthetic	  promise”	  (ibid.,	  100).	  The	  bottom	  line	  is	  that	  moral	  problems	  arise	  
only	  from	  the	  particularity	  of	  agents	  situated	  in	  an	  incomplete	  picture	  (ibid.).	  Could	  
anything	  be	  more	  evident	  of	  such	  truth	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  otherwise	  “good”	  kids	  rioted	  in	  
the	  streets	  of	  State	  College	  when	  Joe	  Paterno	  was	  fired,	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  America	  watched	  
in	  horror,	  pronouncing	  judgment	  upon	  them	  from	  outside	  their	  community.	  Rhetoric	  
doesn’t	  condone	  either	  the	  Penn	  State	  student	  body	  or	  the	  country’s	  response.	  Rhetoric	  
simply	  starts	  from	  within	  those	  given	  communities.	  “Partisanship,”	  Farrell	  writes,	  “an	  
excessive	  allegiance	  to	  locales	  and	  persons	  that	  are	  near	  and	  dear,	  is	  not	  a	  bias	  inherent	  in	  
rhetoric	  itself.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  human	  nature”	  (ibid.).	  It	  is	  a	  universal	  element	  in	  all	  
human	  activity,	  and	  lamenting	  it	  is	  a	  waste	  of	  time	  and	  energy.	  Instead,	  we	  must	  address	  
the	  problem	  by	  making	  the	  best	  of	  the	  situation,	  using	  partisanship	  as	  a	  resource,	  
whenever	  possible.	  Farrell	  concludes:	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If	  larger	  civic	  obligations	  toward	  the	  generalized	  other	  are	  to	  be	  engendered,	  we	  
must	  first	  see	  the	  other	  in	  ourselves.	  To	  develop	  such	  as	  sense,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  drawn	  
out	  of	  ourselves.	  And	  to	  enact	  this	  phase	  of	  moral	  development,	  we	  must	  employ	  the	  
only	  art	  capable	  of	  presenting	  others	  to	  ourselves	  as	  both	  potential	  victims	  and	  
potential	  moral	  witnesses—that	  is	  to	  say,	  as	  audiences.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
This	  means	  that	  before	  one	  can	  extend	  a	  virtuous	  eye	  toward	  the	  appearances	  of	  others	  
outside	  our	  own	  group,	  one	  must	  first	  be	  able	  to	  look	  upon	  the	  others	  within	  one’s	  own	  
group	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective.	  Rhetoric,	  for	  Aristotle,	  was	  the	  method	  by	  which	  this	  
virtue	  could	  be	  trained.	  The	  norms	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  culture	  begin	  in	  the	  home	  and	  move	  to	  
the	  community,	  the	  church	  congregation,	  the	  city,	  the	  state,	  the	  nation,	  and	  beyond.	  At	  each	  
level,	  the	  rhetor	  also	  changes,	  for	  each	  level	  requires	  a	  different	  aesthetic	  reconfiguration	  
according	  to	  each	  audience.	  
Farrell’s	  summary	  of	  Aristotle	  demonstrates	  the	  affinity	  between	  Aristotle’s	  
Rhetoric	  and	  Poetics,	  and	  puts	  forth	  reasonable	  cause	  for	  us	  to	  think	  that	  Aristotle	  viewed	  
rhetoric	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  activity.	  For	  example,	  consider	  the	  term	  krisis.	  Krisis	  in	  tragic	  
poetry	  moves	  us	  from	  fear	  to	  pity;	  krisis	  in	  rhetorical	  practice	  moves	  us	  through	  morally	  
significant	  emotions	  as	  well.	  National	  crises	  usually	  mark	  moments	  of	  memorable	  public	  
address:	  Bobby	  Kennedy’s	  Indianapolis	  address	  after	  MLK’s	  assassination,	  Reagan’s	  
“Challenger	  Speech,”	  Lincoln’s	  second	  inaugural	  address	  and	  Roosevelt’s	  first,	  are	  but	  a	  few	  
examples.	  Rhetoric	  then,	  not	  only	  engages	  audiences,	  but	  also	  “invents	  public	  moods.”	  With	  
this,	  the	  twofold	  nature	  of	  rhetoric	  is	  revealed.	  Rhetoric	  is	  the	  ethical	  practice	  that	  provides	  
“definition,	  impetus,	  and	  direction	  to	  history	  in	  the	  making,	  even	  as	  we	  wait	  impatiently	  for	  
the	  heroes	  and	  the	  villains	  to	  be	  named	  later”	  (ibid.,	  39).	  Rhetoric	  names	  the	  heroes	  and	  
villains	  before	  the	  act	  of	  judgment,	  and	  in	  a	  rhetorical	  culture,	  it	  continually	  amends	  the	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narrative	  by	  re-­‐naming	  them	  in	  the	  future,	  accounting	  for	  the	  new	  and	  unexpected	  
appearances	  of	  all	  tomorrow’s	  historical	  parties.	  
Traditionally,	  we	  conceptualizing	  appearances	  aesthetically	  in	  one	  of	  three	  ways:	  
pathetically,	  tragically,	  or	  comically.	  Each	  of	  these	  responses,	  or	  “frames	  of	  acceptance”	  are	  
both	  the	  consequence	  and	  cause	  of	  specific	  attitudes	  toward	  history	  and	  others.	  It	  is	  the	  
rhetor’s	  task	  to	  reconfigure	  appearances	  for	  her	  audience;	  in	  order	  to	  prepare	  our	  attitudes	  
for	  her	  desired	  actions.	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  
I	  wonder	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  way	  of	  being	  potent	  oratorically	  without	  over-­‐
simplifying	  truth.	  Or	  must	  power	  always	  be	  bought	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  truth?	  Perhaps	  
some	  simplification	  of	  life	  is	  justified.	  Every	  artist	  does,	  after	  all,	  obscure	  some	  
details	  in	  order	  to	  present	  others	  in	  bolder	  relief.	  The	  religious	  rhetorician	  has	  a	  
right	  to	  count	  himself	  among,	  and	  take	  his	  standards	  from,	  the	  artists	  rather	  than	  
the	  scientists.	  The	  trouble	  is	  that	  he	  is	  usually	  no	  better	  than	  a	  cartoonist.	  (Leaves)	  
	  
Niebuhr’s	  reflection	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  pulpit	  oratory	  gives	  credence	  to	  Aristotle’s	  vision	  for	  
rhetorical	  practice.	  It	  is,	  on	  the	  first	  hand,	  an	  ethical	  practice	  that	  is	  concerned	  with	  truth	  
and	  conveying	  this	  truth	  to	  an	  audience	  of	  shared	  interests.	  On	  the	  second	  hand,	  it	  is	  an	  
aesthetic	  practice	  that	  must	  reconfigure	  appearances	  into	  artistic	  forms	  if	  it	  is	  to	  achieve	  
intelligibility	  on	  a	  level	  deeper	  than	  that	  of	  raw	  data,	  phainomena.	  Aristotle,	  Farrell	  notes,	  
“believed	  that	  matter	  achieved	  intelligibility	  through	  form”	  (1993,	  109).	  Unlike	  Plato,	  
Aristotle	  insisted	  that	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  recognition	  affords	  us	  another	  kind	  of	  seeing,	  
equally	  valuable	  to	  the	  seeing	  of	  perfect	  essences	  that	  comes	  from	  philosophical	  reflection,	  
and	  this	  aesthetic	  seeing	  is	  what	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  “pleasure	  of	  learning”	  (ibid.,	  111).	  
This	  pleasure	  is	  grounded	  in	  mimesis,	  according	  to	  Aristotle,	  and	  comes	  whenever	  we	  
experience	  the	  “imitation	  of	  action”	  that	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  view	  of	  our	  particular	  
contingencies	  as	  generalizable	  and	  reoccurring	  forms.	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Before	  one	  aesthetically	  reconfigures	  appearances	  into	  forms,	  one	  encounters	  them	  
pathetically,	  i.e.	  one	  suffers	  (pathos)	  them.	  Rhetorically	  reconfigured	  pathos	  is	  the	  method	  
by	  which	  one	  gets	  others	  to	  suffer	  appearances	  they	  haven’t	  suffered.	  It	  is,	  as	  the	  traditional	  
prophetic	  discourse	  would	  have	  it,	  the	  hark!	  listen!	  and	  look!	  that	  depends	  upon	  an	  
audience	  that	  has	  “ears	  to	  hear”	  and	  “eyes	  to	  see.”	  Thus,	  it	  requires	  an	  audience	  
characterized	  by	  civic	  friendship,	  an	  audience	  who	  trusts	  that	  the	  ethos	  of	  the	  orator	  is	  a	  
kindred	  spirit	  to	  its	  own	  values	  and	  goods.	  The	  audience	  is	  an	  agency	  capable	  of	  character;	  
they	  are	  an	  audience	  “as	  a	  capacity”—a	  dynamis.	  Experiencing	  pathos	  “as	  an	  audience”	  is	  
never	  a	  morally	  neutral	  activity,	  for	  emotions	  are	  always	  relational.	  Pathos	  isn’t	  “trafficking	  
in	  emotions;”	  rhetorically	  configured,	  it	  is	  the	  double-­‐move	  that	  takes	  us	  from	  the	  
awareness	  of	  our	  own	  emotion	  (fear),	  to	  recognition	  of	  what	  may	  be	  involved	  when	  others	  
are	  suffering	  (ibid.,	  71).	  It	  is	  rhetoric	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  the	  move	  from	  fear	  for	  
ourselves	  to	  pity	  for	  others	  (71).	  	  
Pathos	  is	  “that	  which	  happens,”41	  and	  it	  moves	  us	  “because	  it	  is	  that	  which	  is	  
essentially	  the	  vital	  force	  of	  our	  human	  existence.”42	  The	  pathetic	  element	  in	  a	  historical	  
drama	  “elicits	  pity,	  but	  neither	  deserves	  admiration	  nor	  warrants	  contrition.”43	  “Suffering	  
caused	  by	  purely	  natural	  evil”	  writes	  Niebuhr,	  “is	  the	  clearest	  instance	  of	  the	  purely	  
pathetic”	  (IAM,	  xxiii).	  It	  always	  leads	  to	  self-­‐pity.	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  social	  relationships,	  pathos,	  
Niebuhr	  argues,	  “is	  constituted	  of	  essentially	  meaningless	  cross-­‐purposes	  in	  life,	  of	  
capricious	  confusions	  of	  fortune	  and	  painful	  frustrations”	  (ibid.,	  166).	  Niebuhr	  finds	  the	  
pathos	  of	  historical	  dramas	  most	  explicit	  in	  the	  dialectical	  tension	  between	  individualism	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Liddel-­‐Scott,	  A	  Greek-­‐English	  Lexicon.	  
42	  F.	  P.	  B.	  Osmaston,	  trans.	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Fine	  Arts	  (London,	  1920),	  I,	  308	  f.	  
43	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr,	  The	  Irony	  of	  American	  History	  (Chicago,	  IL:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  
Press,	  2008)	  (1952),	  xxiii	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  IAM).	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and	  collectivism.	  This	  is	  because	  intra-­‐group	  relationships	  are	  political,	  not	  ethical;	  they	  are	  
maintained	  by	  power,	  force	  and	  coercion,	  the	  necessary	  elements	  for	  suffering,	  whether	  in	  
the	  realm	  of	  nature	  or	  politics.	  Moral	  or	  rational	  suasion	  are	  as	  futile	  in	  the	  pathetic	  
relationships	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Al	  Qaida,	  as	  they	  are	  futile	  to	  stop	  a	  hurricane	  from	  
crashing	  into	  the	  depleted	  levees	  of	  New	  Orleans.	  Man’s	  pathetic	  situation	  is	  “group	  
immorality,”	  seen	  at	  its	  worst	  in	  the	  relationships	  between	  nations,	  races,	  and	  classes.	  Man	  
is	  forced	  to	  depend	  upon	  others	  for	  his	  survival,	  yet	  his	  egoism	  struggles	  with	  cohabitation	  
and	  conflicting	  desires.	  
The	  prophet,	  as	  we’ve	  already	  noted,	  is	  first	  a	  sufferer.	  He	  feels	  the	  suffering	  of	  his	  
people	  as	  God	  feels	  it.	  He	  suffers	  with	  God.	  Brueggemann	  notes	  that	  this	  type	  of	  prophetic	  
suffering	  requires	  the	  imagination	  we	  call	  “empathy”	  and	  the	  prophet’s	  task	  is	  to	  broaden	  
this	  feeling	  of	  suffering	  in	  order	  to	  stir	  the	  souls	  of	  those	  he	  will	  need	  to	  follow	  him.44	  The	  
prophets,	  best	  exemplified	  in	  this	  aspect	  by	  Jeremiah,	  were	  elicitors	  of	  collective	  grief.	  Grief	  
and	  tears,	  argues	  Brueggemann,	  combats	  the	  numbness—in	  Niebuhr’s	  words	  the	  “social	  
inertia”	  of	  the	  status	  quo—created	  by	  the	  dominant	  culture	  of	  injustice.	  A	  realistic	  survey	  of	  
the	  human	  condition	  leads	  to	  a	  feeling	  of	  desperation	  and	  sadness.	  The	  feeling	  of	  pity	  is	  
often	  paralyzing.	  The	  pathetic	  element	  in	  our	  history	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  flood	  that	  causes	  
mass	  destruction	  or	  in	  the	  human	  condition	  of	  limited	  rationality	  and	  excessive	  egoism.	  To	  
acknowledge	  the	  pathetic	  aspects,	  however,	  doesn’t	  mean	  we	  must	  give	  in	  to	  hopelessness	  
or	  retreat	  in	  asceticism;	  the	  show	  must	  go	  on—the	  levees	  need	  rebuilding	  and	  the	  will-­‐to-­‐
power	  of	  terrorist	  organizations	  must	  be	  dealt	  with	  head-­‐on,	  if	  the	  surviving	  remnant	  is	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  For	  more	  on	  this	  see	  Abraham	  Heschel’s	  “The	  Philosophy	  of	  Pathos”	  in	  The	  Prophets	  
(Peabody,	  MA:	  Hendrickson	  Publishers,	  Inc.,	  2009)	  (1962)	  pp.	  27-­‐47.	  Heschel	  
problematizes	  traditional	  notions	  of	  pathos	  and	  their	  inability	  to	  define	  a	  prophetic	  
understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  reason	  and	  emotion.	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face	  the	  future	  without	  fear.	  Abiding	  in	  the	  pathetic	  leads	  to	  depression	  and	  feelings	  of	  
desperation	  and	  helplessness.	  In	  order	  to	  accomplish	  social	  justice	  in	  human	  affairs,	  one	  
must	  leave	  self-­‐pity	  and	  abide	  in	  the	  world	  of	  judgment,	  which	  is	  always	  a	  potentially	  tragic	  
one.	  
The	  highest	  form	  of	  aesthetic	  reconfiguration,	  for	  Aristotle,	  was	  tragedy.	  Tragedy’s	  
nobler	  characters	  and	  actions,	  its	  bigger	  issues	  and	  greater	  virtues	  and	  vices,	  create	  
tensions	  and	  reversals,	  which	  “enlarge	  life’s	  panorama”	  (Farrell	  1993,	  113).	  Its	  form	  is	  also	  
grander	  than	  all	  forms,	  according	  to	  Farrell,	  because	  it	  contains	  that	  fateful	  character	  
necessity,	  instead	  of	  those	  “less	  formally	  pure	  relationships”	  of	  contingency,	  probability,	  
possibility,	  and	  chance	  (ibid.).	  Lastly,	  we	  should	  note	  that	  tragedy	  is	  bound	  to	  define	  
appearances	  that	  have	  come	  and	  gone.	  We,	  as	  readers	  of	  a	  tragic	  play,	  see	  all	  the	  elements	  
involved	  and	  know	  the	  play	  is	  heading	  for	  a	  tragic	  ending.	  However,	  as	  actors	  in	  history,	  the	  
summary	  of	  a	  scenario	  as	  tragic	  is	  left	  for	  those	  who	  survey	  the	  destruction,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  
observant	  view	  of	  the	  prophet’s	  prospective.	  Their	  task	  is	  to	  stand	  outside	  of	  history	  and	  
reconfigure	  past	  appearances	  as	  tragic	  in	  order	  to	  spur	  that	  emotional	  catharsis	  in	  an	  
audience	  that	  is	  needed	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  disasters,	  or	  to	  reconfigure	  present	  appearances	  in	  
order	  to	  warn	  us	  that	  we	  are	  currently	  in	  a	  dramatic	  tragedy.	  
Tragedy	  elicits	  pity	  and	  admiration	  because	  it	  combines	  “nobility	  with	  guilt.”45	  
When	  a	  government,	  society,	  community,	  or	  individual	  become	  so	  fanatical	  with	  illusions	  of	  
perfection,	  progress,	  and	  utopia;	  when	  symbolic	  motivation	  elicits	  violence	  and	  immorality	  
beyond	  reasonable	  limits;	  the	  tragedy	  of	  human	  history	  narrates	  the	  account.	  Niebuhr’s	  
prophetic	  nature	  is	  wrapped	  up	  in	  the	  fear	  that	  one	  day	  a	  poet	  will	  author	  a	  similar	  tale	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Niebuhr,	  Irony,	  xxiv.	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about	  America.	  Writing	  in	  1952,	  Niebuhr	  sees	  the	  tragic	  element	  exemplified	  in	  America	  by	  
“the	  threat	  of	  atomic	  destruction	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  peace”	  (IAM,	  
xxiii).	  Just	  as	  Prometheus	  sought	  to	  master	  nature	  in	  defiance	  of	  Zeus,	  man	  harnessed	  the	  
atom	  in	  defiance	  of	  nature.	  This	  story	  leads	  Niebuhr	  to	  conclude,	  regarding	  the	  US	  
involvement	  in	  World	  War	  II:	  “The	  democracies	  may	  still	  have	  enough	  power	  to	  win	  a	  war	  
in	  which	  they	  are	  involving	  themselves	  by	  trying	  to	  avoid	  it.	  But	  they	  certainly	  will	  make	  
the	  catastrophe	  of	  war	  more	  inevitable	  by	  their	  effort	  to	  escape	  it”	  (BT).	  This	  tragic	  
perspective	  is	  limited	  because	  it	  introduces	  the	  idea	  of	  necessity	  and	  fate;	  actions	  seem	  to	  
be	  running	  along	  their	  own	  course,	  refusing	  interventions	  that	  may	  interrupt	  their	  seeming	  
inevitability.	  Burke	  notes	  that	  the	  tragic	  acceptance	  of	  these	  consequences	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  
of	  the	  logic	  of	  scientific	  cogency,	  as	  the	  events	  of	  tragedy	  seem	  to	  grow	  out	  of	  one	  another	  
(1984,	  39).	  Tragedy	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  world	  that	  is	  much	  like	  a	  chemical	  reaction,	  in	  that	  
once	  the	  elements	  have	  come	  together,	  the	  reaction	  is	  going	  to	  have	  necessary,	  fated	  
consequences,	  ruled	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  nature,	  which	  no	  man	  can	  stop.	  
The	  third	  response	  to	  appearances	  is	  the	  comic	  one.	  Humor	  is	  our	  way	  of	  accepting	  
appearances	  that	  seem	  incongruous.	  Whereas	  tragedy	  accepts	  the	  world	  as	  fated	  and	  ruled	  
by	  certain	  laws—the	  most	  notable,	  in	  both	  Greek	  and	  Christian	  frames	  being,	  “pride	  comes	  
before	  a	  fall”—the	  world	  of	  comedy	  accepts	  the	  world	  as	  absurd,	  ruled	  not	  by	  laws	  but	  by	  
accidents,	  ignorance,	  and	  the	  unexpected.	  Whereas	  tragic	  heroes	  are	  framed	  as	  guilty,	  
vicious,	  and	  villainous,	  comic	  victims	  are	  understood	  as	  stupid,	  mistaken,	  fools.	  This	  is,	  
according	  to	  Burke,	  the	  highest	  pinnacle	  of	  human	  progress;	  we	  can	  go	  no	  further	  than	  to	  
picture	  people,	  not	  as	  vicious,	  but	  as	  mistaken	  (1984,	  41).	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  comic	  frame	  
returns	  to	  the	  lesson	  of	  the	  tragic	  one—humility.	  Tragedy	  warns	  man	  that	  only	  humility	  
	   189	  
can	  save	  one	  from	  the	  fate	  of	  hubris	  and	  comedy	  helps	  create	  the	  proffered	  attitude	  of	  
humility	  by	  emphasizing	  that	  we	  are	  less	  intelligent,	  aware,	  and	  knowledgeable	  than	  we	  
think.	  It	  is	  a	  comic	  fact	  that	  every	  insight	  contains	  its	  own	  special	  kind	  of	  blindness;	  it	  is	  a	  
tragic	  fact	  that	  we	  prefer	  to	  think	  this	  comic	  fact	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  The	  fusion	  of	  these	  two	  
statements	  is	  what	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  final	  framing	  device,	  dramatic	  irony,	  which	  comes	  only	  
into	  play	  for	  the	  spectators	  of	  history,	  i.e.	  the	  prophets.	  It	  is	  this	  device,	  we	  will	  see	  
momentarily,	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  prophet’s	  rhetoric	  of	  aspiration,	  his	  capacity	  to	  goad	  man	  
to	  seek	  perfection,	  beyond	  the	  tragedy	  that	  comes	  whenever	  he	  seeks	  perfection.	  
To	  summarize,	  we	  note	  that	  appearances	  present	  us	  with	  a	  scene	  in	  which	  we	  
participate	  (Farrell	  1993,	  30).	  Though	  we	  can’t	  freeze	  these	  scenes	  in	  time,	  as	  we	  can	  a	  
photograph,	  their	  more	  compelling	  features	  tend	  to	  stabilize	  and	  “arrest	  the	  unfolding	  
tendencies	  of	  events	  and	  hold	  our	  attention.”	  Appearances,	  in	  their	  natural	  form,	  as	  raw	  
data,	  come	  to	  us	  with	  tone,	  aura,	  aspect	  and	  texture	  and	  wait	  to	  be	  reconfigured	  poetically	  
by	  the	  aesthetically	  sensitive	  rhetor.	  Aspect,	  Farrell	  notes,	  refers	  to	  those	  visual	  features	  of	  
appearance	  that	  seem	  to	  call	  out	  to	  the	  community,	  standing	  out	  from	  the	  background	  and	  
imposing	  themselves	  on	  us	  (ibid.).	  “We	  wait	  for	  the	  hostages	  to	  descend	  from	  the	  plane,”	  
Farrell	  argues,	  and	  then	  “There	  they	  are!”	  Out	  of	  contrast,	  discovered	  irony,	  and	  dramatic	  
tensions,	  these	  appearances’	  particular	  elements	  will	  stand	  out,	  while	  others	  necessarily	  
then	  recede	  into	  the	  backdrop.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  appearances,	  aesthetically	  
reconfigured,	  become	  like	  shadowy	  illusions	  of	  the	  raw	  data	  of	  phainomena.	  As	  with	  
everything	  then,	  these	  rhetorical	  reconfigurations	  may	  be	  used	  rightly	  or	  wrongly.	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One	  of	  the	  most	  fruitful	  sources	  of	  self-­‐deception	  in	  the	  ministry	  is	  the	  proclamation	  
of	  great	  ideals	  and	  principles	  without	  any	  clue	  to	  their	  relation	  to	  the	  controversial	  
issues	  of	  the	  day.	  The	  minister	  feels	  very	  heroic	  in	  uttering	  the	  ideals	  because	  he	  
knows	  that	  some	  rather	  dangerous	  immediate	  consequences	  are	  involved	  in	  their	  
application.	  But	  he	  doesn’t	  make	  the	  application	  clear,	  and	  those	  who	  hear	  his	  
words	  are	  either	  unable	  to	  see	  the	  immediate	  issue	  involved	  or	  they	  are	  
unconsciously	  grateful	  to	  the	  preacher	  for	  not	  belaboring	  a	  contemporaneous	  issue	  
which	  they	  know	  to	  be	  involved	  but	  would	  rather	  not	  face.	  
⎯R.	  Niebuhr,	  Leaves	  
	  
The	  italicized	  points	  of	  emphasis,	  which	  I’ve	  added	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  poignant	  reflection,	  
couldn’t	  be	  more	  profound	  and	  applicable	  to	  our	  analysis	  of	  rhetorical	  inquiry.	  They	  
contain,	  implicitly,	  the	  first	  and	  perennially	  asked	  question	  of	  an	  ethicist,	  whether	  it	  is	  
Niebuhr,	  Aristotle,	  or	  MacIntyre:	  Is	  virtue	  teachable?	  The	  two	  points	  of	  emphasis	  in	  this	  
quote	  start	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  overarching	  question	  is,	  yes.	  In	  this	  
epigraph	  we	  see	  that	  Niebuhr	  formulates	  the	  twofold	  task	  of	  teaching	  ethics.	  The	  first	  task	  
is	  a	  matter	  of	  sight:	  How	  do	  we	  get	  an	  audience	  to	  see	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  looked	  at?	  The	  
second	  task	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  conscience:	  Once	  they’ve	  seen	  what	  the	  prophet	  sees—that	  is,	  
injustice,	  for	  Niebuhr—how	  does	  he	  get	  them	  to	  address	  the	  appearance	  of	  injustice	  in	  
concerted	  action?	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  problem	  is	  about	  getting	  their	  attention;	  on	  the	  
other,	  it	  is	  about	  getting	  them	  to	  pay	  attention.	  The	  former	  requires	  they	  look,	  while	  the	  
latter	  requires	  they	  do.	  The	  former	  is	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  for	  ethical	  action;	  the	  latter	  
requires	  courage	  and	  effort—what	  Bonhoeffer	  would	  call	  the	  “cost	  of	  discipleship,”	  which	  
was,	  we	  note	  briefly,	  one’s	  whole	  life.	  Thus,	  Aristotle’s	  vision	  for	  rhetoric	  is	  a	  useful	  
framework	  for	  understanding	  Niebuhr’s	  rhetoric	  as	  an	  ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  practice.	  
The	  ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  dimensions	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  implicit	  rhetorical	  theory	  can	  be	  
drawn	  out,	  for	  simplicity	  sake,	  by	  quickly	  gesturing	  toward	  the	  titles	  of	  his	  works.	  First,	  we	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have	  the	  ethical	  titles:	  Does	  Civilization	  Need	  Religion?,	  Moral	  Man	  and	  Immoral	  Society,	  The	  
Contribution	  of	  Religion	  to	  Social	  Work,	  Man’s	  Nature	  and	  His	  Communities,	  The	  Structure	  of	  
Nations	  and	  Empires,	  Christianity	  and	  Power	  Politics,	  Christian	  Realism	  and	  Political	  
Problems,	  and	  Faith	  and	  Politics.	  These	  titles	  show	  that	  from	  the	  first	  text,	  written	  in	  1927,	  
to	  the	  last	  book	  Niebuhr	  published	  in	  1963,	  one	  theme	  remained	  steadfast	  throughout	  
Niebuhr’s	  career;	  that	  theme	  is	  “the	  relationship	  between	  individuals	  and	  their	  collectives.”	  
If	  we	  recall	  that	  Niebuhr	  considered	  himself,	  not	  a	  theologian,	  not	  a	  political	  scientist,	  not	  a	  
philosopher,	  but	  a	  Christian	  ethicist;	  and	  if	  we	  begin	  with	  the	  fairly	  broad	  and	  uncontested	  
notion	  that,	  whatever	  rhetoric	  is,	  it	  definitely	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  discourse	  
between	  individuals	  and	  collectives;	  then	  we	  have	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  for	  assuming	  that	  
Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  and	  his	  rhetoric	  will	  be	  bound	  to	  one	  another.	  
	   Only	  rarely	  is	  Niebuhr	  explicit	  about	  the	  role	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  ethics,	  and	  even	  then,	  
one	  will	  rarely	  find	  the	  word	  “rhetoric”;	  one	  has	  to	  dig	  deep	  for	  the	  linkages.	  Nevertheless,	  
they	  are	  there;	  for	  instance,	  the	  relationship	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  ethics	  comes	  to	  the	  
forefront	  in	  this	  passing	  reflection	  from	  Beyond	  Tragedy:	  
Pure	  power	  cannot	  maintain	  itself.	  It	  must	  have	  some	  measure	  of	  moral	  respect.	  It	  
must	  be	  admitted	  that	  pure	  conscience	  seldom	  defeats	  an	  unjust	  social	  system.	  
Those	  who	  speak	  against	  its	  injustice	  are	  primarily	  its	  victims.	  Yet	  slavery	  would	  
have	  persisted	  if	  only	  the	  slaves	  had	  recognized	  its	  oppression.	  A	  moral	  element	  
thus	  enters	  into	  every	  successful	  challenge	  of	  Caesar’s	  authority.	  (285)	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  this	  fact,	  Niebuhr	  comes	  to	  a	  conclusion—again,	  in	  1937—that	  may	  be	  the	  most	  
important	  rhetorical	  and	  ethical	  contribution	  to	  United	  States	  history.	  In	  this	  book,	  rated	  
fifth	  among	  Niebuhr’s	  works	  in	  popularity,	  according	  to	  Amazon.com,	  Niebuhr	  articulates	  
the	  rhetorical	  theories	  that	  twenty	  years	  later,	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.	  would	  credit	  as	  the	  
greatest	  influence	  on	  his	  own	  social	  movement.	  Niebuhr	  writes:	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…Those	  who	  draw	  their	  inspiration	  from	  Christ’s	  Kingdom	  must	  limit	  themselves	  to	  
purely	  moral	  weapons	  in	  contending	  against	  historic	  injustice…	  The	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  
is	  relevant	  to	  every	  moment	  of	  history	  as	  an	  ideal	  possibility	  and	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  
judgment	  upon	  present	  realities.	  Sometimes	  it	  must	  be	  obeyed	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  
world,	  though	  such	  obedience	  means	  crucifixion	  and	  martyrdom.	  Sometimes	  
courageous	  obedience	  forces	  the	  evil	  of	  the	  world	  to	  yield,	  thus	  making	  a	  new	  and	  
higher	  justice	  in	  history	  possible.	  Sometimes	  the	  law	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  must	  be	  mixed	  
with	  the	  forces	  of	  nature	  which	  operate	  in	  the	  world,	  to	  effect	  at	  least	  a	  partial	  
mitigation	  of	  oppression.	  (ibid.,	  286)	  
	  
With	  these	  three	  dramatic	  scenes,	  Niebuhr	  makes	  the	  pluralistic	  point	  that	  martyrs,	  
prophets	  and	  statesmen	  may	  each	  in	  their	  own	  way	  be	  servants	  of	  the	  Kingdom.	  Obeying	  
the	  Kingdom	  in	  defiance	  may	  lead	  to	  death.	  This	  is	  the	  dramatic	  tale	  of	  the	  martyr.	  “Without	  
the	  martyr”	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “we	  might	  live	  under	  the	  illusion	  that	  the	  kingdom	  of	  Caesar	  is	  
the	  Kingdom	  of	  Christ	  in	  embryo”	  forgetting	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  contradiction	  
between	  the	  two.	  At	  other	  times	  a	  dissident	  individual	  will	  rise	  up	  and	  judge	  the	  drama	  as	  if	  
they	  were	  an	  observer	  in	  the	  balcony.	  This	  is	  the	  position	  of	  the	  prophet	  in	  historical	  
dramas.	  “Without	  the	  successful	  prophet,”	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “whose	  moral	  indictments	  effect	  
actual	  changes	  in	  the	  world,	  we	  might	  forget	  that	  each	  moment	  of	  human	  history	  faces	  
actual	  and	  realizable	  higher	  possibilities”	  (ibid).	  Lastly,	  there	  are	  those	  actors	  in	  the	  drama	  
who	  are	  tasked	  with	  passing	  bills,	  vetoing	  legislation,	  and	  overthrowing	  political	  regimes.	  
This	  is	  the	  heroic	  role	  of	  statesmen,	  like	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  and	  Abraham	  Lincoln.	  “Without	  
the	  statesman,	  who	  uses	  power	  to	  correct	  the	  injustices	  of	  power,	  we	  might	  allow	  the	  
vision	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Christ	  to	  become	  a	  luxury	  of	  those	  who	  can	  afford	  to	  acquiesce	  in	  
present	  injustice	  because	  they	  do	  not	  suffer	  from	  it”	  (ibid.,	  286).	  
There	  is	  an	  important	  element	  revealed	  in	  these	  lines	  that	  goes	  far	  past	  the	  power	  of	  
non-­‐violence	  and	  appeals	  to	  conscience.	  The	  conclusion	  Niebuhr	  reaches	  shows	  us,	  not	  
only	  an	  actual	  rhetorical	  tactic	  fused	  with	  a	  lived	  ethic	  that	  is	  used	  to	  further	  the	  cause	  of	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justice;	  it	  also	  reveals	  another	  important	  aspect	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  rhetorical	  ethics,	  and	  that	  is,	  
how	  he	  views	  rhetorical	  agents	  as	  actors	  in	  dramatic	  historical	  scenes.	  Our	  second	  
observation	  begs	  us	  once	  more	  to	  reflect	  on	  some	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  titles:	  The	  Self	  and	  The	  
Dramas	  of	  History,	  Beyond	  Tragedy,	  and	  The	  Irony	  of	  American	  History.	  Niebuhr’s	  
understanding	  of	  social	  action	  and	  communication	  echoes	  the	  one	  of	  Kenneth	  Burke,	  the	  
patron	  saint	  of	  contemporary	  rhetorical	  theory.	  Rhetorical	  theorists	  would	  not	  be	  faulting	  
for	  crediting	  Burke	  with	  the	  following	  lines	  from	  Niebuhr’s	  Self	  and	  the	  Dramas	  of	  History:	  
The	  self	  is	  engaged	  in	  a	  perpetual	  dialogue	  with	  other	  selves	  in	  which	  its	  
dependence	  upon	  others	  becomes	  apparent	  but	  which	  also	  proves	  its	  independence	  
over	  all	  relationships.	  These	  dialogues	  create	  dramatic	  actions	  of	  various	  kinds…	  
The	  dialogues	  may	  be	  prompted	  by	  casual,	  or	  by	  permanent,	  relationships	  with	  
others.	  While	  these	  dialogues	  represent	  a	  dimension	  of	  selfhood	  as	  a	  “social	  animal,”	  
they	  are	  not	  in	  the	  category	  of	  social	  life	  as	  usually	  defined.	  They	  move	  above	  the	  
level	  of	  social	  cohesion	  which	  may	  be	  observed	  objectively.	  They	  are	  dramatic	  
elaborations	  of	  these	  social	  cohesions.	  (30)	  
	  
Niebuhr	  understands	  man’s	  dialogues	  with	  the	  community	  as	  dramatic	  actions	  and,	  
developing	  this	  theme	  further,	  he	  discovers	  that	  the	  community	  does	  have	  some	  
similarities	  to	  the	  individual.	  Unlike	  the	  former	  titles	  mentioned,	  wherein	  Niebuhr	  
distinguishes	  individual	  and	  community	  quite	  sharply	  from	  one	  another;	  in	  these	  “dramatic”	  
themed	  texts	  he	  isn’t	  so	  sure.	  Individuals,	  he	  argues,	  like	  communities,	  are	  historical	  
entities	  who	  respond	  to	  historical	  events	  (SDH,	  39).	  The	  memories	  of	  these	  historical	  
events,	  for	  both,	  are	  significant	  factors	  in	  their	  unique	  identities;	  both	  express	  this	  
uniqueness	  in	  their	  devotion	  to	  heroes,	  who	  embody	  the	  particular	  “genius”	  of	  their	  city,	  
state,	  or	  nation;	  and	  in	  their	  devotion	  to	  past	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  declaration	  
of	  independence.	  Memories	  give	  back	  to	  individuals	  and	  communities	  a	  consistent	  “spirit.”	  
Importantly,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  though	  these	  memories	  develop	  into	  a	  dramatic	  historical	  
pattern	  that	  may	  present	  such	  a	  consistency	  of	  action	  that	  the	  future	  courses	  of	  action	  are	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necessary	  or	  fated,	  “they	  never	  produce	  a	  pattern	  which	  could	  become	  the	  basis	  of	  
confident	  future	  action”	  (ibid.,	  40).	  Thus,	  for	  Niebuhr,	  the	  future	  is	  always	  dramatically	  
unfolding	  in	  historical	  patterns;	  yet,	  it	  nevertheless	  remains	  open	  to	  new	  possibilities,	  i.e.	  
tomorrow	  is	  always	  contingent.	  
	   In	  a	  New	  Republic	  review	  of	  Peter	  Viereck’s	  book	  Dream	  and	  Responsibility	  (1953),	  
Niebuhr	  noted	  that	  he	  shared	  with	  Viereck	  a	  “distrust	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  aesthetics	  from	  
political	  and	  ethical	  concerns,	  particularly	  for	  high	  modernists	  such	  as	  Ezra	  Pound”	  
(Halliwell	  2009).	  Niebuhr	  argued	  that	  the	  responsible	  artist	  should	  have	  a	  keen	  sense	  that	  
aesthetics	  and	  ethics	  are	  always	  connected,	  that	  they	  partly	  overlap.	  It	  is	  the	  artist	  job	  to	  be	  
a	  non-­‐conformist,	  he	  insisted,	  a	  “disturber	  of	  the	  peace;	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  artist	  must	  
not	  become	  too	  cynical	  as	  to	  cut	  ties	  with	  public	  life,	  or	  become	  so	  disillusioned	  that	  they	  
resort	  to	  nihilism.	  A	  “middle	  way”	  should	  be	  sought,	  he	  argued,	  rejecting	  both	  the	  
“uncritical	  glorification	  of	  technics”	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  “full-­‐scale	  romantic	  rebellion	  
against	  the	  realities	  of	  a	  machine	  civilization”	  on	  the	  other.	  
However,	  the	  middle	  way	  was	  not	  a	  compromise,	  Niebuhr	  argued;	  as	  Martin	  
Halliwell	  has	  noted,	  Niebuhr	  always	  preferred	  a	  Jamesian	  “double-­‐jointedness”	  to	  the	  
dilution	  of	  either	  thought	  or	  practice.	  It	  was	  this	  very	  double-­‐jointedness	  that	  presents	  us	  
with	  two	  aspects	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric	  that	  correspond	  to	  two	  ways	  of	  
approaching	  appearances,	  what	  Niebuhr	  called,	  at	  times,	  the	  “poet-­‐prophet,”	  and	  at	  other	  
times	  the	  “spiritualized-­‐technician”	  or	  the	  “prophet-­‐technician.”	  One	  is	  a	  moral	  rhetorical	  
response	  to	  the	  appearances	  of	  injustices	  in	  the	  present.	  The	  other	  is	  a	  dramatic	  
interpretation	  of	  appearances	  that	  were	  once	  present	  but	  are	  now	  past,	  i.e.	  the	  martyr	  is	  
not	  a	  martyr	  until	  he	  has	  died.	  The	  martyr	  responds	  to	  appearances	  in	  the	  present,	  but	  is	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not	  honored	  as	  a	  martyr	  until	  history	  recognizes	  the	  act	  as	  past	  martyrdom.	  This	  means	  
that	  a	  community	  must	  be	  present	  who	  will	  recognize	  the	  dramatic	  framing	  of	  the	  martyr’s	  
sacrifice	  as	  a	  courageous,	  noble,	  and	  moral	  deed.	  
The	  Prophet’s	  People:	  The	  Church,	  the	  Body	  of	  Christ,	  and	  Civic	  Friendship	  
	  
Aristotle’s	  definition,	  like	  Niebuhr’s	  political	  and	  ethical	  thought,	  requires	  that	  we	  
pay	  attention	  to	  how	  collectives	  act	  as	  membership	  groups.	  Farrell	  notes	  that	  the	  very	  
word	  “act”	  may	  strain	  our	  thoughts	  of	  the	  collective	  group	  because	  we—scholars	  that	  is;	  
particularly	  communication	  scholars—typically	  think	  of	  audiences	  as	  “targets”	  or	  message	  
“consumers”	  (1993,	  96).	  This	  turns	  the	  audience	  to	  a	  “victim,”	  instead	  of	  a	  group	  of	  
individuals	  who	  are	  friendly	  and	  have	  shared	  interests.	  More	  than	  a	  target	  or	  consumer,	  
Farrell	  notes	  that	  Aristotle	  views	  the	  rhetorical	  audience	  as	  “between	  a	  public	  and	  a	  
constituency—a	  kind	  of	  collaborative	  agency	  for	  making	  ongoing	  judgments”	  (ibid.).	  
Rhetoric	  generates	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  civic	  friendship	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  it	  cultivates	  
conditions	  “wherein	  an	  audience	  might	  accomplish	  or	  accommodate	  goods	  beyond	  itself.”	  
Additionally,	  rhetoric	  envisions	  a	  common	  language	  of	  argumentation	  and	  a	  “lexicon	  of	  
values,	  wherein	  civic	  ideals	  and	  ordinary	  convictions	  must	  eventually	  come	  together	  so	  as	  
to	  reflect,	  refine,	  and	  extend	  one	  another	  in	  the	  unfinished	  world	  of	  the	  practical”	  (ibid.,	  96-­‐
7).	  	  
This	  is	  why,	  Farrell	  points	  out,	  that	  Aristotle	  enumerates	  so	  many	  long	  lists	  of	  the	  
various	  appearances	  of	  different	  virtues.	  These	  enumerations	  are	  the	  “annotations	  of	  civic	  
virtue	  that	  we	  must	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  in	  order	  to	  ground	  conduct	  consistent	  with	  the	  
stated	  aspirations	  of	  public	  life”	  (ibid.).	  These	  doxa	  provide	  the	  vocabulary	  that	  is	  essential	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for	  a	  culture	  of	  justification,	  one	  that	  fosters	  and	  encourages	  occasions	  for	  collective	  
judgment.	  These	  occasions	  may	  be	  utter	  failures,	  as	  they	  often	  are;	  but	  that	  is	  not	  the	  point.	  
Farrell	  insists	  that	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  agency	  opened	  up	  by	  rhetorical	  
practice,	  where	  collective	  action	  is	  concerned.	  Character	  is	  possible	  only	  because	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  fail,	  Farrell	  notes	  (ibid.).	  Rhetoric	  then,	  can’t	  guarantee	  ethical	  collective	  
conduct;	  but	  it	  always	  gives	  the	  public	  the	  possibility	  for	  moral	  action.	  
Aristotle’s	  take	  on	  the	  rhetorical	  audience	  departs	  from	  modern	  theories	  that	  decry	  
partiality	  as	  a	  component	  of	  rhetorical	  practice.	  Yet,	  an	  understanding	  of	  rhetorical	  cultures	  
that	  doesn’t	  include	  partiality,	  likewise	  cannot	  account	  for	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  
aspects	  of	  Aristotle’s	  vision:	  the	  notion	  of	  phronesis	  or	  “practical	  reason.”	  Of	  the	  five	  virtues,	  
Farrell	  argues	  that	  Phronesis	  deserves	  special	  attention	  for	  rhetoric.	  Phronesis,	  that	  
practical	  reasoning	  that	  is	  marked	  as	  excellent	  by	  a	  kind	  of	  “prudence”	  or	  “moral	  insight,”	  
Aristotle	  treats	  as	  a	  virtue.	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric,	  Farrell	  argues,	  shows	  us	  the	  possibilities	  for	  
practical	  reason	  in	  a	  community	  where	  there	  are	  multiple	  goods,	  virtues,	  and	  authorities;	  in	  
so	  doing,	  it	  is	  our	  “first	  sustained	  exposure	  to	  the	  norms	  of	  rhetorical	  culture.”	  Practical	  
reason	  reveals	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  matter	  how	  excellent	  an	  individual’s	  moral	  prudence	  may	  
be;	  there	  are	  times	  when	  it	  must	  be	  shored	  up	  by	  the	  feedback	  from	  a	  community	  as	  we	  
practice	  the	  art	  together.	  “Where	  social	  virtues	  are	  concerned”	  Farrell	  notes,	  “it	  is	  others	  
who	  must	  enact	  and	  thus	  complete	  the	  choices	  available”	  (1993,	  74).	  Audiences	  cannot	  
cultivate	  proper	  judgment	  all	  by	  themselves.	  By	  making	  one’s	  reasoning	  public,	  one	  makes	  
it	  relational	  and	  practical.	  Practical	  reason	  is	  how	  a	  community	  addresses	  the	  contingency	  
of	  their	  shared	  appearances.	  Since	  this	  reasoning	  depends	  upon	  the	  agents	  in	  a	  community	  
having	  a	  mutual	  regard	  for	  one	  another,	  since	  they	  are	  both	  witnesses	  to	  the	  arguments	  
	   197	  
and	  are	  capable	  of	  being	  persuaded,	  there	  is	  an	  ethical	  propensity	  to	  rhetoric.	  In	  other	  
words,	  since	  we	  all	  feel	  these	  appearances	  to	  be	  pressing	  matters	  of	  concern	  and	  we	  have	  
all	  gathered	  in	  this	  space	  to	  hear	  arguments	  about	  how	  to	  address	  these	  appearances,	  we	  
are	  also	  inevitably,	  even	  if	  only	  to	  a	  minimal	  degree,	  other-­‐centered	  during	  this	  activity.	  But	  
we	  must	  note	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  this	  rhetorical	  audience.	  Aristotle	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  “not	  just	  
any	  others	  will	  do”;	  a	  community	  of	  kinship	  and	  civic	  friendship	  is	  required	  for	  phronesis	  
(ibid.,	  75).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  audience	  is	  made	  up	  of	  other	  Greeks	  alone	  and	  the	  interests	  
of	  those	  outside	  Greece,	  whether	  citizens	  or	  gods,	  is	  of	  no	  concern	  to	  it.	  
Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  and	  Poetics,	  seen	  through	  the	  readings	  of	  Nussbaum	  and	  Farrell,	  
provide	  us	  with	  a	  model	  for	  citizenship	  that	  we	  may	  now	  summarize.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  
model	  citizen	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  culture	  will	  attend	  to	  the	  appearances	  of	  this	  world.	  She	  will	  
seek	  the	  knowledge	  that	  comes	  from	  analytical	  and	  scientific	  investigations;	  she	  will	  seek	  
the	  truth	  that	  comes	  from	  dialectical	  contemplation	  and	  dialogue;	  and	  she	  will	  practice,	  
alongside	  and	  in	  front	  of	  other	  model	  citizens,	  the	  techne	  of	  rhetorical	  inquiry.	  This	  means	  
that	  she	  will	  practice—as	  both	  orator	  and	  audience—the	  art	  of	  deliberation,	  argumentation,	  
and	  phronesis;	  arriving	  at	  conclusions	  and	  making	  judgments	  about	  shared	  contingencies.	  
Her	  rhetorical	  practice	  will	  assist	  her	  polis	  in	  making	  necessarily	  tragic	  decisions	  in	  the	  
least	  tragic	  way,	  i.e.	  they	  will	  be	  as	  ethical	  as	  possible	  because	  they	  will	  be	  as	  informed,	  
rational,	  and	  just	  as	  a	  thoroughly	  deliberated	  judgment	  among	  civic	  friends	  can	  be.	  As	  a	  
rhetor,	  she	  will	  practice	  the	  art	  of	  aesthetic	  reconfiguration	  and	  dramatic	  presentation	  of	  
appearances	  that	  have	  passed.	  As	  an	  audience,	  she	  will	  practice	  the	  art	  of	  civic	  friendship	  
that	  ideally	  provides	  her	  with	  a	  comedic	  attitude	  that	  fosters	  pluralism,	  tolerance	  and	  
humility.	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However,	  though	  she	  is	  a	  model	  citizen,	  she	  will	  not	  be	  all	  the	  polis	  needs	  to	  deal	  
with	  the	  appearances	  of	  dramatic	  yesterdays,	  contingent	  todays,	  and	  unpredictable	  
tomorrows,	  because	  she	  will	  lack	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  higher	  authority	  outside	  her	  own	  
polis.	  The	  polis	  needs	  many,	  many	  model	  citizens	  to	  function	  in	  an	  orderly	  manner;	  but	  it	  
also	  needs	  something	  else.	  Though	  Farrell	  notes	  that	  neither	  he	  nor	  Aristotle	  is	  calling	  for	  a	  
sublimation	  of	  the	  individual	  into	  a	  collective	  will,	  Farrell	  fails	  to	  mention	  what	  Niebuhr	  is	  
quick	  to	  point	  out,	  which	  is	  that	  neither	  Plato	  nor	  Aristotle	  could	  find	  a	  higher	  perspective	  
than	  that	  of	  the	  Greek	  polis	  from	  which	  to	  make	  their	  critiques.	  Thus,	  slavery	  in	  Greece,	  
though	  lamented	  by	  some	  classical	  thinkers,	  could	  never	  be	  destroyed	  because	  it	  depended	  
upon	  a	  higher	  law;	  one	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  reason	  that	  comes	  from	  an	  ultra-­‐rational	  and	  
transcendent	  source,	  which	  would	  have	  been	  considered	  illogical	  by	  even	  the	  noblest	  of	  
Greek	  citizens.	  
It	  was	  exactly	  this	  type	  of	  higher	  law	  that	  Socrates	  tried	  to	  use	  to	  critique	  the	  
political	  power	  of	  Greek’s	  aristocracy.	  However,	  Plato’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  higher	  law	  was	  
found	  in	  the	  divine	  logos,	  the	  pure	  forms	  discovered	  by	  dialectically	  cleansed	  reason.	  By	  
Niebuhr’s	  estimation,	  Plato’s	  formulation	  of	  reason	  was	  an	  unrealistic	  ideal	  because	  it	  
didn’t	  account	  for	  the	  “ideological	  taint”	  in	  every	  reasoned	  proposition.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  
Christian	  aspect	  of	  prophetic	  religion	  is	  a	  necessary	  one	  for	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  Its	  
unification	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  body	  in	  spirit	  are	  imperative,	  if	  man	  is	  to	  avoid	  pessimism,	  
asceticism,	  cynicism	  and	  despair	  and	  its	  insistence	  on	  a	  higher	  law	  than	  the	  logos	  has	  
substantial	  ethical	  implications.	  That	  this	  is	  the	  case	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  critique	  of	  
Greek	  thought.	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In	  the	  history	  of	  metaphysical,	  philosophical	  thought	  there	  are	  two	  propositions,	  
two	  commonly	  held	  viewpoints	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  man,	  which	  in	  varying	  compounds	  and	  
transformations,	  inform	  all	  modern	  views	  of	  man	  in	  the	  West.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  view	  of	  
classical	  antiquity,	  i.e.	  the	  Graeco-­‐Roman	  world,	  and	  the	  second	  is	  the	  Biblical	  view.	  Though	  
these	  views	  are	  distinct	  and	  partly	  contradictory,	  “it	  is	  important	  to	  remember,”	  Niebuhr	  
writes,	  “they	  were	  actually	  merged	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  medieval	  Catholicism”—perfectly	  
expressed	  in	  the	  Thomistic	  synthesis	  of	  Augustinian	  and	  Aristotelian	  thought	  (Hall	  2009,	  5).	  
The	  history	  of	  modern	  culture	  begins,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  with	  the	  destruction	  of	  this	  
synthesis,	  foreshadowed	  in	  nominalism,	  and	  completed	  in	  the	  Renaissance	  and	  
Reformation;	  the	  former	  removed	  the	  Augustinian	  elements	  and	  the	  latter	  removed	  the	  
Aristotelian	  perspective.	  In	  other	  words,	  two	  unique	  perspectives	  about	  man’s	  nature	  
existed	  separately,	  were	  momentarily	  synthesized,	  and	  modernity	  can	  be	  demarcated	  as	  
the	  period	  in	  which	  they	  separated	  once	  again	  (though	  today,	  Liberal	  Protestantism	  
represents	  the	  effort—abortive,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr—to	  reconcile	  the	  two	  again).	  As	  
Niebuhr	  sees	  it,	  the	  classical	  view	  of	  man	  is	  an	  amalgam	  of	  Platonic,	  Aristotelian,	  and	  some	  
Stoic	  conceptions	  of	  human	  nature.	  Though	  they	  differ	  on	  many	  accounts,	  they	  all	  share	  one	  
premise	  in	  common,	  which	  is	  that	  man	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  unique	  creature	  
because	  of	  his	  rational	  faculty,	  his	  nous.	  Though	  translated	  as	  “spirit,”	  nous	  is	  equivalent	  to	  
man’s	  capacity	  for	  thought	  and	  reason.	  Man’s	  being	  is	  equivalent	  to	  his	  reason	  and	  thus,	  
implicitly	  in	  Aristotle	  and	  explicitly	  in	  Plato,	  his	  mind	  and	  his	  body	  are	  split	  into	  two	  
separate	  entities.	  Accordingly,	  though	  Aristotle	  and	  Plato	  have	  different	  ideas	  about	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  nous	  and	  the	  soul,	  among	  other	  things,	  both	  share	  a	  common	  
“rationalism”	  and	  “dualism”	  that	  Niebuhr	  argues	  have	  important	  ethical	  consequences.	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Niebuhr	  traces	  these	  propositions	  out	  into	  their	  logical	  consequences.	  Since	  reason,	  
logos,	  is	  the	  creative	  and	  forming	  principle	  of	  the	  world,	  it	  is	  the	  divine	  element	  in	  man,	  
identical	  with	  God.	  Therefore,	  rationalism	  according	  to	  Niebuhr	  identifies	  rational	  man	  
(who	  is	  essential	  man)	  with	  the	  divine	  (ibid.,	  7).	  In	  Aristotle’s	  view,	  it	  is	  the	  active	  nous	  that	  
is	  not	  involved	  with	  the	  soul	  and	  is	  immortal;	  while	  for	  Plato,	  the	  immutability	  of	  ideas	  is	  
considered	  proof	  of	  the	  immortality	  of	  the	  nous,	  the	  logistikon.	  The	  consequence	  of	  the	  
classical	  body-­‐mind	  dualism	  is	  that	  the	  body	  is	  considered	  evil	  while	  the	  rational	  mind	  is	  
considered	  essentially	  good.	  This,	  by	  the	  way,	  is	  the	  sharpest	  contrast	  between	  the	  Hellenic	  
and	  the	  Biblical	  views:	  “the	  Bible	  knows	  nothing	  of	  a	  good	  mind	  and	  an	  evil	  body”	  (ibid.).	  
Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  Platonic	  and	  Aristotelian	  valuations	  of	  logos	  were	  blind	  to	  the	  realities	  
of	  man’s	  will-­‐to-­‐power,	  which	  is	  essentially	  man’s	  will-­‐to-­‐rationalize	  his	  own	  interests	  
using	  logical	  arguments.	  Niebuhr	  called	  this	  the	  “ideological	  taint”	  in	  all	  human	  reasoning,	  
an	  idea	  taken	  from	  Marx,	  but	  which	  Niebuhr	  clung	  to	  long	  after	  he	  abandoned	  Marxism	  as	  a	  
worldview	  (MM).	  He	  sums	  it	  up	  this	  way:	  
Men	  will	  not	  cease	  to	  be	  dishonest,	  merely	  because	  their	  dishonesties	  have	  been	  
revealed	  or	  because	  they	  have	  discovered	  their	  own	  deceptions.	  Wherever	  men	  hold	  
unequal	  power	  in	  society,	  they	  will	  strive	  to	  maintain	  it.	  They	  will	  use	  whatever	  
means	  are	  most	  convenient	  to	  that	  end	  and	  will	  seek	  to	  justify	  them	  by	  the	  most	  
plausible	  arguments	  they	  are	  able	  to	  devise.	  (ibid.	  34)	  
	  
Rhetoric	  scholars	  will	  locate	  Niebuhr’s	  thoughts	  on	  this	  matter	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  Burkean	  
ideological	  criticism.	  What	  Niebuhr	  calls	  the	  “ideological	  taint,”	  Burke,	  drawing	  from	  the	  
writings	  of	  Bentham,	  calls	  “eulogistic	  coverings”	  or	  “fig	  leaves	  of	  the	  mind”	  (1989,	  304).	  
Ideology,	  for	  Mannheim,	  was	  a	  way	  to	  transcend	  political	  faction,	  but	  it	  wasn’t	  the	  only	  way,	  
according	  to	  Burke;	  the	  second	  was	  by	  way	  of	  “myth.”	  This,	  according	  to	  J.A.	  Stewart	  (1905),	  
was	  the	  method	  used	  by	  Plato,	  who	  always	  fused	  into	  his	  dialogues	  a	  mythic	  element	  that	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“sustained	  the	  crisis	  on	  another	  plane”—the	  plane	  of	  “revelation”	  that	  takes	  one	  from	  the	  
“order	  of	  reason	  to	  the	  order	  of	  imagination”	  (Burke	  and	  Gusfield	  1989,	  307).	  Burke’s	  
summary	  of	  the	  movement	  is	  almost	  interchangeable	  with	  Niebuhr’s:	  “Political	  or	  social	  
motives	  cannot	  be	  ultimate,	  since	  they	  must	  in	  turn	  be	  grounded	  in	  motives	  outside	  or	  
beyond	  the	  political	  or	  social.”	  Burke	  and	  Niebuhr	  agree	  that	  these	  myths	  can	  themselves	  
be	  used	  as	  ideologies	  and	  thus,	  they	  must	  be	  “unmasked”	  whenever	  they	  are	  used	  as	  such.	  
We	  will	  see,	  momentarily,	  how	  Niebuhr	  sought	  to	  unmask	  them	  using	  the	  prophetic	  voice	  
of	  his	  religious	  tradition,	  but	  for	  now	  we	  will	  only	  briefly	  note	  Niebuhr’s	  remarks	  
comparing	  Greek	  thought	  to	  “prophetic	  religion”:	  the	  prophetic	  insight	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  
identify	  the	  nation	  with	  God	  stands	  in	  sharpest	  contrast	  to	  the	  “simple	  identification	  of	  
morals	  and	  politics	  in	  thought	  of	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle”	  who	  were	  unable	  to	  find	  any	  
perspective	  “from	  which	  to	  judge	  the	  relative	  character	  and	  contingent	  achievements	  of	  
their	  Greek	  city-­‐state”	  (NDMI,	  214).	  Niebuhr’s	  summation	  is	  that	  “In	  this	  realm	  of	  thought	  
Greek	  philosophy	  must	  be	  regarded	  as	  no	  more	  than	  a	  rationalized	  form	  of	  tribal	  religion.”	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  “noble	  lie”	  (gennaios	  pseudos),	  or	  what	  Jonathan	  Lear	  prefers	  to	  call,	  
“the	  high-­‐minded	  fiction,”	  may	  be	  noble	  and	  high-­‐minded,	  but	  it	  will	  never	  be	  loving	  or	  just	  
to	  anyone	  but	  Greece.	  
Classical	  ideas	  lead	  to	  further	  consequences,	  which	  may	  call	  “attitudinal.”	  Though	  
the	  classical	  view	  of	  human	  nature	  is	  optimistic	  about	  man’s	  future	  potential—since	  it	  finds	  
no	  essential	  defect	  in	  man’s	  nous—and	  while	  it	  is	  confident	  in	  the	  virtue	  of	  rational	  man,	  it	  
lacks	  the	  confidence	  that	  moderns	  share	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  all	  men	  to	  be	  either	  virtuous	  or	  
happy	  (ibid.,	  9).	  The	  result	  is	  that	  “an	  air	  of	  melancholy”	  hangs	  over	  Greek	  life—“There	  is	  
nothing,	  methinks,	  more	  piteous	  than	  man,	  of	  all	  things	  that	  creep	  and	  breathe	  upon	  the	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earth,”	  declares	  Zeus—“and	  that	  note”	  runs	  consistently	  through	  Greek	  thought,	  from	  
Homer	  to	  Hellas	  (ibid.).	  Neither	  Plato’s	  assurance	  of	  immortality	  or	  Epicurus’	  brave	  
encounter	  with	  death	  could	  dissuade	  the	  Greeks	  from	  this	  melancholy	  mood.	  So	  it	  was,	  that	  
Aristotle	  confessed,	  “not	  to	  be	  born	  is	  the	  best	  thing	  and	  death	  is	  better	  than	  life,”	  and	  
argued	  that	  melancholy	  was	  the	  concomitant	  of	  genius	  (ibid.).	  
Consequently,	  yet	  another	  impact	  of	  classical	  perspectives	  traces	  itself	  out:	  It	  wasn’t	  
that	  the	  wise	  man	  couldn’t	  be	  virtuous;	  it	  was	  that	  only	  the	  few	  could	  be	  wise.	  An	  
“aristocratic	  condescension”	  can	  be	  found	  in	  all	  of	  classical	  writings,	  from	  the	  Stoics	  to	  
Aristotle	  to	  Seneca—who	  prays	  “forgive	  the	  world:	  they	  are	  all	  fools”	  (ibid.,	  10).	  This	  led	  
eventually	  to	  a	  conception	  that	  history	  was	  a	  meaningless	  cycle	  of	  life	  and	  death,	  of	  endless	  
recurrences.	  Classical	  pessimism	  about	  man	  and	  history,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  the	  
logical	  consequence	  of	  the	  mind-­‐body	  dualism	  characteristic	  of	  Greek	  thought.	  It	  
culminates	  logically	  in	  neo-­‐Platonism’s	  conviction	  that	  “the	  body	  is	  a	  tomb.”	  The	  
consequences	  of	  classical	  dualism	  are	  also	  found	  in	  Greek	  art.	  Though	  the	  Greek	  poets,	  
contrary	  to	  Greek	  philosophers,	  viewed	  man’s	  human	  passions	  as	  something	  more	  than	  
mere	  impulses	  of	  the	  body,	  presenting	  hero	  after	  hero	  disregarding	  the	  prudent	  advices	  of	  
moderation	  and	  rationalism,	  inevitably	  dying	  for	  this	  very	  reason.	  Greek	  tragedy	  offers	  no	  
resolutions	  for	  man’s	  existential	  problems	  in	  a	  world	  where	  immortality	  isn’t	  promised	  for	  
heroic	  sacrifice.46	  Thus,	  “life	  is	  at	  war	  with	  itself,	  according	  to	  Greek	  tragedy.”	  No	  solution	  
can	  or	  will	  ever	  come,	  because	  the	  conflict	  is	  perennial	  and	  the	  only	  way	  out	  of	  it	  is	  death	  or	  
ascetic	  prudence.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  See	  (Arendt	  1998).	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Having	  traced	  out	  the	  commonly	  held	  hypotheses	  about	  man’s	  nature	  from	  classical	  
antiquity,	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  view	  of	  man’s	  rational	  faculties	  and	  capacity	  for	  
virtue	  that	  don’t	  add	  up	  to	  the	  facts	  of	  life,	  and	  a	  dualism	  that	  eventually	  results	  in	  a	  
rejection	  of	  the	  body	  and	  the	  world.	  This	  means	  that	  though	  we	  may	  begin	  with	  Aristotle’s	  
Rhetoric	  and	  move	  through	  Burke’s	  dramatic	  categories	  of	  acceptance	  and	  rejection,	  we	  
may	  not	  end	  at	  these	  two	  points.	  We	  must	  account	  for	  the	  mythical	  element	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  
thought	  as	  well—his	  unique	  contribution	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric—of	  which	  the	  most	  
notable	  is	  the	  profound	  symbolism	  of	  the	  Cross	  that	  takes	  us	  “Beyond	  Tragedy.”	  We	  will	  see	  
how	  Niebuhr	  identifies	  the	  “ideal	  myth”	  of	  Kenneth	  Burke—myth	  as	  the	  “nonpolitical	  
ground	  of	  the	  political,	  not	  as	  antithetical	  to	  it,	  but	  as	  the	  ‘prepolitical’	  source	  out	  of	  which	  
it	  is	  to	  be	  derived”	  (1989,	  310).	  Our	  purpose	  is	  to	  observe	  how	  Niebuhr	  goes	  beyond	  both	  
Platonic	  notions	  of	  political	  dissent	  and	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  the	  model	  citizen	  and	  roots	  his	  
rhetorical	  ethics	  in	  a	  Hebraic-­‐Christian	  tradition	  that,	  if	  given	  a	  voice	  in	  a	  free	  and	  open	  
society,	  results	  in	  a	  more	  ethical	  rhetorical	  culture;	  one	  that	  pays	  attention	  to	  the	  
appearances	  of	  politics,	  unmasks	  its	  ideologies	  and	  ideological	  myths,	  and	  then	  goes	  even	  
further,	  “beyond	  tragedy.”	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Niebuhr	  can	  go	  too	  far	  beyond	  the	  
Aristotelian	  tradition	  in	  his	  rhetorical	  theory;	  Niebuhr	  doesn’t	  regard	  the	  Greek	  “half”	  of	  
Western	  culture	  as	  impotent	  by	  any	  means.	  Niebuhr’s	  insights	  into	  the	  prophetic	  aspects	  of	  
Hebrew	  culture	  are	  not	  isolated	  in	  abstraction;	  Niebuhr	  lives	  in	  the	  West	  and	  is	  bound	  to	  
the	  West’s	  norms	  of	  rhetorical	  culture.	  The	  result	  then,	  is	  Niebuhr’s	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	  a	  
rhetorical	  voice	  of	  dissent	  that,	  though	  it	  speaks	  from	  an	  authority	  outside	  Western	  
civilization,	  speaks	  from	  inside	  the	  West’s	  rhetorical	  culture.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  a	  voice	  in	  
the	  world	  but	  not	  of	  it.	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The	  Prophet’s	  Position:	  Detached	  Attachment	  
	  
Perhaps	  human	  selfhood	  in	  its	  collective	  form	  constitutionally	  is	  unable	  to	  imagine	  
any	  higher	  value	  than	  the	  common	  value	  of	  its	  devotion.	  Hence,	  the	  redemptive	  
value	  of	  dissident	  individuals,	  the	  prophet,	  the	  critic,	  even	  the	  rebel,	  in	  a	  free	  
community.	  
	  
	  All	  theology	  really	  begins	  with	  Amos.	  
⎯Reinhold	  Niebuhr	  
	  
Amos	  was	  a	  farmer,	  not	  a	  prophet.	  God	  called	  him	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  prophet,	  but	  he	  
insisted,	  even	  after	  the	  calling,	  that	  he	  was	  a	  farmer.	  Amos	  condemned	  the	  nation	  of	  Israel	  
on	  behalf	  of	  God:	  “Are	  you	  not	  as	  the	  Ethiopians	  to	  me?”	  Amos	  was	  layman,	  sent	  to	  the	  
palace	  gates	  by	  God,	  to	  condemn	  his	  nation’s	  pride	  and	  idolatry.	  It	  is	  a	  significant	  and	  yet	  
small	  book	  in	  the	  Old	  Testament,	  and	  it	  is	  remarkable	  that	  Niebuhr	  would	  say,	  “All	  theology	  
really	  begins	  with	  Amos.”	  Why	  this	  was	  the	  case,	  we	  will	  soon	  discover	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  
articulation	  of	  the	  prophet’s	  task.	  
Niebuhr’s	  call	  for	  a	  Christian	  rhetorical	  voice,	  characterized	  by	  its	  critical	  stance	  
toward	  political	  sources	  of	  injustice	  and	  its	  hopeful	  message	  that	  tomorrow	  may	  yield	  more	  
justice	  than	  today,	  begins	  in	  his	  first	  book.	  It	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  recall	  for	  a	  moment	  
Niebuhr’s	  rhetorical	  situation	  and	  the	  intellectual	  climate	  that	  he	  emerged	  in.	  It	  is	  1927.	  
Niebuhr	  has	  just	  spent	  twelve	  years	  in	  Detroit,	  MI	  as	  a	  pastor,	  where	  he	  witnessed	  Henry	  
Ford	  running	  roughshod	  over	  autoworkers,	  the	  destruction	  of	  personality	  and	  the	  
alienation	  of	  individuals	  within	  in	  his	  congregation,	  and	  the	  apathy,	  the	  lack	  of	  empathy	  
and	  assistance	  from	  those	  uninvolved	  in	  the	  labor	  struggle,	  who	  refused	  to	  look	  at	  the	  
appearances	  of	  injustice.	  Lippmann	  has	  just	  demystified	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  public	  and	  called	  for	  
the	  assistance	  of	  experts	  in	  government	  policy.	  Dewey,	  in	  response	  to	  Lippmann’s	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argument,	  has	  just	  argued	  that	  we	  treat	  American	  democracy	  as	  an	  experimental	  method	  of	  
arranging	  conflicting	  interests	  and	  that	  the	  public,	  though	  it	  exists,	  has	  been	  eclipsed.	  The	  
last	  thing	  anyone	  wanted	  to	  hear,	  one	  would	  have	  thought,	  was	  that	  we	  should	  look	  to	  
religion	  for	  some	  solutions;	  especially	  since	  Christianity	  had	  been	  so	  supportive	  of	  the	  
laissez	  faire	  capitalist	  structure	  that	  many	  viewed	  responsible	  for	  society’s	  ills.	  Niebuhr	  
however,	  wasn’t	  ready	  to	  scrap	  religion	  into	  the	  heap.	  As	  a	  neo-­‐orthodox	  thinker	  (though	  
not	  a	  theologian,	  despite	  the	  accusation	  by	  many)	  he	  was	  forever	  interested,	  no	  matter	  the	  
topic	  of	  study,	  in	  retaining	  what	  was	  good	  and	  separating	  out	  the	  bad	  from	  traditions.	  The	  
idea	  was	  simply	  that,	  whatever	  it	  was	  today,	  it	  obviously	  had	  some	  value	  yesterday	  or	  man	  
would	  not	  have	  used	  it.	  In	  Does	  Civilization	  Need	  Religion?	  Niebuhr	  (1928)	  began	  this	  
winnowing	  task	  in	  the	  field	  of	  religion.	  
Niebuhr	  argued	  that	  religion	  was	  dying	  in	  modern	  culture	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  
was	  guilty	  of	  literalism.	  It	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  “restate	  its	  affirmations”	  so	  that	  they	  would	  
be	  consistent	  with	  scientific	  fact	  (ibid.,	  220).	  Secondly,	  it	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  make	  its	  
ethical	  and	  social	  resources	  available	  for	  the	  solutions	  modern	  civilization’s	  unique	  moral	  
problems,	  e.g.	  labor	  justice,	  alienation,	  urban	  sprawl,	  etc.	  “Its	  rejuvenation	  therefore	  waits”	  
Niebuhr	  writes,	  “upon	  a	  reorientation	  of	  its	  ethical	  traditions	  as	  well	  as	  of	  its	  theological	  
conceptions.”	  Niebuhr	  isn’t	  arguing	  in	  the	  abstract	  historical	  sense	  about	  cultural	  
movement;	  he	  is	  always	  concerned	  with	  active	  agents	  acting	  in	  freedom	  to	  solve	  for	  the	  
problems	  they	  encounter.	  So	  Niebuhr’s	  “rejuvenation”	  waits	  upon	  individuals	  who	  will	  do	  
the	  reorienting.	  These	  individuals	  must	  develop	  the	  critical	  faculty	  while	  maintaining	  the	  
reverence	  and	  naiveté	  of	  the	  religious	  faith.	  Their	  task	  is	  to	  perform	  the	  unnatural	  
unification	  of	  “reason	  and	  imagination,	  intelligence	  and	  moral	  dynamics,”	  into	  mutual	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cooperation.	  Moral	  purpose	  must	  be	  astutely	  guided,	  yet	  moral	  purpose	  itself	  is	  rooted	  in	  
ultra-­‐rational	  sanctions	  that	  an	  intelligent	  mind	  will	  naturally	  dismiss.	  There	  is	  nothing	  
rational	  about	  love	  and	  humility,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  and	  a	  discriminating	  and	  critical	  
intelligence	  will	  have	  problems	  maintaining	  the	  fanatical	  energy	  needed	  to	  foster	  a	  “robust	  
moral	  idealism.”	  The	  task,	  Niebuhr	  concludes,	  is	  difficult	  but	  not	  impossible	  (ibid.,	  223).	  
No	  civilization	  can	  afford	  to	  dispense	  with	  the	  irrational	  moral	  will	  or	  the	  critical	  
intelligence	  by	  which	  it	  is	  made	  effective	  in	  complex	  situations,	  Niebuhr	  insists.	  He	  
summarizes	  the	  situation:	  
Men	  need	  to	  subject	  all	  partial	  moral	  achievements	  to	  comparison	  with	  the	  absolute	  
standards	  of	  truth,	  beauty	  and	  goodness	  of	  their	  religious	  faith,	  and	  yet	  be	  able	  to	  
see	  and	  willing	  to	  concede	  the	  relativities	  in	  the	  absolute	  values	  of	  their	  devotion.	  
They	  can	  be	  saved	  from	  a	  morality	  of	  mere	  utilitarianism	  only	  by	  the	  religious	  quest	  
for	  an	  absolute	  moral	  standard;	  yet	  they	  need	  to	  be	  discerning	  enough	  to	  see	  that	  
every	  ethical	  achievement,	  even	  when	  inspired	  by	  religious	  motives,	  is	  tinged	  with	  
prudential	  self-­‐interest.	  They	  must	  continue	  to	  strive	  after	  freedom	  and	  yet	  realize	  
that	  human	  life	  and	  character	  is	  largely	  determined	  by	  environment.	  If	  they	  seek	  
happiness,	  divorced	  from	  fortune,	  they	  nevertheless	  escape	  the	  duty	  of	  making	  the	  
material	  world	  serve	  human	  welfare.	  Their	  ability	  to	  discover	  the	  transcendent	  
values	  in	  human	  personality	  has	  value	  only	  if	  they	  maintain	  faith	  in	  human	  nature	  
after	  they	  have	  discovered	  its	  imperfections.	  They	  must	  search	  after	  the	  perfect	  
goodness	  in	  God	  and	  yet	  be	  prepared	  to	  face	  the	  cruelties	  of	  life	  without	  denying	  
their	  reality	  or	  being	  driven	  to	  despair	  by	  them.	  (ibid.,	  224-­‐5).	  
	  
To	  do	  this,	  Niebuhr	  concludes	  that	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  asceticism	  is	  needed;	  not	  the	  type	  of	  
monkish	  retreat	  from	  the	  world	  that	  is	  typical	  of	  asceticism,	  but	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  elevated	  
detachment	  that	  is	  engaged	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  men.	  One	  such	  asceticism,	  for	  example,	  would	  
be	  a	  detachment	  from	  the	  greed	  and	  consumerism	  of	  modern	  culture.	  Religious	  idealism,	  if	  
it	  is	  to	  be	  as	  purely	  objective	  as	  possible,	  must	  detach	  itself	  from	  the	  culture	  it	  seeks	  to	  
morally	  guide.	  “No	  religious	  idealism”	  writes	  Niebuhr,	  “can	  maintain	  any	  degree	  of	  purity	  if	  
it	  does	  not	  enter	  into	  a	  conscious	  conflict	  with	  the	  civilization	  in	  which	  it	  functions	  and	  
succeed	  in	  setting	  some	  bounds	  to	  the	  expansive	  desires	  of	  men	  and	  of	  nations”	  (ibid.,	  226).	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This	  seems	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  lessons	  Niebuhr	  learned	  in	  Detroit	  when	  he	  saw	  the	  effects	  
consumerism	  had	  on	  the	  moral	  sight	  of	  his	  congregation;	  one	  he	  took	  with	  him	  to	  Union,	  
where	  he	  feared	  that	  the	  academy	  would	  temper	  his	  polemical	  public	  voice	  by	  insisting	  on	  
a	  bourgeois	  spirit	  of	  patience	  and	  progress.	  
This	  is	  why	  Niebuhr	  knew	  the	  church,	  as	  a	  body,	  wouldn’t	  make	  the	  level	  of	  
detachment	  that	  it	  needed	  to.	  This	  level	  of	  detachment,	  he	  insisted,	  “must	  be,	  as	  it	  has	  
always	  been,	  a	  minority	  movement.	  But	  he	  minority	  ought	  not	  detach	  itself	  from	  the	  
majority	  so	  completely	  that	  it	  will	  sacrifice	  the	  possibility	  of	  acting	  as	  a	  leaven	  in	  it”	  (ibid.,	  
226-­‐7).	  Niebuhr’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	  leaven	  is	  a	  Biblical	  trope	  rooted	  in	  the	  prophetic	  
tradition.	  Also	  called	  a	  “saving	  remnant,”	  the	  leavening	  portion	  comes	  from	  a	  bread	  
metaphor.	  The	  idea,	  still	  preached	  today,	  is	  that	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  yeast	  can	  have	  a	  
dramatic	  transformative	  effect	  on	  dough.	  Thus,	  we’ve	  come	  full	  circle	  to	  “this	  little	  light	  of	  
mine.”	  Niebuhr’s	  task,	  at	  this	  point,	  is	  to	  articulate	  the	  necessary	  tasks	  and	  the	  character	  
traits	  of	  what	  a	  leavening	  portion	  might	  look	  like	  in	  modern	  society.	  The	  great	  majority	  will	  
continue	  to	  obscure	  the	  defects	  in	  human	  nature	  and	  go	  on	  reassuring	  perplexed	  souls	  by	  
recounting	  the	  victories	  of	  the	  past	  without	  seeking	  new	  triumphs	  (ibid.).	  They	  will	  build	  
systems	  of	  faith	  upon	  the	  past	  without	  any	  effort	  to	  validate	  them	  or	  amend	  them	  in	  fresh	  
experience.	  This	  means	  that	  rejuvenation	  and	  progress	  must	  come	  from	  the	  few,	  the	  saving	  
remnant	  who	  fully	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  faith	  they	  share	  with	  the	  multitudes	  
“whose	  eyes	  are	  holden	  and	  who	  lack	  the	  courage	  to	  follow	  even	  such	  visions	  as	  may	  come	  
to	  them”	  (ibid.).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  majority	  is	  missing	  out	  on	  some	  phenomena,	  some	  
appearances,	  and	  even	  when	  they	  encounter	  them,	  when	  they	  “Hark!	  Look!	  Listen!”	  they	  
lack	  the	  courage	  to	  address	  these	  appearances	  ethically.	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A	  highly	  spiritual	  religion	  can’t	  be	  possessed	  only	  by	  a	  few,	  of	  course—Niebuhr	  isn’t	  
trying	  to	  set	  up	  a	  Plutocracy	  ruled	  by	  Theologian	  Kings.	  	  Niebuhr	  insists	  that	  the	  new	  moral	  
idealism	  of	  measured	  detachment	  must	  be	  something	  the	  masses	  can	  aspire	  to;	  the	  
movement	  cannot	  afford	  to	  lose	  confidence	  in	  the	  masses,	  he	  argues	  (ibid.,	  227).	  The	  
leavening	  portion	  must	  resist	  the	  temptation	  toward	  mediocrity	  while	  also	  avoiding	  
becoming	  a	  priestly	  caste,	  an	  exclusionary	  cult	  to	  which	  the	  laymen	  cannot	  be	  initiated.	  In	  
fact,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  if	  it	  is	  going	  to	  be	  successful,	  the	  modern	  movement	  of	  detachment	  
must	  be	  a	  layman’s	  movement;	  “for	  it	  must	  express	  itself	  in	  rebuilding	  the	  social	  order	  
rather	  than	  in	  rebuilding	  new	  social	  institutions”	  (ibid.,	  228,	  emphasis	  mine).	  The	  most	  
effective	  teachers	  of	  this	  movement	  will	  “lack	  neither	  the	  technical	  skill	  nor	  the	  spiritual	  
resource	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  practical	  problems	  of	  industry	  and	  politics”	  (ibid.).	  Religious	  
teachers,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  may	  play	  the	  role	  of	  inspiration	  for	  this	  movement;	  but	  the	  
movement	  will	  prove	  ineffective	  if	  those	  engaged	  in	  the	  world’s	  work	  are	  not	  at	  the	  mast.	  
The	  saving	  remnant	  consists	  of	  men	  who	  “use	  and	  direct	  the	  machines	  of	  modern	  industry	  
without	  making	  mechanical	  efficient	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  and	  without	  succumbing	  to	  the	  lure	  of	  
the	  material	  rewards	  which	  come	  so	  easily	  to	  those	  who	  are	  proficient	  in	  the	  industrial	  
enterprise”	  (ibid.).	  	  
“Puritanism,”	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  “sanctified	  economic	  power,	  and	  monasticism	  fled	  its	  
responsibilities”	  (ibid.,	  228-­‐9).	  The	  other	  prophets	  that	  told	  the	  king	  what	  he	  wanted	  to	  
hear	  fit	  the	  Puritan	  model,	  they	  were	  what	  Niebuhr	  calls	  the	  false-­‐prophets	  of	  the	  king’s	  
court.	  The	  monkish	  asceticism	  denies	  the	  world	  of	  politics	  has	  relevance.	  Niebuhr’s	  
detached	  leaven	  will	  practice	  a	  “new	  asceticism”	  which	  will	  “produce	  spiritualized	  
technicians	  who	  will	  continue	  to	  conquer	  and	  exploit	  nature	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  human	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welfare,	  but	  who	  will	  regard	  their	  task	  as	  a	  social	  service	  and	  scorn	  to	  take	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  
the	  returns	  of	  industry	  than	  is	  justified	  by	  reasonable	  and	  carefully	  scrutinized	  needs”	  
(ibid.).	  This	  means	  that	  it	  must	  “be	  in	  the	  world	  and	  yet	  not	  of	  this	  world,”	  be	  “truly	  
scientific	  in	  gauging	  the	  advantage	  to	  human	  personality	  in	  the	  conquest	  of	  nature	  and	  
truly	  religious	  in	  finding	  a	  basis	  for	  human	  happiness	  beyond	  the	  material	  rewards	  which	  
this	  conquest	  returns.”	  It	  must	  be	  emphasized	  that	  Niebuhr	  isn’t	  condemning	  the	  material	  
advantages	  of	  commercialism	  for	  their	  own	  sake,	  just	  as	  Daniel	  doesn’t	  turn	  down	  the	  
king’s	  gifts	  simply	  because	  he	  rejects	  materialism.	  
The	  demand	  for	  this	  rejection	  comes	  from	  the	  tendency	  humans	  have	  to	  cloud	  their	  
judgments	  when	  they	  are	  intimate	  with	  those	  they	  must	  judge.	  Niebuhr	  discovers	  three	  
problems	  for	  prophetic	  ministry	  that	  come	  from	  this	  intimacy.	  The	  first	  pertains	  to	  the	  
relationship	  between	  a	  prophet’s	  livelihood	  and	  his	  criticism.	  If	  one	  is	  dependent	  on	  
another	  for	  financial	  stability,	  one	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  clearly	  and	  objectively	  see	  the	  
appearances	  of	  this	  world	  for	  what	  they	  are.	  The	  gifts	  blur	  our	  vision,	  so	  to	  speak.	  Niebuhr	  
writes,	  “Too	  few	  realize	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  detach	  oneself	  from	  an	  unethical	  
nationalism	  if	  one	  continues	  to	  enjoy	  the	  material	  advantages	  which	  from	  the	  nation’s	  
unqualified	  insistence	  upon	  the	  right	  to	  hold	  its	  advantages	  against	  the	  world”	  (ibid.,	  230).	  
Niebuhr	  wasn’t	  just	  speaking	  theoretically;	  he	  experienced	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  gifts	  on	  a	  
personal	  and	  professional	  level.	  As	  a	  pastor,	  he	  records	  in	  one	  of	  the	  more	  humorous	  and	  
perhaps	  personally	  bitter	  confessions	  in	  Leaves;	  a	  reflection	  on	  a	  local	  church’s	  search	  for	  a	  
new	  pastor.	  He	  writes:	  
After	  trying	  futilely	  to	  find	  the	  right	  man,	  who	  was	  to	  have	  as	  much	  scholarship	  as	  
his	  predecessor	  and	  more	  “punch,”	  they	  decided	  to	  raise	  the	  salary	  to	  $15,000.	  I	  
don’t	  know	  whether	  that	  was	  the	  factor	  which	  finally	  solved	  their	  problem,	  but	  at	  
any	  rate	  they	  have	  the	  man	  they	  wanted.	  I	  suppose	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  get	  a	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combination	  of	  Aristotle	  and	  Demonthenes,	  and	  on	  the	  current	  market,	  that	  ought	  to	  
be	  worth	  $15,000.	  (Leaves,	  55)	  
	  
We	  ought	  to	  question,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  the	  oversized	  salaries	  and	  the	  increasing	  demand	  
for	  rhetorical	  eloquence	  by	  church	  congregations.	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “What	  kind	  of	  
fundamental	  ethical	  question	  can	  a	  man	  be	  eloquent	  about	  when	  he	  draws	  that	  much	  cash,	  
particularly	  since	  a	  Croesus	  or	  two	  usually	  has	  to	  supply	  an	  undue	  portion	  of	  it?”	  Then,	  
with	  a	  final	  closing	  remark,	  Niebuhr	  pokes:	  “I	  hope	  that	  the	  new	  prophet	  won’t	  begin	  his	  
pastorate	  with	  a	  sermon	  on	  the	  text,	  ‘I	  count	  all	  things	  but	  loss.’”	  One	  can	  sense	  Niebuhr’s	  
acute	  awareness	  of	  problems	  that	  might	  interfere	  with	  the	  prophetic	  task	  and	  cloud	  the	  
prophet’s	  judgment.	  It	  was	  this	  same	  awareness	  that	  almost	  led	  him	  to	  refuse	  the	  position	  
at	  Columbia	  University’s	  Union	  Theological	  Seminary.	  	  
But	  Niebuhr’s	  journal	  reveals	  another	  impediment	  to	  prophetic	  ministry.	  Not	  only	  
could	  a	  prophet’s	  salary	  cloud	  his	  judgment	  but	  so	  too	  could	  his	  relationship	  with	  his	  
audience	  have	  a	  tempering	  affect.	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  “I	  am	  not	  surprised	  that	  most	  prophets	  
are	  itinerants.	  Critics	  of	  the	  church	  think	  we	  preachers	  are	  afraid	  to	  tell	  the	  truth	  because	  
we	  are	  economically	  dependent	  upon	  the	  people	  of	  our	  church.	  There	  is	  something	  in	  that,	  
but	  it	  does	  not	  quite	  get	  to	  the	  root	  of	  the	  matter”	  (ibid.,	  47).	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  he	  could	  
get	  a	  raise	  anytime	  he	  wanted	  one	  but	  that	  he	  catches	  himself	  weighing	  his	  words	  and	  
gauging	  their	  possible	  effect	  on	  certain	  individuals	  in	  his	  congregation,	  leading	  him	  to	  
conclude:	  “I	  think	  the	  real	  clue	  to	  the	  tameness	  of	  a	  preacher	  is	  the	  difficulty	  one	  finds	  in	  
telling	  unpleasant	  truths	  to	  people	  whom	  one	  has	  learned	  to	  love.”	  This	  problem	  begins	  
with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  prophet	  does	  speak	  from	  within	  a	  culture,	  and	  that	  he	  cares	  about	  this	  
culture	  dearly.	  Abraham	  Heschel	  argues	  that	  the	  most	  notable	  trait	  of	  the	  prophet	  is	  his	  
ability	  to	  experience	  the	  suffering	  of	  his	  people	  as	  God	  experiences	  it	  (2001).	  The	  prophet’s	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“sensitivity	  to	  evil”	  is	  highly	  attuned;	  even	  minor	  injustices	  assume	  cosmological	  
proportions	  because	  the	  prophet	  “is	  a	  man	  who	  feels	  fiercely.”	  The	  intense	  capacity	  for	  
pathos	  leaves	  the	  prophet	  in	  a	  rhetorical	  tension	  between	  rage	  and	  lamentation.	  “God	  is	  
raging	  in	  the	  prophet’s	  words,”	  writes	  Heschel,	  yet	  the	  prophet	  is	  motivated	  and	  embodies	  
God’s	  love.	  This	  leads	  to	  contradictions	  in	  the	  prophetic	  message	  that	  seem	  perplexing.	  
“What	  hidden	  bond	  exists	  between	  the	  word	  of	  wrath	  and	  the	  word	  of	  compassion,	  
between	  ‘consuming	  fire’	  and	  ‘everlasting	  love’?”	  Heschel	  asks.	  The	  only	  solution	  to	  this	  
tension	  is	  that	  it	  transcends	  the	  demand	  for	  rational	  coherency	  because	  it	  is	  about	  the	  
relationship	  between	  man	  and	  God.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  prophet,	  as	  Niebuhr	  reveals	  here,	  
always	  feels	  the	  tension	  between	  criticism	  and	  love:	  
To	  speak	  the	  truth	  in	  love	  is	  a	  difficult,	  and	  sometimes	  an	  almost	  impossible,	  
achievement.	  If	  you	  speak	  the	  truth	  unqualifiedly,	  that	  is	  usually	  because	  your	  ire	  
has	  been	  aroused	  or	  because	  you	  have	  no	  personal	  attachment	  to	  the	  object	  of	  your	  
strictures.	  Once	  personal	  contact	  is	  established	  you	  are	  very	  prone	  to	  temper	  your	  
wind	  to	  the	  shorn	  sheep.	  It	  is	  certainly	  difficult	  to	  be	  human	  and	  honest	  at	  the	  same	  
time.	  I’m	  not	  surprised	  that	  most	  budding	  prophets	  are	  tamed	  in	  time	  to	  become	  
harmless	  parish	  priests.	  (Leaves,	  47)	  
	  
In	  1924,	  when	  he	  wrote	  this	  reflection,	  Niebuhr	  wasn’t	  sure	  what	  business	  he	  had	  “carping	  
at	  the	  good	  people	  who	  are	  doing	  the	  world’s	  work	  and	  who	  are	  enmeshed	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  
less	  degree	  in	  the	  iniquities	  of	  society”	  (ibid.)	  What	  Niebuhr	  doesn’t	  call	  our	  attention	  to	  is	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  love	  of	  the	  people	  is	  required	  before	  one	  can	  criticize	  them	  prophetically.	  
By	  1927	  he’d	  had	  enough;	  his	  frustrations	  with	  Detroit	  peaked	  and	  he	  realized	  that	  the	  
problem	  was	  with	  his	  definition	  of	  his	  parishioners	  as	  “good	  people.”	  He	  began	  to	  view	  the	  
pathetic	  element	  as	  priestly	  and	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  justice	  and	  morally	  potent	  faith.	  He	  
writes:	  
The	  perennial	  conflict	  between	  priest	  and	  prophet	  is	  given	  in	  the	  double	  function	  of	  
religion.	  The	  priest	  dispenses	  comfort	  and	  the	  prophet	  makes	  the	  challenge	  of	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religion	  potent.	  The	  priest	  is	  more	  numerous	  than	  the	  profit	  because	  human	  
selfishness	  is	  as	  determining	  in	  religion	  as	  in	  other	  fields.	  Though	  the	  priest	  always	  
defeats	  the	  prophet	  in	  the	  end,	  the	  prophet	  is	  avenged	  because	  his	  original	  
experience	  is	  the	  reality	  which	  makes	  the	  priest’s	  assurance	  plausible.	  There	  is	  no	  
way	  of	  guaranteeing	  the	  reality	  of	  God	  if	  someone	  does	  not	  make	  them	  real	  in	  
experience,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  way	  of	  declaring	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  ideal	  if	  someone	  does	  
not	  defeat	  reality	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  ideal	  in	  history.	  Religion	  validates	  itself	  in	  
spiritual	  experience	  and	  moral	  triumph…	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  free	  religion	  altogether	  
of	  its	  priestly	  corruptions.	  But	  anything	  which	  will	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  accept	  
the	  comforts	  of	  faith	  without	  accepting	  its	  challenges	  will	  increase	  the	  moral	  
potency	  of	  religion	  and	  decrease	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  corruption	  by	  those	  who	  want	  
to	  use	  it	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  ensuring	  the	  dignity	  of	  human	  life	  without	  paying	  the	  
price	  of	  moral	  effort	  for	  the	  boon.	  (1927,	  216-­‐217)	  
	  
To	  muster	  the	  courage	  to	  challenge	  the	  world,	  he	  targeted	  the	  “nation”	  instead	  of	  
individuals,	  and	  he	  reflected	  on	  the	  model	  of	  Jesus’s	  prophetic	  ministry,	  instead	  of	  his	  
priestly	  one:	  “Woe	  unto	  you	  scribes	  and	  Pharisees!”	  Niebuhr	  noted,	  were	  words	  written	  by	  
the	  embodiment	  of	  perfect	  love	  (Leaves,	  75).	  Yet	  even	  here,	  the	  prophet	  risked	  becoming	  
too	  intimate,	  not	  with	  his	  parishioners,	  but	  with	  the	  nation.	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “Whenever	  
religion	  comes	  into	  a	  too-­‐intimate	  relation	  with	  the	  processes	  of	  government,	  it	  succumbs	  
to	  the	  temptation	  of	  regarding	  government	  as	  only	  an	  instrument	  of	  God	  and	  of	  forgetting	  
its	  prophetic	  function	  of	  declaring	  that	  the	  state	  is	  a	  rebel	  against	  God”	  (L&J,	  75).	  For	  this	  
reason,	  amateur,	  rather	  than	  professional	  and	  established	  religious	  readers,	  usually	  
perform	  the	  prophetic	  function.	  
	   The	  third	  and	  final	  problem	  Niebuhr	  discovers	  impeding	  the	  prophet’s	  calling	  comes	  
from	  one	  his	  last	  reflections	  in	  Leaves,	  written	  in	  1928.	  He	  begins	  with	  a	  confession:	  “I	  think	  
I	  ought	  to	  repent	  of	  the	  many	  unkind	  things	  I	  have	  said	  about	  various	  ministers.	  We	  liberal	  
preachers	  are	  too	  ready	  to	  attribute	  conventional	  opinions	  to	  cowardice.”	  (141).	  Niebuhr	  
found	  himself,	  unknowingly	  and	  unwittingly,	  taking	  the	  position	  of	  Greek	  rationalism	  he	  
later	  condemned	  in	  his	  arguments	  against	  John	  Dewey.	  Niebuhr	  had	  assumed	  those	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ministers,	  having	  read	  the	  same	  bible	  and	  having	  seen	  the	  same	  injustices	  he	  had,	  must	  
have	  been	  refusing	  to	  speak	  out	  cowardice;	  he	  assumed	  they	  were	  afraid	  of	  losing	  their	  
jobs	  or	  were	  afraid	  of	  hurting	  their	  parishioners	  feelings.	  Now,	  Niebuhr	  returned	  to	  his	  
Jamesian	  roots	  and	  located	  the	  problem	  in	  habits	  of	  thought:	  
I	  think	  we	  have	  a	  right	  to	  wonder	  a	  little	  how	  one	  can	  claim	  discipleship	  to	  one	  who	  
disturbed	  history	  so	  much	  and	  yet	  be	  such	  a	  thorough	  conformist.	  Yet	  it	  is	  usually	  
not	  cowardice	  but	  mental	  inertia	  which	  creates	  the	  conformity;	  and	  sometimes	  the	  
conformity	  is	  the	  honest	  fruit	  of	  a	  finely	  poised	  rather	  than	  a	  daring	  mind.	  After	  all	  
most	  of	  us	  are	  conformists	  in	  some	  sense,	  and	  it	  is	  rather	  presumptuous	  on	  our	  part	  
to	  condemn	  every	  type	  of	  conformity	  except	  our	  own.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
From	  this	  reflection,	  Niebuhr	  has	  another,	  more	  telling	  one.	  Noting	  that	  the	  editor	  of	  the	  
Christian	  Register	  has	  called	  every	  liberal	  churchgoer	  who	  refused	  to	  join	  the	  Unitarian	  
church	  a	  coward,	  he	  writes	  that	  it	  is	  then	  his	  “ox	  that	  is	  gored.”	  If	  the	  Register	  editor	  can	  go	  
wrong	  in	  assuming	  his	  own	  motives	  then,	  Niebuhr	  decides,	  he	  may	  well	  be	  wrong	  in	  
assuming	  why	  parsons	  fail	  to	  measure	  up	  to	  his	  standards.	  The	  final	  note	  in	  this	  journal	  
entry	  is	  telling	  because	  it	  summarizes	  how	  Niebuhr,	  later	  in	  his	  life,	  articulates	  the	  
embodiment	  of	  love	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  justice,	  an	  idea	  we	  will	  return	  to	  in	  the	  final	  section	  of	  
our	  analysis.	  He	  writes:	  “I	  learn	  how	  to	  be	  tolerant	  when	  I	  become	  the	  victim	  of	  somebody	  
else’s	  spiritual	  pride.”	  This	  is	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  Niebuhr’s	  method	  of	  criticism	  for	  it	  
was	  a	  solution	  to	  a	  perennial	  problem,	  which	  Niebuhr	  records	  here:	  “Whenever	  a	  prophet	  
is	  born,	  either	  inside	  the	  church	  or	  outside	  the	  church,	  he	  does	  face	  the	  problem	  of	  
preaching	  repentance	  without	  bitterness	  and	  of	  criticizing	  without	  spiritual	  pride”	  (Leaves,	  
74).	  How	  was	  he	  to	  condemn	  the	  world	  and	  still	  love	  it?	  How	  was	  he	  to	  condemn	  the	  world	  
and	  not	  love	  himself?	  
Instead	  of	  going	  after	  Ford,	  or	  the	  Christian	  Register	  editor,	  or	  the	  pastor	  on	  the	  
other	  side	  of	  town,	  Niebuhr	  formulated	  a	  way	  to	  condemn	  the	  nation,	  the	  church,	  and	  the	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individuals,	  who	  weren’t	  furthering	  the	  cause	  of	  justice.	  Instead	  of	  condemning	  them	  
personally,	  he	  condemned	  their	  pride,	  and	  by	  doing	  so	  he	  condemned	  in	  them	  what	  was	  in	  
every	  one	  of	  us;	  in	  other	  words,	  his	  prophetic	  criticism,	  at	  its	  most	  raging	  and	  tragic,	  and	  at	  
its	  most	  humble	  and	  comic,	  was	  always	  given	  from	  the	  ironic	  perspective	  of	  transcendent	  
judgment.	  What	  was	  it	  that	  Niebuhr	  had	  and	  others	  did	  not?	  How	  was	  he	  able	  to	  approach	  
the	  world	  through	  the	  ironic	  frame,	  as	  a	  spectator	  and	  observer,	  instead	  of	  as	  a	  participant?	  
I	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  two	  things	  unique	  about	  Niebuhr	  that	  led	  him	  to	  the	  ironic	  
perspective	  of	  the	  prophet.	  The	  first,	  is	  his	  broad	  array	  of	  life	  experiences	  from	  many	  and	  
diverse	  cultures,	  classes,	  and	  nationality.	  In	  Niebuhr’s	  journal	  entries,	  he	  reflects	  on	  his	  
visits	  to	  the	  automobile	  plants	  in	  Detroit,	  describing	  in	  intimate	  detail,	  feeling	  that	  the	  
workers	  were	  ghosts	  of	  their	  former	  selves,	  noting	  the	  immense	  heat	  that	  pummeled	  out	  of	  
the	  foundry	  onto	  the	  laborers,	  for	  hours	  on	  end.	  Niebuhr	  recalls	  visiting	  the	  Rhine	  in	  1918,	  
touring	  the	  war	  training	  camps,	  writing	  with	  anxiety	  about	  life’s	  ultimate	  incongruities:	  “I	  
hardly	  know	  how	  to	  bring	  order	  out	  of	  confusions	  in	  my	  mind	  in	  regard	  to	  this	  war”	  (ibid.,	  
19).	  As	  a	  pastor,	  he	  counseled	  parishioners	  on	  their	  deathbeds,	  praying	  with	  them	  as	  they	  
lamented	  their	  failures	  and	  unfulfilled	  promises.	  Though	  Niebuhr	  experienced	  all	  these	  
things,	  his	  response	  could	  just	  as	  well	  been	  an	  overwhelming	  despair,	  a	  cynicism	  that	  knew	  
no	  bounds,	  nihilism,	  a	  complete	  asectism	  and	  rejection	  of	  the	  world.	  
Take	  the	  last	  experience,	  for	  instance,	  and	  we	  may	  note	  how	  powerful	  are	  its	  affects	  
and	  effect	  on	  many	  thinkers,	  thinkers	  like	  Heidegger	  and	  Freud,	  who	  encountered	  death	  
without	  a	  faith	  in	  life’s	  meaningfulness,	  and	  whose	  entire	  lives	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  
experience.	  The	  first,	  rejecting	  the	  meaning	  system	  of	  his	  childhood,	  tried	  to,	  as	  Arendt	  
describes	  his	  ascetic	  withdrawal,	  hide,	  like	  a	  fox,	  in	  a	  fallen	  tree	  in	  the	  lonely	  woods.	  Freud	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however,	  refused	  to	  retreat	  from	  the	  world,	  for	  he	  was,	  after	  all,	  a	  lover	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  so	  
he	  created	  his	  own	  sense	  of	  meaning,	  one	  that	  has	  proven	  helpful	  to	  the	  many	  people;	  as	  
Niebuhr	  would	  describe	  it,	  having	  abandoned	  religious	  beliefs	  as	  irrational	  and	  illogical,	  
they	  nevertheless	  require	  faith	  in	  an	  ultimate	  principle	  of	  interpretation.	  The	  question	  then,	  
for	  an	  evaluation	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  would	  be,	  does	  it	  contain	  an	  ironic	  worldview,	  or	  a	  
tragic	  one?	  The	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  would	  likely	  depend	  on	  how	  one	  interprets	  the	  
Oedipus	  myth.	  
This	  is	  the	  power	  of	  myth;	  the	  second	  thing	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  life	  that	  led	  him	  to	  an	  ironic	  
worldview,	  for	  his	  myth	  was	  inundated	  with	  irony.	  The	  ironic	  perspective	  of	  detached-­‐
attachment	  is	  the	  perspective	  consistent	  with	  the	  Hebraic-­‐Christian	  attitudes	  as	  a	  prophetic	  
religion.	  Niebuhr’s	  attachment	  to	  the	  world,	  leads	  him	  to	  explore	  its	  many	  different	  
experiences	  and	  pay	  attention	  to	  appearances.	  The	  Christian	  myth	  teaches	  him	  to	  be	  on	  the	  
look	  out,	  when	  attending	  to	  the	  various	  appearances	  of	  this	  world,	  for	  dramatic	  irony.	  This	  
ironic	  perspective	  doesn’t	  keep	  him	  from	  engaging	  the	  world	  tragically	  or	  comically.	  
Niebuhr	  is	  able	  to	  call	  a	  spade	  a	  spade,	  and	  where	  there	  is	  injustice	  and	  pathos,	  he	  calls	  
attention	  to	  it,	  never	  cowering,	  but	  condemning	  the	  causes	  of	  injustice	  with	  unqualified	  
judgments.	  The	  ironic	  perspective	  doesn’t	  keep	  him	  from	  engaging	  the	  world	  comically	  
either;	  Niebuhr	  states	  “laughter	  is	  a	  sane	  and	  healthful	  response	  to	  the	  innocent	  foibles	  of	  
men;	  and	  even	  to	  some	  which	  are	  not	  innocent;”	  and	  also,	  “A	  sense	  of	  humour	  is	  
indispensable	  to	  men	  of	  affair	  who	  have	  the	  duty	  of	  organizing	  their	  fellowmen	  in	  common	  
endeavors.	  It	  reduces	  the	  friction	  of	  life	  and	  makes	  the	  foibles	  of	  men	  tolerable”	  (ERN,	  51).	  
Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  there	  is,	  in	  this	  laughter,	  “a	  nice	  mixture	  of	  mercy	  and	  judgment,	  of	  
censure	  and	  forbearance.”	  Yet,	  as	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  comedy,	  faced	  with	  serious	  evil,	  senses	  its	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impotence,	  and	  turns	  into	  bitterness.	  Serious	  evil,	  he	  writes,	  must	  be	  dealt	  with	  seriously.	  
That	  fact	  that	  life’s	  ultimate	  incongruities	  can’t	  be	  laughed	  away,	  this	  fact	  doesn’t	  keep	  us	  
from	  trying.	  Thus,	  we	  have	  “gallows	  humor.”	  But	  Niebuhr	  insists	  that	  when	  we	  try	  to	  turn	  
all	  of	  life	  into	  a	  comedy,	  we	  reduce	  it	  to	  meaninglessness	  (ibid.,	  57).	  Faith	  is	  the	  final	  
triumph	  over	  life’s	  ultimate	  incongruities.	  There	  is	  laughter	  in	  the	  vestibule	  of	  the	  temple,	  
he	  notes,	  the	  echoes	  of	  laughter	  in	  the	  temple	  itself;	  but	  there	  is	  only	  faith	  and	  prayer	  in	  the	  
holy	  of	  holies.	  
One	  may	  think	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  absurd	  here,	  which	  Camus	  articulated	  so	  
poetically,	  and	  in	  which,	  recognizing	  the	  threat	  of	  meaninglessness	  in	  it,	  he	  embedded	  the	  
implicit	  idea	  of	  heroism	  for	  heroism’s	  sake.	  Faith	  is	  the	  final	  triumph	  over	  incongruity,	  
Niebuhr	  insisted,	  and	  Camus’	  heroic	  Dr.	  Roux	  demonstrates	  such	  faith,	  just	  as	  Sisyphus	  
does;	  for	  though	  it	  may	  not	  take	  a	  theistic	  belief	  in	  an	  anthropomorphic	  God,	  it	  nevertheless	  
requires	  a	  religious	  faith	  that	  something	  different	  will	  happen,	  one	  day,	  perhaps,	  if	  I	  just	  
keep	  pushing	  the	  rock	  up	  the	  hill,	  if	  I	  just	  keep	  marching	  in	  Selma	  and	  getting	  arrested,	  if	  I	  
just	  keep	  riding,	  marching,	  praying,	  wondering,	  and	  fighting	  for	  freedom,	  justice,	  or	  
equality.	  This	  is	  why	  there	  was	  a	  group	  called	  “Atheists	  for	  Niebuhr”	  and	  this	  is	  why,	  
though	  Camus	  was	  an	  avowed	  atheist,	  a	  recent	  Christianity	  Today	  cover	  article	  featured	  a	  
young	  man	  who	  became	  a	  Christian	  after	  reading	  Camus.	  
Returning	  full-­‐circle,	  to	  the	  position	  of	  the	  prophet	  as	  ironist,	  we	  find	  another	  
imperative	  for	  the	  prophet	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  world	  of	  appearances,	  yet	  to	  partially	  
transcend	  it	  as	  well.	  The	  ironic	  contrasts	  and	  incongruities	  in	  a	  historical	  drama	  are	  
obvious,	  but	  they	  are	  often	  missed,	  “because	  irony	  cannot	  be	  directly	  experienced,”	  
Niebuhr	  argues	  (IAM,	  153).	  The	  knowledge	  of	  irony	  depends,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  “upon	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an	  observer	  who	  is	  not	  so	  hostile	  to	  the	  victim	  of	  irony	  as	  to	  deny	  the	  element	  of	  virtue	  
which	  must	  constitute	  a	  part	  of	  the	  ironic	  situation;	  nor	  yet	  so	  sympathetic	  as	  to	  discount	  
the	  weakness,	  the	  vanity	  and	  pretension	  which	  constitute	  another	  element.”	  Participants	  in	  
an	  ironic	  situation	  cannot,	  unless	  they	  be	  exceptionally	  self-­‐critical,	  fulfill	  the	  latter	  
condition	  and	  thus,	  “the	  knowledge	  of	  irony	  is	  usually	  reserved	  for	  observers	  rather	  than	  
participants.”	  For	  this	  reason	  then,	  the	  prophet	  must	  remain	  observant,	  but	  not	  participate	  
in	  the	  conflicts	  of	  power	  politics;	  ironic	  refutations	  of	  power	  are	  demanded	  of	  him	  and	  only	  
the	  rare	  statesman,	  perhaps	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  for	  example,	  would	  be	  capable	  of	  doing	  both.	  
Prophetic	  Criticism:	  Polemicizing	  Pride	  in	  Public	  Argument	  
	  
The	  ideological	  taint,	  the	  dishonest	  pretension	  of	  universality,	  which	  accompanies	  
every	  partial	  perspective	  in	  history	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  significant	  choices	  between	  
rival	  political	  movements	  cannot	  be	  made;	  we	  are	  still	  capable	  of	  making	  them,	  
though	  we	  are	  ourselves	  involved	  in	  rationalization	  and	  have	  no	  absolute	  and	  
impartial	  perspective.	  If	  there	  were	  not	  some	  degree	  of	  freedom	  from	  interest	  in	  the	  
human	  mind,	  there	  could	  be	  no	  culture	  at	  all,	  and	  all	  life	  would	  be	  no	  more	  than	  a	  
conflict	  of	  interests.	  But	  our	  choices	  will	  be	  less	  confused	  if	  we	  know	  how	  to	  
discount	  the	  latest	  ideology,	  which	  always	  present	  itself	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  a	  final	  
freedom	  from	  rationalization.	  
	  
⎯Niebuhr,	  Christianity	  and	  Power	  Politics	  
	  
The	  gospel	  cannot	  be	  preached	  with	  truth	  and	  power	  if	  it	  does	  not	  challenge	  the	  
pretension	  and	  pride,	  not	  only	  of	  individuals,	  but	  of	  nations,	  cultures,	  civilizations,	  
economic	  and	  political	  systems…	  if	  the	  ministers…	  become	  again	  the	  simple	  priests	  
and	  chaplains	  of	  this	  American	  idolatry,	  subtly	  compounded	  with	  a	  few	  stray	  
Christian	  emphases…	  the	  church	  becomes	  not	  merely	  useless	  but	  dangerous.	  
	  
⎯Niebuhr,	  “The	  Idolatry	  of	  America”	  
	  
	  
The	  prophet’s	  business,	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  is	  to	  “remind	  the	  men	  of	  power”	  that	  “God	  
resisteth	  the	  proud	  and	  giveth	  grace	  to	  the	  humble”	  and	  that	  he	  will	  “cast	  the	  mighty	  from	  
their	  seats	  and	  exalt	  them	  of	  low	  degree,”	  that	  “he	  bringeth	  princes	  to	  naught	  and	  maketh	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the	  judges	  of	  the	  earth	  as	  vanity”	  (L&J,	  75).	  Prophetic	  religion,	  he	  argues,	  “sees	  how	  all	  
human	  power	  is	  tempted	  to	  pride	  and	  injustice”	  and	  specifically,	  it	  marks	  out	  for	  criticism	  
the	  priest-­‐kings	  and	  god-­‐kings	  of	  sacrosanct	  and	  majestic	  power.	  The	  method	  by	  which	  one	  
destroys	  the	  ideological	  pretenses	  of	  others,	  the	  formal	  method	  of	  ideological	  criticism	  as	  
Niebuhr	  articulates	  and	  practices	  it,	  can	  be	  fairly	  called	  “polemicizing	  pride.”	  When	  
Niebuhr	  finds	  an	  injustice	  he	  locates	  as	  many	  potential	  causes	  of	  the	  injustice	  as	  possible.	  
Locating	  these	  causes,	  he	  is	  sure	  to	  note	  that	  none	  of	  them	  are	  the	  sole	  cause	  but	  that	  all	  
work	  together	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  manifestation	  of	  injustice.	  From	  the	  causes	  he	  draws	  out	  
agents	  responsible	  for	  them.	  He	  qualifies	  his	  comments	  continually,	  noting	  that	  there	  are	  
many	  agents	  involved	  in	  every	  crisis	  of	  injustice,	  etc.	  Though	  always	  a	  careful	  qualifier	  of	  
his	  remarks,	  Niebuhr	  was	  nevertheless	  quite	  capable	  of	  speaking	  with	  a	  prophet’s	  rage.	  
When	  he	  located	  a	  public,	  nation,	  statesman	  and/or	  public	  intellectuals	  that	  were	  the	  root	  
cause	  of	  injustice,	  he	  attacked	  their	  rhetoric	  in	  order	  to	  reveal	  their	  motives.	  Burke	  argues	  
that	  if	  you	  want	  to	  know	  why	  people	  do	  things,	  pay	  attention	  to	  what	  they	  say,	  and	  Niebuhr	  
could	  easily	  have	  given	  this	  advice	  as	  well.	  Niebuhr	  paid	  attention	  to	  what	  people	  said	  and	  
in	  their	  words	  he	  listened	  for	  pride,	  egotism,	  and	  self-­‐interests.	  This	  was	  his	  method	  of	  
prophetic	  criticism.	  Niebuhr	  called	  attention	  to	  both	  prideful	  and	  sensual	  tones	  in	  public	  
discourses	  wherever	  the	  taint	  of	  self-­‐interests	  manifested.	  
	   The	  prophet’s	  task,	  I	  argue,	  is	  to	  criticize	  the	  manifestations	  of	  pride	  in	  public	  
rhetorics	  of	  significance.	  When	  we	  talk	  about	  pride	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  the	  manifestation	  
of	  sin.	  The	  occasion	  for	  sin	  is	  man’s	  twofold	  nature	  as	  both	  a	  finite	  and	  a	  free	  being,	  both	  a	  
creature	  and	  a	  creator,	  which	  results	  in	  existential	  anxiety.	  Anxiety,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “is	  the	  
internal	  description	  of	  the	  state	  of	  temptation”	  (NDMI,	  182).	  The	  prophet	  starts	  with	  the	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assumption	  that,	  though	  this	  tension	  is	  perennial	  and	  permanently	  an	  occasion	  for	  sin,	  it	  is	  
not	  normative.	  Anxiety	  is	  not	  sin.	  Man	  can	  choose	  to	  not	  overstep	  his	  creaturely	  bounds	  in	  
the	  search	  for	  security	  in	  the	  natural	  world,	  though	  he	  often	  doesn’t.	  Man	  is	  insecure,	  
Niebuhr	  notes,	  and	  involved	  in	  natural	  contingency	  which	  he	  seeks	  to	  overcome	  by	  a	  “will-­‐
to-­‐power	  that	  overreaches	  the	  limits	  of	  human	  creatureliness”	  (ibid.,	  178).	  “Man	  is	  ignorant	  
and	  involved	  in	  the	  limitations	  of	  a	  finite	  mind,”	  Niebuhr	  argues;	  “but	  he	  pretends	  that	  he	  is	  
not	  limited.”	  The	  result	  is	  that	  everything	  he	  achieves,	  culturally	  and	  intellectually,	  becomes	  
“infected	  with	  the	  sin	  of	  pride”	  (ibid.,	  179).	  This	  infection	  disturbs	  the	  harmony	  of	  the	  
natural	  world	  on	  two	  planes.	  It	  disturbs	  the	  religious	  plane	  because	  man	  rebels	  against	  God	  
and	  attempts	  to	  usurp	  his	  place	  on	  the	  throne.	  It	  disturbs	  the	  moral	  and	  social	  plane	  
because	  it	  results	  in	  injustice.	  It	  is	  the	  priestly	  task,	  we	  can	  assume,	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  first	  
plane	  by	  addressing	  his	  parishioners	  from	  within	  the	  sacred	  walls	  of	  the	  church.	  It	  is	  the	  
prophet’s	  task	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  social	  and	  moral	  plane,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  church	  
walls,	  because	  the	  prophet’s	  number	  one	  concern,	  as	  it	  was	  for	  Amos	  and	  Niebuhr	  the	  
ethicist,	  and	  as	  Heschel	  has	  called	  our	  attention	  to,	  is	  justice.	  The	  prophet	  longs	  for	  justice	  
to	  roll	  down	  like	  waters.	  
	   Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  three	  forms	  of	  pride:	  the	  pride	  of	  power,	  the	  pride	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  the	  pride	  of	  virtue.	  The	  last	  form	  gives	  way	  to	  another,	  fourth	  form,	  Niebuhr	  
calls	  “spiritual	  pride.”	  We	  must	  note	  that	  Niebuhr	  never	  states	  that	  these	  three	  prides	  
neither	  represent	  the	  limits	  of	  prophetic	  criticism;	  nor	  does	  he	  ever	  state	  that	  he	  uses	  these	  
three	  criticisms	  rhetorically	  in	  a	  model	  of	  prophetic	  criticism.	  But	  the	  evidence	  is	  there	  in	  
his	  writings	  and	  in	  those	  he	  drew	  inspiration	  from,	  such	  as	  Amos,	  that	  these	  do	  represent	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the	  model	  for	  prophetic	  criticism	  and	  its	  limits.	  There	  are	  few	  sins	  one	  can	  commit	  that	  
can’t	  be	  accounted	  for	  under	  this	  rubric.	  
	   Though	  one	  will	  find	  much	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  influence	  throughout	  Niebuhr’s	  work,	  it	  is	  
always	  displayed	  most	  clearly	  when	  Niebuhr	  discusses	  power.	  Yet,	  in	  The	  Nature	  and	  
Destiny	  of	  Man,	  Niebuhr	  is	  giving	  the	  Gifford	  lectures	  and	  thus,	  we	  are	  given	  a	  Bertrand	  
Russell	  quote	  that	  is	  more	  appropriate	  for	  his	  audience.	  Quoting	  form	  Russell’s	  Power,	  A	  
New	  Social	  Analysis,	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “Of	  the	  infinite	  desires	  of	  man,	  the	  chief	  are	  the	  desires	  
for	  power	  and	  glory.	  They	  are	  not	  identical	  though	  closely	  allied.”	  Pride	  of	  power	  occurs	  
when	  man	  doesn’t	  recognize	  the	  contingency	  of	  his	  existence,	  makes	  himself	  the	  judge	  and	  
jury	  of	  his	  actions,	  or	  believes	  he	  is	  the	  author	  of	  his	  existence.	  Though	  everyone	  is	  tempted	  
to	  such	  pride,	  it	  happens	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  those	  who	  have	  more	  than	  an	  ordinary	  degree	  
of	  social	  power	  are	  most	  guilty	  of	  the	  sin	  (ibid.,	  189).	  In	  a	  footnote,	  Niebuhr	  continues	  with	  
Russell’s	  refrain:	  “Every	  man	  would	  like	  to	  be	  God,	  if	  it	  were	  possible;	  some	  few	  find	  it	  
difficult	  to	  admit	  the	  possibility.”	  Those	  those	  who	  have	  power	  commit	  the	  sin	  of	  pride	  of	  
power	  but	  they	  are	  not	  alone.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  those	  who	  have	  none	  at	  all	  
lust	  for	  it,	  committing	  the	  sin	  of	  lust	  for	  power	  that	  has	  pride	  as	  its	  end-­‐in-­‐view.	  In	  his	  
insecurity	  man	  seeks	  security	  and	  knows	  that	  power	  is	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  allows	  his	  to	  
control	  as	  many	  variable	  as	  possible.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  the	  self	  is	  completely	  oblivious	  to	  the	  
finitude	  of	  its	  existence	  and	  tromps	  about	  the	  world	  in	  complete	  confidence	  and	  pride.	  In	  
the	  second	  case,	  the	  self	  is	  completely	  conscious	  of	  its	  finitude	  and	  therefore	  desires	  and	  
uses	  all	  of	  its	  energy	  to	  control	  it	  by	  gaining	  power	  over	  it.	  
	   The	  pride	  of	  power	  by	  those	  who	  feel	  secure	  in	  this	  world	  is	  condemned	  in	  Biblical	  
prophecy,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  where	  it	  is	  declared	  to	  be	  “bogus”	  and	  always	  goes	  “before	  a	  fall.”	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This	  pride	  is	  always	  destroyed	  by	  history,	  the	  prophet	  warns,	  and	  the	  warning	  is	  true,	  for	  
every	  great	  empire	  that	  has	  ever	  existed	  is	  a	  historical	  relic.	  The	  fact	  that	  Americans	  have	  
an	  undeniable	  faith	  and	  confidence	  that	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  Greeks	  and	  Romans	  will	  
never	  happen	  to	  the	  US,	  Niebuhr	  marked	  as	  a	  pride	  of	  power	  that	  spells	  eventual	  
destruction.	  Nothing	  has	  changed,	  for	  prophetic	  criticism,	  since	  the	  time	  of	  Ezekiel,	  who	  
prophesied	  doom	  upon	  the	  all	  the	  nations	  of	  the	  earth	  and	  who	  constantly	  accused	  them	  of	  
having	  a	  false	  sense	  of	  “security,	  independence	  and	  self-­‐mastery.”	  For	  instance,	  Ezekiel	  
accuses	  Egypt	  of	  imagining	  herself	  the	  responsible	  party	  for	  the	  gift	  that	  is	  the	  Nile	  River.	  
Egypt	  says,	  “My	  river	  is	  my	  own,	  I	  have	  made	  it	  for	  myself.”	  Niebuhr	  notes	  Ezekiel’s	  
prophetic	  response:	  “In	  the	  doom	  which	  overtakes	  this	  pride	  the	  real	  source	  and	  end	  of	  life	  
will	  be	  revealed:	  ‘They	  shall	  know	  that	  I	  am	  the	  Lord’	  (Ez.	  30:8).”	  This	  is	  the	  reoccurring	  
trope	  of	  the	  pride	  of	  power	  in	  those	  who	  have	  a	  false	  sense	  of	  security.	  
	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  the	  pride	  of	  power	  by	  those	  who	  seek	  power	  to	  evade	  
insecurity.	  This	  is	  the	  sin	  committed	  often	  by	  the	  “advancing	  forces	  of	  human	  society	  in	  
distinction	  to	  the	  established	  forces”	  (NDMI,	  190).	  The	  most	  obvious	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  
pride	  is	  the	  pride	  of	  scientific	  man.	  At	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  the	  scientific	  advances	  of	  
modern	  culture	  were	  the	  result	  of	  man’s	  desire	  to	  overcome	  the	  limits	  and	  insecurities	  of	  
nature.	  This	  is	  a	  legitimate	  enterprise	  according	  to	  Niebuhr;	  but	  it	  gives	  way	  to	  the	  pride	  of	  
power	  when	  the	  mastery	  of	  nature	  is	  corrupted	  and	  gives	  way	  to	  the	  exploitation	  of	  nature.	  
In	  modern	  debates,	  this	  would	  be	  the	  pride	  of	  power	  that	  one	  often	  hears	  laced	  into	  
debates	  about	  environmental	  issues.	  For	  Niebuhr,	  we	  need	  not	  look	  at	  large	  crises	  to	  find	  it	  
but	  only	  to	  the	  individual	  agrarian	  farmer,	  whose	  “arrogance	  of	  independence	  and	  greedy	  
effort	  to	  overcome	  the	  insecurity	  of	  nature’s	  rhythms	  and	  seasons	  by	  garnering	  her	  stores	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with	  excessive	  zeal	  and	  beyond	  natural	  requirements”	  (ibid.,	  191).	  Greed	  then,	  Niebuhr	  
notes,	  is	  another	  name	  for	  this	  form	  of	  the	  pride	  of	  power.	  This	  false	  security	  is	  shattered	  
by	  the	  prophet’s	  promise	  of	  death,	  “a	  vicissitude	  of	  nature	  which	  greed	  cannot	  master.”	  
writes	  Niebuhr.	  It	  is	  what	  Christ	  says	  to	  the	  rich	  fool	  who	  wishes	  to	  eat,	  drink,	  and	  be	  
merry:	  “This	  night	  thy	  soul	  shall	  be	  required	  of	  thee”	  (Luke	  12:	  19-­‐20).	  Niebuhr	  further	  
notes	  that	  this	  sin	  of	  greed	  is	  the	  “setting	  sin	  of	  a	  bourgeois	  culture”	  that	  is	  constantly	  
tempted	  to	  “regard	  physical	  comfort	  and	  security	  as	  life’s	  final	  good	  and	  to	  hope	  for	  its	  
attainment	  to	  a	  degree	  which	  is	  beyond	  human	  possibilities.”	  Niebuhr	  sums	  up	  with	  an	  
anecdote:	  “Modern	  man	  has	  forgotten	  that	  nature	  intends	  to	  kill	  man	  and	  will	  succeed	  in	  
the	  end.”	  
	   The	  desire	  for	  security	  in	  nature	  is	  not	  the	  only	  manifestation	  of	  this	  pride	  of	  power	  
that	  is	  called	  greed.	  It	  also	  manifest	  in	  the	  social	  realm	  of	  course.	  Here,	  the	  “power	  over	  
men”	  combines	  itself	  with	  the	  “power	  over	  matter”	  and	  results	  in	  a	  “will-­‐to-­‐power”	  that	  
always	  involves	  the	  ego	  in	  injustice.	  The	  will-­‐to-­‐power	  has	  an	  ironic	  element	  in	  it	  because	  it	  
always	  results	  in	  the	  very	  insecurity	  it	  tries	  to	  overcome.	  Thus,	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  
researches	  and	  designed	  to	  make	  the	  US	  more	  safe,	  makes	  her	  less	  safe	  than	  she	  has	  ever	  
been.	  It	  was	  no	  different	  for	  the	  prophet	  Isaiah’s	  culture	  either,	  who	  wrote:	  “Woe	  to	  thee	  
that	  spoilest,	  and	  thou	  wast	  not	  spoiled;	  and	  dealest	  treacherously,	  and	  they	  dealt	  not	  
treacherously	  with	  thee!	  When	  thou	  shalt	  cease	  to	  spoil,	  thou	  shalt	  be	  spoiled”	  (Is.	  33:1).	  
The	  result	  of	  man’s	  establishing	  himself	  in	  power	  and	  glory	  is	  always	  followed	  by	  the	  fear	  
of	  falling	  from	  this	  power	  and	  glory.	  Niebuhr’s	  example	  is	  nicely	  put:	  “Poverty	  is	  a	  peril	  to	  
the	  wealthy	  but	  not	  to	  the	  poor”	  (NDMI,	  193);	  and	  his	  concluding	  aphorism	  is	  poetic:	  “Thus	  
man	  seeks	  to	  make	  himself	  God	  because	  he	  is	  betrayed	  by	  both	  his	  greatness	  and	  his	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weakness;	  and	  there	  is	  no	  level	  of	  greatness	  and	  power	  in	  which	  the	  lash	  of	  fear	  is	  not	  at	  
least	  one	  strand	  in	  the	  whip	  of	  ambition”	  (ibid.).	  
	   The	  second	  form	  of	  pride	  Niebuhr	  characterizes	  as	  a	  “more	  spiritual	  sublimation”	  of	  
the	  pride	  of	  power,	  and	  that	  is	  “intellectual	  pride”	  (ibid.).	  Sometimes	  these	  two	  are	  so	  
intertwined	  and	  involved	  with	  one	  another	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  tell	  the	  two	  apart.	  Niebuhr	  
notes	  that	  every	  ruling	  oligarchy	  has	  needed	  the	  ideological	  support	  of	  its	  creeds	  to	  
bulwark	  its	  authority,	  just	  as	  much	  as	  it	  has	  a	  police	  power.	  Thus,	  intellectual	  pride	  is	  a	  
useful	  concept	  for	  rhetorical	  studies	  because	  it	  gives	  us	  a	  new	  way	  to	  understand	  
ideological	  discourse.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  privilege	  of	  the	  oligarchy	  but	  is	  found	  in	  all	  human	  
knowledge,	  which	  is	  inevitably	  tainted	  by	  the	  “ideological”	  taint.	  Simply	  said,	  “It	  pretends	  to	  
be	  more	  true	  than	  it	  is.”	  Man,	  like	  all	  animals,	  is	  limited	  intellectually	  by	  his	  time	  and	  place;	  
yet	  he	  is	  not	  as	  limited	  as	  the	  animals	  are,	  for	  man	  actually	  knows	  something	  of	  these	  limits.	  
Since	  man	  knows	  more	  than	  his	  immediate	  situation	  he	  constantly	  seeks	  to	  understand	  his	  
immediate	  situation	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  total	  situation	  (ibid.,	  182).	  He	  is	  unable	  to	  define	  such	  a	  
total	  situation	  without	  coloring	  his	  knowledge	  by	  the	  limits	  of	  his	  finite	  perspective	  and,	  
knowing	  this,	  he	  becomes	  a	  skeptic.	  “The	  abyss	  of	  meaninglessness	  yawns	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  
all	  his	  mighty	  spiritual	  endeavors”	  Niebuhr	  concludes,	  and	  this	  abyss	  tempts	  him	  to	  deny	  
the	  limited	  character	  of	  his	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  involved	  in	  human	  ignorance,	  yet	  it	  is,	  
according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  always	  something	  more	  than	  ignorance—an	  effort	  to	  hide	  that	  
ignorance	  by	  pretension.	  In	  other	  words,	  just	  like	  the	  pride	  of	  power,	  intellectual	  pride	  
results	  from	  two	  anxious	  situations.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  man’s	  ignorance	  of	  his	  ignorance,	  like	  
the	  powerful	  man’s	  ignorance	  of	  his	  finitude;	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  man’s	  recognition	  of	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his	  ignorance	  and	  subsequent	  willful	  veiling	  of	  his	  conditioned	  knowledge	  and	  the	  taint	  of	  
self-­‐interest	  in	  his	  truth.	  
Intellectual	  pride	  then,	  is	  the	  “pride	  of	  reason	  which	  forgets	  that	  it	  is	  involved	  in	  a	  
temporary	  process	  and	  imagines	  itself	  in	  complete	  transcendence	  over	  history”	  (ibid.,	  195).	  
Engels,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  was	  wrong	  to	  think	  that	  the	  ideological	  taint’s	  driving	  impulse	  was	  
the	  unconscious.	  The	  real	  fact	  of	  the	  matter,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  that	  “all	  pretensions	  of	  
final	  knowledge	  and	  ultimate	  truth	  are	  partly	  prompted	  by	  the	  uneasy	  feeling	  that	  the	  truth	  
is	  not	  final	  and	  also	  by	  an	  uneasy	  conscience	  which	  realizes	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  ego	  are	  
compounded	  with	  this	  truth.”	  It	  is	  an	  interesting	  side	  note	  that	  Niebuhr	  calls	  attention	  to	  
how	  this	  ideological	  taint	  manifest	  in	  individual	  rhetorics	  as	  well	  as	  collective	  ones.	  
Descartes	  and	  Schopenhauer	  he	  categorizes	  as	  examples	  of	  the	  individual	  pretense;	  Hegel	  
and	  Comte	  he	  categorizes	  in	  the	  latter,	  collective	  pretense	  of	  a	  nation.	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  
another	  aspect	  of	  intellectual	  pride,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  significant	  inability	  of	  the	  agent	  to	  
recognize	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  limitations	  of	  perspective	  in	  himself	  that	  he	  detects	  in	  others.	  
The	  Marxists	  and	  Socialists	  were	  the	  most	  apt	  example	  of	  this	  pride	  of	  intellect	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  
time.	  They	  imagined	  that	  everyone’s	  motives	  were	  ideologically	  tainted	  except	  their	  own.	  
Perhaps	  it	  was	  an	  ignorance	  of	  their	  ignorance,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Marx	  thought	  
ideological	  taints	  were	  limited	  to	  economic	  structures.	  Niebuhr	  isn’t	  so	  sure	  though.	  “The	  
vehemence	  with	  which	  the	  foe	  is	  accused	  of	  errors	  of	  which	  the	  self	  regards	  itself	  free,”	  
Niebuhr	  writes,	  “betrays	  the	  usual	  desperation	  with	  which	  the	  sled	  seeks	  to	  hide	  the	  
finiteness	  and	  determinateness	  of	  its	  own	  position	  from	  itself”	  (ibid.,	  197).	  The	  explicit	  
nature	  of	  this	  pride,	  it	  seems	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  always	  revealed	  clearly	  whenever	  the	  
universalistic	  note	  in	  a	  certain	  truth	  becomes	  the	  basis	  for	  dominations	  over	  life	  that	  don’t	  
	   225	  
conform	  to	  it,	  i.e.	  scapegoating	  and	  atonements.	  Niebuhr’s	  example	  is	  that	  of	  the	  religious	  
nationalist,	  who	  “declares	  in	  one	  moment	  that	  his	  culture	  is	  not	  an	  export	  article	  but	  is	  
valid	  for	  his	  nation	  alone”	  and	  in	  the	  next	  moment	  “declares	  that	  he	  will	  save	  the	  world	  by	  
destroying	  inferior	  forms	  of	  culture.”	  This	  leads	  Niebuhr	  to	  another	  observation:	  the	  white	  
race	  insists	  that	  the	  negro	  race	  in	  America	  is	  unable	  have	  equal	  rights	  because	  it	  is	  unable	  
to	  profit	  from	  them	  due	  to	  its	  lack	  of	  civilized	  culture	  and	  intelligence;	  yet,	  the	  white	  race	  
knows	  that	  if	  it	  were	  to	  offer	  equal	  education	  then	  it	  would	  soon	  be	  discovered	  that	  its	  
intellectual	  pride	  was	  unjustified	  and	  could	  no	  longer	  justify	  the	  unjust	  privileges	  it	  
currently	  maintains.	  
	   The	  third	  form	  of	  pride	  we’ve	  called	  the	  “pride	  of	  virtue”	  or	  moral	  pride	  and	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  note,	  Niebuhr	  insist,	  that	  all	  forms	  of	  moral	  pride	  are	  involved	  in	  intellectual	  
pride.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that,	  excluding	  the	  most	  abstract	  philosophical	  debates,	  any	  
attempt	  to	  claim	  one’s	  truth	  as	  ultimate	  truth	  is	  primarily	  meant	  to	  establish	  one’s	  good	  as	  
the	  Good	  (ibid.,	  199).	  How	  can	  we	  spot	  moral	  pride?	  It	  is	  easy	  enough,	  actually;	  it	  is	  
revealed	  in	  every	  judgment	  that	  condemns	  another	  for	  failure	  to	  conform	  to	  our	  own	  
“highly	  arbitrary	  standards.”	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  
Since	  the	  self	  judges	  the	  self	  by	  its	  own	  standards	  it	  finds	  itself	  good.	  It	  judges	  other	  
by	  its	  own	  standards	  and	  finds	  them	  evil,	  when	  their	  standards	  fail	  to	  conform	  to	  its	  
own.	  This	  is	  the	  secret	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  cruelty	  and	  self-­‐righteousness.	  
When	  the	  self	  mistakes	  its	  standards	  for	  God’s	  standards	  it	  is	  naturally	  inclined	  to	  
attribute	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  evil	  to	  non-­‐conformists.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
In	  a	  beautiful	  Paulean	  passage,	  we	  find	  the	  character	  of	  this	  moral	  pride	  perfectly	  described.	  
St.	  Paul	  writes,	  “that	  they	  have	  the	  zeal	  of	  God,	  but	  not	  according	  to	  knowledge.	  For	  they,	  
being	  ignorant	  of	  God’s	  righteousness	  and	  going	  about	  to	  establish	  their	  own	  righteousness,	  
	   226	  
have	  not	  submitted	  themselves	  unto	  the	  righteousness	  of	  God”	  (Romans	  10:2-­‐3).47	  	  The	  
worst	  part	  of	  this	  pride,	  for	  Niebuhr,	  was	  that	  it	  made	  virtue	  the	  very	  vehicle	  for	  sin.	  
Niebuhr	  understood,	  in	  1937,	  the	  process	  involved	  in	  this	  cruel	  logic;	  one	  that	  Burke	  
formulated	  for	  rhetoric	  scholars	  as	  the	  “guilt-­‐redemption”	  cycle.	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  
specifically	  about	  Rational	  Humanism:	  
…	  it	  forgets	  the	  finiteness	  and	  creatureliness	  of	  man.	  It	  does	  not	  subject	  human	  
righteousness	  to	  a	  transcendent	  righteousness,	  the	  righteousness	  of	  God.	  Thus	  it	  
tempts	  men	  to	  “go	  about	  establishing	  its	  own	  righteousness”	  and	  finally	  denigrates	  
into	  a	  fanaticism	  more	  grievous	  than	  that	  of	  dogmatic	  religion.	  The	  logic	  of	  the	  decay	  
of	  modern	  culture	  from	  universalistic	  humanism	  to	  nationalistic	  anarchy	  may	  be	  
expressed	  as	  follows:	  Men	  seek	  a	  universal	  standard	  of	  human	  good.	  After	  painful	  
effort	  they	  define	  it.	  The	  painfulness	  of	  their	  effort	  convinces	  them	  that	  they	  have	  
discovered	  a	  genuinely	  universal	  value.	  To	  their	  sorrow,	  some	  of	  their	  fellow	  men	  
refuse	  to	  accept	  the	  standard.	  Since	  they	  know	  the	  standard	  to	  be	  universal	  the	  
recalcitrance	  of	  their	  fellows	  is	  a	  proof,	  in	  their	  minds,	  of	  some	  defect	  in	  humanity	  of	  
the	  non-­‐conformists.	  Thus	  a	  rationalistic	  age	  creates	  a	  new	  fanaticism.	  The	  non-­‐
conformists	  are	  figuratively	  expelled	  from	  the	  human	  community.	  (BT,	  237)	  
	  
This	  is	  why	  Paul	  refuted	  the	  claims	  to	  salvation	  of	  those	  who	  insisted	  that	  the	  
“righteousness	  of	  works”	  was	  the	  path	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God,	  as	  he	  follows	  up	  with	  “lest	  
any	  man	  should	  boast.”	  The	  pride	  of	  virtue	  not	  only	  involves	  us	  in	  the	  greatest	  form	  of	  sin,	  
but	  it	  also	  involves	  us	  the	  greatest	  guilt	  because,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “It	  is	  responsible	  for	  our	  
most	  serious	  cruelties,	  injustices	  and	  defamations	  against	  our	  fellowmen.”	  He	  concludes	  
noting	  that	  “The	  whole	  history	  of	  racial,	  national,	  religious	  and	  other	  social	  struggles	  is	  a	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  Though	  Niebuhr	  doesn’t	  cite	  this	  passage	  in	  Moral	  Man,	  it	  is	  exactly	  this	  fanaticism	  that	  
Niebuhr	  was	  trying	  to	  create	  and	  yet	  temper	  with	  reason,	  by	  way	  of	  a	  social	  “illusion”	  that	  
perfect	  justice	  could	  be	  achieved;	  something	  he	  later	  regretted	  writing,	  but	  that	  had	  
significant	  influence	  on	  how	  King	  understood	  his	  task	  during	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement.	  
The	  question	  being,	  how	  do	  I	  condemn	  the	  sins	  that	  lead	  to	  injustice	  without	  being	  self-­‐
righteous	  myself;	  the	  answer	  being,	  non-­‐violent	  protests	  that	  don’t	  voice	  one’s	  self-­‐
righteousness	  but	  reveal	  it	  in	  action,	  i.e.	  the	  “words”	  of	  non-­‐violent	  protests	  can’t	  be	  argued	  
with	  or	  dismissed	  as	  ideological.	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commentary	  on	  the	  objective	  wickedness	  and	  social	  miseries	  which	  result	  from	  self-­‐
righteousness”	  (NDMI,	  200).	  
As	  Niebuhr	  was	  delivering	  this	  very	  lecture	  he	  didn’t	  need	  to	  reach	  far	  for	  evidence	  
of	  the	  claim;	  the	  bombs	  of	  WWII	  were	  shaking	  the	  Gifford	  lectures	  hall	  he	  delivered	  them	  in,	  
causing	  the	  power	  to	  go	  out,	  and	  an	  eerie	  doom	  seemed	  to	  linger	  over	  every	  lecture.	  This	  
must	  have	  come	  roaring	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  his	  audience’s	  minds	  when	  Niebuhr	  began	  his	  
final	  lecture	  on	  pride.	  Niebuhr,	  moving	  from	  the	  pride	  of	  power	  that	  leads	  to	  intellectual	  
pride,	  intellectual	  pride	  that	  leads	  to	  moral	  pride,	  finally	  arrives	  at	  the	  final	  form	  of	  pride,	  
“spiritual	  pride.”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “The	  ultimate	  sin	  is	  the	  righteous	  sin	  of	  making	  the	  self-­‐
deification	  implied	  in	  moral	  pride	  explicit”	  (ibid.)	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  man’s	  “partial	  
standards	  and	  relative	  attainments	  are	  explicitly	  related	  to	  the	  unconditioned	  good,	  and	  
claim	  divine	  sanction.”	  This,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  is	  precisely	  the	  reason	  that	  religion	  isn’t	  as	  
necessarily	  as	  it	  is	  sometimes	  supposed,	  an	  “inherently	  virtuous	  human	  quest	  for	  God.”	  It	  is	  
instead,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “merely	  a	  final	  battleground	  between	  God	  and	  man’s	  self-­‐esteem”	  
and	  “in	  that	  battle	  even	  the	  most	  pious	  practices	  may	  be	  instruments	  of	  human	  pride.”	  This	  
means	  that	  much	  of	  prophetic	  criticism	  must	  always	  be	  against	  religion,	  the	  church,	  and	  the	  
self,	  a	  realization	  of	  the	  Biblical	  emphasis	  on	  removing	  the	  plank	  from	  one’s	  own	  eye	  before	  
one	  points	  out	  the	  splinter	  in	  another’s.	  The	  same	  man	  that	  professes	  to	  follow	  Christ	  and	  
fall	  under	  his	  judgment	  will,	  in	  the	  next	  moment,	  try	  to	  prove	  that	  his	  own	  standards	  are	  
more	  similar	  to	  Christ’s	  than	  his	  enemy’s.	  We	  should	  remind	  ourselves	  once	  again	  that	  even	  
in	  this	  theological	  exposition	  delivered	  as	  a	  lecture,	  Niebuhr	  is	  invoking	  the	  very	  principle	  
he	  speaks	  on,	  for	  his	  audience	  is	  made	  up	  entirely	  of	  religious	  thinkers	  and	  theological	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“geniuses”	  of	  Europe’s	  intellectual	  class.	  To	  that	  audience	  then,	  we	  can	  imagine	  Niebuhr	  
speaking	  these	  words,	  while	  looking	  each	  one	  of	  them	  in	  the	  eye:	  
The	  worst	  form	  of	  class	  domination	  is	  religious	  class	  domination	  in	  which,	  as	  for	  
instance	  in	  the	  Indian	  caste	  system,	  a	  dominant	  priestly	  class	  not	  only	  subjects	  
subordinate	  classes	  to	  social	  disabilities	  but	  finally	  excludes	  them	  from	  participation	  
in	  any	  universe	  of	  meaning.	  The	  worst	  form	  of	  intolerance	  is	  religious	  intolerance,	  in	  
which	  the	  particular	  interests	  of	  the	  contestants	  hide	  behind	  religious	  absolutes.	  
The	  worst	  form	  of	  self-­‐assertion	  is	  religious	  self-­‐assertion	  in	  which	  under	  the	  guise	  
of	  contrition	  before	  God,	  He	  is	  claimed	  as	  the	  exclusive	  ally	  of	  our	  contingent	  self.	  
“What	  goes	  by	  the	  name	  of	  ‘religion’	  in	  the	  modern	  world,”	  declares	  a	  modern	  
missionary,	  “is	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  unbridled	  human	  self-­‐assertion	  in	  religious	  disguise.	  
(ibid.,	  200-­‐1)	  
	  
The	  conclusion	  is	  clear:	  a	  man	  that	  recognizes	  that	  God	  has	  revealed	  himself	  must	  never	  
assume	  that	  possession	  of	  this	  revelation	  makes	  him	  more	  righteous	  or	  more	  contrite	  than	  
other	  men.	  Niebuhr	  loathed	  spiritual	  pride	  so	  much	  that	  one	  cannot	  but	  assume	  it	  is	  the	  
reason	  he	  preferred	  Amos	  over	  other	  prophets;	  for	  it	  was	  Amos	  who	  declared	  to	  Israel	  that	  
its	  covenant	  with	  God	  didn’t	  grant	  it	  special	  protection,	  but	  instead,	  demanded	  of	  it	  a	  
greater	  responsibility.	  It	  was	  Amos	  who	  pronounced	  the	  word	  of	  the	  Lord,	  which	  surely	  
must	  have	  sounded	  horrifying	  to	  the	  Hebrews:	  “Are	  you	  not	  as	  the	  Ethiopians	  to	  me!”	  
	   With	  this	  final	  analysis	  of	  sin	  as	  pride,	  Niebuhr	  moves	  into	  another	  lecture	  that	  is	  
pertinent	  for	  us,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  the	  prophetic	  perspective,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  
“collective	  egoism.”	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  correct	  to	  assume	  that	  collective	  pride	  is	  the	  
mere	  accumulation	  of	  individuals	  who	  share	  the	  same	  pride	  and	  that	  “strictly	  speaking,	  
only	  individuals	  are	  moral	  agents”	  (ibid.,	  208).	  Nevertheless,	  there	  are	  some	  distinct	  
differences	  between	  individual	  and	  collective	  pride	  that	  Niebuhr	  finds	  important	  to	  
investigate.	  It	  is	  important	  because	  in	  some	  ways,	  group	  pride,	  though	  made	  of	  individuals,	  
has	  a	  weird	  ability	  to	  achieve	  a	  “certain	  authority	  over	  the	  individual	  and	  results	  in	  
unconditioned	  demands	  by	  the	  group	  upon	  the	  individual.”	  The	  group	  develops	  “organs	  of	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will”	  such	  as	  the	  “state”	  and	  when	  it	  does,	  it	  appears	  to	  the	  individual	  to	  become	  the	  
“independent	  center	  of	  moral	  life.”	  Once	  again,	  we	  find	  Niebuhr’s	  conclusions	  crossing	  
paths	  with	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric;	  both	  thinkers	  are	  noting	  that	  ethos	  is	  a	  community	  project	  
and	  is	  never	  the	  sole	  possession	  of	  an	  individual.	  An	  individual	  in	  a	  collective	  that	  has	  a	  
moral	  agent	  acting	  as	  its	  representative	  will	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  bow	  to	  the	  agent’s	  
“pretensions	  and	  to	  acquiesce”	  to	  its	  claims,	  “even	  when	  these	  do	  not	  coincide	  with	  his	  
moral	  scruples	  or	  inclinations”	  (ibid.).	  Furthermore,	  not	  only	  will	  the	  individual	  be	  more	  
likely	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  pretenses	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  collective,	  but	  also	  a	  collective’s	  
pretenses	  typically	  exceed	  the	  claims	  of	  an	  individual.	  “The	  group”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “is	  more	  
arrogant,	  hypocritical,	  self-­‐centered	  and	  more	  ruthless	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  its	  ends	  than	  the	  
individual.”	  (ibid.)	  The	  tension	  between	  the	  I	  and	  the	  we	  is	  created	  regarding	  moral	  issues,	  
making	  for	  an	  interesting	  phenomenon,	  which	  Cavour,	  the	  Italian	  politician,	  states	  as	  such:	  
“If	  we	  did	  for	  ourselves	  what	  we	  do	  for	  our	  country,	  what	  rascals	  we	  would	  be”	  (ibid.,	  209).	  
	   The	  state	  is	  able	  to	  make	  these	  moral	  claims	  upon	  the	  individual	  for	  several	  reasons,	  
all	  of	  which	  are	  important	  factors	  to	  criticize	  if	  one	  is	  a	  prophet.	  First,	  the	  egotism	  of	  groups	  
is	  expressed	  most	  consistently	  by	  the	  national	  state	  and	  thus,	  it	  is	  the	  highest	  source	  of	  
criticism	  for	  the	  prophet.	  Second,	  we	  must	  inquire	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  we	  find,	  
according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  that	  the	  nation	  state	  “gives	  the	  collective	  impulses	  of	  the	  nation	  such	  
instruments	  of	  power	  and	  presents	  the	  imagination	  with	  such	  obvious	  symbols	  of	  its	  
discrete	  collective	  identity	  that”	  it	  can	  make	  absolute	  claims	  for	  itself,	  and	  “enforce	  those	  
claims	  by	  power	  and	  to	  give	  them	  plausibility	  and	  credibility	  by	  the	  majesty	  and	  panoply	  of	  
its	  apparatus”	  (ibid.).	  Thus,	  it	  prompts	  obedience	  by	  the	  fear	  of	  power	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  
by	  reverence	  for	  its	  majesty	  on	  the	  other,	  revealing,	  in	  its	  majesty,	  the	  temptation	  to	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idolatry	  that	  Nazi	  Germany	  was	  guilty	  of	  to	  the	  nth	  degree,	  and	  to	  which	  the	  US	  also	  fell	  
victim	  to	  after	  its	  WWII	  victory.	  
It	  is	  here	  we	  find	  Niebuhr’s	  calling	  for	  prophetic	  ministry	  embedded	  in	  critiques	  of	  
national	  pride	  and	  idolatry.	  The	  sinful	  pride	  and	  idolatrous	  pretensions	  of	  a	  large	  political	  
group	  are	  inevitable	  if	  it	  is	  to	  have	  any	  cohesion.	  Furthermore,	  this	  collective	  possesses	  
only	  an	  inchoate	  “mind,”	  and	  its	  organs	  of	  self-­‐transcendence	  are	  “very	  unstable	  and	  
ephemeral	  compared	  to	  its	  organs	  of	  the	  will.”	  Nevertheless,	  it	  does	  have	  an	  organ	  of	  self-­‐
transcendence	  and	  self-­‐criticism.	  Just	  as	  an	  individual	  has	  a	  daimon,	  an	  other	  self	  that	  it	  
must	  be	  able	  to	  live	  with	  if	  it	  is	  going	  to	  live	  at	  all,	  so	  to	  does	  a	  nation.	  The	  other	  self	  of	  the	  
nation	  is	  the	  “prophetic	  minority;”	  it	  is	  the	  instrument	  of	  self-­‐transcendence	  for	  a	  nation,	  
just	  as	  the	  state	  is	  the	  organ	  of	  a	  nation’s	  will.	  The	  prophetic	  minority	  must	  understand	  that	  
group	  egotism,	  collective	  pride,	  is	  “man’s	  last,	  and	  in	  some	  respects	  most	  pathetic,	  effort	  to	  
deny	  the	  determinate	  and	  contingent	  character	  of	  his	  existence.	  The	  very	  essence	  of	  human	  
sin	  is	  in	  it”	  (ibid.,	  213).	  It	  is	  also	  the	  most	  fruitful	  sin	  of	  human	  guilt	  and	  this	  is	  why	  the	  
prophet	  starts	  with	  the	  collective	  manifestations	  of	  these	  sins	  of	  pride;	  group	  egotism,	  from	  
family	  to	  nation,	  is	  the	  “most	  pregnant	  source	  of	  injustice	  and	  conflict	  than”	  any	  purely	  
individual	  pride.”	  The	  task	  of	  the	  prophet	  is	  to	  recognize,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  positive	  
aspects	  of	  group	  pride,	  such	  as	  the	  necessity	  of	  it	  for	  survival;	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  must	  
always	  note	  that	  men	  are	  not	  animals	  and	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  a	  nation	  says	  it	  is	  “fighting	  
for	  survival”,	  men	  are	  never	  merely	  fighting	  for	  survival—men	  fight	  for	  ultimate	  values	  that	  
they	  think	  are	  absolute;	  if	  they	  didn’t,	  martyrs	  and	  heroes	  would	  be	  mocked	  instead	  of	  
heralded	  in	  all	  of	  literature.	  With	  this,	  we	  arrive	  at	  the	  reason	  for	  prophetic	  criticism.	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Niebuhr	  first	  explored	  tragedy	  as	  a	  form	  of	  appearance	  reconfiguration	  in	  a	  1938	  
essay	  “Greek	  Tragedy	  and	  Modern	  Politics,”	  published	  later	  in	  a	  collection	  Christianity	  and	  
Power	  Politics	  (1969).	  He	  begins	  the	  essay	  by	  noting	  that	  the	  recurring	  motif	  in	  Greek	  
tragedy	  is	  “the	  hero’s	  deeper	  involvement	  in	  his	  fate	  through	  his	  very	  efforts	  to	  extricate	  
himself”	  (95).	  He	  illustrates	  this	  principle	  in	  a	  paraphrase	  of	  Oedipus	  and	  then	  notes	  that	  
the	  “modern	  international	  situation	  offers	  abundant	  proof	  of	  the	  profound	  insight	  into	  
human	  tragedy	  of	  the	  Greek	  dramatists.	  They	  were	  not	  writing	  melodrama	  but	  were	  
interpreting	  history,	  including	  that	  of	  modern	  times”	  (ibid.,	  96).	  The	  democratic	  nations	  of	  
the	  world,	  from	  Niebuhr’s	  perspective,	  were	  involving	  themselves	  in	  world	  catastrophe	  by	  
their	  very	  attempts	  to	  avoid	  such	  catastrophe.	  The	  democratic	  nations	  were	  the	  so-­‐called	  
“good”	  nations,	  according	  to	  their	  own	  estimations,	  yet	  Niebuhr	  insisted,	  “History	  does	  not	  
justify	  simple	  moral	  judgments”	  (ibid.).	  The	  US	  and	  Britain,	  perhaps	  better	  than	  some,	  were	  
not	  the	  “good”	  guys	  and	  worst,	  in	  thinking	  they	  were,	  they	  pursued	  a	  course	  of	  action	  
Niebuhr	  called	  “gangster”	  diplomacy,	  the	  result	  of	  which	  was	  that	  they	  gave	  the	  fascist	  
nations	  evidence	  that	  the	  US	  and	  Britain	  were	  correct	  in	  their	  estimation	  that	  they	  
represented	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  way	  of	  life.	  Thus,	  in	  trying	  to	  control	  the	  fascists	  they	  made	  the	  
fascist	  stronger	  and	  more	  fanatical.	  The	  US	  and	  Britain	  were,	  by	  Niebuhr’s	  estimate,	  
“tragically	  committed	  to	  this	  dance	  of	  death”	  (ibid.,	  99).	  	  
Had	  the	  U.S.	  been	  destroyed,	  Niebuhr	  argued	  that	  the	  story	  would	  be	  tragic	  because	  
it	  featured	  that	  key	  element	  in	  all	  tragic	  drama:	  death	  in	  defense	  of	  a	  principle	  without	  
hesitation	  or	  adjustment	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  situation.	  Tragedy	  is	  the	  narrative	  device	  
that	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  principles	  run	  amuck.	  The	  tragic	  element	  in	  history	  is	  revealed	  when	  
men	  make	  conscious	  choices	  to	  do	  evil	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  good	  cause.	  If	  men,	  Niebuhr	  writes,	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“cover	  themselves	  with	  guilt	  in	  order	  to	  fulfill	  some	  high	  responsibility;	  or	  if	  they	  sacrifice	  
some	  high	  value	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  higher	  or	  equal	  one	  they	  make	  a	  tragic	  choice.”48	  Niebuhr	  
argues	  that	  man’s	  dialectical	  nature	  is	  consists	  in	  his	  existence	  as	  a	  creator	  and	  a	  creature.	  
When	  man’s	  creator	  capacity	  takes	  over	  and	  he	  forgets	  his	  role	  as	  creature,	  he	  will	  soon	  
find	  himself	  in	  a	  tragic,	  if	  not	  ironic,	  situation.	  Niebuhr	  finds	  in	  Aeschylus’	  Prometheus	  
Bound	  a	  prophetic	  tale	  of	  tragedy	  America	  would	  do	  well	  to	  remember.	  
Thus	  understood,	  the	  prophet’s	  critical	  task	  is	  to	  call	  attention	  to	  the	  appearances	  of	  
pride	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  those	  in	  power,	  the	  hubris	  of	  those	  who	  are	  in	  control,	  the	  self-­‐
righteousness	  revealed	  in	  the	  uncritical	  actions	  of	  unqualified	  power.	  These	  are	  the	  
elements	  in	  public	  discourse	  that	  reveal	  a	  march	  toward	  tragic	  endings.	  The	  prophet,	  
sitting	  in	  the	  balcony	  of	  the	  theatre,	  stands	  on	  stage	  at	  intermission,	  and	  tells	  the	  audience	  
what	  is	  about	  to	  happen—a	  prophetic	  spoiler	  alert!	  But	  like	  all	  prophets,	  he	  knows	  that	  the	  
drama	  is	  scripted,	  and	  that	  the	  show	  will	  go	  on;	  he	  is	  going	  to	  be	  able	  to	  save	  the	  city	  from	  
destruction.	  So	  the	  prophet	  earns	  his	  ethos	  in	  the	  tragic	  framing	  and	  the	  prideful	  criticism.	  
He	  knows	  that	  the	  future	  will	  bear	  out	  his	  judgments	  and,	  after	  the	  destruction	  is	  over,	  he	  
will	  have	  been	  proven	  right,	  for	  as	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  “Outraged	  truth	  has	  a	  way	  of	  avenging	  
itself”	  (DCNR,	  8).	  The	  audience	  will	  turn	  to	  him	  again,	  as	  for	  generations	  people	  have	  turned	  
back	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  Amos,	  and	  they	  will	  reflect	  on	  the	  sins	  of	  the	  generation	  that	  bore	  
them.	  They	  will	  see	  pride	  in	  their	  forefathers	  that	  led	  to	  destruction,	  and	  they	  they	  will	  look	  
around	  and	  see	  that	  same	  pride	  in	  themselves	  and	  their	  own	  nation.	  If	  this	  is	  all	  they	  do,	  
they	  will	  refuse	  to	  participate.	  They	  will	  say	  “my	  vote	  doesn’t	  count,”	  they	  will	  concentrate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Niebuhr,	  Irony,	  xxiii.	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on	  their	  family	  alone,	  they	  will	  ignore	  appearances	  and	  leave	  justice	  outside	  their	  own	  
circle	  of	  friends	  to	  chance.	  But	  there	  is	  another	  option;	  there	  is	  another	  way.	  
The	  prophet	  calls	  a	  nation	  to	  task	  whenever	  it	  claims	  a	  more	  absolute	  devotion	  to	  
values	  that	  transcend	  its	  life	  than	  the	  facts	  warrant,	  and	  whenever	  it	  regards	  the	  values	  to	  
which	  it	  is	  loyal	  as	  more	  absolute	  than	  they	  really	  are	  (NDMI,	  213).	  The	  inception	  of	  
prophetic	  religion,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  was	  its	  initial	  conflict	  with	  national	  self-­‐deification	  (ibid.,	  
214).	  Though	  Niebuhr	  doesn’t	  ever	  mention	  exactly	  how	  one	  should	  discover	  what	  a	  
nation’s	  claims	  are,	  his	  own	  prophetic	  practice	  and	  common	  sense	  will	  show	  that	  he	  is	  
calling	  for	  a	  prophetic	  rhetorical	  criticism;	  the	  claims	  a	  nation	  makes	  are	  always	  made	  by	  
its	  statesmen,	  its	  public	  intellectuals,	  its	  journalists,	  its	  priests	  and	  kings.	  If	  the	  state	  is	  the	  
organ	  of	  a	  collective	  will,	  and	  the	  prophet	  is	  the	  organ	  of	  a	  collective	  conscience	  or	  self-­‐
transcendence,	  then	  civil	  discourse	  is	  a	  collective’s	  voice.	  This	  voice	  then,	  is	  the	  collective	  
self	  that	  the	  prophetic	  other	  self	  criticizes	  through	  dialectical	  refutations	  and	  rhetorical	  
polemics,	  just	  as	  the	  self	  and	  the	  other	  self	  are	  in	  dialogue	  with	  one	  another	  as	  conscience	  
manifest	  itself.	  The	  next	  question	  that	  begs	  we	  answer	  it	  then,	  is	  what	  attitude	  should	  the	  
collective	  self	  have,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  dialogue	  with	  its	  other	  self,	  the	  prophetic	  voice?	  
What	  attitude	  must	  civil	  discourse	  carry	  with	  it	  in	  order	  for	  the	  dialogue	  to	  be	  fruitful	  of	  
ethical	  and	  just	  actions?	  And	  how	  is	  this	  attitude	  formed	  and	  shaped,	  if	  not	  in	  the	  dialogue	  
itself?	  Whence	  does	  it	  get	  this	  attitude?	  Answering	  this	  question	  is	  our	  next	  task	  in	  
outlining	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric.	  We’ve	  seen	  that	  the	  prophetic	  task	  is	  to	  critique	  the	  
pride	  of	  collectives	  that	  manifest	  in	  its	  public	  discourses.	  From	  this,	  we	  must	  now	  inquire	  
about	  the	  attitudes	  that	  these	  collectives	  must	  bring	  to	  the	  conversation,	  if	  the	  dialogue	  
with	  the	  prophetic	  voice	  is	  to	  bear	  ethical	  fruits.	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Prophetic	  Aspiration:	  Faith	  and	  Hope	  Beyond	  Tragedy	  
	  
Jeremiah	  and	  Second	  Isaiah	  together,	  poets	  of	  pathos	  and	  amazement,	  speak	  in	  
laments	  and	  doxologies.	  They	  cannot	  be	  torn	  from	  each	  other.	  Reading	  Jeremiah	  
alone	  leaves	  faith	  in	  death	  where	  God	  finally	  will	  not	  stay.	  And	  reading	  Second	  
Isaiah	  alone	  leads	  us	  to	  imagine	  that	  we	  may	  receive	  comfort	  without	  tears	  and	  
tearing.	  Clearly,	  only	  those	  who	  anguish	  will	  sing	  new	  songs.	  Without	  anguish	  the	  
new	  song	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  strident	  and	  just	  more	  royal	  fakery.	  
	  
⎯Walter	  Brueggemann,	  The	  Prophetic	  Imagination	  
	  
If	  he	  wants	  to	  convict	  Detroit	  of	  her	  sins	  he	  preaches	  a	  sermon	  on	  the	  city	  of	  God,	  
and	  lets	  all	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  get-­‐rich-­‐quick	  metropolis	  of	  merge	  by	  implication.	  
If	  he	  wants	  to	  flay	  the	  denominationalism	  of	  the	  churches	  he	  speaks	  on	  some	  topic	  
which	  gives	  him	  the	  chance	  delineate	  the	  ideal	  and	  inclusive	  church.	  On	  the	  whole,	  
people	  do	  not	  achieve	  great	  moral	  heights	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  duty.	  You	  may	  be	  able	  to	  
compel	  them	  to	  maintain	  certain	  minimum	  standards	  by	  stressing	  duty,	  but	  the	  
highest	  moral	  in	  spiritual	  achievements	  depend	  not	  upon	  a	  push	  but	  upon	  a	  pull.	  
People	  must	  be	  charmed	  into	  righteousness.	  The	  language	  of	  aspiration	  rather	  than	  
that	  of	  criticism	  and	  command	  is	  the	  proper	  pulpit	  language.	  Of	  course	  it	  has	  its	  
limitations.	  In	  every	  congregation	  there	  are	  a	  few	  perverse	  sinners	  who	  can	  go	  into	  
emotional	  ecstasies	  about	  the	  city	  of	  God	  and	  yet	  not	  see	  how	  they	  are	  helping	  to	  
make	  their	  city	  a	  hell-­‐hole.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  good	  thing	  to	  convict	  sin	  only	  by	  implication.	  
Sometimes	  the	  cruel	  word	  of	  censure	  must	  be	  uttered.	  “Woe	  unto	  you	  scribes	  and	  
Pharisees,	  hypocrites”	  was	  spoken	  by	  one	  who	  incarnated	  tenderness.	  The	  language	  
of	  aspiration	  is	  always	  in	  danger	  of	  becoming	  soft;	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  avoid	  that	  





Niebuhr’s	  thoughtful	  reflection	  on	  pulpit	  rhetoric	  gives	  us	  some	  rhetorical	  terms	  to	  work	  
with	  regarding	  this	  prophetic	  balance.	  For	  those	  preachers	  who	  have	  the	  habit	  of	  “scolding”	  
he	  offers	  his	  brother’s	  sermons	  as	  a	  corrective	  model,	  “his	  technique	  in	  uniting	  religious	  
emotion	  with	  aspiration	  rather	  than	  with	  duty”	  (Leaves,	  75).	  Niebuhr	  finds	  himself	  in	  the	  
eternal	  rhetorical	  struggle,	  which	  every	  prophet	  faces,	  as	  does	  every	  social	  movement	  
leader	  and	  rhetor	  today.	  It	  occurs	  over	  and	  over	  again	  throughout	  Niebuhr’s	  works,	  though	  
it	  is	  articulated	  differently.	  In	  1927,	  he	  stated	  the	  problem	  in	  these	  terms:	  “Moral	  idealism	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which	  fails	  to	  gauge	  the	  measure	  of	  resistance	  which	  its	  ideals	  must	  meet	  in	  the	  confused	  
realities	  of	  life	  or	  to	  fashion	  adequate	  weapons	  for	  its	  conflict	  degenerates	  into	  mere	  
sentimentality.	  But	  a	  social	  intelligence	  which	  is	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  discouraging	  realities	  
and	  despairs	  of	  the	  attainment	  of	  any	  ideal	  sinks	  into	  a	  morally	  enervating	  cynicism”	  
(DCNR,	  161-­‐62).	  In	  Moral	  Man,	  the	  task	  was	  articulated	  in	  similar	  terms,	  with	  the	  addition	  
of	  metaphors	  of	  movement,	  the	  threat	  of	  “fanaticism”	  and	  its	  dialectical	  partner,	  “inertia.”	  
Herein	  lies	  reason	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  is	  always	  an	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric,	  for	  he	  understands	  
politics	  as	  power,	  and	  as	  such,	  he	  gives	  us	  a	  way	  to	  talk	  about	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  dynamic	  power	  
of	  coercion	  that	  moves	  human	  beings	  in	  concerted	  action	  toward	  ideal	  goods.	  What	  makes	  
his	  rhetoric	  ethical	  is	  that	  it	  looks	  upon	  the	  reality	  of	  appearances	  realistically,	  approaches	  
the	  future	  pragmatically,	  and	  views	  mankind	  ironically.	  All	  three	  of	  these	  things,	  according	  
to	  Niebuhr’s	  reading,	  are	  the	  permanent	  insights	  and	  imperatives	  of	  the	  Christian	  myth.	  
They	  take	  us	  beyond	  even	  the	  Hebraic	  truths	  because	  they	  take	  us	  beyond	  the	  tragedy	  of	  
prophetic	  lamentation	  and	  criticism,	  beyond	  even	  the	  hope	  of	  Isaiah,	  becomes	  it	  fulfills	  it.	  
Christ	  enters	  the	  world,	  thereby	  making	  appearances	  meaningful;	  Christ	  tries	  to	  improve	  
the	  world	  by	  making	  politics	  more	  just	  and	  personal	  relationships	  more	  loving,	  thereby	  
approaching	  the	  future	  pragmatically,	  building	  toward	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God,	  
reaching	  after	  the	  impossible	  possibility;	  Christ	  declares	  profoundly	  and	  paradoxically—as	  
paradox	  is	  the	  language	  of	  irony,	  the	  opposite	  of	  common	  sense—that	  he	  who	  loses	  his	  life	  
shall	  gain	  it,	  that	  he	  that	  tries	  to	  save	  his	  life	  will	  lose	  it,	  a	  transvaluation	  of	  our	  ultimate	  
values	  and	  a	  truth	  attested	  to	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  2,000	  years	  later,	  He	  lives.	  
Christ	  then,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  was	  for	  Niebuhr	  the	  ultimate	  revelation	  of	  the	  ironic	  
attitude	  that	  leads	  to	  ethical	  action.	  It	  is	  the	  necessary	  combatant	  of	  moral	  apathy	  and	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social	  inertia,	  for	  doing	  the	  right	  thing	  for	  others	  requires	  moral	  energy,	  heroic	  logic,	  faith.	  
Niebuhr	  writes:	  “If	  reality	  only	  thinly	  veiled	  the	  ideal	  implicit	  in	  it,	  or	  if	  the	  implicit	  ideal	  is	  
certain	  to	  become	  real	  in	  history,	  there	  is	  no	  occasion	  for	  moral	  adventure	  and	  no	  reason	  
for	  moral	  enthusiasm”	  (DCNR,	  202-­‐203).	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  note	  that	  Burke	  sees	  comedy	  as	  
dealing	  with	  man	  in	  society	  and	  tragedy	  as	  dealing	  with	  cosmic	  man	  (1984,	  42).	  If	  this	  is	  
true,	  then	  Niebuhr	  would	  certainly	  argue	  that	  Christ	  collapses	  these	  two	  into	  one	  ironic	  
symbol;	  Christ,	  by	  entering	  history,	  becomes	  the	  cosmic	  man	  in	  society.	  This	  can	  be	  nothing	  
less	  than	  the	  vision	  of	  perfection	  in	  imperfection,	  the	  impossible	  possibility	  that	  leads	  to	  
moral	  energy.	  His	  tragi-­‐comic	  role	  is	  given	  the	  name	  “The	  Son	  of	  Man”	  (Son	  of	  Adam)	  and	  is	  
dramatized	  as	  the	  Passion.	  The	  universal	  becomes	  a	  particular	  that	  embodies	  the	  universal-­‐
particular.	  Sacred	  and	  Profane	  collapse,	  as	  the	  sacred	  reveals	  itself	  in	  the	  profane,	  making	  
the	  profane	  sacred	  and	  making	  the	  sacred	  prone	  to	  profanation.	  The	  dramatic	  moral	  
adventure	  gives	  us	  a	  reason	  for	  moral	  enthusiasm,	  in	  light	  of	  all	  the	  facts	  around	  us	  that	  
lead	  us	  to	  despair	  and	  dismay.	  We	  are	  able	  to	  get	  beyond	  tragedy.	  
John	  E.	  Smith	  argues	  that	  one	  cannot	  fully	  appreciate	  Niebuhr’s	  prophetic	  insight	  
into	  American	  history	  without	  understanding	  what	  he	  meant	  by	  irony	  and	  how	  this	  relates	  
to	  the	  Christian	  worldview	  (2009,	  51).	  Niebuhr	  was	  often	  at	  pains	  to	  distinguish	  irony,	  not	  
from	  comedy,	  as	  we	  may	  suspect,	  but	  from	  tragedy.	  Tragedy,	  Niebuhr	  knew,	  was	  about	  the	  
dilemmas	  that	  arise	  when	  we	  must	  choose	  between	  equally	  valid	  loyalties.	  Niebuhr	  also	  
knew	  that	  it	  painted	  a	  picture	  of	  man	  as	  guilty	  whenever	  he	  used	  his	  creative	  capacities,	  
which	  being	  given	  to	  him	  by	  God,	  seemed	  not	  quite	  right.	  Thus,	  the	  purely	  tragic	  view	  was	  
neither	  viable	  nor	  Christian,	  for	  according	  to	  his	  faith,	  man	  was	  given	  dominion	  over	  the	  
earth	  and	  tasked	  with	  making	  it	  better,	  so	  tragedy	  could	  not	  be	  the	  final	  summation	  of	  the	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human	  drama.	  Smith	  writes,	  “Irony	  goes	  beyond	  tragedy;	  it	  involves	  an	  interpretation	  of	  
human	  evil	  that,	  in	  Niebuhr’s	  view,	  coincides	  with	  the	  Christian	  conception	  of	  sinful	  man	  
and	  in	  turn	  goes	  beyond	  irony,	  ending	  in	  a	  redemption	  that	  must	  come	  from	  contrition	  and	  
repentance”	  (ibid.,	  51).	  “Man,”	  as	  Niebuhr	  saw	  him,	  “is	  an	  ironic	  creature	  because	  he	  forgets	  
that	  he	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  creator	  but	  also	  a	  creature,”	  and	  everyone	  is	  guilty	  of	  making	  this	  
mistake	  (IAM).	  The	  biblical	  reading	  of	  history	  validates	  this	  view,	  Niebuhr	  argued,	  as	  
demonstrated	  in	  the	  prophetic	  summation	  of	  the	  tower	  of	  Babel,	  and	  the	  repeated	  exiles	  
and	  failures	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  people.	  These	  falls	  were	  always	  about	  a	  people’s	  virtue	  
becoming	  a	  destructive	  vice,	  after	  making	  pretentious	  claims	  about	  their	  own	  virtue.	  
The	  Christian	  path	  from	  pathos	  to	  tragedy,	  and	  from	  tragedy	  to	  irony,	  is	  best	  
demonstrated	  in	  one	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  sermonic	  essays,	  “Christianity	  and	  Tragedy”	  from	  his	  
collection	  Beyond	  Tragedy:	  Essays	  on	  the	  Christian	  Interpretation	  of	  History	  (1937).	  In	  this	  
essay	  Niebuhr	  analyzes	  a	  passage	  from	  Luke.	  Luke	  tells	  us	  that	  when	  Christ	  was	  marched	  to	  
Golgotha,	  where	  he	  was	  to	  be	  crucified,	  some	  women	  followed	  behind	  him	  on	  the	  path	  
“bewailing	  and	  lamenting	  him.”	  Christ,	  en	  route	  to	  experiencing	  one	  of	  the	  more	  tortuous	  
and	  grueling	  methods	  of	  capital	  punishment	  the	  creative	  imaginations	  of	  mankind	  has	  
devised,	  turns	  to	  the	  women	  and	  says,	  “Daughters	  of	  Jerusalem,	  weep	  not	  for	  me;	  but	  weep	  
for	  yourselves	  and	  for	  your	  children”	  (Luke	  23:27-­‐29).	  Here	  is	  pathos	  par	  excellence.	  
Anyone	  whose	  ever	  looked	  around	  at	  the	  world	  and,	  surveying	  its	  scenes—from	  the	  
holocaust’s	  overwhelming	  images	  of	  death	  and	  hate-­‐realized,	  to	  the	  evening	  news	  stories	  of	  
a	  small	  child	  whose	  Christian	  parents	  refused	  to	  “spare	  the	  rod”—and	  asked	  in	  sadness	  and	  
frustration,	  “What	  is	  wrong	  with	  this	  world?”	  has	  experienced	  history	  as	  pathetic.	  Niebuhr	  	  
notes,	  “Pity	  is	  curiously	  mixed	  with	  both	  love	  and	  reverence”	  and	  “love	  for	  equals	  is	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difficult”	  (BT,	  155).	  We	  typically	  empathize	  with	  what	  is	  weak	  and	  suffers	  because	  it	  
appeals	  to	  our	  strength	  without	  challenging	  it,	  Niebuhr	  argues;	  yet,	  we	  also	  revere	  those	  
who	  suffer	  because	  of	  the	  their	  strength	  or	  nobility.	  With	  this	  reverence,	  we	  leave	  the	  realm	  
of	  pure	  pathos	  and	  enter	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  tragedy.	  Jesus,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  is	  usually	  
considered	  a	  tragic	  figure,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  superficial	  reading,	  for	  it	  isn’t	  correct	  (ibid.).	  
Niebuhr	  corrects	  this	  assumption,	  writing:	  “Christianity	  is	  a	  religion	  which	  transcends	  
tragedy.	  Tears,	  with	  death,	  are	  swallowed	  up	  in	  victory.	  The	  cross	  is	  not	  tragic	  but	  the	  
resolution	  of	  tragedy.”	  Christianity’s	  tears	  are	  not	  for	  the	  Christian’s	  suffering	  and	  death;	  
they	  are	  tears	  of	  pity	  for	  “those	  who	  do	  not	  understand	  life	  profoundly	  enough	  to	  escape	  
the	  chaos	  of	  impulse	  and	  chance	  by	  which	  most	  loves	  are	  determined”	  (ibid.,	  156).	  Weep	  
for	  yourselves,	  Christ	  says,	  and	  weep	  for	  your	  children.	  It	  is	  as	  if	  he	  were	  saying,	  you	  are	  
pitiful,	  while	  I	  am	  tragic.	  
True	  tragedy,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  features	  a	  hero	  who	  defines	  malignant	  power	  to	  assert	  
the	  integrity	  of	  his	  soul.	  This	  hero	  suffers	  because	  he	  is	  strong,	  not	  weak.	  It	  is	  not	  his	  vice	  
that	  involves	  him	  in	  guilt,	  but	  his	  virtue.	  It	  is	  the	  level	  of	  life	  that	  is	  achieved	  by	  only	  a	  few	  
for,	  as	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  “Most	  men	  perish	  in	  weakness,	  frustration	  and	  confusion.”	  We	  may	  
weep	  for	  these	  weak	  men,	  but	  our	  tears	  are	  not	  cathartic,	  for	  though	  we	  pity	  them,	  there	  is	  
no	  terror	  to	  fear	  in	  their	  sad	  lives,	  determined	  only	  by	  their	  silly	  passions	  and	  unfortunate	  
circumstances.	  These	  characters	  aren’t	  tragic,	  as	  they	  come	  from	  authorial	  attitudes	  
saturated	  with	  the	  gloom	  and	  melancholy	  of	  a	  thoroughgoing	  pessimism.	  “Surely	  Nietzsche	  
was	  right	  in	  his	  assertion,”	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “that	  tragedy	  stands	  beyond	  pessimism	  and	  
optimism”	  (ibid.,	  157).	  This	  must	  say	  something	  about	  man,	  who	  sees	  the	  pitiful	  character	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as	  someone	  familiar	  and	  not	  strange.	  It	  must	  be	  that	  much	  of	  actual	  life	  is	  lived	  on	  this	  
plane	  of	  pessimism	  and	  pity,	  Niebuhr	  concludes.	  
This	  pity	  is	  often	  even	  greater	  for	  these	  pitiful	  characters	  because	  they	  do	  not	  weep	  
for	  themselves.	  Pitiful	  characters	  never	  rise	  above	  their	  fate	  and	  survey	  its	  meaning;	  they	  
never	  subdue	  the	  confusions	  of	  life	  that	  cause	  their	  pain.	  Pity	  then,	  is	  the	  view	  of	  the	  
spectator	  and	  not	  the	  actors	  of	  the	  drama,	  for	  only	  the	  spectator	  discerns	  meanings	  that	  are	  
not	  beheld	  by	  the	  participants.	  Niebuhr	  concludes	  that	  the	  most	  thoroughgoing	  realists	  
may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  write	  tragedy	  “because	  in	  actual	  life	  pathos	  overwhelms	  tragedy	  and	  the	  
spectator	  feels	  only	  pity	  without	  reverence”	  (ibid.,	  157-­‐80).	  What	  pitiful	  characters	  need	  is	  
a	  greater	  degree	  of	  comprehension	  of	  the	  forces	  that	  determine	  their	  action,	  so	  they	  can	  
arouse	  some	  heroic	  defiance	  of	  the	  Fate	  that	  hurls	  them	  toward	  destruction.	  Niebuhr’s	  
reading	  of	  pity	  and	  tragedy	  is	  nuanced.	  He	  notes	  that	  the	  “so-­‐called	  tragic	  victims	  of	  
warfare”	  aren’t	  tragic	  at	  all.	  Their	  courage	  and	  loyalty	  to	  the	  cause	  only	  deliver	  them	  more	  
assuredly	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  “all	  the	  blind	  and	  anarchic	  forces”	  that	  set	  nations	  against	  
nations.	  It	  is	  not	  courage	  and	  loyalty	  that	  makes	  a	  tragic	  hero,	  or	  else	  every	  character	  in	  the	  
Illiad	  would	  be	  the	  tragic	  hero	  and	  Achilles	  wouldn’t	  have	  stood	  out	  from	  the	  armies	  of	  the	  
Athenians.	  “The	  really	  tragic	  hero	  of	  warfare”	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  
…	  is	  not	  the	  soldier	  who	  makes	  the	  greatest	  sacrifice	  but	  the	  occasional	  discerning	  
spirit	  who	  plunges	  into	  the	  chaos	  of	  war	  with	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  its	  dark,	  
unconscious	  sources	  in	  the	  human	  psyche	  and	  an	  equal	  resolution,	  either	  to	  defy	  
these	  forces	  or	  to	  submit	  himself	  as	  their	  tool	  and	  victim	  in	  recognition	  of	  his	  
common	  humanity	  with	  those	  who	  are	  unconscious	  victims.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
However,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  it’s	  impossible	  to	  reserve	  pure	  tragedy	  only	  for	  the	  occasional	  
hero	  of	  nobility	  and	  strength,	  and	  to	  comprehend	  daily	  life	  as	  only	  pathetic.	  The	  two	  are	  
always	  compounded.	  Genuine	  tragedy	  is	  always	  composed	  partly	  of	  pitiful	  elements	  as	  well,	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for	  all	  heroes	  demonstrate	  strength	  and	  weakness,	  noble	  purposes	  and	  blindness.	  Othello’s	  
love	  of	  Desdemona	  ensnares	  him	  in	  a	  murderous	  jealousy;	  King	  Lear’s	  love	  and	  obtuseness,	  
lead	  him	  to	  love	  his	  daughters	  that	  hate	  him	  and	  hate	  the	  daughter	  that	  loves	  him.	  Both	  
Othello	  and	  King	  Lear	  are	  genuinely	  tragic	  figures	  because	  their	  strength	  becomes	  the	  
source	  of	  their	  weakness.	  Both	  Othello	  and	  King	  Lear	  mirror	  a	  reality	  of	  human	  existence,	  
Niebuhr	  argues,	  revealed	  whenever	  men,	  while	  suffering,	  manifest	  strength	  and	  dignity,	  
thereby	  lifting	  the	  pitiful	  into	  a	  nobler	  category	  and	  transmuting	  weakness	  into	  sublimity	  
(ibid.,	  160).	  Here,	  Niebuhr	  also	  includes	  those	  otherwise	  pitiful	  characters	  that	  deal	  with	  
life’s	  pain	  and	  misery	  with	  noble	  courage	  and	  bravery.	  
	   Pure	  tragedy	  goes	  beyond	  these	  forms	  of	  tragedy,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  because	  in	  
pure-­‐tragedy	  the	  suffering	  is	  self-­‐inflicted.	  Instead	  of	  transmuting	  the	  suffering	  into	  
courage	  and	  strength—as	  Achilles	  transmutes	  the	  suffering	  of	  disgrace	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  
Agamemnon	  and	  the	  suffering	  of	  his	  grief	  over	  Patroclus’	  death	  into	  rage	  that	  spurs	  him	  to	  
victory	  on	  the	  battlefield—the	  purely	  tragic	  hero	  initiates	  the	  suffering	  by	  his	  own	  act.	  This	  
is	  the	  pure	  tragedy	  of	  Sophocles	  and	  Aeschylus,	  whose	  heroes	  defy	  God	  or	  violate	  moral	  
codes	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  higher	  principle.	  It	  manifests	  in	  two	  forms:	  the	  Promethean	  and	  the	  
Dionysian	  tragedy.	  The	  Promethean	  tragedy	  is	  the	  best	  example	  of	  pure	  tragedy	  because	  it	  
notes	  the	  perennial	  self-­‐destruction	  that	  comes	  when	  man’s	  pride	  and	  hubris	  cause	  him	  to	  
reach	  higher	  than	  he	  should.	  Zeus,	  who	  is	  just,	  but	  not	  loving,	  is	  aroused	  to	  jealousy	  and	  
becomes	  vindictive.	  Greek	  tragedy,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  sees	  the	  problem	  of	  man	  correctly,	  but	  it	  
sees	  no	  solution	  to	  the	  problem.	  Aeschylus	  insists	  again	  and	  again	  that	  man	  must	  observe	  
the	  law	  of	  measure,	  which	  became	  the	  foundation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  prudential	  ethics;	  yet,	  the	  
“heroes	  of	  Aeschylus	  are	  tragically	  noble	  precisely	  because	  they	  disregard	  the	  author’s	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pious	  advice.”	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  Aeschylian	  plot	  is	  much	  more	  profound	  than	  the	  
Aeschylian	  philosophy,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  for	  it	  sees	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  man’s	  rational	  faculty,	  
man	  has	  an	  imagination,	  one	  that	  surveys	  the	  stars	  and	  aspires	  to	  reach	  them,	  and	  it	  
recognizes	  that	  this	  is	  the	  root	  of	  all	  human	  creativity	  and	  the	  source	  of	  all	  human	  evil.	  	  
The	  Promethean	  form	  of	  tragedy	  is	  not	  a	  dominant	  one	  in	  Greek	  poetry.	  It	  is	  only	  
expressed	  clearly	  in	  Prometheus	  Bound	  and	  in	  most	  other	  tragedies	  by	  Sophocles	  and	  
Aeschylus,	  the	  theme	  is	  Dionysian.	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  in	  the	  former,	  a	  semi-­‐god	  
consciously	  tries	  to	  undermine	  the	  authority	  of	  God,	  while	  in	  the	  latter,	  heroic	  men	  
consciously	  affirm	  an	  unconscious	  human	  impulse	  in	  defiance	  of	  society’s	  conventions	  and	  
society’s	  moral	  laws.	  Though	  the	  hero	  is	  guilty,	  he	  emphasis	  in	  Dionysian	  tragedy	  is	  on	  how	  
they	  cover	  their	  guilt	  with	  primitive,	  powerful	  and	  partly	  unconscious	  passions	  of	  the	  soul.	  
In	  Promethean	  tragedy,	  human	  imagination	  breaks	  the	  forms	  of	  prudent	  morality	  as	  it	  
strives	  toward	  the	  infinite;	  in	  Dionysian	  tragedy,	  human	  imagination	  expresses	  impulses	  
and	  passions	  that	  lay	  below	  the	  consciousness	  of	  ordinary	  men	  and	  result	  in	  consequences	  
outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  decency	  (ibid.,	  163).	  Combined,	  the	  two	  cover	  the	  heights	  (pride	  and	  
hubris)	  and	  depths	  (sensuality)	  of	  existence,	  one	  that	  a	  morality	  of	  prudence	  can	  neither	  
comprehend	  fully	  nor	  restrain.	  Their	  heroes	  are	  not	  mere	  victims	  but	  willfully	  affirm	  in	  
themselves	  what	  is	  considered	  faulty	  in	  lesser	  men.	  The	  Dionysian	  impulse	  is	  romantic	  and	  
affirms	  the	  whole	  of	  life,	  whatever	  the	  consequences,	  including	  the	  Promethean	  will,	  which	  
is	  an	  aristocratic	  virtue	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  Aristotle’s	  and	  Plato’s	  
prudential	  aristocrat,	  who	  tempers	  emotion	  with	  reason.	  The	  weakness	  of	  the	  tragic	  hero,	  
most	  notable	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  that	  he	  is	  always	  crying	  “weep	  for	  me.”	  “He	  needs	  a	  chorus	  to	  
extol	  his	  virtues	  and	  justify	  his	  actions.	  He	  requires	  lesser	  men	  to	  appreciate	  his	  true	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greatness”	  (ibid.,	  164).	  Thus,	  in	  Greek	  tragedy	  there	  is	  a	  sustained	  element	  of	  self-­‐pity.	  The	  
“necessity	  of	  pity	  from	  the	  lesser	  men	  who	  keep	  the	  law	  for	  the	  greater	  men	  who	  break	  it	  
out	  of	  an	  inner	  necessity	  is	  the	  symbol	  of	  an	  unresolved	  conflict	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Greek	  
tragedy.”	  Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  Greek	  tragedy	  does	  not	  know	  where	  the	  real	  center	  of	  life	  
lies,	  whether	  in	  life’s	  laws	  or	  in	  life’s	  vitality.	  Thus,	  “the	  weak	  law-­‐abiders	  must	  honor	  the	  
strong	  law-­‐breakers,	  lest	  the	  latter	  seem	  dishonorable”	  (ibid.,	  165).	  
Although	  the	  Christian	  view	  and	  Greek	  view	  of	  life	  have	  many	  differences,	  they	  are	  
also	  similar.	  Both,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  “measure	  life	  in	  the	  same	  depth”	  and	  “neither	  
gives	  itself	  to	  the	  simple	  delusion	  that	  the	  titanic	  forces	  of	  human	  existence”	  can	  be	  easily	  
controlled	  by	  a	  scheme	  of	  rational	  prudence.	  Furthermore,	  both	  agree	  that	  guilt	  and	  
creativity	  are	  inextricably	  interwoven.	  However,	  the	  Christian	  view	  is	  that	  guilt	  is	  not	  
inevitable	  in	  all	  human	  creativity,	  which	  means	  that	  sin	  is	  not	  normative	  or	  natural.	  Sin,	  
according	  to	  the	  Christian	  myth,	  does	  emerge	  out	  of	  human	  freedom	  and	  is	  possible	  only	  
because	  man	  is	  free;	  “but	  it	  is	  done	  in	  freedom,	  and	  therefore	  man	  and	  not	  life	  bears	  the	  
responsibility	  for	  it”	  (ibid.,	  166).	  Sin	  accompanies	  every	  creative	  act,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  
creativity.	  It	  comes	  from	  man’s	  self-­‐centeredness	  and	  egotism	  by	  which	  he	  destroys	  life	  and	  
life’s	  harmony.	  That	  man	  does	  this	  is	  not	  an	  occasion	  for	  admiration,	  but	  for	  pity.	  Sin,	  no	  
matter	  how	  much	  we	  qualify	  its	  tragic	  elements,	  is	  pitiful.	  Thus,	  “weep	  for	  yourselves.”	  
Yet	  Christianity	  takes	  man	  beyond	  this	  pitiful	  situation.	  Christ	  does	  not	  die	  upon	  the	  
cross	  because	  he	  has	  sinned	  but	  because	  he	  hasn’t.	  This	  death	  proves	  then	  that	  sin	  is	  so	  
much	  a	  part	  of	  our	  existence	  that	  sinlessness	  cannot	  exist	  within	  it.	  Yet,	  since	  Christ	  is	  not	  
only	  cosmic	  man,	  but	  is	  also	  man	  in	  society,	  he	  demonstrates	  that	  sin	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  and	  
inherent	  characteristic	  of	  life.	  Christ	  reveals	  in	  history	  the	  essential	  goodness	  of	  his	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creation.	  Christ,	  though	  defeated	  in	  history,	  proves	  in	  that	  very	  defeat	  that	  he	  cannot	  be	  
ultimately	  defeated.	  He	  is	  a	  symbol	  that	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  our	  existence	  swallows	  up	  
evil	  and	  destroys	  it.	  Life	  is	  also	  able,	  not	  only	  of	  doing	  good,	  but	  of	  also	  destroying	  the	  evil	  
which	  has	  been	  produced	  in	  it	  (ibid.,	  168).	  Thus,	  Christ,	  in	  saying	  “Weep	  not	  for	  me”	  stands	  
beyond	  tragedy.	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  
If	  there	  are	  tears	  for	  this	  man	  on	  the	  cross	  they	  cannot	  be	  tears	  of	  “pity	  and	  terror.”	  
The	  cross	  does	  not	  reveal	  life	  at	  cross	  purposes	  with	  itself.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  
declares	  that	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  inherent	  defect	  in	  life	  itself	  is	  really	  a	  contingent	  
defect	  in	  the	  soul	  of	  each	  man,	  the	  defect	  of	  the	  sin	  which	  he	  commits	  in	  his	  freedom.	  
If	  he	  can	  realize	  that	  fact,	  if	  he	  can	  weep	  for	  himself,	  if	  he	  can	  repent,	  he	  can	  also	  be	  
saved.	  He	  can	  be	  saved	  by	  hope	  and	  faith.	  His	  hope	  and	  faith	  will	  separate	  the	  
character	  of	  life	  in	  its	  essential	  reality	  from	  life	  as	  it	  is	  revealed	  in	  sinful	  history.	  
(ibid.)	  
	  
In	  this	  way	  the,	  the	  man	  on	  the	  cross	  is	  also	  able,	  in	  saying,	  “weep	  not	  for	  me,”	  to	  save	  us	  
from	  our	  tears	  of	  self-­‐pity.	  Self-­‐pity,	  after	  Christ’s	  death	  on	  the	  cross,	  is	  transmuted	  “into	  
tears	  of	  remorse	  and	  repentance.”	  Repentance,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  doesn’t	  accuse	  life	  or	  God	  
but	  accuses	  the	  self.	  There,	  in	  that	  responsible	  and	  repentant	  self-­‐accusation,	  lies	  the	  
beginning	  of	  hope	  and	  salvation,	  for	  if	  the	  defect	  is	  not	  in	  life	  itself,	  but	  in	  us,	  then	  life	  is	  
never	  hopeless.	  “If	  we	  can	  only	  weep	  for	  ourselves	  as	  men	  we	  need	  not	  weep	  for	  ourselves	  
as	  man”	  (ibid.,	  169).	  In	  this	  sense	  then,	  the	  Christian	  myth	  is	  an	  ironic	  one,	  which	  leads	  to	  
the	  humble	  and	  tolerant	  attitude	  that	  genuine	  democracy	  thrives	  on.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  
men,	  thus	  prompted	  to	  humility,	  may	  differ	  in	  their	  ideals,	  but	  they	  will	  know	  themselves	  
one	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  must	  differ,	  that	  their	  differences	  are	  rooted	  in	  natural	  and	  historic	  
circumstances	  and	  that	  these	  differences	  rise	  to	  sinful	  proportions	  beyond	  anything	  which	  
nature	  knows.	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  
They	  will	  not	  regard	  either	  their	  unities	  or	  differences	  in	  moral	  ideals	  as	  
unimportant.	  They	  will	  know	  that	  men	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  make	  fateful	  decisions	  in	  
human	  history	  and	  that	  these	  decisions	  sometimes	  set	  a	  son	  at	  variance	  with	  his	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father	  and	  a	  daughter	  with	  her	  mother.	  To	  subordinate	  the	  righteousness	  to	  which	  
they	  are	  devoted	  under	  the	  righteousness	  of	  God	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  be	  less	  loyal	  to	  
any	  cause	  to	  which	  conscience	  prompts	  them.	  Yet	  they	  will	  know	  that	  they	  are	  finite	  
and	  sinful	  men,	  contending	  against	  others	  who	  are	  equally	  finite	  and	  equally	  sinful.	  
Here	  the	  religious	  perspective	  crosses	  the	  moral	  perspective	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  
there	  is	  always	  a	  possibility	  that	  men	  will	  be	  beguiled	  from	  devotion	  to	  the	  most	  
genuine	  moral	  duties	  they	  know.	  But	  at	  its	  best	  the	  sense	  of	  Christian	  humility	  does	  
not	  destroy	  moral	  ardour.	  It	  merely	  destroys	  moral	  arrogance	  and	  prevents	  
righteousness	  from	  denigrating	  into	  self-­‐righteousness.	  (ibid.,	  246-­‐7)	  
	  
Getting	  beyond	  tragedy	  means	  getting	  beyond	  what	  is	  tragic	  in	  human	  existence,	  the	  
clash	  of	  conflicting	  principles	  in	  a	  time	  of	  crisis,	  the	  fork	  in	  the	  road	  of	  contingency	  that	  
demands	  we	  choose	  the	  lesser	  evil	  or	  the	  greater	  good	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  perfection,	  ideals	  and	  
absolutes.	  “No	  amount	  of	  pressure	  from	  an	  itinerant	  ‘prophet’	  can	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  
minister	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  a	  statesman,”	  argues	  Niebuhr;	  he	  must	  deal	  with	  situations	  as	  well	  
as	  principles.	  “In	  specific	  situations,	  actions	  must	  be	  judged	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  absolute	  
standards	  but	  in	  consideration	  of	  available	  resources	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  whom	  the	  
minister	  leads.”	  The	  prophet	  then,	  as	  a	  prophet-­‐technician,	  is	  tasked	  with	  experiencing	  
tragedy	  as	  a	  statesman	  who	  leads	  people	  in	  concerted	  action;	  he	  must	  be	  willing	  and	  able,	  
not	  only	  to	  condemn	  the	  Egyptian	  pharaoh,	  not	  only	  to	  persuade	  his	  people	  to	  leave	  the	  
order	  of	  Egypt	  and	  head	  for	  an	  imagined	  promised	  land	  that	  no	  man	  has	  seen,	  but	  he	  must	  
also	  be	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  escort	  his	  congregation,	  his	  city,	  and	  his	  nation	  through	  the	  
wilderness.	  Choosing	  the	  right	  course	  of	  action,	  i.e.	  leaving	  Egypt,	  isn’t	  enough	  to	  evade	  
tragedy,	  because	  we	  can’t	  know	  all	  of	  the	  factors	  involved	  in	  our	  decisions,	  i.e.	  that	  God	  will	  
force	  us	  to	  roam	  in	  the	  wilderness	  for	  forty	  years,	  that	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  will	  make	  the	  trip	  
to	  the	  promised	  land	  is	  Joseph’s	  bones,	  that	  we	  will	  have	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  new	  covenant	  that	  
will	  hold	  our	  people	  more	  responsible	  for	  evil	  than	  any	  other	  on	  earth.	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Beyond	  tragedy	  means	  that	  another	  covenant	  is	  coming.	  A	  new	  promise	  is	  made,	  the	  
future	  is	  opened	  up,	  the	  impossible	  possibility	  seems	  a	  little	  less	  impossible,	  and	  in	  death	  
there	  is	  life.	  The	  prophet	  speaks	  these	  possibilities	  into	  the	  collective	  imagination	  with	  the	  
hope,	  as	  Niebuhr	  states	  it,	  that	  ideas	  may	  lead	  to	  action.	  The	  ultimate	  hope	  is,	  in	  some	  sense,	  
the	  fulfillment	  of	  life.	  There	  is	  no	  religion	  or	  philosophy	  of	  life	  that	  doesn’t	  hope	  for	  the	  
fulfillment	  of	  life	  in	  some	  form	  or	  another.	  Niebuhr	  writes	  of	  this	  hope:	  “Since	  it	  is	  man’s	  
nature	  to	  be	  emancipated	  of	  the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  immediate	  present	  and	  to	  transcend	  the	  
processes	  of	  nature	  in	  which	  he	  is	  involved,	  he	  cannot	  exist	  without	  having	  his	  eyes	  upon	  
the	  future”	  (BT,	  305).	  Tomorrow,	  something	  new	  may	  happen.	  Tomorrow,	  there	  is	  
resurrection,	  new	  life,	  a	  small	  chance	  that	  one	  may	  will	  oneself	  to	  Be	  something	  different	  
than	  they	  were	  yesterday,	  thereby	  changing	  the	  course	  of	  dramatic	  history.	  “The	  future,”	  
Niebuhr	  writes,	  “is	  the	  symbol	  of	  man’s	  freedom.”	  Discerned	  ironically,	  history	  yields	  a	  
“frame	  of	  meaning	  in	  which	  human	  freedom	  is	  real	  and	  valid	  and	  not	  merely	  tragic	  or	  
illusory,”	  Niebuhr	  argues	  (IAM,	  168).	  Christianity	  complicates	  the	  future	  because	  it	  insists	  
that	  the	  very	  freedom	  that	  brings	  the	  future	  into	  view	  is	  the	  occasion	  for	  the	  corruption	  of	  
the	  present	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  man	  (BT,	  306).	  Simply	  becoming	  what	  he	  is	  currently	  on	  course	  
to	  become	  cannot	  save	  man,	  because	  this	  development	  will	  only	  heighten	  all	  the	  
contradictions	  he	  lives	  in.	  Emancipating	  himself	  from	  the	  “march	  of	  time”	  and	  the	  law	  of	  
becoming	  by	  choosing	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  timeless	  and	  motionless	  eternity	  cannot	  save	  him	  
either,	  for	  mysticism	  and	  asectism	  doesn’t	  ever	  save	  man—it	  can	  only	  annihilate	  him.	  
Beyond	  tragedy	  means	  that	  man’s	  hope	  lies	  in	  forgiveness,	  not	  for	  being	  human,	  an	  
animal,	  a	  finite	  creature,	  but	  forgiveness	  for	  corrupting	  his	  freedom	  by	  loving	  himself	  and	  
the	  extensions	  of	  himself.	  His	  hope	  lies	  in	  this	  forgiveness	  and	  a	  divine	  omnipotence,	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someone	  who	  will	  complete	  his	  life	  without	  destroying	  his	  essential	  nature.	  Thus,	  Niebuhr	  
argues,	  the	  Apostolic	  Creed	  is	  the	  final	  expression	  of	  man’s	  hope	  and	  is	  a	  much	  more	  
sophisticated	  expression	  of	  hope	  in	  ultimate	  fulfillment	  than	  all	  of	  its	  modern	  substitutes,	  “I	  
believe	  in	  the	  forgiveness	  of	  sins,	  the	  resurrection	  of	  the	  body	  and	  life	  everlasting.”	  The	  
creed	  grows	  out	  of	  a	  realization	  of	  the	  total	  human	  situation,	  which	  the	  modern	  mind	  has	  
not	  yet	  fathomed,	  Niebuhr	  argues.	  Though	  the	  symbols	  by	  which	  this	  hope	  is	  expressed	  are	  
difficult	  for	  rational	  minds	  to	  comprehend,	  modern’s	  man’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  symbols	  has	  
little	  to	  do	  with	  their	  irrationality.	  The	  real	  cause	  of	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  message	  that	  goes	  
beyond	  tragedy,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  that	  modern	  man	  has	  failed,	  and	  continues	  to	  fail,	  
to	  understand	  the	  problem	  of	  human	  existence	  in	  all	  its	  complexity.	  Modern	  man	  has	  not,	  
as	  is	  often	  assumed,	  substituted	  superior	  scientific	  ideas	  for	  outmoded	  religious	  myths;	  
rather,	  he	  is	  simply	  blind	  to	  the	  paradoxes	  of	  human	  existence	  (300).	  Man	  doesn’t	  
understand	  the	  hopes	  of	  unconditioned	  perfection,	  both	  social	  and	  individual,	  which	  
beckon	  the	  human	  conscience	  and	  are	  involved	  in	  every	  concept	  of	  the	  relative	  and	  
historical	  good.	  “He	  sees	  them	  in	  history	  but	  does	  not	  see	  that	  they	  point	  beyond	  history.”	  
Perhaps	  times	  have	  changed	  a	  bit	  since	  Niebuhr’s,	  where	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  
man	  thought	  he	  could	  control	  the	  world	  with	  science	  and	  logic	  and	  technics.	  Today	  we	  live	  
in	  a	  world	  where	  the	  collective	  sins	  of	  our	  “intelligence”	  are	  constantly	  pointing,	  not	  to	  our	  
ability	  to	  succeed	  and	  harness	  the	  natural	  world	  at	  our	  discretion,	  but	  to	  our	  limits	  and	  the	  
certainty	  that	  tomorrow	  will	  be	  just	  like	  today.	  In	  such	  a	  world,	  the	  character	  of	  rhetoric	  is	  
uncertain	  at	  best	  (1993,	  139).	  But	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  this	  uncertainty,	  Farrell	  asks	  us	  to	  
remember,	  “that	  the	  experience	  of	  tragedy,	  even	  in	  its	  archetypal,	  perfected	  state,	  is	  not	  the	  
final	  experience.	  It	  is	  only	  the	  archetypal	  aesthetic	  experience.	  The	  comedy	  of	  history	  does	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not	  stop.	  In	  some	  perverse	  but	  necessary	  sense,	  the	  murmuring	  of	  survivors	  goes	  on	  and	  is	  
rekindled”	  (ibid.).	  These	  survivors	  are	  the	  reoccurring	  promise	  of	  a	  saving	  remnant	  of	  
spiritualized-­‐technicians.	  They	  survey	  the	  world	  realistically	  and	  have	  a	  keen	  intelligence.	  
They	  are	  experimental	  and	  experienced,	  well-­‐versed	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  laity,	  and	  they	  
do	  not	  denigrate,	  but	  instead	  revere	  the	  common-­‐sense	  wisdom	  of	  the	  man	  on	  the	  street	  
that	  Aristotle	  called	  phronesis.	  They	  are	  humble	  and	  qualify	  their	  judgments	  continually,	  
for	  theirs	  is	  a	  pluralistic	  and	  humble	  attitude;	  yet,	  when	  the	  chips	  are	  down	  and	  
contingency	  rears	  its	  head,	  they	  are	  brave	  and	  courageous	  in	  defending	  the	  cause	  of	  justice.	  
Though	  their	  rhetoric	  is	  certain	  and	  unwavering	  in	  the	  face	  of	  injustice,	  they	  nevertheless	  
will	  express	  in	  their	  deepest	  reflections	  an	  attitude	  that	  Kierkegaard	  expressed	  as	  “fear	  and	  
trembling.”	  So	  it	  was	  with	  Niebuhr’s	  last	  journal	  entry:	  
It	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  be	  sane	  and	  Christian	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  on	  the	  whole	  I	  
have	  been	  more	  sane	  than	  Christian.	  I	  have	  said	  what	  I	  believe,	  but	  in	  my	  creed	  the	  
divine	  madness	  of	  a	  gospel	  of	  love	  is	  qualified	  by	  considerations	  of	  moderation	  
which	  I	  have	  called	  Aristotelian,	  but	  which	  an	  unfriendly	  critic	  might	  call	  
opportunistic.	  I	  have	  made	  these	  qualifications	  because	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  without	  
them	  the	  Christian	  ethic	  degenerates	  into	  asceticism	  and	  becomes	  useless	  for	  any	  
direction	  of	  the	  affairs	  of	  a	  larger	  city.	  I	  do	  not	  say	  that	  some	  one	  ought	  not	  to	  
undertake	  an	  ascetic	  revolt	  against	  civilization.	  Certainly	  there	  would	  be	  a	  peace	  in	  
it	  which	  no	  one	  can	  find	  who	  tries	  to	  adapt	  the	  principles	  of	  love	  to	  a	  civilization	  
built	  upon	  the	  drive	  of	  power	  and	  greed.	  Those	  of	  us	  who	  make	  adjustments	  
between	  the	  absolute	  ideal	  of	  our	  devotion	  and	  the	  necessities	  of	  the	  immediate	  
situation	  lack	  peace,	  because	  we	  can	  never	  be	  sure	  that	  we	  have	  our	  adjustment	  at	  




It	  is	  a	  beautiful	  and	  pitiful	  refrain,	  which	  are	  characteristic	  of	  tragic	  catharsis.	  Yet	  it	  is	  not	  a	  
tragic	  story.	  It	  is	  the	  story	  of	  a	  humble	  and	  contrite	  liberal	  who,	  as	  Niebuhr	  describes	  his	  
mission,	  attempts	  to	  “combine	  the	  ethic	  of	  Jesus	  with	  what	  might	  be	  called	  Greek	  caution”	  
(Leaves,	  152).	  The	  tragic	  hero	  throws	  caution	  to	  the	  wind.	  The	  tragic	  hero	  makes	  judgments	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confidently	  and	  knows	  nothing	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  feelings	  of	  a	  “lack	  of	  peace”	  that	  comes	  from	  
compromising	  principles	  in	  the	  name	  of	  contingency,	  prudence,	  phronesis.	  Niebuhr’s	  task,	  
as	  a	  prophet,	  was	  to	  further	  the	  ironic,	  the	  comi-­‐tragic,	  view	  of	  human	  history,	  in	  order	  to	  
foster	  an	  ethical	  attitude	  of	  humility	  and	  reverence	  in	  political	  affairs.	  He	  sums	  up	  the	  
journal	  entry,	  his	  last	  in	  the	  book,	  with	  the	  following:	  
Modern	  industry,	  particularly	  American	  industry,	  is	  not	  Christian.	  The	  economic	  
forces	  which	  move	  it	  are	  hardly	  qualified	  at	  a	  single	  point	  by	  really	  ethical	  
considerations.	  If,	  while	  it	  is	  in	  the	  flush	  of	  its	  early	  triumphs,	  it	  may	  seem	  
impossible	  to	  bring	  it	  under	  the	  restraint	  of	  moral	  law,	  it	  may	  strengthen	  faith	  to	  
know	  that	  life	  without	  law	  destroys	  itself.	  If	  the	  church	  can	  do	  nothing	  else,	  it	  can	  
bear	  witness	  to	  the	  truth	  until	  such	  a	  day	  as	  bitter	  experience	  will	  force	  a	  recalcitrant	  
civilization	  to	  a	  humility	  which	  it	  does	  not	  now	  possess.	  (emphasis	  mine,	  152)	  
	  
Here	  is	  Niebuhr’s	  faith	  at	  its	  finest.	  Niebuhr	  is	  girding	  his	  loins,	  as	  the	  prophets	  would	  have	  
it,	  before	  he	  embarks	  for	  New	  York,	  mustering	  up	  the	  courage	  and	  strength	  he	  will	  need	  to	  
continue	  preaching	  the	  gospel	  to	  a	  prideful	  nation.	  His	  faith	  in	  God’s	  ultimate	  judgment	  is	  
the	  only	  thing	  that	  can	  get	  him	  beyond	  tragedy	  and	  irony,	  to	  what	  may	  be	  called	  “ironic	  
irony.”49	  These	  are,	  as	  the	  title	  of	  his	  journal	  calls	  our	  attention	  to,	  the	  Confessions	  of	  a	  
Tamed	  Cynic.	  	  As	  Kierkegaard’s	  Climacus	  notes,	  “From	  the	  fact	  that	  irony	  is	  present	  it	  does	  
not	  follow	  that	  earnestness	  is	  excluded.	  That	  is	  something	  only	  assistant	  professors	  
assume.”	  Niebuhr,	  and	  his	  formulation	  of	  a	  prophet-­‐technician,	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  ably	  
under	  Kierkegaard’s	  aphorism:	  Ever	  ironic,	  yet	  earnest—or	  to	  flip	  the	  clauses	  and	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Conclusion	  
	  
The	  new	  myth,	  to	  be	  the	  ideal	  myth,	  must	  give	  us	  that	  new	  vision,	  and	  not	  merely	  in	  
its	  purity,	  as	  with	  the	  Christian	  vision	  of	  peace	  on	  earth,	  but	  in	  its	  ideological	  
implications	  as	  well.	  And	  maybe	  it	  must	  do	  this	  very	  soon.	  Or	  must	  the	  myth	  wait	  for	  
quiet	  times,	  as	  Virgil’s	  myth	  celebrated	  the	  end	  of	  wars?	  And	  if	  it	  must,	  what	  will	  
there	  be	  fore	  the	  new	  myth	  to	  celebrate,	  if	  the	  magic	  number	  three	  is	  to	  have	  its	  
sway,	  if	  there	  is	  to	  be	  a	  third	  world	  war?	  
	  
⎯Kenneth	  Burke,	  Ideology	  and	  Myth	  
	  
The	  Christian	  myth,	  properly	  understood,	  was	  the	  perfect	  democratic	  myth	  for	  
Niebuhr.	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  the	  prophetic	  and	  ironic	  elements	  in	  a	  religious	  myth	  do	  not	  
inevitably	  lead	  to	  ethical	  activity	  and	  that	  many	  forms	  of	  Christianity	  “play	  the	  part	  of	  
chaplain	  to	  the	  pride	  of	  nations”	  (NDMI,	  216).	  The	  church	  can	  become,	  just	  as	  the	  state	  can,	  
the	  vehicle	  of	  collective	  egotism	  because,	  “Every	  truth	  can	  be	  made	  the	  servant	  of	  sinful	  
arrogance,	  including	  the	  prophetic	  truth	  that	  all	  men	  fall	  short	  of	  the	  truth”	  (ibid.,	  217).	  
Nevertheless,	  reconfiguring	  appearances	  aesthetically,	  the	  prophet,	  the	  spiritualized-­‐
technician,	  stimulates	  the	  ethical	  imagination	  of	  her	  audience.	  Appearances	  take	  on	  new	  
life	  in	  the	  Christian	  interpretation	  of	  history,	  as	  Niebuhr	  presents	  it.	  The	  limits	  of	  our	  
individual	  imaginations	  are	  multiplied	  in	  collective	  existence,	  and	  this	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  
ethical	  problem;	  however,	  Niebuhr	  recognizes	  amidst	  human	  sin	  a	  potential	  solution	  by	  
way	  of	  the	  Christian	  myth.	  Realism	  alone	  is	  the	  benefactor	  of	  complacency	  with	  the	  status	  
quo.	  “We	  need	  to	  ask,”	  writes	  Brueggemann,	  “not	  whether	  it	  is	  realistic	  or	  practical	  or	  
viable	  but	  whether	  it	  is	  imaginable”	  for	  “Imagination	  must	  come	  before	  implementation”	  
(2001,	  39-­‐40).	  
Niebuhr’s	  survey	  of	  the	  church’s	  potential	  for	  success	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  justice	  was	  
dismal;	  but	  he	  notes	  that	  the	  church	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  the	  only	  group	  that	  had	  the	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symbolic	  resources	  already	  in	  place	  to	  take	  on	  the	  task.	  The	  church	  body	  was	  congenial	  to	  
the	  “energy	  and	  activism	  of	  Western	  peoples	  and	  is	  yet	  capable	  of	  setting	  bounds	  to	  its	  
expansive	  desires.”	  A	  model	  of	  self-­‐assertion	  by	  self-­‐denial	  was	  already	  in	  place	  in	  its	  
doctrines;	  the	  cross	  was	  the	  symbol	  of	  life’s	  highest	  achievement.	  “Its	  optimism	  is	  rooted	  in	  
pessimism	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  able	  to	  reach	  both	  repentance	  and	  hope.	  It	  is	  able	  to	  condemn	  
the	  world	  without	  enervating	  life	  and	  to	  create	  faith	  without	  breeding	  illusions.”	  (DCNR,	  
235-­‐6).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  church	  was	  an	  organization	  that	  already	  had	  the	  proper	  
mythical	  symbols	  in	  place	  to	  take	  on	  the	  task	  of	  social	  reconstruction.	  “When	  dealing	  with	  
life’s	  ultimates,	  symbolism	  is	  indispensable,”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  “and	  a	  symbolism	  which	  has	  a	  
basis	  in	  historic	  incident	  is	  most	  effective”	  (ibid.,	  237).	  A	  morally	  creative	  worldview	  
requires,	  Niebuhr	  argued,	  “a	  potent	  but	  yet	  suffering	  divine	  ideal	  which	  is	  defeated	  by	  the	  
world	  but	  gains	  its	  victory	  in	  the	  defeat.”	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  corrective	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  
modernity	  must	  be	  a	  tragic	  worldview	  that	  goes	  beyond	  tragedy	  because	  its	  tragedy	  
transcends	  the	  meaning	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  fail.	  
Niebuhr	  was	  unaware	  at	  the	  time	  he	  penned	  Man’s	  Nature	  and	  His	  Communities	  that	  
Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.	  was	  using	  his	  works	  for	  inspiration	  and	  guidance.50	  So	  it	  is	  a	  
profound	  coincidence,	  an	  ironic	  one	  even,	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  survey	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  
movement	  echoed	  those	  very	  themes	  King	  pulled	  from	  Niebuhr’s	  thought.	  While	  arguing	  
that	  the	  1954	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  to	  desegregate	  schools	  initiated	  the	  Negro	  revolt,	  
Niebuhr	  described	  the	  process	  as	  one	  that	  took	  the	  African-­‐American	  population	  beyond	  
tragedy.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  “transmuted	  the	  desperation	  of	  the	  minority	  into	  that	  
wonderful	  combination	  of	  hope	  and	  despair,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  motive	  power	  of	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  (Niebuhr	  1965)	  (hereafter	  cited	  as	  MNC).	  
	   251	  
rebellions	  against	  injustice”	  (ibid.,	  102).	  Yet,	  it	  was	  not	  King	  that	  got	  schools	  to	  desegregate.	  
It	  began	  in	  Topeka,	  Kansas,	  when	  thirteen	  parents,	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  twenty	  children,	  filled	  
a	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  Board	  of	  Education.	  The	  plaintiffs	  were	  encouraged	  to	  file	  the	  suit	  by	  
the	  Topeka	  NAACP	  president,	  McKinley	  Burnett,	  who	  had	  been	  writing	  letters	  to	  the	  
Topeka	  School	  Board	  for	  two	  year	  to	  encourage	  desegregation.	  When	  reviewed	  by	  the	  
Supreme	  Court,	  all	  nine	  justices	  overturned	  the	  ruling	  of	  the	  Topeka	  district	  court	  to	  
enforce	  segregation	  unanimously.	  With	  these	  facts,	  we	  return	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  conclusion	  to	  
Does	  Civilization	  Need	  Religion?	  
The	  modern	  movement	  of	  detachment	  must	  be	  a	  layman’s	  movement;	  “for	  it	  must	  
express	  itself	  in	  rebuilding	  the	  social	  order	  rather	  than	  in	  rebuilding	  new	  social	  institutions”	  
(DCNR,	  228,	  emphasis	  mine).	  The	  most	  effective	  teachers	  of	  this	  movement	  will	  “lack	  
neither	  the	  technical	  skill	  nor	  the	  spiritual	  resource	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  practical	  problems	  of	  
industry	  and	  politics”	  (ibid.).	  The	  movement	  will	  prove	  ineffective	  if	  those	  engaged	  in	  the	  
world’s	  work	  are	  not	  at	  the	  mast.	  The	  prophet’s	  task,	  Brueggemann	  argues,	  “is	  to	  nurture,	  
nourish,	  and	  evoke	  a	  consciousness	  and	  perception	  alternative”	  to	  that	  of	  the	  dominant	  
culture	  (2001,	  3).	  This	  alternative	  consciousness	  serves	  to	  criticize	  the	  dominant	  one,	  while	  
also	  serving	  to	  energize	  communities	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  something	  better	  to	  come	  (ibid.)	  
Imagination	  comes	  before	  implementation,	  and	  the	  imagination	  of	  only	  a	  few,	  a	  saving	  
remnant	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  life’s	  work—eleven	  parents	  in	  Topeka	  or	  nine	  supreme	  court	  
justices—may	  prove	  that	  Niebuhr’s	  summation	  in	  Moral	  Man	  was	  correct:	  
There	  must	  always	  be	  a	  religious	  element	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  a	  just	  society.	  Without	  the	  
ultrarational	  hopes	  and	  passions	  of	  religion	  no	  society	  will	  ever	  have	  the	  courage	  to	  
conquer	  despair	  and	  attempt	  the	  impossible;	  for	  the	  vision	  of	  a	  just	  society	  is	  an	  
impossible	  one,	  which	  can	  be	  approximated	  only	  by	  those	  who	  do	  not	  regard	  it	  as	  
impossible.	  The	  true	  visions	  of	  religion	  are	  illusions,	  which	  may	  be	  partially	  realized	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by	  being	  resolutely	  believed.	  For	  what	  religion	  believes	  to	  be	  true	  is	  not	  wholly	  true	  
but	  ought	  to	  be	  true;	  and	  may	  become	  true	  if	  its	  truth	  is	  not	  doubted.	  (MM,	  81)	  
	  
What	  is	  religion?	  It	  is	  “the	  courageous	  logic	  which	  makes	  the	  ethical	  struggle	  consistent	  
with	  the	  world’s	  facts;”	  it	  “validates	  its	  sublime	  assumptions	  in	  immediate	  experience	  and	  
gives	  man	  an	  unshakable	  certainty;”	  thus,	  it	  “becomes	  the	  dynamic	  of	  moral	  action	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  logic	  which	  makes	  the	  action	  reasonable”	  (DCNR,	  53).	  The	  spiritualized-­‐technician	  
then,	  provides	  the	  moral	  energy	  and	  action	  needed	  to	  move	  collectives	  toward	  social	  
justice	  as	  an	  ideal	  that	  can	  be	  approximated	  but	  never	  perfectly	  actualized.	  Thus,	  the	  
spiritualized-­‐technician,	  the	  prophet,	  must	  have	  “the	  wisdom	  of	  serpents”	  and	  “the	  
guilelessness	  of	  doves”	  if	  they	  are	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  moral	  regeneration	  of	  society.	  Niebuhr’s	  
formulation	  echoes	  Burke’s	  vision	  of	  the	  ideal	  myth,	  one	  that	  transcends	  the	  political	  and	  
yet	  has	  political	  attitudes	  interwoven	  into	  it.51	  The	  wisdom	  of	  serpents	  means	  recognizing	  
that	  the	  lawsuit	  and	  civil	  disobedience	  are	  the	  means	  for	  changing	  structures	  based	  on	  
power,	  not	  love	  and	  forgiveness.	  The	  guilelessness	  of	  doves	  means	  that	  the	  civil	  
disobedience	  be	  non-­‐violent	  and	  that	  the	  movement,	  with	  an	  element	  of	  naïve	  hope	  and	  
faith	  its	  ideals,	  remain	  detached	  from	  the	  politics	  of	  power	  whenever	  possible.	  
Appearances	  come	  to	  us	  from	  the	  unknown	  future.	  In	  preparing	  for	  them	  ethically,	  
we	  can	  only	  control	  our	  attitudes	  toward	  history	  and	  its	  actors:	  friends,	  families,	  and	  
communities—our	  own	  and	  other’s.	  Appearances	  stare	  us	  down	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  present	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  (Burke	  and	  Gusfield	  1989,	  208)	  Burke	  notes	  the	  motivational	  problem	  that	  arises,	  if	  you	  
treat	  the	  mythic	  narrative	  as	  on	  par	  with	  the	  ideological	  motives.	  Burke	  argues	  that	  if	  we	  
eliminate	  the	  ideological	  taint	  or	  bias	  then	  we	  deprive	  society	  of	  its	  motive	  power.	  “For	  
though	  bias	  is	  false	  promise,	  it	  is	  promise.”	  This	  was	  Mannheim’s	  problem,	  as	  well	  as	  
Niebuhr’s.	  For	  Mannheim	  asks	  himself	  the	  same	  question	  Niebuhr	  does	  in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  
Moral	  Man,	  and	  that	  is	  “where	  the	  zeal	  of	  human	  effort	  would	  come	  from,	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  
the	  false	  promises	  of	  our	  utopias.	  And	  he	  asks	  this,	  [as	  Niebuhr	  does]	  even	  as	  he	  aims	  by	  
scrupulous	  method	  to	  destroy	  the	  zeal	  of	  such	  false	  promises,	  or	  mythic	  utopian	  illusions.	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us	  with	  a	  crisis	  in	  which	  a	  judgment	  must	  be	  made.	  The	  ethic	  of	  our	  responses	  will	  depend	  
upon	  entering	  the	  crisis	  with	  a	  humble	  attitude	  and	  contrite	  heart,	  which	  it	  is	  the	  prophet’s	  
task	  to	  evoke;	  as	  well	  as	  our	  capacity	  for	  rational	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  amount	  of	  
information	  we	  have	  on	  the	  particular	  problem	  at	  hand,	  and	  a	  realistic	  survey	  of	  the	  power	  
relations	  involved,	  which	  are	  the	  technician’s	  and	  statesman’s	  highest	  calling.	  Appearances,	  
once	  gone,	  are	  recollected	  in	  both	  individual	  and	  collective	  memories,	  passed	  down	  from	  
generation	  to	  generation.	  These	  shared	  experiences	  make	  up	  a	  community’s	  ethos.	  The	  
quality	  of	  this	  ethos	  depends	  up	  the	  dramatic	  and	  mythic	  interpretations	  it	  uses	  to	  frame	  
these	  collective	  memories;	  it	  depends	  on	  whether	  they	  are	  fundamentally	  tragic,	  or	  if	  they	  
provide	  a	  ray	  of	  light	  to	  the	  world	  that	  takes	  man	  and	  society	  beyond	  tragedy	  and	  despair.	  
This	  light	  that	  takes	  us	  beyond	  tragedy	  completes	  the	  circular	  movement	  of	  a	  Niebuhrian	  
ethics	  of	  Christian	  rhetoric;	  for	  only	  if	  we	  believe	  in	  man’s	  freedom	  and	  the	  impossible	  
possibility	  that	  man	  can	  do	  better,	  will	  we	  be	  able	  to	  do	  the	  first	  task:	  approach	  the	  
appearances	  of	  the	  future	  with	  an	  open	  mind,	  a	  contrite	  spirit	  and	  a	  humble	  heart.	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Conclusion	  
The	  Niebuhrian	  Rhetoric	  of	  King	  David	  and	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  
	  
	  
Any	  society	  that	  hopes	  to	  be	  imperishable	  must	  carve	  out	  for	  itself	  a	  piece	  of	  space	  
and	  period	  of	  time	  in	  which	  it	  can	  look	  honestly	  at	  itself.	  This	  honesty	  is	  not	  that	  of	  
the	  scientist,	  who	  exchanges	  the	  honesty	  of	  his	  ego	  for	  the	  objectivity	  of	  his	  gaze.	  It	  
is,	  rather,	  akin	  to	  the	  extreme	  honesty	  of	  the	  creative	  artist	  who,	  in	  his	  presentations	  
on	  the	  stage,	  in	  the	  book,	  on	  canvas,	  in	  marble,	  in	  music,	  or	  in	  towers	  and	  houses,	  
reserves	  to	  himself	  the	  privilege	  of	  seeing	  straight	  what	  all	  cultures	  build	  crooked.	  
All	  generalizations	  are	  in	  some	  way	  skewed,	  and	  artists	  with	  candid	  vision	  “labor	  
well	  the	  particulars,”	  as	  Blake	  knew.	  
	  
⎯Victor	  Turner,	  The	  Anthropology	  of	  Experience	  
Let	  the	  study	  serve	  to	  reveal	  the	  relativity	  of	  all	  things	  so	  that	  pulpit	  utterances	  do	  
not	  become	  too	  extravagant,	  and	  let	  the	  pulpit	  save	  the	  student	  from	  sinking	  in	  the	  
sea	  of	  relativities.	  However	  qualified	  every	  truth	  may	  be	  there	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  
portion	  in	  every	  truth	  and	  value	  which	  is	  essentially	  absolute	  and	  which	  is	  therefore	  
worth	  proclaiming.	  “All	  oratory,”	  declares	  a	  Greek	  scholar,	  “is	  based	  on	  half	  truths.”	  
That	  is	  why	  one	  ought	  naturally	  to	  distrust	  and	  to	  discount	  the	  orator.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  oratory	  may	  be	  the	  result	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  poetic	  gift	  which	  sees	  a	  truth	  
dissociated,	  for	  a	  moment	  at	  least,	  from	  all	  relativities	  of	  time	  and	  circumstance	  and	  




Niebuhr	  also	  struggled	  to	  find	  the	  right	  balance	  between	  prophetic	  scolding	  and	  
priestly	  encouragement,	  between	  didactic	  and	  dialogic	  elements	  of	  his	  ministry.	  Niebuhr	  
wondered	  “Why	  is	  that	  when	  I	  arise	  in	  the	  pulpit	  I	  try	  to	  be	  imaginative	  and	  am	  sometimes	  
possessed	  by	  a	  kind	  of	  madness	  which	  makes	  my	  utterances	  extravagant	  and	  dogmatic?”	  
(34)	  “Perhaps,”	  he	  thought,	  it	  is	  due	  to	  “my	  desire	  to	  move	  the	  audience”	  from	  their	  
lethargy,	  a	  difficult	  task	  for	  a	  “cool	  and	  critical	  analysis.”	  Rousing	  the	  emotions	  demands,	  
instead,	  a	  presentation	  of	  ideal	  values,	  he	  concludes.	  Niebuhr	  also	  noted	  that	  this	  tendency	  
to	  become	  fanatical	  or	  hyperbolic	  increased	  as	  the	  size	  of	  his	  congregation	  grew.	  “A	  full	  
church	  gives	  me	  the	  sense	  of	  fighting	  with	  a	  victorious	  host	  in	  the	  battles	  of	  the	  Lord”	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whereas,	  “A	  half	  empty	  church	  immediately	  symbolizes	  the	  fact	  that	  Christianity	  is	  very	  
much	  of	  a	  minority	  movement	  in	  a	  pagan	  world	  and	  that	  it	  can	  be	  victorious	  only	  by	  
snatching	  victory	  out	  of	  defeat.”	  Niebuhr	  constantly	  gauged	  his	  oratory’s	  priestly	  and	  
prophetic	  balances,	  checking	  that	  his	  ethics	  remained	  rhetorically	  potent	  and	  that	  his	  
rhetoric	  remained	  ethical,	  i.e.	  that	  it	  both	  condemn	  and	  aspire.	  
It	  is	  dangerous	  to	  make	  coherence	  the	  standard	  by	  which	  all	  truths	  are	  measured.	  
“Irrational,”	  “illogical,”	  and	  “pre-­‐scientific”	  are	  often	  mistaken	  adjectives,	  used	  to	  falsely	  
denote	  what	  is	  supra-­‐rational,	  ultra-­‐rational,	  and	  supra-­‐scientific.	  There	  are	  truths	  that	  at	  
permanent,	  truths	  that	  seem	  to	  dissociate	  from	  the	  contingencies	  of	  the	  shifting	  sands	  we	  
make	  political	  judgments	  on.	  In	  today’s	  high-­‐speed	  world,	  where	  everything	  is	  sped	  up	  and	  
the	  world	  around	  us	  seems	  to	  spiral	  out	  of	  our	  control	  so	  often,	  Niebuhr	  would	  
undoubtedly	  call	  our	  attention	  to	  two	  things:	  Permanent	  truths	  are	  needed	  now,	  more	  than	  
ever,	  and	  likewise,	  the	  very	  reasons	  they	  are	  needed	  are	  the	  very	  things	  blocking	  us	  from	  
grasping	  them.	  What	  are	  the	  chances	  for	  prophetic	  oratory	  in	  times	  such	  as	  these?	  
	   Recalling	  the	  introduction	  of	  our	  analysis,	  we	  may	  note	  that,	  though	  the	  present	  
seems	  too	  fast	  and	  technological	  for	  permanent	  truths,	  it	  is	  Obama’s	  rhetoric	  that	  has	  
revived	  the	  rhetorical	  trope	  “Niebuhrian.”	  This	  fact	  is	  more	  significant	  when	  we	  connect	  
the	  present	  “Niebuhrian”	  rhetorical	  utterances	  with	  those	  of	  the	  past,	  those	  that	  Niebuhr	  
specifically	  points	  to	  as	  rhetorical	  models,	  perfect	  embodiments	  of	  the	  tensions	  between	  
permanent	  truth	  and	  discriminating	  intelligence,	  justice	  and	  love,	  condemnation	  and	  
aspiration.	  There	  is	  an	  ancient	  model	  of	  rhetoric	  that	  harmoniously	  blends	  priestly	  
aspiration	  and	  prophetic	  condemnation,	  and	  that	  is	  found	  in	  the	  story	  of	  King	  David.	  There	  
is	  only	  one	  such	  American	  rhetoric.	  It	  is	  found	  in	  the	  Presidential	  addresses	  of	  Abraham	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Lincoln,	  Niebuhr’s—as	  well	  as	  Obama’s—favorite	  statesman.	  In	  Lincoln,	  Niebuhr	  heard	  the	  
perfect	  articulation	  of	  the	  balance	  needed	  between	  priestly	  and	  prophetic	  utterance,	  
between	  loyalties	  to	  the	  ark	  and	  loyalties	  to	  the	  temple.	  
	   The	  story	  begins	  with	  the	  first	  building	  of	  the	  Jewish	  temple,	  recorded	  in	  First	  and	  
Second	  Chronicles.	  David,	  the	  only	  person	  in	  the	  Bible	  whom	  it	  is	  said	  “was	  a	  man	  after	  
God’s	  own	  heart,”	  sits	  on	  the	  throne	  of	  Israel—an	  Israel	  he	  united	  by	  waging	  war	  against	  
Judah	  and	  capturing	  Jerusalem.	  David	  has	  spent	  years	  designing	  a	  “house	  of	  rest	  for	  the	  ark	  
of	  the	  covenant;”	  the	  porch,	  the	  houses,	  the	  treasuries,	  the	  upper	  chambers—David	  had	  
architectural	  designs	  for	  every	  detail	  of	  the	  temple.	  God	  however,	  has	  other	  plans.	  God,	  who	  
has	  made	  a	  covenant	  with	  David	  that	  his	  house	  shall	  sit	  on	  the	  throne	  of	  Israel	  forever,	  
informs	  David	  later	  that	  because	  he	  has	  blood	  on	  his	  hands,	  he	  will	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  build	  
the	  sacred	  temple.	  His	  son	  Solomon,	  who	  is	  chosen	  to	  build	  it	  instead,	  records	  the	  
conversation:	  “Now	  it	  was	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  David	  my	  father	  to	  build	  an	  house	  for	  the	  name	  of	  
the	  Lord	  God	  of	  Israel.	  But	  the	  Lord	  said	  to	  David	  my	  father,	  Forasmuch	  as	  it	  was	  in	  thine	  
heart	  to	  build	  an	  house	  for	  my	  name,	  thou	  didst	  well	  in	  that	  it	  was	  in	  thine	  heart:	  
Notwithstanding	  thou	  shalt	  not	  build	  the	  house”	  (II	  Chronicles	  6).	  It	  is	  a	  tragic	  story,	  for	  by	  
all	  accounts	  David	  waged	  a	  just	  and	  necessary	  war	  for	  God’s	  people,	  even	  executing	  the	  
assassins	  of	  the	  king	  of	  Judah	  for	  war	  crimes.	  It	  is	  ironic,	  of	  course,	  that	  David	  is	  most	  
remembered	  by	  Protestants	  for	  his	  heroic	  defeat	  of	  the	  giant	  Goliath,	  and	  by	  Jews	  for	  his	  
unification	  of	  the	  two	  tribes	  into	  one	  nation	  in	  Jerusalem,	  Israel.	  The	  one	  man	  who	  has	  a	  
heart	  for	  God,	  who	  unites	  the	  tribes	  into	  one	  kingdom,	  and	  whose	  motives	  for	  building	  God	  
a	  house	  in	  Israel	  are	  pure	  and	  noble,	  is	  punished	  for	  doing	  the	  right	  thing.	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   Niebuhr’s	  exegesis	  of	  this	  narrative	  is	  significant,	  for	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  an	  
analysis	  of	  how	  gods,	  ultimate	  terms,	  what	  Burke	  calls	  “god-­‐terms,”	  are	  invoked	  on	  behalf	  
of	  nations	  during	  times	  of	  war.	  In	  every	  war	  that	  David	  engaged	  in	  on	  behalf	  of	  Israel,	  
Niebuhr	  notes,	  “the	  ark	  of	  the	  covenant	  accompanied	  him,	  guaranteeing,	  as	  it	  were,	  the	  
presence	  and	  help	  of	  the	  God	  of	  his	  fathers	  in	  his	  battles”	  (BT,	  51).	  The	  presence	  of	  the	  ark	  
symbolizes	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  Niebuhr	  puts	  it;	  “all	  men	  are	  men	  of	  God	  in	  their	  warfare.”	  It	  is	  
this	  that	  distinguishes	  them	  from	  animals,	  Niebuhr	  notes.52	  Not	  since	  the	  most	  primitive	  of	  
tribes	  has	  man	  fought	  merely	  for	  existence,	  for	  human	  life	  is	  more	  than	  mere	  existence	  and	  
human	  society	  is	  more	  than	  an	  association	  of	  people.	  Society	  is	  “bound	  to	  the	  past	  and	  is	  
therefore	  a	  sacred	  brotherhood.	  Values	  which	  transcend	  its	  immediate	  existence	  are	  
always	  involved	  in	  its	  conflicts”	  (ibid.,	  52).	  The	  ark	  then,	  is	  a	  symbol	  of	  every	  culture	  
religion:	  religions	  that	  bind	  together	  the	  highest	  values	  of	  their	  devotion	  and	  their	  own	  
existence.	  Primitive	  gods	  were	  tribal	  gods	  but	  the	  deities	  of	  early	  cultures	  and	  civilizations	  
pointed	  beyond	  the	  tribe,	  “symbols	  of	  a	  profound	  and	  disturbing	  reality	  in	  the	  spiritual	  life	  
of	  man.”	  Culture	  gods	  were	  Janus-­‐faced,	  Niebuhr	  notes;	  they	  pointed	  to	  both	  the	  immediate	  
and	  the	  ultimate.	  They	  glorify	  one	  culture’s	  existence	  and,	  pointing	  beyond	  their	  existence,	  
lead	  them	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  their	  culture	  toward	  ultimate	  and	  total	  fulfillment.	  The	  
gods	  of	  culture	  religion	  are	  always	  gods	  of	  battle,	  helping	  them	  gain	  victory	  in	  the	  battle	  
because	  they	  are	  little	  more	  than	  just	  gods	  of	  battle.	  
	   Examples	  that	  attest	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  position	  abound.	  The	  Pax	  Romana	  was	  a	  Roman	  
peace	  based	  on	  Roman	  arms,	  but	  it	  was	  more	  than	  just	  a	  Roman	  peace	  because	  its	  peace	  
benefited	  both	  the	  subjects	  and	  the	  victims	  of	  Rome.	  Social	  peace,	  Rome’s	  god,	  transcended	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Again,	  Niebuhr	  and	  Burke	  are	  remarkably	  similar	  in	  their	  analyses	  of	  these	  themes.	  See,	  
(Burke	  1970).	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Roman	  power.	  “The	  god	  of	  bourgeois	  society	  is	  more	  than	  bourgeois	  society”	  Niebuhr	  
argues;	  he	  is	  “the	  god	  of	  liberty,	  democracy	  and	  fraternity”	  and	  Niebuhr	  notes	  quickly,	  “he	  
is	  also	  the	  god	  of	  battles.”	  Every	  one	  of	  these	  “universal	  values”	  is	  profitable	  and	  necessary	  
for	  bourgeois	  existence	  to	  maintain	  itself,	  and	  every	  one	  of	  them	  is	  also	  in	  “conflict	  with	  
other	  equally	  worthy	  values”	  (ibid.,	  53).	  The	  so-­‐called	  “American	  Dream”	  is	  an	  American	  
god,	  writes	  Niebuhr;	  “yet	  he	  is	  god	  and	  not	  just	  America,	  because	  the	  freedom	  of	  
opportunity	  which	  America	  offered	  the	  class-­‐ridden	  peoples	  of	  Europe,	  when	  America	  was	  
at	  her	  best,	  was	  a	  human	  and	  not	  just	  an	  American	  value.”	  The	  European	  god	  of	  feudalism	  
was	  a	  Christian	  god,	  a	  god	  of	  battles,	  and	  a	  god	  of	  a	  unique	  agrarianism.	  “In	  Spain,”	  Niebuhr	  
notes,	  “they	  are	  still	  doing	  battle	  for	  him;	  and	  they	  call	  their	  war	  a	  war	  for	  ‘Christian	  
civilization.’”	  Suffice	  to	  say,	  the	  god	  of	  a	  culture,	  the	  god	  of	  a	  civilization,	  is	  always	  the	  god	  of	  
the	  ark;	  it	  is	  emblazoned	  on	  shields,	  armor,	  banners,	  and	  the	  undercarriages	  of	  bombers,	  
wherever	  a	  particular	  culture	  or	  way	  of	  life	  faces	  off	  with	  one	  that	  is	  at	  variance	  with	  it.	  
Human	  beings	  who	  develop	  a	  culture,	  i.e.	  a	  life	  that	  involves	  more	  than	  mere	  existence,	  
never	  fight	  well	  if	  “they	  are	  not	  certain	  that	  more	  than	  existence	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  struggle”	  
(ibid.,	  54).	  The	  conclusion	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  god	  of	  the	  ark	  is	  the	  source	  of	  what	  Burke	  calls	  
“motives,”	  and	  what	  in	  modern	  times,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  we	  call	  “morale.”	  
	   If	  religion	  were	  no	  more	  than	  this	  type	  of	  morale-­‐boosting	  culture	  religion,	  and	  
Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  is	  frequently	  is,	  in	  spite	  of	  living	  in	  a	  “Christian	  age,”	  then	  it	  would	  be	  
fair	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  world	  was	  essentially	  polytheistic.	  The	  gods	  of	  a	  culture	  make	  warfare	  
terrible	  because	  they	  endow	  each	  contestant	  with	  a	  certainty	  that	  they	  are	  fighting	  for	  
something	  greater	  than	  themselves;	  a	  certainty	  that	  leads	  to	  righteous	  fury	  and	  cruelty	  
(ibid.).	  Though	  certainty	  exists	  in	  the	  men	  of	  battle,	  there	  is	  nevertheless	  an	  ambiguous	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nature	  in	  the	  culture	  god,	  the	  very	  ambiguity	  of	  which	  creates	  the	  fury	  that	  point	  beyond	  
itself.	  The	  symbol	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  culture	  god	  is	  usually	  attributed	  
with	  giving	  birth	  to	  life;	  the	  culture	  god	  is	  the	  creator	  of	  the	  entire	  world,	  and	  therefore	  not	  
bound	  to	  a	  nation.	  This,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  was	  the	  “achievement	  and	  glory	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  
Prophets.”	  
	   King	  David	  accepted	  the	  prophetic	  interpretation	  of	  God’s	  universalism.	  Niebuhr	  
notes	  that	  when	  David,	  a	  man	  of	  war,	  stopped	  waging	  battles	  and	  settled	  into	  a	  peaceful	  
leadership	  role,	  he	  decided	  to	  replace	  the	  mobile	  tenement	  that	  housed	  Yahweh’s	  presence	  
in	  times	  of	  war,	  with	  a	  permanent	  and	  lasting	  structure.	  And	  here,	  at	  this	  very	  moment,	  
God’s	  character	  seems	  to	  change.	  The	  God	  who	  gave	  David	  battle	  in	  victory	  “stayed	  David’s	  
hand,”	  declaring	  him	  unworthy	  to	  build	  such	  a	  sacred	  monument	  because	  he	  was	  “too	  
deeply	  involved	  in	  the	  conflict	  of	  life	  with	  life”	  (ibid.,	  55).	  Niebuhr	  calls	  attention	  to	  his	  
favorite	  prophet,	  noting	  that	  David’s	  God	  was	  the	  same	  one	  that	  Amos	  spoke	  of,	  who	  says,	  
“Are	  ye	  not	  as	  the	  children	  of	  the	  Ethiopians	  to	  me?”	  This	  is	  the	  God	  of	  whom	  Jesus	  spoke	  
when	  he	  said,	  “Why	  callest	  thou	  me	  good?	  None	  is	  good,	  save	  one,	  that	  is	  God;”	  the	  God	  
“who	  bringeth	  the	  princes	  to	  naught	  and	  maketh	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  world	  as	  vanity”;	  the	  God	  
to	  whom	  the	  nations	  are	  as	  “drop	  in	  the	  bucket;”	  not	  the	  ally	  of	  nations,	  but	  their	  judge	  and	  
their	  redeemer	  (ibid.,	  56).	  
	   This	  presents	  David	  with	  a	  problem,	  various	  solutions	  to	  which	  present	  themselves.	  
David’s	  problem	  is	  how	  can	  a	  man	  involved	  in	  the	  conflicts	  of	  life	  build	  a	  temple	  to	  a	  God	  
who	  transcends	  them?	  The	  first	  solution,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  contains	  a	  certain	  “pathos	  and	  
beauty:”	  David	  said,	  I	  am	  not	  good	  enough,	  but	  let	  my	  son	  “who	  is	  young	  and	  tender”	  build	  
the	  temple;	  let	  it	  be	  built	  by	  “the	  purity	  of	  youth,”	  not	  yet	  involved	  in	  man’s	  sins.	  This,	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Niebuhr	  notes,	  “is	  a	  moral	  solution;”	  “it	  seeks	  to	  find	  some	  one	  good	  enough	  to	  build	  the	  
temple	  of	  God”	  (ibid.).	  In	  modern	  terms,	  it	  is	  a	  sectarian	  solution,	  for	  the	  sectarian	  church	  
protests	  against	  the	  orthodox	  church	  that	  it	  is	  not	  worthy	  to	  belong	  to	  it.	  The	  sect	  wants	  to	  
build	  a	  new	  church	  with	  regenerated	  members,	  members	  who	  are	  pure	  and	  holy.	  The	  
symbol	  of	  the	  error	  in	  this	  solution,	  Niebuhr	  points	  out,	  is	  a	  perfect	  one.	  Solomon	  is	  indeed	  
allowed	  to	  build	  the	  temple,	  but	  he	  isn’t	  really	  better	  than	  David;	  though	  “young	  and	  
tender,”	  as	  David	  describes	  him,	  he	  is	  not	  so	  tender	  when	  he	  no	  longer	  so	  young.	  Rebels	  
would	  soon	  protest	  to	  Rehoboam,	  Solomon’s	  son,	  “Your	  father’s	  yoke	  was	  grievous!”	  
Solomon	  heavily	  taxed	  Israel,	  in	  order	  to	  proudly	  impress	  the	  Queen	  of	  Sheba,	  and	  Niebuhr	  
adds,	  as	  if	  an	  Old	  Testament	  prophet	  himself,	  the	  unsubstantiated	  condemnation,	  “One	  has	  
the	  uneasy	  feeling	  that	  the	  very	  building	  of	  the	  temple	  may	  have	  added	  to	  the	  tax	  burden”	  
(ibid.,	  57).	  Niebuhr’s	  prophetic	  pronouncement	  on	  the	  long	  dead	  Solomon	  is	  not	  without	  
purpose,	  for	  it	  is	  this	  pronouncement	  that	  leads	  Niebuhr	  to	  declare	  that	  the	  extravagant	  
building	  programs	  of	  our	  own	  civilization	  are	  having	  the	  same	  effects;	  grand	  opera	  houses	  
in	  metropolitan	  centers,	  which	  support	  fine	  art	  and	  high	  culture,	  are	  the	  proud	  gifts	  of	  
plutocrats	  who	  sit	  in	  the	  “diamond	  horseshoe.”	  These	  “toys	  and	  playthings,”	  even	  the	  less	  
entertaining	  ones,	  such	  as	  universities,	  have	  “a	  disquieting	  relation	  to	  economic	  injustice,	  
as	  their	  endowments	  are	  gathered	  from	  the	  crumbs	  fallen	  from	  the	  rich’s	  tables	  (ibid.,	  58).	  
It	  remains	  a	  task,	  even	  today,	  for	  civilizations	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  too	  intimate	  
relationship	  between	  culture	  and	  social	  injustice.	  
	   The	  lesson	  of	  Solomon’s	  injustice,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  is	  of	  special	  importance	  for	  
America,	  a	  country	  who,	  like	  Solomon,	  achieved	  its	  acclaim	  and	  power	  with	  little	  effort,	  
making	  it	  easy	  to	  forget	  the	  imperial	  impulse	  that	  came	  before	  it’s	  majesty.	  David’s	  sword	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provided	  Solomon’s	  peace	  just	  as	  America’s	  conquest	  of	  Oregon,	  California	  and	  Texas	  
preceded	  its	  rise	  to	  global	  power.	  More	  importantly,	  David’s	  regime	  expressed	  its	  conflicts	  
openly,	  while	  Solomon’s	  had	  to	  express	  it	  covertly,	  just	  as	  America’s	  imperial	  impulse	  and	  
national	  egotism	  is	  now	  veiled	  in	  rhetorical	  rationalizations.	  When	  America	  conquered	  the	  
West	  it	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  to	  do	  so	  and	  that	  was	  that.	  When	  America	  
conquers	  Iraq,	  it	  does	  it,	  not	  because	  it	  is	  in	  America’s	  best	  interest,	  but	  because	  America	  
loves	  democracy.	  The	  conclusion	  is	  simply	  this:	  Solomon’s	  reign,	  though	  less	  overt	  about	  its	  
savageness,	  was	  no	  less	  savage,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  extricate	  ourselves	  from	  the	  warfare	  
of	  human	  existence	  and	  the	  conflicts	  of	  political	  power.	  
	   Niebuhr	  argues	  that	  the	  real	  builder	  of	  the	  temple	  wasn’t	  Solomon’s	  goodness,	  but	  
David’s	  uneasy	  conscience	  (ibid.,	  60).	  The	  church,	  he	  argues,	  isn’t	  created	  by	  the	  
righteousness	  of	  the	  Pharisee	  but	  by	  the	  “contrition	  of	  the	  publican.”	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
temple	  wasn’t	  the	  achievement	  of	  pure	  goodness	  but	  the	  “recognition	  of	  the	  sinfulness	  of	  
all	  human	  goodness.”	  That	  this	  contrition	  is	  the	  fruit	  of	  faith	  in	  a	  transcendent	  Goodness,	  is	  
expressed	  in	  David’s	  prayer:	  “Thine	  is	  the	  majesty	  and	  the	  power	  and	  the	  victory;	  we	  are	  
but	  sojourners	  and	  strangers—we	  are	  as	  a	  shadow	  that	  declineth”	  (ibid.).	  Here,	  Niebuhr	  
argues,	  is	  the	  confession	  of	  one’s	  creatureliness	  before	  God,	  a	  confession	  of	  the	  “vanity	  of	  all	  
human	  victories”	  that	  must	  be	  a	  part	  of	  every	  temple	  that	  isn’t	  merely	  the	  “sanctification	  of	  
human	  ideals.”	  The	  temple	  or	  church	  is	  a	  congregation	  of	  people	  who,	  ideally,	  feel	  God	  
speak	  to	  them	  and	  who	  answer	  with	  the	  words	  of	  Job:	  “I	  have	  uttered	  things	  too	  wonderful	  
for	  me,	  which	  I	  understood	  not.	  Wherefore	  I	  abhor	  myself	  and	  repent	  in	  dust	  and	  ashes”	  
(ibid.,	  61).	  This	  contrition	  is	  the	  human	  foundation	  of	  the	  church.	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   The	  completion	  of	  the	  church	  requires	  more	  than	  human	  contrition,	  however;	  it	  
demands	  completion,	  which	  comes	  from	  God’s	  grace.	  Niebuhr	  points	  out,	  once	  again,	  the	  
words	  God	  spoke	  to	  David:	  “Since	  it	  was	  in	  thine	  heart	  [to	  build	  the	  temple]	  thou	  dost	  well	  
that	  it	  was	  in	  thine	  heart”	  (ibid.).	  Man,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  is	  limited	  in	  time	  and	  place	  and	  thus,	  
all	  of	  his	  ideals	  are	  tainted	  with	  his	  limited	  interests;	  “He	  follows	  the	  ark	  of	  his	  own	  ideals.”	  
Yet	  this	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story;	  if	  it	  were,	  man	  would	  be	  a	  pitiful	  and	  tragic	  creature	  
alone.	  God	  takes	  him	  beyond	  tragedy	  because	  God	  speaks	  to	  him,	  allowing	  him	  to	  see	  “the	  
possibility	  of	  a	  truth	  which	  is	  more	  than	  his	  truth	  and	  of	  a	  goodness	  which	  is	  more	  than	  his	  
goodness.”	  Niebuhr	  writes:	  “He	  contemplates	  the	  eternal	  but	  he	  cannot	  name	  it.	  When	  he	  
names	  it	  he	  gives	  it	  a	  name	  which	  introduces,	  again,	  his	  own	  finite	  perspectives.	  He	  cannot	  
even	  worship	  the	  Christ	  without	  drawing	  images	  of	  him	  which	  make	  it	  appear	  that	  Christ	  is	  
his	  own	  peculiar	  possession”	  (ibid.).	  Regarding	  the	  latter,	  we	  could	  add	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  
sentiment	  the	  images	  of	  America’s	  Christ	  always	  portray	  him	  as	  a	  white	  Anglo-­‐Saxon,	  not	  
the	  middle-­‐eastern	  who	  fits	  the	  racial	  profile	  of	  Islamic	  terrorists.	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  
Ignatius	  Loyola	  was	  a	  warrior	  and	  a	  monk	  and	  his	  Christ	  was	  a	  warrior	  and	  a	  monk	  as	  well.	  
Francis	  of	  Assisi	  was	  a	  pure	  ascetic	  and	  his	  Christ	  was	  a	  pure	  monk.	  Gregory	  VII	  was	  a	  
Caesar	  and	  a	  pope,	  and	  his	  Christ	  was	  half	  Caesar	  and	  half	  pope.	  Yet	  each	  one	  of	  them	  was	  
also	  disturbed	  at	  times	  by	  their	  eternal	  vision	  that	  the	  true	  Christ	  was	  more	  than	  just	  their	  
own.	  In	  this	  sense	  then,	  the	  church	  is	  a	  place	  where	  men	  are	  “disturbed	  by	  the	  word	  of	  the	  
eternal	  God,	  which	  stands	  as	  a	  judgment	  upon	  human	  aspirations”	  (ibid.,	  62).	  But	  it	  is	  more	  
than	  that;	  for	  it	  is	  also	  a	  place	  “where	  the	  word	  of	  mercy,	  reconciliation	  and	  consolation	  is	  
heard.”	  It	  is	  not	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God;	  it	  is	  the	  place	  in	  a	  society	  where	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God	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impinges	  on	  all	  human	  achievements	  with	  divine	  judgments	  and	  where	  the	  grace	  of	  God	  is	  
made	  available	  to	  everyone	  who	  accepts	  those	  judgments.	  
	   The	  last	  significant	  fact	  regarding	  the	  building	  of	  the	  temple,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  
is	  that	  the	  ark	  was	  placed	  inside	  of	  it.	  The	  ark,	  the	  symbol	  of	  the	  God	  of	  battles,	  rests	  inside	  
of	  a	  temple	  built	  to	  the	  God	  of	  peace	  who	  condemned	  David’s	  involvement	  in	  war.	  The	  God	  
of	  the	  temple	  transcends	  the	  God	  of	  battles	  and	  encapsulates	  him,	  yet	  he	  does	  not	  destroy	  
or	  negate	  his	  authority	  altogether.	  This	  is	  where	  David’s	  culture	  religion	  and	  prophetic	  
religion	  part,	  for	  the	  prophet’s	  were	  more	  rigorous	  than	  the	  priests.	  The	  prophets,	  Niebuhr	  
notes,	  spoke	  an	  eternal	  “no”	  to	  all	  human	  pretensions.	  The	  prophets	  would	  not	  place	  the	  
ark	  in	  the	  temple.	  The	  priests	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  appreciated	  what	  pointed	  to	  the	  eternal	  in	  
human	  values;	  they	  were	  the	  poets	  who	  comprehended	  “the	  meaning	  of	  human	  activities	  in	  
the	  light	  of	  the	  eternal	  purpose”	  (ibid.,	  63).	  From	  the	  prophet’s	  perspective,	  human	  
pretensions	  point	  toward	  sin;	  while	  from	  the	  priest’s	  perspective,	  they	  point	  toward	  
approximations	  of	  the	  will	  of	  God.	  The	  prophet	  says,	  “whoso	  loveth	  the	  father	  and	  mother”	  
more	  than	  God	  “is	  not	  worthy”	  of	  God;	  the	  priest	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  gives	  family	  life	  a	  
sacramental	  character,	  noting	  the	  love	  between	  family	  members	  as	  a	  sign	  and	  token	  of	  
God’s	  perfect	  love.	  Regarding	  national	  and	  cultural	  loyalties,	  Niebuhr	  notes	  that	  the	  priest	  
never	  condemns	  a	  man’s	  love	  for	  his	  country.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  man’s	  love	  for	  his	  
country	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  usurpation	  of	  God	  by	  nationalism,	  making	  the	  nation	  the	  center	  and	  
source	  of	  ultimate	  meaning,	  the	  priest	  sees	  loyalty	  and	  devotion	  to	  a	  cause	  greater	  than	  
oneself	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  for	  man	  do	  give	  the	  same	  loyalty	  to	  a	  God	  who	  is	  
greater	  than	  man.	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There	  is	  no	  way	  of	  achieving	  a	  perfect	  balance	  between	  the	  priestly	  and	  prophetic	  
voices,	  between	  the	  faith	  that	  incorporates	  the	  ark	  into	  the	  temple	  and	  the	  one	  that	  regards	  
the	  ark	  as	  the	  devil.	  Human	  actions	  are	  characteristically	  ambiguous,	  making	  such	  a	  
balance	  impossible.	  But	  on	  the	  whole,	  Niebuhr	  points	  out	  that	  priestly	  religion	  is	  much	  
more	  dangerous	  than	  prophetic	  religion,	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  once	  the	  ark	  is	  in	  the	  temple,	  
the	  aura	  and	  majesty	  of	  the	  temple	  expand	  and	  enhance	  the	  proportions	  of	  the	  ark.	  This,	  
Niebuhr	  concludes,	  is	  usually	  how	  the	  Christian	  church	  functions.	  It	  is	  a	  temple	  with	  an	  ark.	  
One	  needs	  to	  look	  no	  further	  than	  the	  national	  flags	  that	  hang	  in	  its	  sanctuaries,	  for	  
evidence	  of	  it,	  though	  it	  is	  always	  there	  in	  reality,	  even	  if	  the	  symbols	  aren’t.	  “Many	  a	  
church	  is	  more	  devoted	  to	  the	  characteristic	  ideals	  of	  its	  national	  life,”	  argues	  Niebuhr,	  
‘than	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  God	  in	  the	  light	  of	  which	  these	  ideals	  are	  seen	  in	  their	  pettiness	  and	  
sinfulness”	  (ibid.,	  64-­‐5).	  For	  this	  reason,	  Niebuhr	  concludes,	  “the	  word	  of	  the	  prophet	  must	  
always	  be	  heard.”	  The	  prophet,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  “an	  iconoclast	  who	  throws	  all	  
symbols	  of	  human	  goodness	  out	  of	  the	  temple.	  Only	  the	  word	  of	  the	  eternal	  God	  must	  be	  
heard	  in	  the	  temple,	  a	  word	  of	  judgment	  upon	  human	  sin	  and	  of	  mercy	  for	  sinners.”	  
	   However,	  the	  prophet’s	  words	  are	  characteristically	  “unambiguous”	  and	  this	  may	  do	  
injustice	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  human	  enterprise,	  if	  it	  is	  nothing	  else,	  is	  ambiguous.	  This	  
ambiguity,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  may	  be	  the	  source	  of	  dishonesty	  and	  pretension,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  the	  
source	  of	  all	  genuine	  creativity	  in	  human	  history.	  The	  god	  of	  the	  ark	  is	  never	  purely	  the	  
devil,	  just	  as	  human	  goodness	  is	  never	  purely	  pretension	  and	  egoism	  (ibid.,	  65).	  Man’s	  
reaching	  beyond	  himself	  for	  that	  which	  he	  cannot	  obtain—for	  perfection,	  ideals,	  utopias—
is	  the	  root	  of	  all	  sin	  and	  the	  proof	  of	  his	  destiny	  as	  a	  child	  of	  God.	  Niebuhr	  summarizes:	  “His	  
imagination	  is	  quickened	  by	  the	  vision	  of	  an	  eternal	  good.	  Following	  that	  vision,	  he	  is	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constantly	  involved	  both	  in	  the	  sin	  of	  giving	  a	  spurious	  sanctity	  to	  his	  imperfect	  good	  and	  in	  
the	  genuine	  creativity	  of	  seeking	  a	  higher	  good	  than	  he	  possesses”	  (ibid.).	  The	  conclusion	  is	  
this:	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  prophets	  say,	  there	  will	  always	  be	  King	  Davids;	  “nor	  could	  history	  
exist	  without	  them,”	  for	  they	  are	  “actually	  the	  authors	  of	  all	  human	  enterprise”	  (ibid.)	  Many	  
a	  King	  David	  lacks	  King	  David’s	  uneasy	  conscience,	  Niebuhr	  notes,	  and	  their	  religion	  never	  
transcends	  their	  devotion	  to	  the	  ark.	  “But	  even	  those	  who	  hear	  the	  word	  of	  the	  Eternal	  and	  
in	  moments	  of	  high	  insight	  confess	  ‘we	  are	  but	  sojourners	  and	  strangers—we	  are	  as	  a	  
shadow	  that	  declineth’	  cannot	  for	  that	  reason	  cease	  from	  performing	  the	  tasks	  of	  today	  and	  
tomorrow”	  (ibid.,	  65-­‐66).	  It	  is	  significant,	  Niebuhr	  concludes,	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  America’s	  
simple	  religion	  of	  the	  ark,	  it	  has	  had	  one	  statesman	  who	  understood	  exactly	  what	  David	  
was	  going	  through.	  
	   Lincoln,	  according	  to	  Niebuhr’s	  estimation,	  was	  devoted	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  abolition	  
of	  slavery	  and	  to	  the	  Union,	  though	  the	  latter	  was	  his	  ultimate	  priority.	  When	  Lincoln	  spoke	  
about	  these	  two	  divergent	  ideals,	  he	  said,	  “Both	  read	  the	  same	  Bible	  and	  pray	  to	  the	  same	  
God,	  and	  each	  invokes	  his	  aid	  against	  the	  other.	  The	  prayers	  of	  both	  could	  not	  be	  answered”	  
(ibid.).	  In	  this	  passage,	  Niebuhr	  finds	  the	  articulation	  of	  God’s	  will	  as	  a	  transcendent	  one;	  
one	  that	  surpasses	  the	  ideals	  of	  both	  the	  North	  and	  the	  South.	  Niebuhr,	  who	  had	  a	  pension	  
for	  quoting	  secular	  poetry	  in	  his	  sermons,	  borrows	  the	  lyrics	  of	  Stephen	  Vincent	  Benet	  to	  
lean	  on:	  
They	  come	  to	  me	  and	  talk	  about	  God’s	  will	  
In	  righteous	  deputations	  and	  platoons,	  
Day	  after	  day,	  laymen	  and	  ministers.	  
They	  write	  me	  Prayers	  From	  Twenty	  Million	  Souls	  
Defining	  me	  God’s	  will	  and	  Horace	  Greeley’s.	  
God’s	  will	  is	  General	  This	  and	  Senator	  That,	  
God’s	  will	  is	  those	  poor	  coloured	  fellows’	  will,	  
It	  is	  the	  will	  of	  the	  Chicago	  churches,	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It	  is	  this	  man’s	  and	  his	  worst	  enemy’s.	  
But	  all	  of	  them	  are	  sure	  they	  know	  God’s	  will.	  
I	  am	  the	  only	  man	  who	  does	  not	  know	  it.	  
	  
And,	  yet,	  if	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  God	  
Should,	  and	  so	  very	  clearly,	  state	  his	  will	  
To	  others,	  on	  a	  point	  of	  my	  own	  duty,	  
It	  might	  be	  thought	  He	  would	  reveal	  it	  to	  me	  
Directly,	  more	  especially	  as	  I	  
So	  earnestly	  desire	  to	  know	  His	  will.53	  
	  
Such	  an	  uneasy	  conscience	  can	  be	  paralyzing,	  but	  Niebuhr	  is	  quick	  to	  note	  that	  this	  was	  not	  
the	  effect	  it	  had	  on	  Lincoln.	  Lincoln	  wasn’t	  deterred	  from	  making	  “moral	  judgments	  
according	  to	  his	  best	  insight.”	  
Lincoln	  continues	  in	  his	  Second	  Inaugural:	  “It	  may	  seem	  strange	  that	  men	  should	  
ask	  the	  assistance	  of	  a	  just	  God	  in	  wringing	  their	  bread	  from	  other	  men’s	  toil.”	  Niebuhr	  calls	  
this	  statement	  “a	  purely	  moral	  judgment	  and	  a	  necessary	  one”	  (BT,	  67).	  Here,	  we	  find	  
Niebuhr’s	  insistence	  that	  we	  not	  let	  the	  complexity	  and	  ambiguity	  of	  all	  human	  values,	  nor	  
the	  subjectivity	  of	  our	  own	  interests,	  nor	  the	  humility	  and	  love	  of	  a	  Christian	  attitude,	  get	  in	  
the	  way	  of	  our	  ability	  to	  make	  moral	  and	  political	  judgments	  about	  what	  is	  right	  and	  what	  
is	  wrong.	  “No	  nation	  is	  free	  of	  the	  sin	  of	  pride,”	  Niebuhr	  writes,	  just	  as	  no	  individual	  is	  free	  
of	  it”	  (NDMI,	  219).	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  those	  nations,	  like	  Nazi	  
Germany,	  that	  censored	  the	  prophetic	  voice	  of	  national	  self-­‐transcendence,	  and	  those,	  like	  
the	  U.S.,	  that	  do	  not.	  What	  makes	  a	  nation	  a	  “Christian	  nation,”	  according	  to	  Niebuhr,	  is	  not	  
that	  it	  embodies	  the	  principles	  of	  Christianity	  perfectly,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  “still	  receptive	  to	  
prophetic	  words	  of	  judgment	  spoken	  against	  the	  nation”	  (ibid.).	  It	  may	  be	  that	  only	  a	  
“prophetic	  minority”	  really	  feels	  the	  judgment	  spoken	  against	  the	  nation	  keenly,	  but	  “there	  
is	  a	  genuine	  difference	  between	  nations	  which	  do	  not	  officially	  destroy	  the	  religious-­‐
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  (Benét	  1928)	  
	   267	  
prophetic	  judgment	  against	  the	  nation	  and	  those	  which	  do.”	  Every	  nation	  may	  be	  guilty	  of	  
pride	  and	  egotism	  but	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  recognize	  differences	  in	  degree.	  It	  is	  just	  as	  
important,	  Niebuhr	  argues,	  “to	  recognize	  differences	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  pride	  and	  self-­‐will	  
expressed	  by	  men	  and	  nations,	  as	  it	  is	  to	  know	  that	  all	  men	  and	  nations	  are	  sinful	  in	  the	  
sight	  of	  God.”	  	  
Lincoln’s	  pronouncement	  of	  a	  moral	  and	  necessary	  judgment	  represents	  a	  devotion	  
to	  the	  highest	  moral	  ideal	  we	  know,	  which	  in	  this	  case	  was	  the	  ideal	  of	  freedom	  for	  all	  men.	  
However,	  this	  statement	  alone	  wouldn’t	  set	  Lincoln	  apart	  from	  his	  predecessors	  nor	  his	  
successors.	  A	  Niebuhrian	  rhetoric	  is	  not	  a	  rhetoric	  that	  says,	  “I’m	  conflicted	  about	  which	  
tragic	  choice	  to	  make;	  that	  said,	  I	  think	  the	  South	  is	  acting	  immorally.”	  Niebuhrian	  rhetoric	  
goes	  one	  step	  further	  and	  returns	  immediately	  to	  another	  level,	  as	  Lincoln	  does:	  “But	  let	  us	  
judge	  not	  that	  we	  be	  not	  judged”	  (BT,	  67).	  Niebuhr	  sums	  up	  his	  evaluation	  of	  Lincoln’s	  
rhetoric:	  
One	  could	  scarcely	  find	  a	  better	  example	  of	  a	  consummate	  interweaving	  of	  moral	  
idealism	  and	  a	  religious	  recognition	  of	  the	  imperfection	  of	  all	  human	  ideals.	  It	  is	  out	  
of	  such	  a	  moral	  and	  religious	  life	  that	  the	  moving	  generosity	  is	  born	  which	  Lincoln	  
expressed	  in	  the	  words,	  “With	  malice	  toward	  none,	  with	  charity	  toward	  all,	  let	  us	  
strive	  to	  finish	  the	  work	  we	  are	  in.”	  This	  is	  a	  religion	  in	  which	  the	  ark	  has	  not	  been	  
removed	  from	  the	  temple,	  but	  in	  which	  the	  temple	  is	  more	  than	  the	  ark.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
Niebuhr	  concludes	  that,	  though	  the	  church	  rarely	  balances	  the	  ark	  and	  the	  temple	  as	  well	  
as	  this,	  the	  examples	  of	  David	  and	  Lincoln	  reveal,	  much	  like	  God’s	  incarnation	  in	  Christ	  
revealed	  the	  possibilities	  for	  perfect	  love	  on	  this	  earth,	  the	  possibilities	  of	  a	  noble	  rhetoric	  
that	  is	  in	  this	  world,	  but	  not	  of	  it.	  A	  rhetoric	  that	  pays	  attention	  to	  appearances	  and	  makes	  
moral	  judgments	  that	  are	  contingent	  and	  thus,	  necessarily	  tragic;	  yet	  a	  rhetoric	  that	  looks	  
beyond	  appearances,	  to	  the	  things	  they	  point	  to.	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This	  is	  the	  noble	  rhetoric	  that	  Aristotle	  dreamed	  of,	  according	  to	  Farrell.	  It	  is	  a	  
rhetoric	  “that	  is	  more	  than	  the	  product,	  more	  even	  than	  the	  practice;	  it	  is	  the	  entire	  process	  
of	  forming,	  expressing,	  and	  judging	  public	  thought	  in	  real	  life”	  (1993,	  320).	  Rhetoric	  such	  as	  
Lincoln’s	  comes	  from	  distinctively	  Christian	  attitudes—those	  transvalued	  values	  that	  
Nietzsche	  argued	  destroy	  culture:	  humility,	  mercy	  and	  love.	  Not	  only	  are	  the	  Christian	  
socio-­‐moral	  insights	  required,	  but	  so	  too,	  are	  the	  prophetic	  ones:	  the	  capacity	  for	  judgment	  
and	  the	  vision	  required	  to	  imagine	  a	  future	  that	  is	  beyond	  tragedy.	  Farrell	  writes:	  
We	  may	  regret	  the	  past	  that	  cannot	  be	  changed.	  We	  may	  suspect	  the	  proposals	  of	  
those	  who	  inhabit	  our	  present	  day.	  But	  the	  very	  continuity	  of	  the	  human	  project	  
requires	  something	  more.	  It	  requires,	  Hannah	  Arendt	  reminds	  us,	  the	  mood	  and	  the	  
emotional	  capacity	  for	  forgiveness.	  It	  also	  requires,	  as	  Walter	  Benjamin	  notes,	  the	  
rejuvenating	  capacity	  to	  wish.	  Here	  are	  his	  words:	  “A	  wish…	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  experience.	  
The	  earlier	  in	  life	  one	  makes	  a	  wish,	  the	  greater	  one’s	  chances	  that	  it	  will	  be	  fulfilled.	  
The	  further	  a	  wish	  reaches	  in	  time,	  the	  greater	  the	  hopes	  for	  its	  fulfillment.	  But	  it	  is	  
experience	  that	  accompanies	  one	  to	  the	  far	  reaches	  of	  time,	  that	  fills	  and	  divides	  
time.	  Thus	  a	  wish	  fulfilled	  is	  the	  crowing	  of	  experience.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
This	  is	  the	  summation	  of	  a	  rhetoric	  that	  maintains	  the	  balance	  between	  priest	  and	  
prophetic.	  It	  is	  a	  rhetoric	  that	  Niebuhr	  articulated	  himself,	  and	  it	  is	  one	  he	  intuitively	  
formulated	  in	  his	  reflections	  on	  pulpit	  oratory.	  
It	  is	  the	  Christian	  rhetoric	  of	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.,	  partially	  inspired	  from	  his	  
readings	  of	  Niebuhr,	  and	  woven	  into	  much	  of	  his	  public	  discourse.	  Niebuhr’s	  Christian	  
calling,	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  pastor’s	  priestly	  and	  prophetic	  tasks,	  was	  woven	  into	  his	  
last	  speech,	  delivered	  on	  the	  final	  evening	  of	  his	  life:	  
And	  you	  know	  what’s	  beautiful	  to	  me,	  is	  to	  see	  all	  of	  these	  ministers	  of	  the	  Gospel.	  
It’s	  a	  marvelous	  picture.	  Who	  is	  it	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  articulate	  the	  longings	  and	  
aspirations	  of	  the	  people	  more	  than	  the	  preacher?	  Somehow	  the	  preacher	  must	  be	  
an	  Amos,	  and	  say,	  “Let	  justice	  roll	  down	  like	  waters	  and	  righteousness	  like	  a	  mighty	  
stream.”	  Somehow,	  the	  preacher	  must	  say	  with	  Jesus,	  “The	  spirit	  of	  the	  Lord	  is	  upon	  
me,	  because	  he	  hath	  anointed	  me	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  poor.”	  (1992)	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As	  King	  addressed	  these	  preachers,	  he	  articulates	  Niebuhr’s	  realism,	  Niebuhr’s	  concerted	  
attention	  to	  appearances	  that	  demand,	  not	  only	  mythic	  symbols	  but	  moral	  judgments	  about	  
pressing	  matters:	  
It’s	  all	  right	  to	  talk	  about	  “long	  white	  robes	  over	  yonder,”	  in	  all	  of	  its	  symbolism.	  But	  
ultimately	  people	  want	  some	  suits	  and	  dresses	  and	  shoes	  to	  wear	  down	  here.	  It’s	  all	  
right	  to	  talk	  about	  “streets	  flowing	  with	  milk	  and	  honey,”	  but	  God	  has	  commanded	  
us	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  the	  slums	  down	  here,	  and	  his	  children	  who	  can’t	  eat	  three	  
square	  meals	  a	  day.	  It’s	  all	  right	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  new	  Jerusalem,	  but	  one	  day,	  God’	  
preacher	  must	  talk	  about	  the	  New	  York,	  the	  new	  Atlanta,	  the	  new	  Philadelphia,	  the	  
new	  Los	  Angeles,	  the	  new	  Memphis,	  Tennessee.	  This	  is	  what	  we	  have	  to	  do.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
Though	  King	  often	  articulated	  the	  prophetic	  quality	  of	  rhetorical	  aspiration,	  it	  is	  most	  
prevalently	  a	  Niebuhrian	  brand	  of	  aspiration	  in	  his	  speech	  titled	  “Where	  Do	  We	  Go	  From	  
Here.”	  King’s	  final	  remarks	  are	  an	  aesthetic	  reconfiguration	  of	  appearances—realistic	  in	  
their	  analysis	  of	  actuality	  and	  thus,	  tragic;	  yet	  poetic	  and	  mythic	  in	  their	  reconfiguration	  
and	  thus,	  beyond	  tragedy;	  Christian	  in	  their	  concern	  for	  the	  only	  ideals	  that	  matter:	  justice	  
and	  love.	  Kings	  speaks	  realistically:	  “I	  must	  confess,	  my	  friends,	  the	  road	  ahead	  will	  not	  
always	  be	  smooth.	  There	  will	  be	  still	  be	  rocky	  places	  of	  frustration	  and	  meandering	  points	  
of	  bewilderment…	  Our	  dreams	  will	  sometimes	  be	  shattered	  and	  our	  ethereal	  hopes	  blasted.”	  
King	  offers	  a	  doxology	  of	  hope	  from	  the	  words	  of	  a	  freedom	  fighter’s	  song,	  moving	  beyond	  
tragedy,	  for	  as	  “Difficult	  and	  painful	  as	  it	  is,	  we	  must	  walk	  on	  in	  the	  days	  ahead	  with	  an	  
audacious	  faith	  in	  the	  future.”	  But	  why?	  What	  reason	  would	  King’s	  audience	  have	  for	  
thinking	  the	  future	  will	  be	  different	  than	  the	  past?	  King	  answers:	  
When	  our	  days	  become	  dreary	  with	  low-­‐hovering	  clouds	  of	  despair,	  and	  when	  our	  
nights	  become	  darker	  than	  a	  thousand	  midnights,	  let	  us	  remember	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
creative	  force	  in	  this	  universe,	  working	  to	  pull	  down	  the	  gigantic	  mountains	  of	  evil,	  a	  
power	  that	  is	  able	  to	  make	  a	  way	  out	  of	  no	  way	  and	  transform	  dark	  yesterdays	  into	  
bright	  tomorrows.	  Let	  us	  realize	  the	  arc	  of	  the	  moral	  universe	  is	  long	  but	  it	  bends	  
toward	  justice.	  Let	  us	  realize	  that	  William	  Cullen	  Bryant	  is	  right:	  “Truth	  crushed	  to	  
earth	  with	  rise	  again.”	  Let	  us	  go	  out	  realizing	  that	  the	  Bible	  is	  right:	  “Be	  not	  deceived,	  
God	  is	  not	  mocked.	  Whatsoever	  a	  man	  soweth,	  that	  shall	  he	  also	  reap.”	  This	  is	  for	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hope	  for	  the	  future,	  and	  with	  this	  faith	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  sing	  in	  some	  not	  too	  distant	  
tomorrow	  with	  a	  cosmic	  past	  tense,	  “We	  have	  overcome,	  we	  have	  overcome,	  deep	  in	  
my	  heart,	  I	  did	  believe	  we	  would	  overcome.”	  (ibid.)	  
	  
This,	  then,	  is	  the	  uniquely	  Christian	  aspect	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric:	  a	  Christian	  ethics	  
of	  rhetoric	  moves	  us	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  rhetoric,	  itself	  a	  realm	  of	  tragic	  choices	  between	  
competing	  goods,	  beyond	  tragedy,	  in	  the	  hope	  and	  faith	  that	  the	  arc	  of	  the	  moral	  universe	  
swings	  toward	  justice.	  Only	  rhetoric	  is	  able	  is	  to	  articulate	  this	  faith,	  for	  it	  is	  always	  a	  
culture’s	  faith	  and	  thus,	  it	  depends	  on	  a	  group	  of	  like-­‐minded	  individuals.	  The	  church,	  a	  
brotherhood	  of	  civic	  friendship,	  is	  the	  rhetorical	  culture	  Aristotle	  envisioned	  and	  it	  is	  
responsible	  for	  some	  of	  our	  noblest	  rhetorics.	  
Broadway	  and	  120th	  Street,	  now	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr	  Place,	  was	  the	  sight	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  
office	  in	  New	  York.	  Though	  he	  met	  with	  students	  personally	  at	  this	  office,	  the	  magic	  
happened	  just	  down	  the	  road	  in	  his	  sixth	  floor	  apartment	  on	  Claremont	  Avenue,	  across	  the	  
street	  from	  the	  seminary.	  Every	  week,	  fifty	  students	  would	  crowd	  into	  Niebuhr’s	  home	  for	  
informal	  discussions,	  doughnuts	  and	  beer.	  It	  was	  mostly	  “Reinhold’s	  show”	  since	  most	  of	  
the	  students	  just	  “wanted	  him	  to	  talk”	  (Brown	  1992,	  66).	  These	  evening	  gatherings	  gave	  
rise	  to	  a	  student	  song,	  sang	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  “When	  the	  Roll	  Is	  Called	  up	  Yonder”—a	  tune	  I	  
grew	  up	  singing	  myself:	  
When	  it’s	  eight	  o’clock	  on	  Thursday	  night	  
and	  books	  become	  a	  bore	  
Then	  we’ll	  leave	  our	  desks	  and	  climb	  the	  golden	  stair	  
We	  will	  gather	  at	  the	  master’s	  feet	  
	   a-­‐sitting	  on	  the	  floor.	  
When	  the	  beer	  is	  served	  at	  Reinie’s	  place,	  we’ll	  be	  there.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
It’s	  a	  scene	  from	  a	  Platonic	  dialogue;	  and	  so	  it	  is	  not	  without	  coincidence	  that	  they	  often	  
began	  that	  way,	  for	  as	  one	  student	  recalls,	  “Niebuhr	  often	  began	  responding	  to	  something	  
said	  by	  saying,	  ‘It	  isn’t	  as	  simple	  as	  that.’”	  With	  this,	  Niebuhr	  passed	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	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rhetoric	  to	  his	  students,	  embodying	  what	  his	  arch-­‐nemesis,	  John	  Dewey,	  would	  say	  of	  the	  
ideal	  teacher—Niebuhr’s	  “pedagogical-­‐technician”:	  "I	  believe	  that	  every	  teacher	  should	  
realize	  the	  dignity	  of	  his	  calling;	  that	  he	  is	  a	  social	  servant	  set	  apart	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  
proper	  social	  order	  and	  the	  securing	  of	  the	  right	  social	  growth.	  I	  believe	  that	  in	  this	  way	  the	  
teacher	  always	  is	  the	  prophet	  of	  the	  true	  God	  and	  the	  ushered	  of	  the	  true	  kingdom	  of	  God"	  
(Dewey,	  Hickman,	  and	  Alexander	  1998).	  
We’ve	  seen	  that	  a	  rhetorical	  culture’s	  ethics	  are	  articulated,	  adjusted,	  and	  amended	  
in	  its	  civic	  discourse.	  Niebuhr	  understood	  this	  fact.	  He	  paid	  attention,	  not	  just	  to	  what	  was	  
said,	  but	  to	  how	  things	  were	  said,	  i.e.	  were	  they	  qualified	  repeatedly,	  spoken	  in	  humility	  
and	  toleration.	  What	  we’ve	  drawn	  from	  Niebuhr’s	  works	  in	  this	  study,	  brings	  new	  life	  to	  a	  
timeless	  Niebuhrian	  aphorism:	  
Nothing	  that	  is	  worth	  doing	  can	  be	  achieved	  in	  our	  lifetime;	  therefore	  we	  must	  be	  
saved	  by	  hope.	  Nothing	  which	  is	  true	  or	  beautiful	  or	  good	  makes	  complete	  sense	  in	  
any	  immediate	  context	  of	  history;	  therefore	  we	  must	  be	  saved	  by	  faith.	  Nothing	  we	  
do,	  however	  virtuous,	  can	  be	  accomplished	  alone;	  therefore	  we	  must	  be	  saved	  by	  
love.	  No	  virtuous	  act	  is	  quite	  as	  virtuous	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  our	  friend	  or	  foe	  as	  
it	  is	  from	  our	  standpoint.	  Therefore	  we	  must	  be	  saved	  by	  the	  final	  form	  of	  love	  
which	  is	  forgiveness.	  (IAM,	  66)	  
	  
Our	  evaluation	  of	  his	  Christian	  ethics	  of	  rhetoric,	  also	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  many	  summations	  
of	  Niebuhr’s	  life.	  The	  eulogies	  given	  for	  Niebuhr	  are	  so	  beautiful	  and	  poetic,	  delivered	  by	  
such	  notorious	  public	  intellectuals	  and	  statesman	  like	  Hubert	  Humphrey	  and	  Abraham	  
Heschel,	  that	  the	  analysis	  of	  Niebuhr’s	  thought	  that	  can	  evade	  closing	  with	  them	  is	  a	  rare	  
feat.	  It	  is	  my	  opinion	  that	  Niebuhr	  himself	  would	  not	  have	  approved	  any	  of	  the	  more	  
famous	  eulogies,	  but	  would	  have	  only	  signed	  off	  on	  Roger	  Shinn’s,	  which	  began	  with	  a	  
biblical	  passage	  from	  Ezekiel:	  “And	  whether	  they	  hear	  or	  refuse	  to	  hear…	  they	  will	  know	  
that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  prophet	  among	  them”	  (3:5).	  Shinn	  continued:	  	  “As	  we	  celebrate	  the	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life	  and	  mourn	  the	  death	  of	  Reinhold	  Niebuhr,	  the	  ancient	  words	  ring	  in	  our	  ears.	  We	  know	  
that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  prophet	  among	  us.	  Not	  that	  he	  claimed	  the	  gift	  of	  prophecy.	  He,	  who	  
knew	  so	  well	  the	  fallibility	  of	  men,	  brushed	  off	  flattery.	  His	  style	  was	  to	  risk	  many	  a	  
judgment	  for	  which	  we	  would	  never	  claim	  the	  rubric,	  ‘Thus	  saith	  the	  Lord.’	  Often	  he	  stated	  
his	  new	  insights	  by	  criticizing	  his	  past	  errors.	  Niebuhr	  united	  flashing	  polemic	  and	  
profound	  piety,	  scintillating	  wit	  and	  awed	  reverence,	  spectacular	  intellect	  and	  deep	  
feeling…	  He	  put	  theology	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  world,	  as	  it	  had	  not	  been	  
for	  generations.	  He	  taught	  the	  meaning	  of	  sin	  and	  forgiveness	  for	  massive	  institutional	  
behavior	  as	  well	  as	  for	  personal	  life.”	  What	  more	  was	  Shinn	  noting	  of	  Niebuhr,	  than	  that	  he	  
embodied	  both	  prophet	  and	  priest?	  Both	  Justice	  and	  Love?	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